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Preface 
The past two decades have witnessed a historiographical debate 
over the nature of Populism in which participants on each side 
have made facile judgments based on inconclusive evidence and 
incomplete research. Historians have carried on their debate largely 
apart from the political history of the period, and their analyses 
of Populism have suffered accordingly, with basic questions about 
the movement remaining unanswered, indeed unasked. Both his-
torical friends and critics of Populism have failed in the most 
elemental task of identifying their protagonists, and they have vir-
tually ignored the time dimension in arguing that Populists believed 
this, or that Populism represented that. Although the life of the 
People's party was quite short, the party and its adherents changed 
remarkably during that time, and no exposition on the nature of 
Populism which fails to account for this will add to our under-
standing. 
The purpose of this book is to examine precisely those changes 
that Populism experienced as it confronted American politics and 
society in the 1890s. I employ several methods of historical analysis, 
including quantitative techniques in addition to more traditional 
methodology, and I examine Populism at the personal, local, state, 
and national levels in an effort to review fully the transformation 
of the movement. Thus, although my study is broadly biographical, 
xii Preface 
I focus on William Alfred Peffer primarily to illustrate the changes 
within Populism. For this purpose, his career is unequaled: his 
six-year term in the United States Senate coincided exactly with 
the generally recognized birth and death dates of Populism; and 
with good reason, for he carried the title "Father of Populism" and 
was the foremost public representative of the movement in the 
1890s, though historians have since neglected him. But Peffer 
merely illustrates the more important problems considered, and 
consequently much of this book finds him only distantly involved 
personally. I closely investigate the Populist politics of Kansas, for 
example, in order to suggest reasons for changes, decisions, and 
policy distinctions at the national level, though Peffer usually 
avoided any direct intervention in state politics at that time. 
The essence of Populism was that it was a political movement, 
and the essence of the People's party was that it was a political 
party. This study is therefore primarily political history, and I 
treat the issues that have bedeviled other historians primarily only 
insofar as they operated politically. There are of course some re-
flections on the interpretive debate, but I hope that the larger work 
of tracing the metamorphosis of the movement will itself provide a 
better clue to the problem of Populism in America. 
I am indebted to many people for many things. The late Professor 
George L. Anderson of the University of Kansas first aroused my 
interest in Populism and continued thereafter to encourage my 
work. Professor Gwen S. Argersinger of the University of New 
Mexico contributed immeasurably her time, assistance, and knowl-
edge in both the researching and writing of this study. Professor 
Allan G. Bogue of the University of Wisconsin directed the disserta-
tion on which this book is based and provided valuable advice and 
suggestions. Professor James D. Norris of the University of Missouri 
at St. Louis gave me reassuring advice and consistent support when 
I began this study. Professor David P. Thelen of the University of 
Missouri at Columbia gave an earlier form of the manuscript a 
critical reading and contributed many valuable comments and sug-
gestions. The staffs of many fine institutions, especially the Kansas 
State Historical Society and the State Historical Society of Wiscon-
sin, were helpful in a variety of ways. Portions of Chapter 2 
Preface xiii 
originally appeared in the Kansas Historical Quarterly, and per-
mission to incorporate this material is gratefully acknowledged. My 
wife, Jo Ann Eady Argersinger, devoted her time, patience, and 
encouragement to the completion of this work and improved it in 
both style and substance. If, despite all this assistance, errors still 
persist, they are entirely mine and deservedly so. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Farmers and Politics 
FROM THEIR very beginnings, Kansas and the Republican party 
were inextricably related. The difficulties of the territorial years, 
the struggle of the Civil War, and the postwar influx of Union 
veterans sustained their mutual attraction. As a one-party state, 
however, Kansas still witnessed the political turmoil of the 1860s 
and 1870s, for all political positions found representation within an 
active Republican party. The state GOP, with its flexibility and 
responsiveness, largely controlled those reform impulses that cul-
minated in Populism in the 1890s. Independent parties existed, but 
even during the economic collapse of the 1870s most reformers 
found it more convenient and productive to seek change within 
the existing party structure rather than through a third party. 
William Alfred Peffer fit the pattern of these cautious reformers. 
Born into a distinctive rural society in Pennsylvania in 1831, Peffer 
inherited an enduring belief in the classical virtues and values of 
an agrarian way of life. A temperance and antislavery agitator in 
his youth, he then settled in Indiana where he farmed and helped 
organize the Republican party locally in 1854. Following the Panic 
of 1857 he moved to Missouri only to flee in 1861 because of his 
Unionist sentiments and to join the Eighty-third Illinois Infantry. 
He served in Tennessee as a foot soldier, quartermaster, and judge 
advocate, which provided his enduring title, "Judge" Peffer. His 
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liberal racial and political attitudes necessitated a postwar depar-
ture from Tennessee and in 1870 he settled in Kansas as an editor 
and lawyer. An active local reformer, Peffer nevertheless refused to 
break with the GOP in 1872 over the issue of political reform, 
insisting that greater reform and more reliable candidates were 
available through regular action. In 1874-1875, a period of drought 
and depression, Peffer worked as a Republican state senator to 
produce an effective political response to the troubles of destitute 
farmers and burdened town-dwellers. He scorned the Independent 
Reform party of those years as composed of shysters and charlatans 
whose reform interests involved only personal aggrandizement 
through an irresponsible indifference to public needs. Having suf-
fered in the past for his Republicanism, Peffer was unwilling to 
leave his party voluntarily during hard times and little sympathized 
with those who did.t 
Other Republicans were less demanding and not inclined to pun-
ish errant party members provided they returned quickly to the 
fold. Samuel N. Wood, a Chase County Republican, supported 
Horace Greeley in 1872 and campaigned in 1875 on the Reform 
ticket; in 1876 he was elected to the legislature as a Republican, 
and his party colleagues then elected him Speaker of the House. As 
Republicans were ready to accept, moreover, they were equally 
prepared to expel in order to maintain the character of their party. 
Throughout the 1870s the party struggled to free itself of charges 
of corruption and dictation, and whole campaigns revolved about 
the intraparty defeat of powerful politicians, only the most spec-
tacular being the elimination of Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy for 
John J. Ingalls in 1873.2 
Receptive to new ideas as well as to new men, the Republican 
party in Kansas in the 1870s often seemed as reformist as third 
parties. Railroad regulation, antimonopoly, and free silver planks 
commonly appeared in GOP platforms, and in 1878 the party even 
agreed with the Greenbackers that national bank notes should be 
retired in favor of the issuance of paper money. Republicans re-
t Peter H. Argersinger, "William Alfred Peffer: The Early Years" (Master's 
thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1966). 
2 Directory of the State Government of Kansas (Topeka, 1877), pp. 83-84; James 
C. Malin, A Concern about Humanity: Notes on Reform, 1872-1912 (Lawrence, 
Kans., 1964), pp. 19-20. 
Farmers and Politics 3 
vealed their concern for reform tendencies most clearly in their 
l8i6 state platform which described the GOP as "the surest hope 
of reform" and invited the cooperation of all "to whom 'Reform' 
is something more than an empty name." Under such circumstances, 
sincere reformers had little difficulty in reconciling their advocacy 
of change with their affiliation with the dominant party.3 
By the end of the decade, however, the GOP began to turn from 
its willingness to tolerate diversity and became increasingly less 
flexible, questioning less and accepting more readily the status quo. 
The margin of Republican victory had constantly decreased since 
statehood, and apprehensive party leaders sought to stabilize the 
existing partisan alignment. Party regularity became the watch-
word of influential bosses such as Cy Leland and Samuel J. Craw-
ford who rewarded politicians and electorates to the extent that 
they performed as directed. These professional leaders controlled 
conventions and had their slates of compliant candidates duly nom-
inated without objection. They tolerated no independent action 
and opposed reform as symptomatic of irregularity and a portent 
of party defeat. To retain popular support they also constricted the 
scope of political discussion and introduced no real new issue into 
public debate after 1880. Emphasis upon bloody-shirt prejudices 
and the tariff increasingly dominated the political arena to the 
exclusion of the open-ended discussions of the past. Senator Ingalls, 
more eager for easy notoriety than for the necessary work his 
position required, became the nation's leading Democrat-baiter and 
helped turn his state party to a policy of waving the bloody shirt as a 
reflexive not reflective response to political challenge. With similar 
passion after the enactment of prohibition in 1881, party leaders 
made support for its enforcement the defining characteristic of a 
Republican. This dependence upon sectional and cultural prej-
udices as determining party lines kept the Democrats a despised 
minority, unable to mount an effective opposition, but for the GOP 
it was security only through stultification and servility.4 
The economic boom that struck Kansas in the early 1880s brought 
3 Malin, Concern about Humanity, p. 22. 
4 Raymond C. Miller, "The Populist Party in Kansas" (Ph.D. diss., University 
of Chicago, 1928), pp. 41-45; American Non-Conformist (Winfield, Kans.), May 31, 
1888, April 18, 1889; Malin, Concern about Humanity, p. 26; Burton J. Williams, 
Senator john ]ames Ingalls (Lawrence, Kans., 1972), pp. 72, 101, 119, 122. 
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further pressures upon the Republican party. One paruopant 
explained the cumulative efiect of the boom psychology: "Most 
of us crossed the Mississippi or the Missouri with no money, but 
with vast wealth of hope. . . . Haste to get rich has made us 
borrowers, and the borrower has made booms, and booms made 
men wild, and Kansas became a vast insane asylum covering 80,000 
square miles." But this description benefited from hindsight. Dur-
ing the boom years, Kansans gave full rein to those who viewed 
government as an agency for the stimulation of private wealth and 
personal power. Republican leadership became first the spokesmen 
and then the puppets of business enterprise and, assuring the public 
of an increasing and endless prosperity, they promoted and pursued 
the compelling material vision that an untrammeled business society 
promised. Fearful of antagonizing the goddess of commerce and 
her handmaiden, credit, and thereby checking the state's economic 
development, Republican leaders failed to respond to unfolding 
abuses and disorders and ignored alternative proposals. As they 
muffled criticism of the course of the state's economic development, 
it too became part of Republican orthodoxy. Those who questioned 
the wisdom of public funding for railroads and other private enter-
prises, of grand schemes and overexpansion, were denounced as 
impediments to progress and gradually forced out of the GOP. 
Sam Wood again left the party, this time for good; Peter Percival 
Elder, former lieutenant governor and Speaker of the House, fol-
lowed, as many of the reform Republicans of the 1870s joined the 
independent third-party movements. The more such men left the 
party, the less responsive to popular needs and new issues it became, 
and the smaller became the possibility of substantive reform through 
the Republican party.5 
There remained some Republicans still committed to both reform 
and their party, however, and among these ·william A. Peffer was 
perhaps the most important and influential. In 1881 he became the 
editor of the Topeka Kansas Farmer, the state's foremost agricul-
tural journal and circulation leader among papers of any type, 
and thereby assumed a natural leadership of those who objected to 
5 See James C. Carey, "People, Problems, Prohibition, Politicos, and Politics, 
1870-1890," in Kansas: The First Century, ed. John D. Bright, 4 vols. (New York, 
1956), J: passim; 0. Gene Clanton, Kansas Populism: Ideas and }l,fen (Lawrence, 
Kans., 1969), pp. 22-27, 30-31; Miller, "Populist Party in Kansas," p. 22. 
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the party commitment to business enterprise. The agrarian tra-
dition offered a useful alternative to the commercial values that 
seemed to distort society, and by reaffirming the basic importance 
of agrarian ideals Peffer hoped to bring the developing industrial-
ism into harmony with traditional democratic values. He firmly 
believed in the necessity of establishing popular control over the 
commercial and industrial system to insure a political democracy, 
and he considered the Republican party the only practical vehicle 
for such reform hopes. 
To argue the economic validity of the specific complaints of the 
discontented agrarians of the time ignores the basic point they 
were trying to make. Essential to each grievance was the charge of 
the misuse of public power and the exclusion of agrarian repre-
sentation. The complaints about financial oppression led directly 
into the accusation of power as the agrarians probed the relation-
ship between economic might and political influence. As much as 
anyone, Peffer helped frame the farmers' critique: 
The government's land policies fostered monopoly and privileged wealth 
by encouraging "the rapid absorption of public lands by corporations" 
rather than promoting democratic settlement by actual "poor farmers." 
A system of taxation upon real property discriminated against the 
agricultural classes in favor of those "that deal in stocks and bonds and 
money," while it also provided special exemptions and light assessments 
for railroads. 
The banking laws promoted urban, commercial interests rather than 
rural, agricultural interests and enabled the wealthy "to dictate the amount 
of money the people may use" by creating an unnecessary intermediary 
between the people and their government in the issuance of money. 
The government's financial policies benefited the creditor classes 
through currency contraction while the people at large thereby suffered 
from appreciated interest charges and depreciated values of property 
and produce. 
Tariff laws injured farmers by forcing them to sell in a free market and 
buy in a protected one, designed to benefit industrialists "to the extent 
that they ask it." 
As for interest rates, usury penalties, and foreclosure provisions, "cred-
itors have had the laws their own way a long time," resulting in a system 
designed to benefit the lender not the borrower.6 
6 Kansas Farmer (Topeka), November l, 1882, November 19, December 3, 1884, 
December 15, 1886, January 12, November 24, December 1, 1887, January 17, 
October 2, 1889. 
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A correlative principle of this system that operated so consistently 
against agrarian interests was the farmers' inability to use the gov-
ernment to remedy such abuses or to gain advantages for themselves. 
Peffer and the Kansas farmers watched helplessly, for example, as 
a bill to reduce legal interest rates was referred to a committee 
composed entirely of bankers that unanimously recommended in-
definite postponement. Nor were they able to secure effective rail-
road regulation from a legislature that held itself "in readiness to 
do . . . service" for the railroads, as one legislator phrased it, in 
exchange for free passes and other favors. 7 Their attempt, however, 
well illustrated the plight of agrarian reformers in the 1880s. 
As editor of the Kansas Farmer, Peffer led the agrarian outcry 
against railroad combinations and rate discrimination and manip-
ulation as cheating farmers in "a most gigantic robbery." Despite 
the language, it was clear that Peffer was more interested in political 
justice than simple economic reform. Indeed, he complained more 
of the arbitrary and unrestricted power of the railroads and their 
potential for oppression than of excessive tolls in themselves. The 
issue, he believed, was whether corporations or people were to be 
represented in the government. Insisting that the people were 
sovereign, Peffer urged farmers to "compel your party leaders to 
listen to your appeal, or put them behind you and take the reins 
into your own hands." He outlined what was needed: the destruc· 
tion of railroads' independent power of discriminations, the effective 
prohibition of pools and other combinations, public participation 
in establishing rate scales, and the exposure of "respectable, chris-
tianized robbers." He specifically opposed the appointment of rail· 
road commissioners merely to oversee the carriers, for "railroad 
commissioners amount to no more than a clerical force of respect-
ability to make reports to the legislature." Peffer forced reluctant 
candidates of all parties to declare themselves in favor of railroad 
regulation and was instrumental in having the GOP make it a 
principal platform plank in 1882.8 
Success in the campaign was more than balanced by frustrations 
7 American Non-Conformist (Winfield), March 24, 1887; Topeka Daily Capital, 
January 22, 1887; Joel Moody to 0. E. Learnard, January 28, 1885, in 0. E. 
Learnard Papers, Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas. 
s Kansas Farmer, .June 7, July 26, September 6, 27, 1882, January 3, 1883; 
Topeka Daily Capital, August 7, 9, 11, 1882. 
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m the legislature. Despite their campaign pledges, the legislators 
refused to approve any fundamental regulation and enacted instead 
a weak bill allowing the railroads to set their own rates and ap-
pointing railroad commissioners with advisory power only. As a 
spokesman for Cy Leland later admitted, "Republican legislatures 
of Kansas simply obeyed the orders of the railroad companies. The 
Railroad and other committees were made up largely of railroad 
attorneys. Nothing could be done without the consent of the rail-
road companies. The Railroad Commissioner law, that is supposed 
to be for the purpose of maintaining justice between the people 
and the railroads, was really got up by the attorneys of railroad 
companies, in order to ward off the enactment of laws regulating 
freight rates."9 
Peffer recognized at once the nature and purpose of the law. He 
railed that "the people's cause has been surrendered," assailed the 
legislature for fathering "this miserable mixture of meaningless 
sections," and urged farmers to remember their betrayal at the next 
election. Even that was fruitless, for many less perceptive Kansans 
welcomed the law while at the next election, as Peffer explained at 
another time, the politicians would simply deal "in generalities 
about the iniquities of other parties, the pauperism of other nations, 
and the barbarism of past ages" rather than responding "to matters 
in which their constituents are most directly and most vitally inter-
ested." Even a regular Republican described his party's policy as 
to pass partisan legislation and then "pound on the side of an 
empty barrel."10 
Thus the primary agrarian objection became directed against the 
association between politicians and business interests and the meth-
ods used by each, for, as Peffer wrote, "these things mean the still 
further concentration of power that comes from concentrated wealth 
and political influence." The question ignored in such an arrange-
ment, he declared, was "what of the people's side?" To assure that 
the people's side would be considered, Peffer wanted to encourage 
popular participation in a political system made more directly 
9 Weekly Kansas Chief (Troy), December 31, 1896; Senate Journal: Proceedings 
of the Senate of the State of Kansas. Third Biennial Session (Topeka, 1883), pp. 
431-45, 627-38. 
10 Kansas Farmer, March 7, 14, November 7, 1883, June 6, 1889; Malin, Con· 
cern about Humanity, p. 33. 
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responsive to the wishes and needs of the majority of the people, 
which, in an agricultural society, meant farmers. 11 
Peffer began his career on the Kansas Farmer with a series of 
editorials on "Farmers and Politics." As the largest and only essen-
tial class in society, he argued, farmers should be actively involved 
in the direction of society. But instead "they are in the meshes of 
the bosses and managers, and they are not ignorant of the vicious 
methods used by those fellows in manipulating party machinery." 
Denouncing this passivity, Peffer urged farmers to organize them-
selves, for acting together they could control politics and thereby 
correct social and economic abuses as well. "They could purify 
politics, and then the way would be clear for permanent reform." 
Peffer's concern for local self-action reflected his democratic instincts 
that the people should participate in social and political decisions, 
but it had an awkward corollary. Arguing that organization could 
be successful only if the people and not the politicians arranged 
it, and that "the people will never be ready until their reason is 
convinced that such organization is necessary," Peffer was placed 
in the position of instructing those who were to lead. The essential 
precariousness of such a situation troubled him for nearly a decade 
and left him, alternately, ahead of and then behind the developing 
consciousness and capacity of Kansas farmers for independent 
action.12 
To convince the farmers, Peffer pointed out abuses of social, eco-
nomic, and political power in state and nation and campaigned for 
reforms in the farmers' interest, thereby increasingly attracting a 
general agrarian support for his larger plan. To remedy those 
abuses required organization, and thus throughout the 1880s Peffer's 
reform agitation and farmers' organization proceeded apace. By 
the end of the decade the two would carefully coincide to explode 
into Populism. 
Peffer early broached the subject of general political reform in 
such didactic editorials as "How to Oppose Monopolies." His ob-
jective was to create an effectively democratic society, with public 
restraints on arbitrary private power in those areas where the in-
dividual was virtually defenseless. Here he added to the previous 
11 Kansas Farmer, May 17, 1882, September 29, 1887. 
12 Ibid., November 2, 16, December 28, 1881, February 8, 1882. 
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agrarian grievances demands for government action against trusts, 
fraudulent insurance companies, and speculative trading in grain 
options and futures.13 
The ultimate answer, however, was for farmers themselves to 
enter politics. Especially, then, did Peffer seek to promote the 
creation of a strong agrarian organization which would replace 
impotence and frustration with political and economic power for 
farmers. He applauded both the Grange and the National (or 
Northern) Farmers' Alliance but considered them limited in both 
numbers and outlook and lacking the vigor required to advance 
the farmers' interests and political power. He therefore personally 
attempted to establish a more effective league of farmers. In 1882 
Peffer suggested the formation of a Kansas Farmers' Association to 
oversee the legislature in its railroad regulation efforts. In 1884 he 
proposed holding annual farmers' conventions to "exert a good 
influence over political conventions and party candidates." In 1885 
he recommended the creation of a state association of farmers to 
go beyond the Grange and Alliance and to protect "farmers' inter-
ests in their relation to business and government." In 1887 he once 
more advanced his plan for a statewide organization which would 
purify politics and give agricultural regions the control of their 
own affairs.14 
This very persistence indicates Peffer's lack of success. The con-
ditions he attached to his own proposals may have worked against 
their implementation as much as agrarian alienation and apathy. 
While advocating reforms which required political control and 
encouraging organization to engage in politics, Peffer constantly 
urged that all activity be nonpartisan. To be nonpartisan in Kansas 
was to be Republican, and Peffer wanted reform activity kept within 
party lines. Accordingly he described his proposed 1882 association 
as one that "would deal with subjects only, not with parties"; his 
1884 conventions as political but "in no sense partisan"; his 1885 
association as "wholly free from party politics"; his 1887 organiza-
tion as a pressure group only.15 
13 Ibid., May 24, 31, November 16, 1881, July 30, 1884, February 23, June 23, 
1887. 
14 Ibid., November 15, 1882, October I, 1884, March 18, 1885, December 15, 
1887. 
15 Ibid. 
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Peffer believed an avoidance of partisan activity would promote 
more effective organizations by allowing farmers to act together 
"without being subjected to party discipline or to suspicions of 
treason to their particular political party." Frequently the Farmer's 
readers, however, pursued Peffer's own arguments to their logical 
ends while he refrained. All too often Republican leaders either 
had ignored or scorned his reform efforts or when forced to commit 
themselves, as in 1882, had afterwards violated their campaign 
pledges. The more daring of his readers implored Peffer to support 
third-party action or write-in campaigns directed against those reg-
ular candidates who rejected his reform program. One correspon-
dent criticized Peffer's aversion toward an independent farmers' 
party and declared, "We have the voters; we can make our strength 
felt if we are only supported by the 'old reliable' Kansas Farmer."16 
The Farmer's editor responded that at the very least such a move-
ment was premature, but even more fateful for its chances of 
success in Peffer's eyes was the strength of party bonds. Describing 
party loyalties as second only to patriotism in emotional intensity, 
he asked his questioner to "look at the men in your own vicinity 
that have dared the old parties, and note their apparent seclusion. 
Such is the prejudice in this matter that these men are covered 
with opprobrium, and made to endure insult, suspicion, and some-
times even violence." Rather than organize a new party, Peffer 
concluded, the farmers could accomplish more by "taking hold of 
the old ones and cleaning them out."17 
As much as any Republican, Peffer felt personally the prejudices 
from the Civil War along partisan lines, and he especially abhorred 
those who opposed prohibition in Kansas. Clearly he wanted to 
work within the party to which he had given his allegiance since its 
founding and which had rewarded him with recognition and respect. 
Nevertheless, Peffer refused to rule out categorically the possibility 
of his renunciation of the party if it failed to meet his standards. 
It would be, he believed, more a case of being forced from a party 
that rejected his principles than of leaving voluntarily. As often 
as he declaimed against third-party action, then, Peffer added the 
important qualification: Having organized thoroughly, if the farm-
16 Ibid., July 5, August 9, November 15, 1882, January 26, 1887, July 26, 1888. 
17 Ibid., December 28, 1881, January 18, February 1, March 22, 1882. 
Farmers and Politics 11 
ers "cannot then control existing political parties which they have 
aided and supported willingly so long, they must cut themselves 
loose from all parties and organize one that they can control." "The 
important matter," he concluded, "is not the maintenance of polit-
ical parties, but the redress of wrongs."1S 
The economic condition of Kansas farmers largely dictated their 
response to such calls for reform crusades. The fantastic boom of 
the early and mid-1880s with its good weather, large crops, high 
prices, rapid land-value appreciation, and blind confidence in the 
future made farmers oblivious to the calls of Cassandras such as 
Peffer. But such prosperity was bought by mortgaging their future, 
and when the mortgage came due in times of drought, poor crops, 
low prices, plummeting land values, and despair, they were ready 
to listen and learn. 
The collapse of the boom came in the winter of 1887-1888 when 
signs of poor weather, falling crop prices, and a general slowdown 
in development interacted to break that confidence which had in-
creasingly become the primary foundation of the boom. Artificially 
stimulated and maintained by public bond issues and private mort-
gages to increase land values over those actually warranted, the 
boom left in its wake a state burdened with an overwhelming debt, 
both public and private. The public debt increased during the 
decade from $15 million to $41 million, the largest increase in the 
nation and, excluding four sparsely populated far western states, 
the largest per capita public debt. The per capita private debt was 
nearly four times that of the nation as a whole. Sixty percent of the 
taxed acres were mortgaged, a figure unmatched by any other state. 
The state auditor reported the assessed value of all property in 
Kansas at $348,459,943 against a total indebtedness of $706,181,627. 
The collapse of land values left many farms mortgaged for more 
than their adjusted worth, and the drop in prices further lowered 
farm values while requiring an increasing amount of the farmer's 
products to pay his debts.19 
18 Ibid., January 11, February I, 1882. 
19 Raymond C. Miller, "The Background of Populism in Kansas," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 11 (March 1925): 469-89; W. P. Harrington, "The 
Populist Party in Kansas," Collections of the Kansas State Historical Society 
(Topeka, 1925), 16: 407-8. 
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Shaken from their apathy, Kansas farmers moved toward organiza-
tion. The dormant Northern Alliance revived and, with nearly 700 
local charters, in August 1888 formed a State Alliance which selected 
the Kansas Farmer as its official paper. Peffer also encouraged the 
new Southern Alliance and other minor farm groups. Still others 
joined Peffer in his campaign for political consideration for agrarian 
interests. In particular, the onset of hard times prompted the re-
establishment of an independent political party, whose leaders 
believed that the Republicans, having proudly claimed responsi-
bility for prosperity, could not escape liability for the calamity that 
had overtaken Kansas when the boom turned to bust. The spokes-
men of this Union Labor party made the state's mortgage indebted-
ness a major focus of their effort to break old party political 
dominance and thereby turned the issue into a partisan one. The 
Kirwin Independent, for example, as early as April 1888 reprinted 
advertisements revealing Senators John J. Ingalls and Preston B. 
Plumb as officers of major financial firms and then declared, "These 
are the sort of men who make laws for Kansas farmers. Result-
Two-thirds of the farms of the state under mortgage. Remedy-Let 
farmers stop trusting usurers to make laws."20 
Such appeals had their natural constituency and together with the 
demands of agrarian Republicans such as Peffer alerted the GOP 
to the necessity of an accommodation with the hitherto ignored 
demands for change. State senator C. H. Kimball urged the party 
to steal the reformist thunder from the partisan storm. Prior to the 
Republican state convention, Kimball issued a circular letter to 
all delegates advising, in view of the rapid growth of the Union 
Labor party, the adoption of a platform pledged to reduce legal 
interest rates and provide stronger penalties for usury. Other Re-
publicans applauded Kimball's efforts for their political value to 
the party: "It does certainly seem that there is a great opportunity 
here to prevent the Union Laborites from gaining very many Re-
publican votes by the insertion of such a plank."21 
Thus inspired, the Republicans adopted Kimball's planks and 
then added others demanding remedial labor legislation, destruction 
20 Kansas Farmer, June 7, July 5, August 9, October 18, 1888; Girard Herald, 
April 19, 1888. 
21 Topeka Daily Commonwealth, July 25, 1888; Girard Herald, August 17, 1888. 
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of the dressed beef trust, and protection for farmers from excessive 
railroad charges. The convention refused to be stampeded, however, 
and the mildly reformist agrarian ticket headed by A. W. "Farmer" 
Smith for governor lost to a more conservative one led by Lyman 
U. Humphrey, an Independence banker. The progressive platform 
provoked conservative criticism, but Peffer warmly defended it 
while other Republicans praised it more for its potential political 
appeal than as an earnest program to be followed. One of these 
described Kimball's convention success as "only another evidence 
of the fact that no Republican need leave his party for the purpose 
of accomplishing any needed reform." If any voters still wavered, 
the Republican Topeka Commonwealth assured them that the 
platform "amounts to an instruction from the party to each Re-
publican member of the next legislature to favor the proposed 
legislation."22 
Peffer had been pressured to help form the new party but had 
insisted the effort should be to make existing parties "more respon-
sive to the people's wishes." The Republican platform now rein-
forced his belief that reform could be accomplished more effectively 
through the existing party structure than by starting out anew. 
Despite his Republicanism, however, his personal position did not 
dictate great hostility to the Union Labor party, which had declared 
itself not only for interest reduction but also for programs dealing 
with other issues he had consistently advocated in the Farmer. 
Accordingly, Peffer expressed his respect for and confidence in P. P. 
Elder, the Union Labor gubernatorial candidate, and encouraged 
local voters to select the best man for legislator, regardless of polit-
ical affiliations, declaring that "the interests of the people are far 
above the interests of a party."23 
The Union Laborites, in turn, often accepted Peffer as one of 
their own in principle if not in political practice. John Davis, 
venerable reformer and editor of the ]unction City Tribune, often 
cooperated with Peffer despite their partisan differences, while 
Elder praised Peffer's editorial positions and the Farmer's influence. 
Other third-party men commended Peffer's stands, and one sent 
22 Topeka Daily Commonwealth, July 27, August 3, 1888; Kansas Farmer, 
September 20, 1888. 
23 Kansas Farmer, July 26, August 16, October 4, 1888. 
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him a copy of a Union Labor platform, asking for his opinion of 
it. Peffer responded that he "heartily" endorsed "almost every 
word" of the detailed, radical document and in fact mentioned no 
disagreement. Union Labor newspapers in the 1888 campaign 
frequently reprinted Farmer editorials, urging their own readers 
to study them well, and asserted that only the election of Union 
Labor candidates would bring about the conditions advocated 
therein.24 
But if Union Laborites praised Peffer's analysis of existing prob-
lems and his proposed reforms, most of them bitterly arraigned 
his officially nonpartisan approach. His immense influence with the 
state's farmers made his opposition to independent political action 
a deathblow to Union Labor hopes for any significant success. 
Radical newspapers like the Winfield American Non-Conformist 
attacked reformist Republicans such as Peffer and Kinball as hypo-
critical in advocating change through the agency of the GOP, a 
course that they allegedly knew to be self-defeating. Elder, among 
others, early recognized that Peffer's announced nonpartisan posi-
tion on the Farmer often represented merely a defense of the 
Republican party.25 
The dominant party, however, did not require much defense 
after it pledged relief and reform, and it was further aided by the 
ineptness of the Democrats. They were even less equipped to deal 
with the new issues than were the Republicans, and their readiness 
to agree on prohibition and the tariff as the major issues prevented 
their capitalizing on the discontent of the state by encouraging the 
traditional partisan alignment which assured GOP ascendancy. 
More ominous to Republican success was the Union Labor party, 
which interpreted the old-party emphasis upon the tariff as an 
attempt to divert attention from the real issues and which itself 
stressed crop failures, low prices, and mortgage pressure as political 
weapons. Republicans united to condemn such "senseless howls" 
about poverty and mortgages as more injurious to the state's credit 
and economic growth than droughts, grasshoppers, and tornados 
combined. But, as always, the bloody shirt figured most prom-
24 Girard Herald, October 19, 1888: Kansas Farmer, December 8, 15, 1887; 
]unction City Trihune, October 29, 1885. 
~5 Girard Herald, August 17, 1888; Kansas Farmer, October 13, 1887. 
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inently in the Republican campaign. So effectively waved in the 
past that the word "Democrat" itself connoted treason and treachery 
to most Kansas farmers, the bloody-shirt style of campaigning merely 
made it necessary to contend that the Democratic party was the 
beneficiary of the Union Labor movement. This Republican orators 
and papers did with a vengeance, branding the new party as "the 
stub tail of the Democratic dog," and the GOP swept to an awesome 
victory at the polls.26 
Republican success was so complete that the party proudly ac-
claimed Kansas "the banner state" of Republicanism for carrying 
national, state, and local tickets so overwhelmingly. The voters 
placed thirty-nine Republicans in the forty-seat state senate and 
121 Republicans in the 125-member house. Far from repudiating 
the GOP because of economic distress, Kansans had given the party 
its greatest victory. Success in 1888, however, came only by mort-
gaging the party's future, and the debt had to be paid in January 
1889 when the legislature convened. The voters had granted 
another chance to the dominant party when it promised considera-
tion of agrarian interests and matters of popular concern, when it 
promised a readjustment in the distressing economic situation 
without the necessity of seeking redress outside existing political 
organizations. The Union Labor party had been buried in Novem-
ber's ballots, but the issues it had raised remained alive.27 
Judge Peffer was determined to exact legislative compliance with 
the Republican platform, which he regarded as the result of his 
own work through the Kansas Farmer) and he accepted for himself 
the leadership of those similarly inclined. He emphasized in De-
cember 1888 that the Farmer had a circulation of four times that 
of its nearest rival and that it peculiarly voiced agrarian opinion in 
politics as well as in agriculture. With "an army of toilers" behind 
him, Peffer confidently prepared to place his program before the 
legislature. That program included demands for legislation relat-
ing to railroad regulation, prohibition of the beef combine, radical 
reformation of taxation to redistribute tax burdens, and the general 
land and mortgage problem. This last formed the crux of the 
26 Atchison Daily Champion, September 26, 28, October 2, 9, 24, 1888; American 
Non-Conformist (Winfield), February 23, 1888. 
27 Atchison Daily Champion, November 17, 1888, February 19, 1889. 
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agrarian economic program and embraced interest-rate reduction, 
prohibition of alien land ownership, and a redemption law.2s 
In proposing these measures, Peffer expanded the reform demand 
upon the legislature from that imposed by the 1888 Republican 
state convention. Yet, as soon as the ballots were counted, many 
Republicans were prepared to renege on those campaign promises. 
The Hutchinson News, for instance, declared that the party plat-
form was for the campaign, not the legislature. The Kansas City 
Gazette agreed, announcing that the platform was never intended 
to be enacted into law but was only "a little sop thrown to a half 
dozen who were howling so loud as to make everybody believe the 
woods were full of howlers." The state's leading Republican paper, 
the Topeka Capital, concluded that enacting the party's platform 
"would put Kansas back seventy-five years." Liberal Republican 
newspapers such as the Atchison Champion and the Emporia Re-
publican vigorously disagreed, writing that "party principle is party 
law" and that the party "is morally bound to make such changes 
in the present law as are demanded by the explicit declarations" of 
the platform. Even these papers, however, shrank from Peffer's 
proposed redemption law as inexpedient, admitting the need for 
popular relief but unwilling to support positive government action 
to that end.29 
The farmers of Kansas, however, generally supported Peffer's 
program. The alliances endorsed it, most farm papers seconded 
it, and various ad hoc groups resolved in its favor. Peffer him-
self called a convention of farmers to meet in Topeka to press 
for relief measures when the legislature convened. The virtual 
unanimity of agrarian spokesmen and organizations for the various 
proposals made it clear that the legislative response would reveal 
the actual influence of farmers in Kansas.30 
The disposition of the legislature was soon evident. When the 
outgoing governor urged the enactment of the Republican cam-
paign pledges, conservative legislators protested and even opposed 
the printing of the governor's message. Though numerous bills 
28 Kansas Farmer, December 6, 27, 1888, January 24, 31, 1889. 
29 Atchison Daily Champion, December 20, 28, 29, 1888, January 23, February 
13, 1889. 
30 Kansas Farmer, January 3, February 14, 1889; Atchison Daily Champion, 
December 12, 1888; Miller, "Populist Party in Kansas," pp. 72-73. 
Farmers and Politics 17 
were introduced embodying the reform proposals they were usually 
referred to the conservative Senate Judiciary Committee. This 
committee in particular and the senate in general throughout the 
legislative session prevented the enactment of meaningful financial 
reforms.31 
The financial interests of Kansas counted on just such a per-
formance. Alarmed by the public demand for changes in the 
interest and mortgage laws, many bankers spoke out against the 
recommendations, and representatives of various loan companies 
organized "to take such steps as . . . necessary" to protect their 
interests. The loan agents generally believed, one of them wrote 
privately, that they "can defeat almost any adverse legislation in 
the senate-it only remains to determine what is most advisable to 
encourage or what to defeat."32 With expected results, the loan 
agencies promptly threw their influence against what they termed 
"granger legislation." A moderate bill deferring the time in which 
a mortgage could be foreclosed, for example, was "vigorously as-
sailed" by the senate, wrote one newspaper correspondent. One 
senator read on the floor a letter from a loan agency announcing 
that it would refrain from lending money in Kansas while the 
bill was pending. Having already tabled by a vote of 31-2 a resolu-
tion respecting mortgage foreclosure in order "to soothe and allay 
the anxiety of capital," the senate struck out by a three-to-one 
majority the enacting clause of the condemned bill. "The loan 
agency was needlessly alarmed," confirmed the reporter. "There 
never was a day when there was any danger of Senate Bill No. I 
becoming a law. There will be no 'debtor class' legislation at 
this session."33 
As such an outcome became increasingly obvious, Peffer used the 
editorial and correspondence columns of the Farmer to defend the 
farmers' program warmly. Endorsing the agrarian demands as a 
popular attempt to inject "a little justice and mercy" into a system 
31 Senate journal. Proceedings of the Senate of the State of Kansas. Sixth 
Biennial Session (Topeka, 1889), pp. 45-48; Kansas Farmer, February 14, 1889. 
32 Atchison Daily Champion, January 22, 1889; W. J. Patterson to J. B. 
Watkins, January 18, 1889, Patterson to T. B. Sweet, January 18, 1889, J- B. 
Watkins Land Mortgage Company to C. B. Northrup, February 1, 1889, all in 
J. B. Watkins Papers, Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas. 
33 Atchison Daily Champion, February 14, 1889; Senate Journal (1889), pp. 
297-98, 457-58. 
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biased against the farmer, Peffer sharply questioned the politicians 
in a manner that revealed the underlying agrarian complaint. If 
railroads were permitted to reorganize, decrease their interest rates, 
and save their property when in financial distress, why should the 
farmers be refused an equal right? "Is the debtor to lose all, the 
creditor nothing? Are laws for the protection of creditors only? 
. . . Is it not better that the people have opportunity to save 
their homes after paying their debts, rather than that they should 
be turned out homeless? As a matter of public policy, can the State 
afford to pauperize its own people? Is it not the first duty of the 
State to protect its own citizens?"34 
Readers of the Farmer strongly backed Peffer, and he printed 
many of their letters in an effort to influence the legislature by 
countering the lenders' lobby. The letters invariably commended 
and encouraged Peffer, denounced the inaction and infidelity of 
the legislature, and provided examples of usurious or unethical 
practices of local banks and loan agencies. Peffer editorialized on 
such letters that "the people are speaking out in their own inter-
ests. Farmers are getting to be desperately in earnest about these 
things. . . . They expect the present session of the Legislature to 
do something to relieve the people. "35 
The legislature, however, overlooked Peffer's questions, ignored 
the pleas of his readers, and overwhelmingly rejected the agrarian 
reform program. Its members did pass a law in the closing hours 
of the session reducing interest rates as promised but providing no 
effective penalty for usury. One senator declared that he lent 
money at 24 percent and was assured that he could continue to do 
so under the new law. Another senator described the law as a 
victory for the opponents of usury legislation. The legislature re-
jected the redemption bills as unconstitutional; indefinitely post-
poned taxation reform; failed to approve the alien land ownership 
bill; took no action on the promised legislation granting the State 
Board of Railroad Commissioners the authority to prevent rate 
discriminations; and maintained rather than restricted municipal 
authority to vote bonds. In short, Peffer complained, there was "no 
remedial legislation of any kind," a result he blamed on "the 
party leaders and the party press."36 
34 Kansas Farmer, January 17, February 14, 1889. 35 Ibid. 
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Denunciation of the legislature was widespread. Liberal Re-
publican newspapers such as the Atchison Champion, Wichita 
Eagle, and Emporia Republican censured every action of the legis-
lature and arraigned its members as "vicious demagogues and 
corrupt shysters." The Champion argued that the GOP had be-
trayed the people but would not have a chance to do it again. 
These three papers felt such revulsion that they took the lead in 
what they termed a "rebellion" against the leaders of the GOP 
for the next two years. Others would not be so easily satisfied.37 
Individually and in groups farmers expressed their anger and 
discontent even before the session concluded. No one better stated 
the agrarian complaint or made clearer the link between the legis-
lature and the future of Republicanism than did a rustic correspon-
dent of the Farmer: 
No legislative body was ever elected for a more specific purpose than 
this one, and every one of its members swore solemn allegiance to the 
party platform. . . . The people at large believed the platform was 
made in good faith, the candidates pledged themselves to carry it out 
to the letter in good faith, and the people, believing their words, elected 
them with a wonderful majority. . . . [Now the legislature is attempting] 
to fill poor, simple Republican eyes with dust ... [and money lenders 
urge the legislature to] commit a political infamy. '"'ill they prove success-
ful? . . . Our Republicans here, with coats of blue and heads of gray, 
fear they will and are hot with indignation. Their eyes are fixed upon 
Topeka, and woe to the man that sells them out .... If these money-
loaners compass our defeat look out for the future. The air is full of 
lightning.as 
Peffer saw the lightning and feared it, yet he kept the storm 
building. He repeatedly warned politicians that "a day of reckon-
ing is coming" and asserted that if the legislature failed to enact 
what the Republicans had demanded in their platform and the 
voters had endorsed at the polls, the third-party vote would triple 
to 100,000 in 1890. His concern for the GOP, however, was sur-
passed by his fury over the outrageous conduct of the legislature, 
36 Atchison Daily Champion, January 20, February 21, March 3, 6, 7, 16, 1889; 
Kansas Farmer, February 14, 21, 28, October 2, 1889; Senate Journal (1889), 
passim; House Journal. Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the State 
of Kansas. Sixth Biennial Session (Topeka, 1889), passim. 
37 Atchison Daily Champion, February 19, March 6, 7, 16, 1889. 
38 William Kibbe to W. A. Peffer in Kansas Farmer, February 14, 1889. 
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and he wrote so vigorously that the Kansas Farmer was threatened 
with an advertising boycott unless its editor relented. Peffer brushed 
aside the threat and increasingly addressed farmers in person as 
well as through his paper. Speaking to a Farmers' Institute, for 
instance, he arraigned the legislators "for their refusal to give farm-
ers the promised relief from unjust laws." Partially through his 
assistance, the first state convention of the Farmers' Alliance met 
in Topeka in February, and he spoke by special invitation on the 
work necessary to secure the needed legislation in the farmers' 
interests. 39 
The legislative defeat of the agrarian program, however, made a 
mockery of Peffer's advice. The nonpartisan program of the farmer, 
for which Peffer had labored a decade, resulted in total failure. 
The plan had been to capture the GOP for reform, and it had 
apparently succeeded in the campaign of 1888. In the legislature 
of 1889 it at last became clear how the party viewed reform, even 
in mild measures. The demand for the reform laws had been as 
nearly a mass demand of the farmers as any request for decades, 
and it was completely ignored. 
Now Peffer and the farmers confronted a difficult choice: either 
they must abandon their legislative reform program or they must 
undertake positive political action to gain direct participation in 
political parties and genuine representation in lawmaking bodies. 
The agrarian emphasis upon legislative relief was not so much a 
distortion of the predicament of agriculture as it was a simple 
recognition that the political system was responsive to some inter-
ests, that the instruments of public power were directed toward 
satisfying narrow private ends rather than achieving popular de-
mands. Farmers reasoned that a usurpation of political power had 
occurred at the direct expense of the common masses, and private 
corporate wealth had secured control of the legislature, the rail-
road commission, and other political agencies. Nor were the aliena-
tion and suspicion of the agrarians necessarily symptoms of political 
paranoia or conspiracy-mindedness; rather the farmers were realistic 
in their perception that those without economic power were without 
political power as well. It was not economic distress but political 
39 Kansas Farmer, January 31, February 14, 28, 1889; Girard Herald, February 
16, 1889; Topeka Capital-Commonwealth, February 7, 1889. 
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alienation that would cause popular revolt. But depression con-
ditions had provoked among normally apathetic people a height-
ened political consciousness which coincided with the realization of 
their loss of political power. And the revolt would come, for a 
challenge to private power thus entrenched would have to come 
through public power, a political mass movement. Only the most 
radical argued immediately for independent political action while 
most listened to Peffer's summons to more militant agrarian activity 
within the old parties. The final decision between the two courses 
was not yet clear to those like Peffer who clung to partisan tradi-
tions, but it was certain that the political system would be chal-
lenged as never before. 
CHAPTER TWO 
The People's Rebellion 
THE FAILURE of the agrarian reform program in the 1889 Kansas 
legislature revealed the political weakness of the state's farmers and 
encouraged a movement among them to promote their own inter-
ests. William A. Peffer and other agrarian spokesmen had long 
agitated unsuccessfully for thorough agricultural organization, but 
in this period of political frustration exacerbated by deepening 
depression farmers began to organize spontaneously at the grass-
roots level. Farm organizations were not new to Kansas, but they 
had been weak and ineffective, and when Kansas farmers actively 
turned to one in 1889 they joined the militant National Farmers' 
Alliance and Industrial Union. Known better as the Southern 
Alliance to distinguish itself from the less contentious National (or 
Northern) Farmers' Alliance, this organization entered Kansas in 
1888 prepared to mobilize isolated farmers into a cohesive group 
to advance agrarian interests. 
Peffer delightedly welcomed the order, seeing in its spectacular 
growth the promise of rural influence. He began a "Farmers' 
Alliance Notes" column in the Kansas Farmer and then added an 
"Alliance Department." He encouraged the two Alliances to unite 
and applauded their efforts to voice agricultural discontent. He 
promoted the Alliance on the rostrum as well, traveling across 
Kansas with various Alliance officials, including John H. McDowell 
of Tennessee, the national vice president.l 
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Peffer's active support had made his paper the official organ of the 
Northern Alliance, and he hoped that the Southern Alliance would 
similarly recognize the Farmer. McDowell even suggested that it 
might serve as the official paper of the organization in the entire 
West. While many local subordinate alliances resolved in favor 
of the Farmer) however, others supported the Meriden Advocate) 
a militant new paper edited by Dr. Stephen McLallin. As a result 
of this division, the Alliance did not recognize any paper as official, 
although it agreed to use the Farmer for publishing its correspon-
dence.2 
The resistance to Peffer stemmed from his continued opposition 
to independent political action and a fear that his Farmer might 
therefore not be sufficiently aggressive. McLallin and other Al-
liance leaders commended Peffer's analysis of the agrarian problem 
but contended that his hopes for a conversion of the old parties 
were unwarranted and that ultimately a new party would have to 
be formed. "I have little faith," Benjamin Clover, the state pres-
ident of the Southern Alliance, wrote Peffer, "in a politician who 
is 'good' because he is afraid of being kicked out of office." Those 
already committed to third-party action, largely the Union Laborites 
of 1888, also criticized the "Peffer stripe of statesmen" for being 
unwilling to face the realities of the Kansas political situation. "It 
is an axiom," declared one Union Laborite, "that reforms do not 
come in state affairs by consent of those in power; that 'reform 
within a party' is out of the question; but that reforms come through 
new party organizations. . . . Every utterance of the old party 
leaders on the subject of new parties is but a repetition of false 
promises to reform."3 
Both Peffer and McLallin worked to secure favorable nomina-
tions and platforms in the old parties during the off-year election 
campaign of 1889. Their lack of progress by September caused 
McLallin to advocate third-party action. Peffer's plan of non-
partisan, pressure-group politics, McLallin argued, had been tried 
unsuccessfully for years; a new tactic was necessary. He believed 
that reformers could not effectively use the old parties because 
1 Kansas Farmer, March 21, April II, June 6, 27, August 7, October 2, 1889. 
2 Ibid., April 25, May 2, August 21, 1889. 
3 Meriden Advocate, August 24, 1889; Kansas Farmer) June 27, July 31, 1889; 
Girard Herald) September 7, 14, December 28, 1889. 
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memories of the bitter political past prevented former partisan 
enemies from affiliating with existing parties. The creation of a 
new party, therefore, was both logical and necessary. McLallin, 
however, was as far ahead of most alliancemen as he believed Peffer 
lagged behind, and no widespread third-party movement devel-
oped.4 
In some areas alliancemen did attempt to control the Republican 
party, but they were outmaneuvered by party leaders and forced 
to form local independent parties. Few of these achieved any 
measure of success. In Jefferson County, for example, the Repub-
lican convention rejected alliancemen's credentials, denounced their 
political ambitions, and defeated their resolutions by a six-to-one 
margin. The rebuffed alliancemen met hurriedly on the eve of 
the election and nominated an independent ticket over which the 
established Republicans won easily. The uneven entry into partisan 
action imperfectly revealed potential third-party strength, but it 
did alarm some discerning Republicans. "There are not many 
more Democrats than there were last year," observed one, "but 
there is no use undertaking to disguise the fact that the Republican 
discontents are a very numerous and growing body." For the most 
part, however, the off-year elections had little relevance to the 
Alliance program, and few attached great importance to the results.5 
Peffer himself devoted most of his efforts to publicizing the 
agrarian reform position. To explain the discontent he published 
a brief history of agricultural organization in the December issue 
of the Forum under the title "The Farmers' Defensive Movement." 
In this article he discussed the organization and objectives of the 
Alliances, Grange, Farmers' Mutual Benefit Association (FMBA), 
and other rural groups that would seek consolidation in the St. 
Louis convention of December 1889. The origin of this movement, 
he wrote, lay in the powerless position of the individual and the 
injurious activities of railroads, middlemen, and banks, which were 
aggravated by preferential governmental policies. "By reason of his 
isolation and the smallness of his individual business," Peffer de-
clared, "the farmer found himself paying tribute to men and 
4 Meriden Advocate, September 21, October 5, 1889. 
5 Topeka Mail, October 25, November I, 8, 1889; George L. Douglas to L. U. 
Humphrey, November 9, 1889, in Lyman U. Humphrey Papers, Kansas State 
Historical Society, Topeka (hereafter cited as KSHS). 
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corporations who had control of the money and markets of the 
country." It was to redress this imbalance of power that the nation's 
farmers had organized and were "now conducting the greatest 
revolution ever peacefully inaugurated."6 
Remarkably, Peffer scarcely mentioned agrarian political activity 
in this article, but concentrated largely on social and economic 
aspects of organization. Written in October just before the election, 
it suggested his continuing belief in the possibility of reform within 
the existing political alignment, yet in its national outlook it 
revealed how far Peffer and the Kansas farmers had traveled from 
strictly state demands in early 1889. This increasingly national out-
look, moreover, made independent action more likely, for the farm-
ers could not be satisfied with the relief a state could provide, even 
were it willing, a fact emphasized by the resolutions demanding 
congressional action adopted by the St. Louis meeting. 
Accordingly, Peffer turned his attention to the nation's capital 
in December 1889. Declaring that the Kansas Farmer spoke for 
every farmer in the country, he announced that the "time has come 
for action. The people will not consent to wait longer. The present 
Congress must act, and act in good faith. The future is full of 
retribution for delinquents." He then presented a reform program 
for Congress to follow, as he had for the state legislature earlier. 
And while there was a struggle over the course of the farmers' 
movement, McLallin and Clover assented to Peffer's statement of 
principles: the abolition of national banks and the direct govern-
ment issuance of paper money to the people; suppression of trusts 
and combines; railroad regulation; equitable taxation; market reg-
ulations; unlimited gold and silver coinage; tariff reductions; "rigid 
enforcement of public rights in every special corporate franchise"; 
and, most important and basic to all other demands, the acceptance 
of effective popular participation in political decisions.7 
In addition Peffer developed an extraordinary proposal which he 
published as The Way Out. The agrarians had rejected private 
control of money as dangerous and undemocratic, thereby accepting 
the necessity for government control of money and interest rates 
and the direct issuance of money to the people without such inter-
6 Forum 8 (December 1889): 464-73: Kansas Farmer, November 6, 1889. 
7 Kansas Farmer, June 13, December 4, 1889. 
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mediaries as national banks. The remaining problem was to devise 
a method whereby the money could be distributed. Peffer's solu-
tion, and "the way out" of financial troubles, was to allow farmers 
to borrow short-term money on warehouse or elevator receipts at 
3 percent. Government warehouses would be constructed to store 
the security for short-term loans, and government loan bureaus 
would be established to lend money on real estate security.s 
In December 1889 Peffer began to publish The Way Out serially 
in detailed form in the Farmer) and in early 1890 he issued it as a 
booklet. Phenomenally popular, it went through thirteen printings 
in that one year and formed the nucleus of his book, The Farmer's 
Side) published in 1891 as the fundamental Populist economic 
discussion. The Way Out represented the combination of agrarian 
self-interests and monetary reforms; farmers who had rejected in-
flationist ideas in the past were now, under their heavy indebtedness, 
attracted to the ideological position held as central by post-Civil 
War radical political movements. Developed concurrently with, 
yet independently of, the less sweeping subtreasury proposal of 
Charles W. Macune, which it resembled in expanded form, The 
Way Out culminated the popularization of radical financial ideas 
first proposed in 1849 by Edward Kellogg and provided the dis-
contented farmers with a specific plan promising to relieve their 
economic distress.9 
The publication of The Way Out also marked a decisive shift 
in the focus of agrarian reform agitation in Kansas. Arguing that 
only national government action could alleviate the plight of the 
farmers, The Way Out clearly required congressional rather than 
state legislative approval. Peffer continued to agitate for immediate 
state action but only as a tactic to "sustain ourselves until we can 
secure favorable Congressional action." He requested a public 
statement on these matters from every Kansas candidate for national 
office and advised his readers to pledge every candidate to support 
the desired legislation. Kansas congressmen provided no more 
satisfaction than had state legislators. All except Senator Preston 
B. Plumb ignored Peffer's request or replied evasively.10 
s The Way Out (Topeka, Kans., 1890); Kansas Farmer, December 18, 1889. 
9 Kansas Farmer, February 26, March 5, April 16, 1890; Peffer, The Farmer's 
Side (New York, 1891), pp. 272-75. For Edward Kellogg, see Chester McArthur 
Destler, American Radicalism, 1865-1901 (Chicago, 1966), pp. 7-8, 50-77. 
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Peffer was especially concerned about the position of Senator 
John J. Ingalls, the state's leading Republican. Ingalls had declared 
that legislation could not relieve agricultural distress, directly con-
tradicting Peffer's position. Stressing again the agrarian conviction 
that legislation was a sign of political power as much as it might 
be beneficial in itself, Peffer replied sharply: "The Senator knows, 
we assume, that when banks, and railroads and classes on the 
creditor side of the line want legislation, they ask for it and get it." 
Farmers, he continued, had not requested the federal credit strength-
ening act of 1869, the funding act of 1870, the coinage act of 1873, 
the resumption act of 1875. "It must be," Peffer concluded, "that 
our public men do not understand the situation. . . . Relief can 
come only from legislation, and statesmen are blind not to see it. 
Farmers, in self-defense, will employ new agents. The times will 
raise up new statesmen having eyes and ears."11 
In addition to his public request, Peffer also wrote Ingalls 
personally in February 1890 asking him to outline for publication 
his views on the Alliance demands and agricultural relief. Ingalls 
replied that he would make public his opinions on such questions 
later and through a medium other than Peffer's Kansas Farmer. 
Peffer took Ingalls's impolitic reply as a rebuff to the state's farmers 
and reported it in the same issue with an editorial letter from 
"Farmer" advocating the replacement of Ingalls with a farmers' 
candidate in 1891. Peffer was not alone in his dissatisfaction with 
the course of Ingalls. The Union Labor party had denounced him 
in its 1888 state platform, Democrats regarded him as their greatest 
enemy, and several liberal Republican newspapers opposed his 
reelection.12 
Nevertheless, Ingalls represented so completely Kansas Repub-
licanism that Peffer's misgivings exposed a practical modification 
in his stance against partisan activity. Indeed, from the end of 1889, 
Peffer increasingly demanded positive action regardless of partisan 
consequences. In January 1890 he declared, "It is better to be right 
than to belong to a party." In February he cautioned his readers 
against politicians who attempted to divert attention from the real 
10 Kansas Farmer, February 12, 19, 1890. 
11 Ibid., February 5, 1890. 
12 Ibid., February 26, 1890: Topeka Daily Capital, August 30, 1888; Atchison 
Daily Champion, January 21, 1890. 
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issues of political and economic reform to the false questions of the 
tariff and sectional prejudices. Already anticipating the coming 
campaign, he demanded the election only of men pledged to the 
farmers' cause. "No matter about parties; throw party to the winds 
if necessary to success." "We have," he concluded, "gone too far 
to stop."13 
These views alarmed Republican leaders who feared that Peffer 
might commit the influential Farmer to independent action, and 
they attempted to force him back to orthodoxy. The Topeka 
Capital and Fort Scott Monitor, in particular, led the Republican 
attack on Peffer. His widespread speaking tours combined with his 
editorship of the Farmer and his authorship of The Way Out gave 
him a public prominence that enabled his conservative critics to 
accuse him of seeking personal political preference from the farm-
ers' movement, a charge that gained strength from the frequent 
grass-roots suggestions that Peffer should be elected to replace either 
Ingalls or Governor Lyman Humphrey. The criticism soon de-
volved into personal abuse.14 
As the partisan press increased its verbal assault on him, Peffer 
announced that he would not be silenced: "The Kansas Farmer is 
on the side of those who need help, and there it expects to remain 
until relief comes. If leaders of parties cannot come up to this 
standard we shall have the satisfaction of knowing that we ourselves 
are there." In encountering political opposition to his reform pro-
posals, Peffer increasingly recognized the relationship between poli-
tics and social and economic abuses and the consequent necessity 
for political reform. And remembering his defeated efforts of the 
past years, Peffer wrote, "\Ve have asked for consideration to which 
our constituency is entitled, but no attention was paid ... -they 
laughed at our impertinence. Now that the storm is approaching, 
they would avert its effect by crying out against the Kansas 
Farmer."15 
While Peffer and the Farmer acted as the public lightning rod for 
critics of the farmers' movement, other agrarians sought to increase 
the political strength and effectiveness of the Alliance. Many AI-
13 Kansas Farmer, January 1, February 5, 12, 1890. 
14 Lawrence Daily journal, March 11, 16, April 2, 1890; Topeka Daily Capital, 
March 11, 1890; Kansas Farmer, February 26, March 12, April 30, 1890. 
15 Kansas Farmer, March 19, 1890. 
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liance leaders had become convinced that if the organization func-
tioned only as a pressure group, making endorsements, it would 
create suicidal splits in the order, composed as it was of Republicans, 
Democrats, and old third-party men. More could be gained, they 
decided, through independent action. On March 5, 1890, an Alli-
ance committee met with representatives of the Grange, the FMBA, 
and the Knights of Labor and adopted mutual political platforms. 
The Alliance state president, Benjamin Clover, then issued a call 
for a state convention of the presidents of the county alliances to 
meet in Topeka on March 25 to consider the possibility of organiz-
ing a new party based on Alliance strength.16 
In secret sessions, the convention devoted itself to political dis-
cussion. The resolutions that emerged asked Governor Humphrey 
to call a special session of the legislature to provide mortgage relief; 
requested that farmers be represented on the Board of Railroad 
Commissioners by the appointment of P. B. Maxson; and demanded 
the implementation of other Alliance proposals, including the direct 
popular election of United States senators and railroad commission-
ers. The final resolutions challenged the political order. Denounc-
ing Ingalls as having rarely supported a measure in the interests of 
farmers or workers, the convention resolved to oppose any candidate 
for the legislature that favored his reelection to the Senate. And, 
clearly anticipating some form of direct political action, the alli-
ancemen resolved "that we will no longer divide on party lines, 
and will only cast our votes for candidates of the people, for the 
people, and by the people." They then made arrangements to 
organize "the People's state central committee."17 
The Alliance leaders had taken the decisive step to form a new 
political party, but they recognized the necessity of winning over 
the cautious Peffer, the key to the state's farmers. Led by Stephen 
McLallin of the Advocate and B. E. Kies of the Wichita Kansas 
Commoner, these men earnestly besieged Peffer for his support and 
gradually he granted it. Indeed, as early as February, Peffer had 
responded to a probe of the Commoner by asserting that the people 
16 Topeka Advocate, August 22, 1894; W. F. Rightmire, "The Alliance Move-
ment in Kansas-Origin of the People's Party," Transactions of the Kansas State 
Historical Society (Topeka, 1906), 9: 1-8. 
17 Lawrence Daily Journal, March 26, 28, 1890; Topeka Advocate, August 22, 
1894; Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement," pp. 1·8. 
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themselves could quickly create any political machinery needed. 
Perhaps an even more important influence upon Peffer was the 
continued hostility and arrogance of Republican leaders toward the 
grim efforts of the farmers to gain influence. Following the March 
Alliance convention, Peffer complained of the imperious manner 
in which the Republican press served notice "on the Alliance that 
no attack upon the policy of the Republican party will be tolerated" 
without indicating even a willingness to listen to agrarian com-
plaints. Replying to criticism of the convention's resolutions, Peffer 
declared of the Alliance that "this movement has grown so great 
that it cannot be checked by rehearsing patriotic memories, reviving 
buried prejudices, or appealing to old party associations." He 
warned that the question of a new party would be answered by the 
reception the old parties gave Alliance principles: "Nothing can 
save the parties and party leaders but prompt and earnest response 
to the popular will." The GOP, in particular, would have to 
reverse itself, he argued. "It is the party that is wrong, not the 
people."lS 
Following this editorial, the Atchison Champion observed that 
the Farmer was "out this week with a double coat of war paint" 
and clearly did "not propose to have any more monkeying-the 
issues of the campaign must be met squarely by Kansas politicians 
or they will be compelled to take the consequences." Yet Peffer 
hesitated to make the final break. While he struggled with him-
self in such editorials as "Whom Will Ye Serve?"-the Alliance or 
the party-Ingalls himself forced the issue.19 
Interviewed in theN ew York World in mid-April, Senator Ingalls 
responded to a question of political reform with the blunt assertion: 
The purification of politics is an iridescent dream. Government is force. 
Politics is a battle for supremacy. Parties are the armies. The decalogue 
and the golden rule have no place in a political campaign. The object 
is success. To defeat the antagonist and expel the party in power is the 
purpose. The Republicans and Democrats are as irreconcilably opposed 
to each other as were Grant and Lee in the ·wilderness. They use ballots 
instead of guns, but the struggle is as unrelenting and desperate, and the 
result sought for the same. In war it is lawful to deceive the adversary, 
18 Kansas Farmer, February 12, April 2, 16, 1890; Topeka Advocate, May 7, 
1890. 
19 Atchison Daily Champion, April 18, 1890; Kansas Farmer, April 23, 1890. 
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to hire hessians, to purchase mercenaries, to mutilate, to destroy. The 
commander who lost a battle through the activity of his moral nature 
would be the derision and jest of history. This modern cant about the 
corruption of politics is fatiguing in the extreme. It proceeds from the 
tea-custard and syllabub dilettantism, the frivolous and desultory senti-
mentalism of epicenes.20 
Regardless of the senator's efforts to explain this statement, Alli-
ance leaders pronounced it his true attitude and reprinted the 
interview in all friendly newspapers. It sustained the growing 
Alliance belief that the Republican party was indifferent to the 
wishes and needs of the people and contemptuous of the cry for 
reform. And, in particular, it repelled Judge Peffer. Above all a 
highly moral man, whose conscience had driven him since he was 
a young antislavery agitator in Pennsylvania, Peffer could have 
believed only that Ingalls, the symbol of Republicanism, ridiculed 
his very life. In the wake of this interview, Peffer announced that 
the Farmer would henceforth oppose Ingalls and support any "com-
petent man upon whom the opposition shall unite."21 
Peffer thus crossed the Rubicon to join Clover, McLallin, and 
the state's farmers waiting on the far shore. The Republican press 
exploded in denunciation of Peffer, the last link to past partisan 
stability, often alleging that his opposition to Ingalls stemmed 
merely from a desire to replace the senator in Washington-a 
"Senatorial bee" placed in his bonnet, declared the Kansas City 
journal) by those enemies of Ingalls who realized that "the only 
hope of defeating his re-election lay through uniting the agricultural 
classes of the State against him. . . . Recognizing the influence 
which the Farmer has among the agricultural classes," the journal 
continued, "and the esteem in which Judge Peffer is held by them, 
it was thought that he combined in the largest degree those qualities 
which would solidify and head this opposition."22 
Peffer replied to such charges with more anguish than anger. His 
critics, he announced, misunderstood the motivation for his political 
course. Carefully distinguishing between politicians and the people, 
Peffer pointed out that his position had not changed, but merely 
evolved. 
20 New York World, April 13, 1890. 
21 Kansas Farmer, May 14, 1890. 
22 Ibid., June 4, 1890. 
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\Ve have been on this road a long time, and at every signal station gave 
due and timely warning. Time and again we have called attention to the 
growing discontent among farmers, have pointed out particularly the 
imperative need of some remedial legislation. . . . 
Now the farmers, acting in line with the advice of this paper, many 
times uttered, have organized in their own interest and have set forth 
their demands. What would these party men expect of us but that we 
would stand by the people who are doing just what we have constantly 
urged them to do? Would they have us betray our friends? Did they 
not, long ago, see what our course would lead to?23 
The reelection of Ingalls provided a splendid issue for mobiliz-
ing the political discontent of Kansas for the coming campaign of 
1890. Ingalls represented both the methods and the policies of the 
old Kansas Republicanism-acts and ideas in sharp contrast to those 
of the Alliance. His election to the Senate had twice occurred under 
shady circumstances and his "iridescent dream" interview confirmed 
many people in their belief in the corruption of existing political 
parties. His aloof manner easily aroused criticism from a mass move-
ment rebelling against being ignored, overlooked, and spurned: 
Ingalls, Judge Peffer complained, "holds the masses at arms' length 
and does not enter into the joys and sorrows of the common people," 
discuss affairs with them, or believe in their intelligence. Ingalls 
had disputed the Alliance contention that legislation itself could 
improve the depressed condition of agriculture. His public career 
illustrated that party regularity which the Alliance had to break to 
achieve success, and his personal policy of "skinning Democrats" 
diverted attention from pressing issues. Benjamin Clover pointed 
out that Democratic "skins are the thinnest clothing a shivering 
family was ever wrapped up in." The Alliance wanted a new 
Kansas operated on new issues; Ingalls personified the old Kansas 
and the old issues, and he became the first object of attack.24 
Most Republicans expressed little public alarm over the an-
nounced opposition of the Alliance. Beyond bitter denunciations 
of such apostates as Peffer and Clover, the Republican press 
exhibited a partisan assurance. The Fort Scott Monitor admitted 
23 Ibid., May 21, June 4, 1890. 
24 Raymond C. Miller, "The Populist Party in Kansas" (Ph.D. diss., University 
of Chicago, 1928), pp. 117·18; Burton J. Williams, Senator John ]ames Ingalls 
(Lawrence, Kans., 1972), pp. 73·76, 92-95, and passim; Kansas Farmer, May 21, 
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that farmers comprised two-thirds of the state's voters, but it 
believed most were good Republicans who would do little to hurt 
party candidates. Moreover, "the politicians express great con-
fidence in the re-election of Senator Ingalls." A correspondent of 
another paper blithely announced that the Alliance had "no griev-
ance as far as known" and predicted that Republican farmers would 
stay with their party and support Ingalls. Ingalls himself sarcas-
tically expressed his gratitude to the :March Alliance convention 
"for being the first to formally announce my candidacy for a fourth 
term" and confidently proclaimed that the anti-Ingalls resolution 
would hurt its authors more than its object.25 
More discerning Republicans harbored private doubts about the 
effect of the Alliance's course upon their party. "Some how I fear," 
Governor Humphrey wrote to Republican Congressman Bishop \tV. 
Perkins, "that you, in common with our Republican friends in 
Washington, hardly realize the real condition of public feeling in 
Kansas." A nonpartisan demand existed, Humphrey explained, for 
congressional action to increase the currency supply and to prohibit 
trusts. "While I am not easily panic stricken, and am not given 
to unseemly haste in yielding to public clamor," he assured Perkins, 
"yet the demands respecting these matters are so firmly rooted in 
the public mind, and with all so apparently just, that I almost feel 
that Republican supremacy is entirely dependent upon some sub-
stantial legislation on these questions." To Ingalls Humphrey 
confessed that "the feeling is so intense that I do not very much 
covet a re-nomination for governor" and warned that "your eggs 
and mine are in the same basket." As the GOP controlled all 
branches of the national government, the governor pointed out, 
it would be held responsible; and if no satisfactory action resulted, 
the third-party movement would be greatly strengthened and "the 
question will be, what shall we do [to] be saved? in the next ... 
election."26 
There was a limit to Humphrey's concern, however. Although 
willing to urge congressional action on agrarian complaints, he re-
fused to accede to them himself on the state level. Admitting that 
25 Fort Scott Daily Monitor, June 6, 1890: Atchison Daily Champion, April 1, 
1890: J. J. Ingalls to M. M. Beck, April 6, 1890, M. M. Beck Papers, KSHS. 
26 L. U. Humphrey to B. W. Perkins, March 21, June 25, 1890, and Humphrey 
to J. J. Ingalls, June 25, 1890, Humphrey Papers, KSHS. 
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"some things demanded by the farmers' organizations are just," 
Humphrey still determined to "draw the line and fight." He re-
fused the Alliance petition for a special session of the legislature to 
provide mortgage relief, declaring that the 1889 legislature had 
settled the question. Like most Republican leaders, he denied that 
the farmers' troubles resulted from or could be relieved by legisla-
tion. Moreover, Humphrey, a banker himself, maintained that 
enactment of Alliance proposals would adversely affect the state's 
credit. Although he criticized the farmer for relying on legislative 
relief, he did suggest that a congressional committee investigate 
agricultural conditions, a proposal Peffer denounced as an attempt 
to mislead, divert attention, and postpone action. Finally, the 
governor rejected the Alliance request for the appointment of P. B. 
Maxson to the Board of Railroad Commissioners. He declared his 
opposition was to Maxson personally and that the Alliance should 
have asked merely for board representation. When the Alliance 
suggested another candidate, however, Humphrey described its 
action as "only inclined to complicate matters" and retained the 
objectionable commissioner.27 
The rejection of Alliance demands with such transparent duplic-
ity merely strengthened the determination of farmers to break away 
from the old parties. In an editorial entitled "The People's Re-
bellion," Peffer demonstrated that it was this political discontent, 
not simply economic distress, that was the essence of what would 
become Populism, for it had become obvious that political purifica-
tion was a prerequisite for not only immediate economic reform but 
also the assurance of popular participation in future political de-
cisions. "An open rebellion on the part of the masses," Peffer 
declared, had begun "against existing methods of politicians and 
party leaders in their treatment of just demands set forth by the 
people." In every instance, politicians and parties had failed to 
respond sincerely or effectively to the demand for action in the 
public interest: the legislature had rejected the agrarian program 
of remedial legislation; the governor refused to reconvene the legis-
27 Humphrey to Levi Ferguson, April 22, 1890, Humphrey to T. J. Jackson, 
February 26, 1890, Humphrey to J. Crans, February 14, 1890, Humphrey to L. 
M. Briggs, April 5, 1890, Humphrey to John Kelly, April 5, 1890, Humphrey 
Papers, KSHS; Topeka Daily Capital, January 29, 1890; Kansas Farmer, February 
5, 1890. 
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lature or to recognize agrarian interests in his appointments; Ingalls 
disdained to answer the public's questions; Congress not only 
ignored the St. Louis demands but actually contravened them in 
such legislation as the McKinley Tariff. Politics, then, had failed 
the people. "Nothing short of a rebellion of the people will regain 
the power they have lost and restore justice in public administra-
tion," Peffer concluded. "The political work must be done by the 
people acting in large masses."28 
Mass political action became every day more a reality. By late 
spring the Alliance claimed 100,000 members in nearly 2,000 local 
suballiances, with up to fifty new suballiances being established 
each week. The demand for Peffer's presence was so great that he 
proposed holding mass meetings in order to save time, and he soon 
estimated that he spoke to almost 2,000 people a day. Beginning in 
April, county alliances prepared for independent political action 
in local contests and demanded independent tickets on the state 
and congressional levels as well. Then on May 14, Clover issued 
the authorized call for a June meeting of the People's State Central 
Committee, elected by alliancemen in district meetings, and urged 
other rural and labor organizations to participate in joint action.29 
The convention assembled in Topeka on June 12 with forty-one 
Alliance delegates, twenty-eight Knights of Labor, ten members of 
the FMBA, seven Patrons of Husbandry, and four single taxers. 
The delegates unanimously agreed that full state and congressional 
tickets, pledged to Alliance principles, should be nominated. The 
convention encouraged suballiances to nominate county and legis-
lative tickets responsive to their local interests, though it recom-
mended the creation of a separate organization to avoid the 
transformation of the Alliance directly into a partisan body. It 
then decided that the proper name of the new party would be the 
"People's Party" and called a state nominating convention to meet 
in Topeka on August 13, 1890.30 
Before that nominating convention met, however, the fledgling 
People's party had to withstand a Democratic attempt to assume 
command of the movement, a struggle that set the pattern for the 
28 Kansas Farmer, June 25, 1890. 
29 Topeka Advocate, March 6, May 14, 28, June 4, II, 1890; Fort Scott Daily 
Monitor, March 14, 1890; Kansas Farmer, May 14, 28, 1890. 
30 Topeka Advocate, June 18, 25, 1890; Fort Scott Daily Monitor, June 13, 1890. 
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future course of the third party. The Democrats throughout the 
1880s had been willing to cooperate with reform parties, not out 
of any sympathy in political principles, but because no success was 
possible on a separate basis. The question of campaign "fusion" 
between the two secondary parties, then, figured in each election 
but scarcely troubled the triumphant Republicans. Although fusion 
was rarely successful, it did frequently assist the Democrats who 
were able to operate the plan more to their own advantage than 
to that of their less-established and transient allies.31 The Alliance-
People's party movement of 1890, however, was less a definite par-
tisan entity composed of men with common durable partisan 
attachments than a mass demand for political action. As such, it 
was subject to disruption rather than stabilization by the introduc-
tion of partisan appeals or controls. Certainly such leaders as 
McLallin and Peffer recognized this potential for disintegration 
and so did Republican politicians who sought to exploit it. More-
over, the Alliance, drawing so heavily upon the state's largely 
Republican agricultural class, needed to avoid any taint of col-
lusion with the traditional and bitter enemy of the GOP, the 
Democracy. Alliance leaders who joined the reform movement 
from the Republican party-such as Peffer and McLallin-thus 
attempted to prevent obvious collaboration with the Democrats 
while those from the background of Democratic-Union Labor co-
operation generally tried to foster fusion. 
As early as April Peffer complained of Democratic pressure upon 
the Alliance to enter politics as a Democratic adjunct, but the 
major Democratic effort to capitalize on the strength of the Alliance 
came only with the creation of a new party by the June convention. 
Led by John Martin of Topeka, Democratic politicians maneuvered 
to secure for Charles Robinson the gubernatorial nominations of 
both the new party and the Democracy. Robinson, the state's first 
governor, had become a Democrat during the 1880s because of his 
intense hostility to the Republican policy of prohibition. Well-
known throughout the state, he had acted in the past with third 
31 Walter T. K. Nugent, The Tolerant Populists: Kansas Populism and Nativ-
ism (Chicago, 1963), pp. 47, 52: Girard Herald, December 8, 1888; Topeka Daily 
Commonwealth, August 23, 1888; Elizabeth N. Barr, "The Populist Uprising," 
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parties and seemed a logical choice to lead the opposition to victory 
over the GOP. By July Democratic newspapers had created a 
boom for Robinson's nomination by the People's party, and they 
gained the enthusiastic support of several men perennially active 
in third-party agitation who believed in Robinson's nomination 
out of expediency. W. H. T. Wakefield of Lawrence, the 1888 vice-
presidential candidate of the Union Labor party, declared that 
Robinson's nomination by the People's party would assure Dem-
ocratic cooperation in a united effort to defeat the Republicans.32 
The issue of Robinson's candidacy dominated the political scene 
two weeks before the state convention after Clover, the natural 
choice of the alliancemen within the party, announced that he 
would not accept a nomination. Many Republicans contemplated 
with pleasure the selection of Robinson, for they were convinced 
that such a step would split the new party and ensure continued 
Republican supremacy. They anticipated a quick return of al-
liancemen to the Republican fold if the reform leaders grafted onto 
the new party a Democrat favoring an end to prohibition. Indeed, 
as the possibility of Populist cooperation with the Democracy in-
creased, the Farmers' Alliance of Harvey County resolved to remain 
Republican if it had to align with an old party. Nevertheless, most 
Democrats and some Populists believed that Robinson's nomination 
would assure the defeat of the GOP, and they worked to secure his 
selection. Prominent Democrats solicited the Farmer's support for 
Robinson by suggesting that Peffer would then be the logical 
choice to replace Ingalls in the Senate.33 
The Alliance's antipolitical doctrine that the office must seek the 
man rather than the reverse meant that the politicians' boom for 
Robinson went largely unchallenged. McLallin's Advocate, for 
example, refrained from commenting on possible candidates, lest 
it be accused of attempting to dictate or manipulate nominations. 
Peffer, however, regarded the Democratic advances precisely as 
dictation, and he countered them with his own suggestions that, 
given the nature of the constituency to which he must appeal, the 
32 Kansas Farmer, April 2, 1890; John Martin to Charles Robinson, June 16, 
1890, Charles Robinson Papers, KSHS; Lawrence Gazette, July 10, 1890. 
33 Humphrey to W. R. P. Dow, June 27, 1890, Humphrey to E. H. Crawford, 
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party's gubernatorial candidate should be an old soldier, of Repub-
lican antecedents, and in favor of prohibition. Some observers 
thought that this was a bid by Peffer for his own nomination. 
Robinson himself, however, recognized the objective of Peffer's 
editorial and angrily denounced its author for attempting to rule 
him out.34 
It appeared, however, that Peffer's challenge had come too late 
to stop the Robinson bandwagon. Although admitting that Peffer 
had disturbed the "calculations" of the professional politicians, 
newspapers generally agreed on the eve of the convention that the 
Democrats and Populists would combine on Robinson. To insure 
the success of the fusion plan, it was alleged, the Democrats had 
promised to support Clover in a race for Congress in the Third 
District. Edward Carroll, the Democratic state chairman, and John 
A. Eaton, Democratic leader of the Third District, arrived in 
Topeka "to complete the deal" on August II, 1890. As the con-
vention opened on the thirteenth, Republican leader A. W. Smith 
flatly predicted Robinson's nomination, and the Topeka Capital 
maintained that Democratic manipulation of the People's party 
had already determined the results of the convention. Such ob-
servers admitted the existence of Populist opposition to fusion with 
the Democrats but considered it too weak to overcome the arrange-
ments made. The Kansas City Star reported that "Judge W. A. 
Peffer's name will be presented by those who decline to be led 
into the Democratic camp," and the Capital speculated that John 
F. Willits, a farmer, prohibitionist, former Republican legislator, 
and president of the People's State Central Committee, might also 
be nominated to stop Robinson. "If Judge Peffer was to be nom-
inated for governor a coalition with the Democrats would be 
impossible," the Capital explained, "and it is not likely that Mr. 
Willits would be acceptable to the Democrats."35 
Peffer had frequently been mentioned as a possible gubernatorial 
candidate since early spring, but he had repeatedly asserted his 
noncandidacy. On the eve of the convention he claimed to have 
no interest in the position and left for central Kansas to address 
34 Topeka Advocate, July 23, 1890; Kansas Farmer, August 6, 1890; Kansas 
Democrat (Topeka), August 14, 1890· Topeka Daily Capital, August 10, 1890. 
35 Kansas City Star, August 12, 1890; Topeka Daily Capital, August 10, 12, 13, 
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an Alliance meeting. Such a disinterested attitude reflected not 
only the Alliance doctrine that the office should seek the man but 
also Peffer's natural emergence as the implicit candidate of the 
People's party for senator. He denied any personal ambitions, but 
both friends and enemies considered him the unspoken nominee 
because he had unrivaled prominence within the reform move-
ment and because the Alliance had focused its campaign on re-
placing Ingalls. One preconvention rumor held that if Peffer would 
drop his opposition to Robinson, the fusionists would acquiesce in 
the party's explicit recognition of Peffer as its senatorial candidate.36 
The People's party state nominating convention opened amidst 
vigorous struggles for party control, with the Peffer-Willits-McLallin 
group of radical prohibitionists, woman suffragists, Greenbackers, 
and antifusionists arrayed against the more moderate and pragmatic 
faction represented best by Wakefield and William A. Harris. The 
latter group generally prevailed in framing the platform, which 
merely reiterated the St. Louis demands while avoiding a prohibi-
tion plank, and it seemed that the nominations might be similarly 
controlled. Eight men were nominated for governor and all but 
Robinson, Willits, and Peffer withdrew. Peffer was out of town 
but the others made short speeches. The balloting revealed the 
Populist contempt of politicians' schemes, opposition to Democrats, 
and support for prohibition by awarding Willits the nomination by 
a four-to-one margin. Peffer attracted only a scattering of votes, as 
the antifusionists concentrated on Willits. The convention, how-
ever, did declare Peffer its choice to replace Ingalls, although it 
avoided an explicit nomination because of a technicality. The 
other nominations also reflected the strength of the antifusionists, 
as only one nominee, John Ives for attorney general, had Dem-
ocratic antecedents. The People's party respected its name by 
further designating a woman, a Negro, a minister, a farmer, and a 
schoolteacher for its candidates.37 
The results of the convention brought different reactions from 
the older parties. Though Robinson's rejection in favor of Willits 
surprised Republicans, they were certain of victory over the polit-
36 Kansas Farmer, February 26, May 7, June 11, 1890; Topeka Daily Capital, 
June 12, August 12, 13, 1890. 
37 Topeka Daily Capital, August 13-16, 1890: Fort Scott Daily Monitor, August 
14, 1890; Nugent, Tolerant Populists, pp. 72-73. 
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ically unknown Alliance leader. "The nomination of Peffer," 
admitted the Atchison Globe, "would have caused alarm in the 
Republican party," but Willits was a weak nomination. Democrats, 
on the other hand, raged over their rebuff by the Populists. Robin-
son again denounced Peffer and Willits. Carroll believed that "the 
nominations show a plentiful lack of political wisdom," and other 
Democrats satisfied themselves that Republican interests controlled 
the new party. One wrote to Robinson that "the only adverse 
criticism of you that I have heard is that you are a Democrat!"3S 
Leading Democrats agreed to nominate a separate state ticket 
rather than support the People's party candidates. Robinson and 
several other prominent Democrats even foresaw success for a 
straight ticket, believing that the People's party would split the 
normal Republican vote. There had been few important Dem-
ocrats who had aligned themselves with the new party (as opposed 
to those who were merely willing to fuse with the Populists), and 
after Robinson's repudiation they returned to their old allegiance. 
The politician who had presented Robinson's name to the Populist 
convention, for example, then took a conspicuous role in the 
Democratic state convention that began in Wichita on September 
9, 1890. Resubmission Republicans, so-called because they favored 
resubmitting the constitutional amendment imposing prohibition 
to another vote of the people, met simultaneously and joined the 
Democrats in a coalition ticket. Robinson predictably received the 
gubernatorial nomination. The Democrats did fuse on Ives, but 
this was the only instance of fusion with the Populists on the state 
level in 1890.39 
Opposition to continued Republican control, however, led the 
Democrats to accept Populist candidates for other offices. Most 
importantly, they implicitly fused on three Populist congressional 
candidates by not making nominations opposite Clover in the Third 
District, John G. Otis in the Fourth, and Jerry Simpson in the 
Seventh. On legislative and county offices Democrats even more 
willingly cooperated with Populists, but again it was largely a 
case of Democratic initiative and decision after the Populists had 
38 Topeka Daily Capital, August 16, 1890; Ruth [?] to Robinson, September 
8, 1890, Robinson Papers. 
39 Topeka Daily Capital, August 10, 16, 1890; Fort Scott Daily Monitor, 
September 10, 1890. 
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made independent nominations. The Democrats, moreover, made 
no pretense of acting with Populists out of agreement on principles. 
Rather, they looked upon fusion, even with unwilling allies, as a 
traditional political tool to accomplish real, if limited, political 
goals. The defeat of Ingalls was a platform objective of Kansas 
Democrats and would cause Democratic rejoicing even if achieved 
by Populists. Most Populists, on the other hand, necessarily rejected 
explicit fusion, for they had repudiated both old parties out of 
principle and could not consistently cooperate with one against 
the other. The June state convention creating the People's party 
had in fact resolved that "we will not support for office any member 
of our organization who will accept a nomination from either of 
the old parties, but will consider such member a traitor to our 
cause."40 Generally, then, any fusion in 1890 resulted from Dem-
ocratic fusion on Populist candidates without Populist solicitation 
and regardless of Populist wishes. 
Indeed, the Populists in 1890 made clear that they opposed the 
methods as well as the policies of the old parties, and in their in-
sistence upon real participation and self-determination they adopted 
a number of innovations. In making their conventions effective 
nominating devices, for instance, the Populists frequently employed 
the Phillips County Plan. Each suballiance elected its most qual-
ified members for the various offices, as a sort of primary contest 
which assured a candidate's commitment, and from the men so 
chosen the Populist county convention then elected its nominees. 
The Phillips Plan functioned well in local affairs, for it guaranteed 
faithful candidates not encumbered by promises to special interest 
groups for political expenses or support. It was difficult to extend 
this system to the nomination of state candidates, however, and 
there Populists sought to secure the same results by requiring 
candidates to deliver short speeches to the convention, giving the 
delegates the opportunity to judge the men and their commitment 
personally.41 Time would unfortunately prove that Populists, when 
severed from local sources of information and with their limited 
40 W. P. Harrington, "The Populist Party in Kansas," in Collections of the 
Kansas State Historical Society (Topeka, 1925), 16: 407-8; Smith Centre Pioneer-
Bulletin, September 4, 1890. 
41 Topeka Advocate, April 23, 1890; Miller, "Populist Party in Kansas," pp. 
130-31. 
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access to reliable media, would be susceptible to misleading appeals 
and candidates and succumb to political manipulation despite their 
condemnation of it. 
By early September the Republicans had also completed their 
campaign preparations. The state convention renominated virtually 
the same ticket that had carried the state by 80,000 votes in 1888, 
and congressional incumbents generally won renomination as well. 
Ingalls warned against complacency, however: "In my opinion 
success will depend more on hard work and organization from this 
time on than anything else."42 
Hard work and organization typified the campaigns of all three 
parties, and each added more specific strategy to meet peculiar 
needs. The Populists were in the most precarious position, attempt-
ing to gloss over the traditional and divisive issues of prohibition 
and party loyalty as irrelevant and to emphasize the necessity for 
new action to meet new issues. Clover illustrated the basic approach 
of the People's party when he announced, "The issue this year is 
not whether a man shall be permitted to drink, but whether he 
shall have a home to go to, drunk or sober."43 
Judge Peffer, as closely identified with the GOP as any Populist, 
led the effort to blunt Republican appeals for partisan loyalty. 
His common response to these pleas, which were often publicly 
directed specifically at him, was to deny the efficacy of old-party 
reform, pointing out the repeated rejection by both old parties of 
popular reform requests for the past decade. Clearly, he con-
cluded, "the independent political movement of farmers and labor-
ers is necessary." Peffer also attempted to appropriate Republican 
tradition for Populist advantage. He compared the new party to 
the early GOP, for example, and declared that the Republican 
party had abandoned its original position and vision. He less 
wholeheartedly accepted the irrelevance of prohibition, but he did 
recognize that other issues were more important, and he urged 
Populists to resist all attempts to divert attention from the major 
questions of political and economic reform. "Let all side issues 
alone. Stick to the text."44 
42 Fort Scott Daily Monitor, September 4, 1890; Ingalls to P. I. Bonebreak, 
August 18, 1890, John J. Ingalls Papers, KSHS. 
43 Girard Western Herald, November 1, 1890. 
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Peffer was only one of many who followed the Populist text. 
Mary Elizabeth Lease, a restive firebrand who practiced law and 
preached rebellion; John Davis, Peffer's only rival in producing 
dry statistical speeches; "Sockless Jerry" Simpson, a natural politi-
cian and splendid speaker; Benjamin Clover, sometimes a foolish 
but always a determined worker; John G. Otis, as serious and sober 
as Peffer but less politically oriented; William Baker, a farmer and 
minister of solid persistence; John Willits, a forceful agitator who 
rejected compromise; Annie L. Diggs, a diminutive suffragette who 
realized that Populism necessarily meant woman's rights-these and 
others preached the new gospel of Populism. Through the influence 
of the Farmers' Alliance they were joined by outside speakers in-
cluding Leonidas L. Polk of North Carolina, the national president 
of the Alliance. The Populist rhetoric was stern and unyielding 
but few repudiated it. If the calm Peffer could speak of revolution-
ary times and "the people's rebellion," Mrs. Lease could promise 
"to win this battle with the ballot if possible, but if not that way 
then with the bayonet." All campaigned against "politicians," and 
Willits especially operated on an antipolitics theme.45 
Republicans countered with their own rhetoric and traditional 
political appeals and avoided any real discussion of the Populist 
program. They obliquely replied to the Populist stress on economic 
depression by foolishly asserting that prosperity dominated the 
scene while maintaining that bountiful crops were on the way. 
Sheer ridicule and abuse formed a major part of the Republican 
strategy, culminating in outright fabrications of public records 
and a sordid attack on Willits as a perjurer, swindler, and defaulter. 
Most importantly, however, Republicans emphasized the issue of 
prohibition and waved the bloody shirt. On both issues the two 
old parties held sharply divergent positions, and if prejudice could 
replace discontent the former bifurcated partisan alignment with 
Republican dominance should follow. Republicans announced, 
then, that if the People's party split the prohibition vote with the 
GOP, the whiskey Democrats would triumph at the polls. Governor 
44 Kansas Farmer, June 25, August 20, 27, 1890; Topeka Daily Capital, Septem-
ber 24, October 12, 1890. 
45 Kansas Farmer, June 25, 1890; Smith Centre Pioneer-Bulletin, September 
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Humphrey, privately no prohibitionist, feigned concern to a mem-
ber of the FMBA that "efforts will be made to divert the attention 
of farmers from the question of prohibition, anti-prohibition and 
resubmission this fall, and induce them to indifference concerning 
these questions." And, Humphrey continued, "while the members 
of your order are earnest in their efforts to secure their just rights, 
and to remedy existing and past wrongs, they should not ... 
forget their duty to themselves, their families and the state, on 
this subject of prohibition." The following day Humphrey con-
fidently explained to a fellow Republican, "There are thousands 
of Republican Alliance farmers in the state, who will hesitate very 
long before doing anything to aiel the Democratic party in its fight 
to re-open the question of prohibition in Kansas."46 
Republicans hoped that cultural conflict would fortify the old 
partisan cleavage. The Democrats obtusely helped their opponents 
by proclaiming resubmission the major issue. The Populist rejec-
tion of Robinson removed the possibility of driving "every temper-
ance voter in Kansas" back to the GOP, as one old politician had 
hopefully anticipated, but Republicans continued to associate in-
dependent voting with a Democratic triumph for whiskey. They 
denounced third-party nominees as "creatures of the rum-soaked 
Democracy" and professed to be incapable of believing that Repub-
lican alliancemen would consent "to be led off into the ranks of 
the enemy" under such leadership. And when a court decision in 
October weakened prohibition enforcement, Humphrey refused to 
deemphasize the question of resubmission as a campaign issue 
because "it would probably be detrimental to our candidates."47 
Republicans also employed the old-soldier appeal and revived 
sectional prejudices in their attempt to force the recalcitrant farm-
ers back to the GOP. Polk's presence among the Alliance speakers 
gave a semblance of truth to Republican charges that Southern 
Democrats controlled the Alliance in an effort to divide the GOP 
in the North and thereby gain Democratic ascendancy in order to 
46 Humphrey to W. R. P. Dow, June 27, 1890, Humphrey to S. J. Stewart, 
.June 6, 1890, Humphrey to E. H. Crawford, June 7, 1890, Humphrey Papers, 
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undo the results of the Civil War. Polk's Civil War service as a 
Confederate officer also provoked such outrageous Republican al-
legations as that he had "murdered in cold blood a number of 
[unarmed Union] prisoners of war." Newspapers contrasted Hum-
phrey's war record with Willits's lack of one and implied that the 
Populist had no sympathy with the Union in 1861 or with old 
soldiers in 1890. Even Peffer, whose war record was well known, 
suffered from "the current political gossip," he complained, "that I 
was unfriendly to the soldiers, that I was disloyal to their interests, 
and that in every way I was incapable of serving them." The Re-
publicans climaxed their campaign by welcoming President Har-
rison to Topeka to address a huge gathering of Union veterans 
while the city's newspapers carried articles headlined "The People's 
Party Is the Scheme of Ex-Rebels."48 
Such appeals only partially succeeded. Several Republicans did 
withdraw from the Shawnee County Farmers' Alliance declaring 
that they "would no longer affiliate with an organization which was 
officered by southern brigadiers and run in the interest of the 
Democratic party." More frequently, however, the alliancemen held 
ranks and announced that they would not be diverted from the real 
issues by bloody-shirt tactics. One suballiance recognized such 
intolerant appeals as a product of "the extremity of party position" 
and another reason to leave the corrupt old parties. This deter-
mination inspired Populist optimism as the campaign drew to its 
close, and the Populists were further encouraged when Ingalls 
refused the party's challenge to debate Peffer. Clover then pro-
vided his followers with advice before the polls opened: "Remem-
ber the interests at stake. Remember the homeless, the sorrowing, 
the discouraged, the weary, and the heavy laden. The decalogue 
and the golden rule must have a place in the great uprising; the 
great J. J. to the contrary notwithstanding; reform must come from 
the heart of the common people where the 'higher civilization' 
always comes from."49 
The old parties expected victory too. The Democrats thought 
48 Fort Scott Daily Monitor, October 4, 11, 16, 1890; W. A. Peffer to F. H. 
Hathaway, March 7, 1892, KSHS Archives; Topeka Daily Capital, July 23, 27, 
October 7, 8, 12, 1890. 
49 Fort Scott Daily Monitor, July 13, 1890; Kansas Farmer, July 30, August 13, 
October I, 1890: Leoti Western Farmer, July 31, 1890. 
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that Robinson at least would triumph, though the Democratic state 
chairman admitted that the party could not afford many defections 
to Populism. He therefore concentrated on convincing the former 
Democrats in the third party to return to the Democracy and leave 
the Populists to split the old Republican majority. The Repub-
licans conceded that they would not overwhelm the opposition as 
in the past but foresaw no trouble in winning handily. They were 
also certain of Ingalls's reelection, wrote a correspondent for the 
Chicago Tribune. Of the forty state senators, all holdover, thirty-
nine were Republicans. Of the 125 members of the lower house 
to be elected, the Republicans needed only forty-four to assure 
Ingalls's reelection. The Republicans, he continued, were claiming 
sixty-five and were certain of fifty. To defeat Ingalls the opposition 
would have to elect eighty-two representatives and unite behind 
another candidate, clearly an impossibility, and the Republicans 
confidently went to the polls.5o 
"The election in Kansas," declared the Kansas City Star the follow-
ing day, "has been a Waterloo to the Republican party." Even the 
Topeka Capital, after having predicted a crushing Republican 
victory, admitted "the landslide has slid."51 The Populists elected 
five congressmen and ninety-one members of the legislature and 
stripped the 1888 Republican plurality by 90 percent. The only 
state-level candidate the Populists elected, however, was John Ives, 
who also received full Democratic support. The People's party had 
become the other major party in Kansas, doubling the vote of the 
Democrats and nearly matching that of the Republicans. 
The reactions to these startling results were predictable. Peffer 
rejoiced, "When the people move together they are invincible." 
Joseph K. Hudson of the Capital sullenly retorted that the Pop-
ulists had "trusted for victory to the ignorance of the people and 
to the shame of Kansas their confidence was not misplaced." The 
McKinley Tariff and increased pensions may have caused the 
election reversals elsewhere, he added, "but what did it in Kansas 
50 W. C. Jones to W. H. Sears, [early November 1890], and Chairman of the 
Douglas County Democratic Central Committee to Sears, October II, 1890, 
William H. Sears Papers, KSHS: Kansas City Star, October 30, November I, 1890. 
51 Kansas City Star, November 5, 1890; Topeka Daily Capital, November 6, 
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was 'The Way Out.'" Hudson consoled himself by noting that 
"while the People's Party controls the house by a very large major-
ity, the senate is still Republican by 38 to I, and a governor's veto 
also stands in the way of radical legislation of which businessmen 
and capitalists might have stood in dread."52 
There still remained the imminent contest for the Senate, and 
the results of that struggle over Ingalls were anything but pre-
dictable. Reporters and correspondents of the country's leading 
newspapers and magazines crowded into Topeka to cover the elec-
tion by the legislators in January 1891. Harper's Weekly explained 
the remarkable national interest in the contest by pointing out its 
extraordinary characteristics: first, Ingalls was a major political 
and public figure and permanent president pro tern of the Senate; 
second, "Kansas is the State in which the revolution wrought by the 
Farmers' Alliance is most conspicuous"; third, there existed a 
possibility that the Populist legislators, despite their majority, 
would be unable to elect a candidate and that Ingalls might 
triumph because of factionalism within the People's party.53 One 
thing was certain: whoever emerged from this political struggle 
was assured of national prominence. 
Many observers foresaw sure defeat for Ingalls. Democratic leader 
George Glick assured an anxiously inquiring Grover Cleveland that 
"Ingalls is now eliminated from our politics," and a Leavenworth 
politician declared, "I don't see how Ingalls can make it. The 
farmers have got it and will certainly elect their man." But Peffer, 
while also expressing a judgment against Ingalls's chances, pointed 
out the weakness of the Populist position: "People's Party members 
are all pledged against Ingalls, though not pledged for any other 
man. 54 
Peffer, of course, was the leading candidate to succeed Ingalls, 
and many felt that the party had already implicitly nominated him, 
first by its action in the state convention and then by designating 
him to face Ingalls in public debate. Republicans also regarded 
52 Kansas Farmer, November 12, 1890; Topeka Daily Capital, November 6, 11, 
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Peffer as the Populist senatorial candidate and had acted accord-
ingly during the regular campaign. But after the November elec-
tion, as the possibility of success became greater, so did the number 
of Peffer's challengers. Most formidable of these appeared to be 
John Willits, who most Populists believed had been counted out 
in the gubernatorial contest and now deserved some recognition.55 
P. P. Elder, just elected to the legislature, Charles Robinson, and 
a host of others also attracted public support before the legislature 
convened. 
Peffer had three important advantages over his rivals: recogni-
tion as the party's original choice; control of the influential Kansas 
Farmer; and the support of the National Alliance. L. L. Polk, the 
national president, had pledged his support to Peffer during the 
regular campaign and now reaffirmed it in an attempt to center 
Alliance strength before other candidates appeared to create divi-
sion. ·when the Farmers' Alliance elected ·willits national lecturer 
of the order at its annual convention at Ocala, Florida, in Decem-
ber, it was alleged that Polk had arranged the election "to get 
'Willits out of the way of Judge Peffer for the United States senate." 
Although Peffer opened the Farmer to letters and resolutions sup-
porting all candidates, for weeks the paper printed hundreds of 
endorsements of Peffer from local suballiances. He also used the 
Farmer to answer questions and campaign charges, but he did not 
editorially advocate his own election, and maintained he was mak-
ing no active canvass and had not conferred with legislators on 
the matter.56 
The major Populist objection to Peffer involved his history of 
Republicanism and his relatively recent conversion to independent 
political action. The Winfield American Non-Conformist believed 
that "to overthrow Ingalls and elect a nine-months old convert 
would sound to the world as a very mediocre type of reform." 
Other long-time third-party men expressed reservations about the 
permanency of Peffer's loyalty to Populist principles and feared 
that as senator he would act with Republicans. These former 
55 Atchison Daily Champion, August 27, September 9, October 8, 1890; Topeka 
Daily Capital, November 8, 9, 13, 1890; Kansas Farmer, December 3, 1890. 
56 Topeka Daily Capital, November 11, 13, 19, December 11, 12, 1890; Bird 
City News, November 20, 1890; Kansas Farmer, December 3, 24, 31, 1890, Jan-
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Union Laborites demanded the selection of one of their own, as a 
reward for their persistence in the cause of reform, and generally 
favored either Elder or John Breidenthal.57 
Democrats within and without the People's party also feared a 
latent Republicanism in Peffer and opposed his election. Many 
Democrats believed that the defeat of Ingalls was vital regardless 
of his replacement and though a Democratic successor would be 
preferable, wrote one, "we propose to beat him with any sort of 
a man if we must." Other Democrats, however, insisted that if the 
Populists "want our support they must select a candidate that will 
at least be unobjectionable" and warned that they would support 
neither Peffer nor Willits. Democrats suggested either Robinson or 
William A. Harris. ·when Democratic and Union Laborite senti-
ments combined, as in the editorial policy of Wakefield's Lawrence 
jeffersonian, Peffer was sharply proscribed. But, according to one 
observer, nearly all Populists of Republican antecedents suffered 
from "the suspicion that they have too much Republican blood in 
their veins to be up to the wild-and-wooly standard of reform." 58 
Another objection specifically to Peffer involved his age and 
health. Already nearly sixty years old, he was frail and frequently 
ill. Indeed, a severe attack of bronchial asthma confined him to 
bed most of December. Opponents exaggerated his illness, more-
over, and brutally predicted his rapid demise if elected senator, 
adding that Governor Humphrey could then appoint Ingalls to 
the remainder of the term and cut short the political reformation.59 
In responding to his critics, Peffer reminded the Non-Conformist 
that he was a charter member of the People's party; it was not 
merely the old Union Labor party but a new and distinct organiza-
tion made up of former Republicans, Democrats, and Prohibition-
ists as well as Union Laborites. Moreover, Peffer pointed out, he 
had advocated the Alliance position before either the Alliance or 
the Non-Conformist had even been established in Kansas. And 
while the third-party papers had encouraged the Union Labor and 
57 American Non-Conformist (Winfield), January 15, 1891; Girard Western 
Herald, January 17, 1891; Topeka Populist, December 3, 1892; Topeka Daily 
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Greenback elements, he declared, the Kansas Farmer had delivered 
the bulk of the new party's voters by attracting the decisive converts 
from the major parties. He further insisted that his break from 
the GOP was permanent, that he supported a national third-party 
movement, and that he had not actively sought the nomination 
but that the people and the party had denoted him the rightful 
recipient in the state convention, in the campaign, and in local 
endorsements since that time. Others deemphasized the issue of 
Peffer's age and health by noting that Elder was even older, that 
the robust Willits had been unable to match Peffer's pace in the 
regular campaign, and that although the "Judge" was not strong, 
he had a mental and moral courage that fortified him. 60 
Such explanations apparently satisfied the party's rank and file. 
Even while Peffer lay ill in Topeka, unable to fill his speaking 
appointments in the special election in the Thirty-second Senatorial 
District, the Populist party of that district instructed its successful 
candidate to vote for him. When Chase County farmers heard that 
their representative favored another candidate, they called an 
emergency meeting of the county alliance in which they unan-
imously declared Peffer their choice and instructed their repre-
sentative to vote only for him. As other suballiances and local 
Populist clubs continued to endorse him, it seemed clear that 
Peffer was the popular favorite.61 
But others retained support from the politicians who gathered in 
Topeka. Some still pushed Willits as a compromise candidate who 
could attract votes from the Union Laborite faction without alien-
ating those former Republicans that composed Peffer's strength. 
Frank Doster, one of the most brilliant of public figures in Kansas, 
also attracted former Republicans but did not have Peffer's personal 
popularity. Elder's hopes received a boost when the Populist legis-
lative caucus agreed to elect him Speaker of the House. Behind 
these major possibilities appeared nearly every other figure of 
Kansas Populism as a local or group favorite.62 
The debate over the Populist candidate obscured the fact that 
Ingalls had not conceded and, indeed, provided him with reason 
60 Kansas Farmer, January 7, 1891; Kansas City Star, January 28, 29, 1891. 
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not to do so. The division within the People's party might prove 
so bitter, Republicans hoped, that the Populists would be unable 
to unite on a candidate, and Ingalls might be able to win. The 
ease with which each side of any Populist dispute accused the 
other of being "Ingalls's fixers" delighted the Republicans, who 
confidently expected the People's party to break into its constituent 
parts. As William Buchan, Republican state chairman, explained, 
"Eight out of every ten men elected to the legislature are [or were] 
Republicans, and there will be a division in the ranks and Mr. 
Ingalls will be reelected."63 
Ingalls and his backers actively tried to produce just such a divi-
sion. In particular, they relied upon their traditionally successful 
political weapon-waving the bloody shirt to incite partisan and 
sectional animosities to conceal their narrow demands for Ingalls's 
reelection. Republican newspapers hammered at the theme that 
the Southern Confederacy directed the People's party, that un-
frocked but unrepentent Confederate officers controlled the Farm-
ers' Alliance, that the People's party opposed the flag and old 
soldiers, while needlessly pointing out that Ingalls was a national 
leader in keeping the traitorous Southern Democrats under control. 
The decision of the Ocala conference to postpone the formation of 
a national third party made plausible these charges against the 
People's party as an arm of the Southern Democracy, for it seemed 
to restrict the effects of political discontent to the Republican states 
of the Northwest while the Democratic party continued to profit 
from the unaffected South. Republicans especially appealed to the 
sentiments of the old soldiers. They distributed printed petitions 
to the Kansas posts of the Grand Army of the Republic with 
instructions to flood the legislature with these demands for the 
reelection of Ingalls. In a few days hundreds of these pro-Ingalls 
petitions descended upon the lawmaking body. Veterans staged 
mass meetings and in sanguinary language described how the South 
viewed old soldiers and Ingalls or how the irreconcilable traitors 
had welcomed the Alliance at Ocala as a friend of the Democracy. 
Three thousand Topeka veterans enthusiastically greeted Ingalls 
and resolved that "the election of any other person to fill his 
63 Ibid., November 13, 1890; Kansas Farmer, January 7, 1891; M. W. Wilkins 
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present position ... will be regarded by us as a direct blow to the 
defenders of our country in the hour of her greatest need."64 
In a last effort to divide the Populists, Republicans promoted a 
late senatorial boom for William A. Harris, a former Democrat 
and Confederate officer and a conservative leader of the Leaven-
worth County Alliance. Democrats had avoided any public state-
ments of their intentions but had maneuvered to dictate the selec-
tion of the Populist candidate. They preferred a straight Democrat 
but, recognizing the Populist ability to elect a senator without 
their help, determined to press for a Populist with Democratic 
tendencies. In conjunction with some Democratic Populists, then, 
the straight Democrats urged the selection of Harris. Ingalls's sup-
porters quietly encouraged the Harris boom, expecting that com-
bined with bloody-shirt passions a Harris nomination would split 
the People's party. However, Democratic influence upon the 
Populists was lacking strength, and when Populists also per-
ceived "Buchan's handiwork in the Harris candidacy," as one 
reporter described the Republican interest, the Harris boom faded 
rapidly.65 
But the possibility that Ingalls might indeed achieve a victory 
through Populist dissension activated Populist preparations for the 
election. To ensure Populist solidarity and success, Peffer proposed 
a three-part plan as early as December. He advocated the instruc-
tion of legislators by their constituents, the holding of a caucus 
to prevent a division on the final vote, and the presence in Topeka 
of as many Populists as possible in order to bolster confidence and 
enforce obedience to the caucus decision. Peffer also warned Pop-
ulist legislators, many unfamiliar with the world of Topeka and 
its politics, to be wary of strangers and to bring with them several 
"strong men" selected by the party from their district. Republicans 
derided Peffer as an "old fogy" for this suggestion, but Populists 
readily assented to it, as it corresponded with their emphasis upon 
popular participation and local control.66 
64 Topeka Daily Capital, December 5, 12, 1890, January 24, 25, 1891; Senate 
Journal (Topeka, Kans., 1891), pp. 126, 140-42, 151-56, 160-62, 166-68, 176; House 
Journal (Topeka, Kans., 1891), pp. 138-40. 
65 Carroll to Innes, November 29, 1890, Cleveland Papers; Atchison Daily 
Champion, January 27, 1891; Kansas City Star, January 21, 26, 1891. 
66 Kansas Farmer, November 19, December 3, 10, 1890; Fort Scott Daily 
Monitor, November 25, 1890; Topeka Daily Capital, January 9, 1891. 
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The record of previous senatorial elections seemed to warrant 
all but the most extreme fears of the Populists, and those earlier 
elections had involved merely intraparty struggles and nothing so 
convulsive as the overthrow of the GOP. Members of all parties 
expected Ingalls to attempt to bribe legislators, and many were 
convinced that violent tactics including assassination had not been 
ruled out. In Topeka, one reporter noticed that three bodyguards 
escorted each legislator to prevent Ingalls from practicing his 
feared "amoral tactics to secure his reelection." The Populists 
avoided the major hotels, crowded together in cheap rooming 
houses, and absolutely refused to talk to anyone about anything. 
They held all their meetings secretly, behind locked and guarded 
doors, and in order to keep a united front agreed to make no 
move on any question without caucusing first.67 
Ingalls and his supporters certainly had no intentions of obtain-
ing his election through violent means, but apparently they did not 
completely rule out extralegal tactics. Republican boss Cy Leland 
arrived in Topeka "to remain a few days in the interest of Senator 
Ingalls," as a newspaper delicately phrased it; actually, as William 
Allen White later wrote, Leland carried $10,000 and a list of 
legislators to be bought. Several third-party leaders reported that 
bribes were offered to Populist legislators, though these offers may 
have been without Ingalls's authorization. Ingalls, however, did 
give $250 to John Livingston, president of the New York State 
Farmers' Alliance, to go to Topeka in an effort to influence Alliance 
legislators for his election. There, on the basis of his official posi-
tion, Livingston persuaded Annie Diggs to introduce him to a 
Populist audience, whereupon he "revealed" how the goals of the 
Confederacy were to be realized through the Alliance, declared that 
Alliance leaders intended to punish Union veterans, proclaimed 
that Southern brigadiers dictated to Kansans, and announced 
his support for Ingalls. Finally, Republicans considered adjourning 
the senate to avoid holding the required joint ballot with the 
Populist house and thus perhaps allow Governor Humphrey to 
appoint Ingalls to the Senate.6s 
67 Williams, Ingalls, p. 123; Kansas City Star, January 13, 21, 1891; Chicago 
Tribune, January 26, 1891; Atchison Daily Champion, January 30, 1891; Acres to 
Cleveland, November 13, 1890, Cleveland Papers. 
68 Topeka Daily Capital, January 13, 21, 28, March 21, 1891; The Autobiog-
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All such actions merely intensified the suspense that enveloped 
Topeka and intrigued the nation. Both the Populists and the Re-
publicans scheduled their decisive caucuses for the night of January 
26, 1891. Amidst confidence and harmony, the Republican legis-
lators quickly pledged themselves unanimously for Ingalls. The 
Populist caucus offered a striking contrast. All possible candidates 
were required to speak briefly and to pledge their support for the 
eventual nominee. The caucus balloting revealed the variety of 
positions and personalities within the People's party and the dom-
inant status of former Republicans, particularly Peffer. Seventeen 
aspirants split the ninety-three caucus votes on the first ballot with 
Peffer receiving thirty-five-as many as the total of the next four 
candidates: Willits, twelve; Elder, ten; Breidenthal, eight; Doster, 
five. Generally eliminating the candidate with the fewest votes on 
each preceding ballot, the caucus struggled through five hours of 
debate and voting before declaring Peffer the party's nominee for 
United States Senator. Peffer led on every poll, but the persistent 
strength of Willits and Elder required eighteen ballots before he 
secured a majority.69 
Only superficially had the contest within the People's party been 
a struggle between moderate and radical factions, and few Populists 
genuinely viewed the choice as an ideological decision or a victory 
for the moderate wing of the party. Instead, the reaction among 
Populists to Peffer's selection was nearly invariably governed by 
their previous party affiliation. Ex-Republicans such as William 
Baker admired Peffer and expressed pleasure at his selection. The 
opposition of the former Union Laborites arose from partisan prej-
udice and pride at least as much as from any theoretical disagree-
ments. These critics simply wanted recognition through senatorial 
honors for their generation of reform agitation as they saw it come 
to fruition. Indeed, Elder, the national chairman of the Union 
Labor party, ascribed his rejection to the influence of the radicals, 
and others added that between Willits and Peffer the radical Pop-
raphy of William Allen White (New York, 1946), pp. 190-92; Atchison Daily 
Champion, January 18, 19, 20, 1891; Topeka Advocate, October 28, November 4, 
1891, October 2, 1895; John Livingston to Benjamin Harrison, February 6, 1891, 
and enclosed clippings, Benjamin Harrison Papers, Library of Congress. 
69 Kansas City Star, January 27, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, January 27, 
1891; Kansas Farmer, February 11, 1891. 
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ulists favored the latter.7o Moreover, former Republicans usually 
proved the most militant in arguing for immediate implementation 
of sweeping reform proposals, in the time-honored fashion of con-
verts; whereas most Union Laborites exhibited a practical modera-
tion approaching fatalism produced by a life of defeat and a custom 
of compromise through fusion with that other political minority, 
the Kansas Democracy. Democrats and Democratic-Populists also 
rejected a true ideological approach to the contest, except insofar 
as such practical political issues as prohibition influenced their 
viewpoint. They were willing to accept Elder or another Union 
Labor candidate from the "radical" faction of the party but were 
adamant against a "moderate" former Republican such as Peffer. 
Years of deliberately inflamed prejudices and exaggerated hostility 
separated Democrats and Republicans on principle, as well as 
principles. 
The following day in the legislature the ranks of the People's 
party held firm, resulting in a strict party vote: ninety-eight Pop-
ulists for Peffer, fifty-eight Republicans for Ingalls, and six Dem-
ocrats for Charles Blair. There remained the necessity of the official 
ballot in joint session on January 28, but the demonstration of 
Populist solidarity made it a formality, and all involved conceded 
Peffer's election. The only change stemmed from the maneuverings 
of the Democrats. Displeased with Peffer's nomination, they had 
voted for Blair on the first roll call. Some, however, felt that by 
voting for Peffer on the official ballot they might be able to exert 
more influence upon the course of the People's party. Others such 
as Senator Edward Carroll steadfastly opposed supporting Peffer, 
and a final caucus left the votes up to the individual Democratic 
legislator. Three Democrats did change their votes to Peffer, and 
he was declared senator by a vote of 101-58 over Ingalls. The Pop-
ulists erupted in a paroxysm of shouts, songs, laughter, and tears. 
Representatives danced on their desks in their excitement over 
Ingalls's defeat. The senate quickly dissolved the joint session and 
left the chamber before Peffer was brought forward. In tears, pale, 
and nervous, Peffer spoke only briefly, promising to promote the 
70 Kansas City Star, January 27, 28, 1891; Topeka Populist, December 3, 1892; 
Fort Scott Daily Monitor, January 28, 1891. Compare David Rothman, Politics 
and Power: The United States Senate, 1869-1901 (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 
p. 173. 
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People's party through which a new society could be created.71 
Populists continued their celebrations all day and into the night. 
Alliancemen and reformers throughout the country joined them in 
welcoming Peffer's election. The National Farmers' Alliance con-
sidered the election "the beacon light that will lead to better times," 
and L. L. Polk regarded the defeat of Ingalls as "the greatest blow 
at sectionalism that has been struck for twenty-five years." The 
Knights of Labor exulted over the first Knight senator; countless 
local reform groups across the nation praised their rejoicing Kansas 
counterparts, who heard, somewhat needlessly, Elder describe 
Peffer's election as "the victory of the people."72 
Peffer's election also demonstrated several things about Kansas 
politics. It revealed the continuing domination of the People's 
party by former Republicans, the persistent factionalism of the 
party and the distrust each faction had of the others, the lack of 
Democratic influence on Populist decisions but the repeated Dem-
ocratic efforts to control the party, and the Republicans' unbroken 
reliance upon traditional sectional and partisan prejudices in their 
effort to destroy Populism. 
But the Populist legislators did their job well; the "people's 
rebellion" had succeeded. Peffer's election not only overthrew a 
national symbol of Republicanism, corrupt politics, and sectional 
and partisan hatred but also provided a national leader for the 
new forces of political reform. Harper's Weekly pointed out the 
impact of the contest: "The election of Mr. Peffer has been en-
thusiastically welcomed by Alliancemen in all parts of the country, 
and has greatly encouraged them in their political action. It is 
one of the greatest purely political victories they have won, and 
will doubtless tend to strengthen the third-party movement in that 
body." The intense national interest in the Kansas senatorial con-
test also guaranteed Peffer a vast audience and immense publicity 
for his reform plans. The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin concluded, 
71 Kansas City Star, January 28, 1891; Topeka Mail, January 30, 1891; Topeka 
Daily Capital, January 28, 29, 31, 1891; Chicago Tribune, January 29, 1891. 
72 Topeka State journal, January 29, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, January 
29, 1891; Stuart Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk, Agrarian Crusader (Chapel 
Hill, N.C., 1949), p. 228; National Economist (Washington, D.C.), February 7, 
1891; Atchison Daily Champion, January 29, 1891; journal of the Knights of 
Labor (Philadelphia), February 5, 19, 1891. 
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"There has been no senatorial election this winter which has at-
tracted more attention from the country than the one which has 
just been decided in Kansas. . . . Whether Peffer is a cunning 
demagogue or whether he is an honest dreamer remains to be 
seen, but his election to the senate is one of the most curious results 
of the political upheaval of 1890."73 
Whether demagogue or dreamer, Peffer had become the first 
national figure of Populism and, as he told one reporter, "I shall 
not be the last."74 
13Harper's Weekly 35 (February 7, 1891): 103; Topeka Daily Capital, February 
3, 1891. 
74 Topeka Daily Capital, January 30, 1891. 
CHAPTER THREE 
The Partisans of Politics 
WHAT KIND of people were these Populists who so jolted and 
threatened the established order in 1890 and 1891? For most of 
the first half of the twentieth century, scholars regarded Populism 
with an approving eye and pen; as Walter T. K. Nugent has phrased 
it, the Populist was a Saint George in American historiography 
and his opposition was a dragon. Historians took their cues from 
such sympathetic students as Solon Buck and John D. Hicks and 
viewed Populism as a movement of economic and political protest 
in the rural areas of the West and South during the 1890s, and 
Populists as an injured, democratic citizenry possessing foresight 
concerning important issues of the time. By the mid-1950s, how-
ever, a new generation of scholars, political scientists and sociolo-
gists as well as historians, sharply reversed the images, and the 
resultant Populist dragon was a scaly one indeed: anti-Semitic, 
nativistic, irrational, reacting to nonexistent economic difficulties, 
and even protofascistic. C. Vann Woodward concluded that the 
critics threatened to establish "a new maxim in American political 
thought: Radix malorum est Populismus."1 Clearly, Populists 
seemed to torment many historians in the 1950s and 1960s as they 
had tormented John ]. Ingalls in 1890 when he described them as 
"an enemy whose strength is unknown, a secret organization based 
upon discontent, bound by oath, led by malevolent and vindictive 
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conspirators, who have everything to gain and nothing to lose in 
the conflict.''2 
The judgment of the historians, moreover, was no more well 
founded than that of the partisan Ingalls. With few exceptions, 
no direct and thorough investigations supported this transforma-
tion of the Populist stereotype. It derived from more general studies 
dealing with Populism only obliquely. The implicit methodological 
approach seemed to be one of making broad generalizations based 
on scattered observations of a very few Populists. Though the critics 
proudly claimed to have "detected and described" the "dark side of 
Populism" that earlier students had missed, they made no system-
atic inquiry into the subject that would have resulted in a real 
understanding of Populism, leaving at least one scholar to wail that 
"basically, historians know very little more about the Populists 
today than they knew" thirty years ago.a 
This impasse has resulted at least in part from a failure to con-
sider seriously the approach conducive to an analysis of a popular 
movement. Both the "attempt to purge the American past of 
dissident elements," as Norman Pollack has described recent histori-
ography, and "the tortuous apologetics of the Populist defenders," 
as Oscar Handlin has characterized the even more recent rebuttals, 
have emphasized Populist rhetoric. But like all major popular 
movements, Populism included many different people with many 
divergent attitudes and ideas and had different factions dominant 
at different times. In short, today's scholar can find some support 
for nearly any claim he may care to make.4 
The failure to acknowledge explicitly the diversity of Populists 
and its implications or to consider the time dimension in discussing 
Populism has obstructed the understanding of the contours of the 
1 Walter T. K. Nugent, The Tolerant Populists (Chicago, 1963), pp. 3-32; 
C. Vann Woodward, "The Populist Heritage and the Intellectual," in The 
Burden of Southern History (New York, 1960), p. 147. See also Theodore 
Saloutos, "The Professors and the Populists," Agricultural History 40 (October 
1966): 235-54. 
2 John J. Ingalls to P. I. Bonebreak, August 18, 1890, Ingalls Papers. 
3 Norman Pollack, "Fear of Man: Populism, Authoritarianism, and the His-
torian," Agricultural History 39 (April 1965): 61; Irwin Unger, "Critique of 
Norman Pollack's 'Fear of Man,'" ibid., p. 78; J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Com-
mentary; Populism: The Problem of Rhetoric and Reality," ibid., p. 81; Oscar 
Handlin, "Reconsidering the Populists," ibid., p. 68. 
4 Pollack, "Fear of Man," p. 65; Handlin, "Reconsidering the Populists," p. 69. 
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movement and prevented the construction of an accurate Populist 
model. Much of this book will suggest the variations in Populism 
over time that might have given rise to the contrasting historical 
interpretations. Since this is a study of internal Populist politics, 
traditional methodology can be effectively employed, but methods 
of data quantification can also permit the historian to make legit-
imate generalized statements about the Populists as a group. The-
odore Saloutos has written that, in the 1890s, "there wasn't anything 
mysterious or secretive about who the Populists were," but the 
recent debate over Populism has obscured even their identity until 
the questions to be answered have become the elementary ones of 
who and what kind of people were the Populists.5 In this chapter 
I will attempt to provide some tentative answers to such basic 
questions for the Populists of 1890 through an aggregate data study 
of electoral behavior in that year's election in Kansas, the center 
of Populism. 
Quantitative history, of course, has certain limitations of its own. 
Its applicability is sharply restricted by the kind and amount of 
historical information available. Thus the major technique used 
here is that of ecological correlations, simply because the data 
necessary for individual correlations are not available. The follow-
ing discussion is therefore generally relevant only to the behavior 
of electorates, usually at the county level, and not to that of in-
dividual voters.6 Similarly, neither the data nor the methods avail-
5 Saloutos, "Professors and Populists," p. 254; Hollingsworth, "Commentary," 
pp. 81-85. There have been several recent and notable attempts to explicitly 
identify Populists and to suggest some statistically valid characteristics. Un-
fortunately, thorough consideration of the time dimension is generally absent 
even in these accounts of some statistical sophistication. See Stanley R. Parsons, 
"Who Were the Nebraska Populists?" Nebraska History 44 (June 1963): 83-99; 
Walter T. K. Nugent, "Some Parameters of Populism," Agricultural History 40 
(October 1966): 255-70; and Sheldon Hackney, Populism to Progressivism in 
Alabama (Princeton, N.J., 1969). Other recent and more generalized attempts 
to determine political characteristics and explain political change during this 
period, the assumptions and conclusions of which are not all in agreement with 
this book, include Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of 
Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900 (New York, 1970), and Richard .J. Jensen, The 
Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896 (Chicago, 1971). 
In light of their emphasis upon the religious background of political behavior 
see my earlier "Pentecostal Politics in Kansas: Religion, the Farmers' Alliance, 
and the Gospel of Populism," Kansas Quarterly 1 (Fall 1969): 24-35. 
6 \V. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and Behavior of Individuals," 
American Sociological Review 15 (June 1950): 351-57; Austin Ranney, "The 
Partisans of Politics 61 
able are appropriate for testing such theories as political alienation 
as independent factors. The conclusions necessarily follow the re-
corded measurable statistics of economic and demographic informa-
tion. Here published census data and voting statistics from the 
primary basis for comparative analyses of Populist, Republican, and 
Democratic voting behavior. In order to test the validity of some 
of the Populist rhetoric and some of the claims of historians, I 
used a stepwise regression program to consider the influence on 
voting behavior of those variables originally regarded as important 
and for which data were available: 
a) The previous partisan preferences of each county; 
b) The percentage of the resident farm-owning families on mort-
gaged farms in each county; 
c) The percentage of families residing on farms in each county; 
d) For encumbered acres, the proportion of the acre-value under 
mortgage in each county; 
e) The average interest rate in each county; 
f) The percentage of the population engaged in manufacturing 
in each county; 
g) The voter turnout in 1890 in each county; 
h) The average farm-acre value in each county; 
i) The per capita assessed valuation in each county; 
j) The average value of farm products per farm in each county; 
k) The percentage of the improved farm acres planted in corn 
in each county; 
I) The percentage of the improved farm acres planted in wheat 
in each county; 
m) The percentage of the population of foreign birth in each 
county; 
n) The percentage of the population of Protestant religion in 
each county; 
o) The percentage of the population of Catholic religion in each 
county.7 
Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study of Electoral Behavior," 
in Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, ed. Austin Ranney (Urbana, Ill., 
1962), pp. 91-102. 
7 These variables were calculated from data in the Eleventh Decennial Census 
of the United States (1890) and the Biennial Reports of the Kansas secretary of 
state. As a contest for a state office of low visibility, the secretary of state 
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While the Republicans tried to destroy the popular coalition formed 
by the People's party by appealing to old-party loyalties, waving the 
bloody shirt, and emphasizing the divisive issue of prohibition, the 
Populists rejected these as irrelevant issues during a depression and 
focused much of their campaign on economic questions. At the 
August state convention, Mary Elizabeth Lease stated the Populist 
position: "Forget party affiliations of the past, forget moral issues 
of the present, in this great struggle for our homes."s The election 
results as tested reflected this campaign concern. No other variable 
was as important in predicting a county's Populist vote as the per-
centage of its resident farm-owning families that lived on mortgaged 
farms. The correlation between this ratio and Populist vote was a 
highly significant .526: mortgaged Kansas farmers evidently were 
much more likely to vote Populist than were those unencumbered. 
The impact of the mortgage issue was so overwhelming that this 
was also the most important variable in predicting a county's Re-
publican vote, even more important than knowledge of the county's 
Republican vote in previous elections. The correlation between 
the mortgage ratio and the Republican vote was -.546: the more 
a county's farmers had mortgaged homes the less it voted for the 
GOP, and the converse. 
That the Populists staggered under the heaviest, most onerous 
mortgages, as they claimed, is not so clear. Indeed, the simple 
(Pearsonian) correlation coefficient between Populist vote and the 
proportion of the county's average acre-value under mortgage was 
negligible (-.076) and of no significance in predicting Populist 
vote. In the stepwise regression program, in fact, this variable 
reflecting the degree of mortgage indebtedness was the least im-
portant of the fifteen variables in the prediction of Populist vote. 
It was no more related to a county's Populist vote than to its 
Democratic vote (-.077), but it was significantly and positively 
correlated (.235) with the Republican vote. Apparently it was more 
likely for a county with heavily mortgaged farms to vote Republican. 
election was the best indicator of party strength, and the partisan division of 
votes for that office was used in this study. Correlations with census data involve 
106 counties in analysis; correlations with other voting statistics involve only 
105 counties, the transient Garfield County being aggregated with Finney. 
Unless otherwise stated, the significance level used is .05. 
s Fort Scott Daily Monitor, August 14, 1890. 
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TABLE 1 
Mortgage Variables and Populist Voting, 1890 
25 counties 25 least 
with Populist Populist 
Variable majorities counties 
% of resident median median 
farm-owning 42.52 25.66 
families on average average 
mortgaged farms 39.66 23.93 
%of average median median 
acre-value 47.01 42.58 
under mortgage average average 
for encumbered 49.13 50.59 
acres (with Seward County excluded 42.31) 
Average 
interest rate 8.80 8.77 
The nature of the data, however, undermines that conclusion. 
The data indicate the extent of mortgage indebtedness for only 
those acres that were mortgaged. Thus it was possible for a county 
with only a small proportion of its farms mortgaged, but those 
heavily, to appear greatly encumbered as a whole, while in actuality 
it might have been in relatively favorable financial shape. Gray 
County in the Republican area of southwestern Kansas might be an 
example of such a county. A comparatively high 54 percent of the 
average acre-value of its encumbered acres was under mortgage 
while it cast only 12 percent of its vote for the People's party. 
Countering the superficial conclusion is that scarcely more than 7 
percent of the county's farmers had mortgaged farms. If voters did 
in fact split along economic lines, such counties would obscure the 
result. Another difficulty is that the correlation coefficient is highly 
sensitive to a few extreme values of either variable. The inclusion 
of Seward County, with a small 9 percent Populist vote and the 
extremely high figure of 207 percent of its average acre-value under 
mortgage, may have produced an importantly lower correlation 
than that existing among the other counties (See Table I). 
Further restricting the reliability of the proposal that heavily 
mortgaged counties were not significantly more likely to vote Pop-
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ulist are the contingency table and chi-square statistic relating the 
two variables. They indicate a strong (positive) measure of associa-
tion, with a probability of less than .005 that the Populist vote is 
independent of the index of mortgage indebtedness. That the 
simple correlation was quite small and negative suggests a non-
linear relationship between a county's Populist vote and the pro-
portion of its average acre-value under mortgage for encumbered 
acres. 
To clarify this relationship and to reduce the influence of extreme 
values without excluding them, I determined the rank-order cor-
relation (Spearman's r.) between the two variables for each of the 
three subregions of the state. I divided the state into subregions 
because the pace of settlement created a pattern of regional develop-
ment and because there was, broadly, a geographical distribution 
of Populist and non-Populist counties, with Republicans and Dem-
ocrats predominating in both the older, better-settled, and devel-
oped eastern third and the sparsely and recently settled western 
third. Under these conditions all three correlations indicated a 
positive relation between the variables, though that of the western 
subregion, the locus of most of the extreme values of both variables, 
was not significant (.151). The correlation within the eastern sub-
region was .388, significant at the .05 level, and that of the central 
third, the center of Kansas Populist strength, was .521, significant 
at the .01 level. 
Closely linked with the mortgage issue was that of interest rates. 
The Populists repeatedly contended that the moneylender and 
mortgage broker charged exorbitant interest on loans, perhaps in 
an attempt to gain the borrower's Janel. Although the reported 
interest rates may not be adequate to test the Populist contention 
accurately, the available data did not really support the Populist 
position. Support for none of the three parties was associated sig-
nificantly with interest rates, nor did the variable aid importantly 
in predicting any party's vote. Because the greater risks of lending 
in frontier areas caused interest rates to increase in a westward 
progression, generally regardless of political conditions, regional 
rank-order correlations were again made with the Populist vote. 
The same broad pattern prevailed as before, all three coefficients 
being positive, with the highest (.293) being in the Populistic 
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central region and those of the eastern (.168) and western (.108) 
thirds being somewhat lower. The first verged on insignificance at 
the .05 level while the others were clearly not significant. In addi-
tion to all the above, the interest rates under consideration, varying 
from 7 to II percent, were not the oppressive charges of which the 
Populists complained, though a partisan might reasonably argue 
that any usurious rates would not be reported.9 It might be further 
noted that historians, in evaluating the Populist contentions con-
cerning interest rates, have not always carefully distinguished be-
tween farm mortgages and chattel mortgages nor recognized the 
full role and importance of the latter. In order to meet payments 
on farm mortgages, debtors often had to arrange chattel mortgages, 
thus entering a business with little regard for law or adversity. In 
1887 the state labor commissioner reported the average annual 
interest rate on chattel mortgages in Shawnee County to be 156 
percent. In predominantly agricultural counties the average rate 
was generally lower, though still at least twice the maximum legal 
rate of 10 percent,lO 
Thus a county with a relatively high proportion of mortgaged 
farmers was more likely to vote Populist, though the influence one 
way or the other of the extent of individual mortgaging and of 
interest rates is not clear. Perhaps these served more as a rallying 
cry of Populist orators to convince the farmer that any mortgage 
was ipso facto evidence of impotence and oppression. Just as likely, 
however, is that in a deflationary period all mortgages, even if 
initiated for land speculation or machinery, represented a burden 
and especially so psychologically if entered into during an inflation-
ary time with a promised future. One historian, moreover, has 
convincingly demonstrated that Populists more often mortgaged 
their land from necessity than from entrepreneurial ambitions than 
did members of the old parties and that the responsibility for the 
general financial collapse lay disproportionately on the shoulders 
9 In a situation of generalized usury, however, the face rate of interest 
charges should be at the legal maximum, which certainly was not the case in 
Kansas in 1890. For a general discussion of the whole mortgage problem, see 
Allan G. Bogue, Money at Interest: The Farm Mortgage on the Middle Border 
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1955). 
10 Second Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics 
(Topeka, Kans., 1887), pp. 99-108. 
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of the latter.11 In any case, those who were mortgaged rejected 
overwhelmingly the political party that had sponsored such im-
probable dreams until the dreamers and the yeomen had been 
trapped in a nightmare. 
The percentage of families residing on farms was the second most 
important variable in predicting a county's Populist vote. Other 
variables had higher simple correlations with Populist vote, but 
its .241 was significant and, with the first variable held constant, 
the partial correlation between Populist vote and this measure of 
rural population was .461. This variable was not significantly 
related to the Republican vote, suggesting the broad nature of 
Republican support in Kansas, while its simple correlation with 
the Democratic vote was a significant -.433, indicating that rural 
counties were distinctly not Democratic counties. The Democratic 
vote centered in counties with relatively large urban populations: 
Leavenworth, Atchison, Wyandotte (Kansas City), and Shawnee 
(Topeka) in the northeast and Sedgwick (Wichita) in south-central 
Kansas. 
Counties did not report precinct returns for the 1890 election to 
the Kansas secretary of state, but vote tabulations as irregularly 
published by newspapers of individual counties further revealed the 
relation between voting and residence. Not surprisingly, the Pop-
ulists achieved their greatest strength in rural precincts, attracted 
considerable support from mixed precincts, and languished in the 
urban precincts.12 This pattern remained fairly uniform regardless 
of region. For example, the Populists polled only 17.1 percent of 
the vote in rural Grant precinct of Douglas County in northeastern 
Kansas, but they garnered a scant 1.9 percent of the vote of the 
county seat, Lawrence. Where they did attract more substantial 
town support, their rural vote generally increased correspondingly, 
as in Ellsworth County in central Kansas. There the town of 
Kanopolis cast more than a quarter of its votes for the third party, 
and the rural township of Ash Creek delivered an overwhelming 
96.4 percent of its votes to the People's party. 
Table 2 indicates the approximate division of the three-party 
11 Nugent, "Some Parameters of Populism," pp. 261-70. 
12 As used here, "rural" simply means a precinct (i.e., a township) with no 
communities large enough to be listed separately in the census. "Mixed" refers 
to any precinct with both farmers and villagers in residence. 
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town vote according to community size. The major strength of the 
Republican party was apparently concentrated in the small and 
medium-sized towns where its share of the vote far surpassed its 
percentage of the state's total vote. The Populists usually cut 
sharply into the Republican rural poll and the Democrats were 
dominant in the largest cities, though even there the Republicans 
retained only a slightly smaller proportion of votes than their share 
on the state level because of the very low Populist percentage. 
TABLE 2 
Voting Distribution by Town Size, 1890 
Community size Republican vote Democratic vote 
To 2,500 56.7% 32.1% 
2,501-5,000 57.6 24.7 
5,001-10,000 52.2 32.0 
Over 10,000 38.9 52.2 







The Democrats attracted at each level of community size a con-
siderably greater following proportionately than they did in the 
state as a whole. In the important urban centers the Democratic 
party even achieved majority status, but its very poor showing 
outside the cities greatly reduced its share of the state total vote. 
The negative association between rural dwellers and Democrats has 
already been noted, but even more significant was the highly 
positive correlation (.508) between a county's Democratic vote and 
the percentage of its population engaged in manufacturing. This 
measure of urbanization was the most important variable in pre-
dicting a county's Democratic vote. 
Unlike the Democrats, the People's party collected at each level 
in Table 2 a considerably smaller vote proportionately than it did 
in the state as a whole. Clearly, the Populist stronghold was among 
the farmers, so much so that Populist congressional candidate L. C. 
Clark felt constrained to speak in Atchison on the eve of the elec-
tion "to correct the impression that it [the People's party] was 
against the towns."I3 
This interest in the election outcome encouraged high voter 
13 Atchison Daily Champion, October 9, 1890. 
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turnout throughout Kansas, and 76.7 percent of the state's age-
eligible males voted in 1890. Voter turnout was regularly high in 
the late nineteenth century, but the 1890 rate represented nearly 
a 10 percent increase over the rate of the 1886 state election.l4 Of 
the ninety-three counties that voted in both elections, the voter 
turnout of sixty-one increased in 1890. The vast majority of those 
counties that experienced a decrease was in the western half of the 
state, from which a great exodus took place following the onset 
of hard times, deflating turnout statistics and perhaps removing 
the discontented who, had they stayed, might have voted for the 
third party and thereby increased the recorded association between 
Populists and interest rates. As one western Kansas paper phrased 
it, "White covered wagons are carrying [Populist congressional can-
didate William] Baker votes out of this district by the hundred 
every day."15 The closeness of the vote also apparently affected 
turnout, drawing voters who sensed the marginal value of an addi-
tional vote. Forty-two counties carried by only a plurality vote by 
one of the three parties had greater turnouts and only fifteen had 
lower turnouts than in 1886. Those counties carried by a majority 
vote divided much more evenly: nineteen had higher and seventeen 
had lower turnouts. 
Political scientists like to puncture the venerable (and vulnerable) 
notion of the independent farmer as the backbone of American 
democracy by pointing out the well-established fact of low political 
involvement and high political indifference among farmers. Such, 
14 Comparable figures as to age-eligible males were not available for the 
earlier election, so the crude measure of total votes as a percentage of total 
population was used. The data bias in this approach, however, was usually to 
increase turnout percentages for the 1886 election and to decrease them for 
the second campaign, and thus it is not unreasonable to accept the 10 percent 
figure as representing a real increase in voter participation. (Because the 
population was determined and reported in early spring, and because voting 
requirements were often both easy and loosely enforced, boom years with their 
high rates of immigration would make available for November voting more 
citizens than indicated by the population report, which of course formed the 
base for calculating turnout. In years of depression and emigration the process 
would be reversed.) The population figures used in this discussion are from the 
Biennial Reports of the Kansas State Board of Agriculture. The election of 
1886 was the nearest previous, nonpresidential year, state election to that of 
1890 and occurred before the collapse of the state's economic boom that 
precipitated Populism. 
15 Glen Elder Herald quoted in Atchison Daily Champion, October 16, 1890. 
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however, was not the situation in Kansas in 1890. There was a 
positive association on the county level between voter turnout and 
the percentage of families residing on farms, although the simple 
correlation of .193 was just below the .05 significance level. 
TABLE 3 















Table 3 further illustrates the relation between turnout and res-
idence. There is no direct linear progression, yet the statistics 
indicate a reversal of the usual findings: voter turnout was by far 
the lowest in urban areas and the highest in heavily rural counties. 
In fact, the only true metropolitan county in the state at that time, 
Wyandotte (Kansas City), recorded a turnout of but 43.7 percent 
and was the only county that did not surpass the 50 percent level. 
The slight depression in turnout figures in the highest ranges of 
rurality on Table 3 reflect those counties in the western part of the 
state where the contest was not so close as to generate the feeling 
common in other places, where extremely sparse settlement and 
long distances made it physically more difficult to vote, and perhaps 
where emigration affected turnout as in the 1886-1890 interval. 
With turnout higher in rural areas, it was of course linked to 
Populist voting. At the county level there was a significant simple 
correlation of .296 between voter turnout and Populist voting 
behavior. This did not merely reflect the association between 
Populism and rural residence, for it was a higher correlation than 
that between those two variables and there was a distinction be-
tween rural counties that went Populist and those that did not. 
Rural counties captured by the Populists had higher turnouts on 
the average and far more often experienced increased voter turnouts 
than those rural counties won by the old parties, and when turnout 
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decreased it was proportionately more frequent in non-Populist 
counties. Considering all counties, the relationship between turn-
out and Republican vote was negative but of negligible importance. 
Turnout was much more negatively correlated with Democratic 
vote (-.363) and, of course, with manufacturing population (-.417). 
Evidently, Populist concern for increased political participation 
took real as well as rhetorical form. 
The other variables important in predicting Populist vote suggest 
the economic marginality that characterized Populist counties. Pop-
ulist vote was negatively correlated with average farm-acre value, 
the coefficient of -.209 just significant at the .05 level. With the 
variables measuring rurality and mortgaged farmers held constant, 
however, the importance of this connection sharply dropped. This 
reflects the geographical position of the Populist counties between 
the high land values about the eastern cities (there was a correlation 
of .803 between farm-acre value and the manufacturing population 
index of urbanization) and the low land values in the sparsely 
settled, arid western region. 
The variable measuring per capita assessed valuation for each 
county was the third most important factor in predicting Populist 
vote. It had a negative simple correlation of -.352 with Populist 
vote, and even with the first two variables controlled it had a 
partial correlation of -.239. High per capita assessed valuations 
did not occur in the urban counties of eastern Kansas but were 
most common in the western subregion. Indeed, per capita assessed 
valuation was negatively associated with the manufacturing pop-
ulation index and significantly positively with the index of rurality. 
Despite this, Populist counties were more likely to have lower 
per capita assessed valuations. This tends to support both the Pop-
ulist claim of being among society's have-nots and the hypothesis 
that emigration removed the discontented and left the more pros-
perous in the western subregion, thus partially explaining the low 
Populist vote in that area. 
The fourth and last variable of major importance in predicting 
a county's Populist vote was its average value of farm products per 
farm. With mortgaged farmers controlled, the partial correlation 
between the two was -.352, again suggesting the relative privation 
of Populist voters. These four major variables produced a multiple 
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correlation coefficient of .699, indicating that they explain nearly 
one-half of the variation in Populist votes in 1890. 
Historians and social scientists have recognized that specific farm 
movements are generally confined to specific types of farming areas, 
and they have traditionally assigned Populism to the wheat growers. 
Some historians have made a bald equation that "as the area of 
wheat production moved westward, so did farm protest." Social 
scientists have generally been more circumspect, pointing out the 
vulnerability of farmers who produce for national and world 
markets and the natural tendency for such insecure agricultural 
groups to support radical parties which champion their interests.16 
This association apparently did not hold in 1890 Kansas. At the 
county level, Populist vote was more closely correlated with the 
proportion of improved acres in corn (.285) than in wheat (.069). 
Though both correlations were positive, that with wheat became 
negative when the major variables reflecting mortgages and rurality 
were held constant and certainly was not statistically significant 
itself. Since corn was the pioneer crop on the Kansas frontier, 
perhaps the Populists were more recent arrivals who had not yet 
adapted to an area well suited for wheat production, or perhaps 
they were less commercially oriented than their non-Populist 
neighbors. Evidently, however, there was at least a grain of truth 
in the Populist political exhortation to raise more hell and less corn. 
The data available here also failed to support some of the recent 
claims of historians about the nature of Populism. This analysis 
at the county level particularly did not sustain the charge against 
Populism of nativism. The proportion of foreign-born in a county's 
population bore little relation to its Populist vote. Both old parties, 
however, had significant correlations with the foreign-born. Dem-
ocratic counties were more likely to have higher proportions of 
foreign-born in their populations (a correlation of .258) while 
Republican counties were more likely to have lower proportions 
of foreign-born (-.282) than Populist counties. 
None of the three parties was significantly correlated with Prot-
16 Samuel P. Hays, The Response to Industrialism, 1885-1914 (Chicago, 1957), 
p. 28; S. M. Lipset, P. F. Lazarsfeld, A. H. Barton, and Juan Linz, "The 
Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in Handbook of Social 
Psychology, ed. Gardner Lindzey (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), 2: ll24-37. 
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estant population, and knowledge of it was of negligible importance 
in predicting either a county's Populist or Democratic vote. It was 
of greater importance in predicting Republican vote and was pos-
itively correlated with the Republican vote when the variable 
reflecting mortgaged farmers was held constant. Of even more im-
portance in predicting a county's Republican vote was its Catholic 
population. There was a simple correlation of -.296 between these 
two variables, and the stepwise regression program considered the 
knowledge of a county's Catholic population second in importance 
among the socioeconomic variables to only the knowledge of its 
mortgaged farmers in predicting its Republican poll. Neither 
Catholics nor mortgaged farmers supported the GOP. Catholicism 
was positively correlated with Democratic vote (.360) and was more 
important in predicting a county's Democratic vote than all other 
socioeconomic factors except the variables indicating the mortgaged 
and the manufacturing populations. Populism once again occupied 
an intermediate position, with a weakly negative, but far from 
significant, correlation with Catholicism. Thus, if any party in 
Kansas in 1890 deserved the epithet of nativist, it was not the 
People's party. A more deserving candidate was Populism's fiercest 
opponent, the Grand Old Party. 
In general, then, counties that were carried by the People's party 
were more likely to have large proportions of their populations 
turning out to vote and living on farms which were mortgaged, 
which had lower land values, and which raised more corn than 
wheat. Republican counties were less rural, had fewer mortgaged 
farms and fewer Catholics, and had higher assessed valuations. 
Democratic counties were more often urban, engaged in manufac-
turing, and had relatively more Catholics and foreign-born. Though 
the evidence is not yet conclusive, apparently the Populists of 
Kansas generally recognized their position better than have many 
subsequent scholars. 
Soon after the election m November 1890, Republican Governor 
Lyman Humphrey informed a correspondent that the votes of the 
People's party were "mostly taken from us, of course." A week 
later Democratic leader Thomas Moonlight explained to Grover 
Cleveland that Democrats had overwhelmingly entered the Populist 
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ranks in Kansas,17 It remained for Populist Senator Peffer to 
attempt to gauge accurately the relative strength of the various 
factions within his party, and appropriately so, for the composition 
of the People's party with respect to the former partisan affiliations 
of its members was crucial to the party and its political course. 
Peffer estimated that the Kansas Populists of 1890 included 45,000 
normally Republican voters; 35,000 former Democrats; 33,000 
Union Laborites; and 2,000 ex-Prohibitionists.18 By determining 
the difference between each party's actual vote and its expected 
vote, given its 1888 vote and the voter turnout differential of the 
two years, an estimation of partisan composition remarkably close 
to Peffer's is obtained. On this basis the Kansas Populists of 1890 
consisted of 41,667 Republicans; 35,867 Democrats; 34,024 Union 
Laborites; and 4,375 Prohibitionists. These groups provided, re-
spectively, 35.94 percent, 30.94 percent, 29.35 percent, and 3.77 
percent of the total Populist vote. 
Correlation coefficients further clarify the nature of the party's 
membership. With the county again as the unit of analysis, the 
Populist vote of 1890 correlated positively with the Republican vote 
of 1886 at .201 and negatively with the Democratic vote of the 
same year (-.244), indicating the relatively greater similarity be-
tween 1890 Populist counties and previously Republican counties 
than between Populist and formerly Democratic electorates. The 
disruption within the GOP caused by the new party is also evident 
in the correlation between the Republican votes of 1886 and 1890: 
.249, a figure not greatly more significant than that of the Populist-
Republican correlation. The different impact of the People's party 
upon the Democracy is evident in the correlation of .514 between 
the Democratic votes of 1886 and 1890. Correlation coefficients 
between the 1890 returns and the voting results of 1888, which 
reflect the reintroduction of a third party into the political arena, 
reveal not surprisingly a strong positive relationship between Union 
Labor and Populist strength (.417) and again a closer Populist 
relationship with Republicans (-.257) than with Democrats (-.423), 
17 L. U. Humphrey to George W. Moore & Co., November 19, 1890, Humphrey 
Papers, KSHS; Thomas Moonlight to Grover Cleveland, November 27, 1890, 
Cleveland Papers. 
18 Peiier, The Farmer's Side (New York, 1891), p. 157. 
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though both are negative. The swath cut through politics by 
Populism left the older parties positively if weakly correlated with 
each other (.126) in 1890. 
The greater absolute strength of the ex-Republicans within the 
People's party is thus reflected in the correlations between the 1890 
Populist vote and earlier election results. Another indication is 
the change in vote shares held by the parties between 1888 and 
1890. The Republican share of the state's poll declined by 14.17 
percentage points (55.30 percent to 41.13 percent) and the Dem-
ocratic share by 12.19 points while the third-party share increased 
by 27.85 points from the Union Labor 1888 figure of 11.57 percent.l9 
Thus the People's party clearly drew more Republicans to its ranks 
than any other group of ex-partisans. And yet, the common assump-
tion that the People's party was overwhelmingly ex-Republican in 
composition is clearly inaccurate. The former Republicans held 
only a small plurality of the party's strength and could be outvoted 
by the Democratic and Union Labor elements-which had a tradi-
tion of cooperation. 
Despite the absolute greater numbers of ex-Republicans within 
the People's party, the movement clearly appealed disproportion-
ately to Democrats. If the Democrats lost only 12.19 percentage 
points to the GOP's 14.17, that represented a loss of 39.08 percent 
of their 1888 vote compared to a Republican loss of 25.62 percent 
of its 1888 membership by 1890. This relative difference in the 
effectiveness of the Populist appeal is further indicated by the 
correlations at the county level of analysis between the increase in 
the third party's share of the vote and the decrease in the shares 
of the two old parties between 1888 and 1890. Both figures are 
naturally strongly positive, but the Democratic lossfPopulist gain 
correlation is somewhat higher (.801) than the corresponding Re-
publican figure (.729). 
Again, of the state's 105 counties, only one witnessed a loss of 50 
percent or more in its Republican share of the vote between 1888 
and 1890, and that county (Sedgwick) was the center of Resub-
19 The difference came from a Prohibitionist decline of 1.49 points. A party's 
"share" of the vote here refers to its proportion of the total vote expressed in 
percentages, and "percentage point" here refers to l percent of the total vote 
and not of the party's vote. 
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m1sswn Republicanism and as such one of the few counties m 
which Republican loss did not necessarily mean Populist gain. But 
fifty counties lost 50 percent or more of their Democratic share of 
the 1888 vote by 1890, ranging upward to an incredible decline of 
98.11 percent in one county. This impact upon their own party 
would further prompt Democratic politicians to attempt to manip-
ulate the People's party to accomplish their partisan objectives. 
The decision of voters to enter the People's party, however, 
seemed, except for the Union Laborites, not without reference to 
their expectation of the election outcome within their particular 
counties, indicating a high degree of mass political knowledge and 
involvement. The stronger the Republicans were in 1888, and thus 
ostensibly the more certain of 1890 success, the more willing the 
Democrats were to leave their correspondingly hopeless party for 
the new People's party in 1890. A tetrachoric correlation coefficient 
of .252 existed between the 1888 Republican vote and the propor-
tion of the 1888 Democratic vote lost by 1890. Consistently, the 
stronger the Democratic party in 1888, and thus the greater the 
possibility for a Democratic victory in 1890, especially if the People's 
party could split the formerly Republican vote, the greater was the 
tendency for Democrats to remain steadfast in their partisan alle-
giance. In those nine counties that had Democratic votes of 40 
percent or more in 1888 (no county had a Democratic majority), 
for example, the Democratic vote declined by only 19.34 percent 
from 1888 to 1890, compared to a decrease of 50.32 percent for all 
other counties. Those nine counties contained 22.03 percent of 
the state's Democrats in 1890 compared to only 14.82 percent two 
years previously, and the Democratic share of the total vote of 
those counties varied only from 43.80 percent in 1888 to 40.78 
percent in 1890. Table 4 illustrates the Democratic disposition. 
Republicans also considered the probable actions of their tra-
ditional opponents before casting their ballots. A Populist victory 
over the GOP might be necessary, but a Democratic victory would 
be a catastrophe. Republicans generally proved more stable in their 
affiliation when the apparent chance for a Democratic victory was 
greater, and less constant in counties with little likelihood of a 
Democratic triumph. In contrast to the Democratic practice, then, 
the stronger their party in 1888 the more Republicans deserted it 
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in 1890 to enter the People's party. In the nine most Republican 
counties of 1888, for a comparative example, the Republican share 
of the vote plummeted from 66.60 percent to 51.52 percent between 
1888 and 1890. This Republican tendency was less clear than its 
Democratic counterpart because of the strength of Resubmission 
Republicans in such urban areas as Wichita, Leavenworth, and 
Kansas City which also had above average Democratic concentra-
tions; and because the massive exodus of the less-established from 
the far western counties permitted the retention or expansion of 
the Republican percentage of the vote. 
If Republicans kept a wary eye on the Democrats before com-
mitting themselves it was not without cause. The marginal value 
of a Republican convert far surpassed that of a Democratic adherent 
to the new party. The Kansas GOP had frequently demonstrated 
its capacity to defeat easily a fusion coalition of Democrats and 
third-party voters, and the People's party therefore necessarily re-
quired substantial numbers of normally Republican voters in order 
to achieve any success. A Populist vote taken from the Republicans 
counted twice, once for the Populists and once against the Repub-
licans; a vote acquired from the Democrats counted but once. The 
importance of this distinction is obvious. Of the twenty-five counties 
which returned a Populist majority in 1890, only one could have 
been carried without the assistance of those Populists of Republican 
antecedents; but eleven of those counties could have been carried 
without any support from Populists of Democratic antecedents. 
One other county won with a plurality would still have remained 
Partisans of Politics 77 
Populist without the assistance of previously Democratic voters.20 
Indeed, strictly speaking, the third party could have captured every 
county in the state through Republican converts alone, and not a 
single county with only former Democrats voting its ticket. Thus 
it was more realistic for Populist leaders to appeal to discontented 
Republicans rather than to seek expedient-minded Democrats; and 
any policy or tactic which threatened to drive former Republicans 
from the Populist ranks, even if directly replaced by Democrats 
thereby attracted, would be suicidal. Peffer and McLallin under-
stood this if Wakefield and Harris did not. 
Correlation coefficients calculated between the Populist county 
pluralities and the percentage-point losses of the two old parties 
also indicate the greater importance of Republican-derived Populist 
strength.21 Both coefficients were strongly positive, of course, re-
flecting the general movement of increased third-party strength and 
decreased support for the old parties, but that with the Republican 
figure was significantly stronger than that with the Democratic 
figure (tetrachoric correlations of .753 and .501), again revealing 
the Populist dependence upon ex-Republicans for actual victory. 
The absolute necessity of winning Republican votes placed former 
Republicans in prominence among the Populist leadership in 1890, 
even out of proportion to the number of ex-Republicans within the 
ranks of the People's party. Peffer was only the prize of the Re-
publican catch which also included Benjamin Clover, Stephen 
McLallin, Frank Doster, William Baker, Percy Daniels, and many 
others. Ninety-three Populists were elected to the legislature in 
November 1890, and of the eighty-three that disclosed their previous 
party affiliation fifty-four had been Republicans, only fifteen Dem-
ocrats and fourteen Union Laborites.22 This pattern also held on 
the local level. In Brown County, for example, which had nearly 
equal Republican and Democratic contributions to the People's 
party, sixty-seven of the 134 delegates to the 1890 Populist county 
conventions could be identified by previous party affiliations, and 
2o The Republican loss in percentage points between 1888 and 1890 is here 
taken to represent Populists of Republican antecedents; similarly Populists of 
Democratic antecedents are estimated from the Democratic loss over that period. 
21 "Plurality" as used here indicates the difference between a county's Populist 
vote share and the larger share of the two older parties. 
22 Kansas Legislative Blue Book (Topeka, 1891). 
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of these forty-one had been Republicans, twenty-one Democrats, 
and five Union Laborites.2a 
The prominence of these former Republicans arose from the 
Populist reliance upon the heavily Republican Farmers' Alliance 
and from the rebellion among Republican partisans against the 
deceptions of their leaders. This prominence, however, did not go 
unchallenged. From the initial steps toward third-party action, 
there existed a struggle for leadership among the factions of the 
new party. Union Laborites believed the laws of primogeniture 
entitled them to leadership of the new party; former Republicans 
claimed it as their representative right; and ex-Democrats asserted 
their abilities as traditional and accomplished manipulators of 
anti-Republican coalitions. All wanted power for its own sake. 
But practical policy distinctions were at least as important to these 
men who had already rejected one party for ideological reasons. 
Former Republicans and Union Laborites agreed on the need for 
an active government with a social and economic vision of positive 
and national scope-to the horror of the Democratic-Populists; the 
demand of the former Democrats for an end to prohibition filled 
the Republican-Populists with revulsion and the Union Laborites 
with indifference; and the insistence of the Democratic-Populists 
upon the continued relevance of the tariff as a major political issue 
astounded both Union Laborites and the regenerated Republicans; 
the Union Laborites doubted the sincerity of the reform conversion 
of both their new allies and feared they would accept half a loaf 
to feed the hungry radicals. Above all, the prejudice of years of 
violence and ridicule brought profound distrust into the People's 
party, and especially between former Republicans and ex-Dem' 
ocrats. Each worked more easily with the Union Labor faction 
than with the other. 
In many counties the People's party explicitly nominated can-
didates on the basis of their partisan background in an attempt to 
unify the party and balance its ticket. Reports of the outcomes 
of factional struggles commonly appeared in the press, as did this 
23 Previous partisan affiliation was determined by delegate attendance at 
previous county conventions during the 1880s in Brown County. That fully 
half of the Populist delegates had never before attended a political convention 
in Brown County again reveals the increased popular political participation that 
was an essential element of Populism. 
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description of the effects of one Populist county convention: "After 
the meeting adjourned the [former] Greenbackers and Union 
Laborites were very jubilant, the [ex-]Republicans looked care-
worn, and the [erstwhile] Democrats were not as jubilant as they 
have been in times past." Mutual distrust also encouraged vote 
trading and scratched tickets. Democrats within and without the 
People's party pressured the organization on both candidates and 
tactics, and both groups frequently announced their intention to 
vote for only the former Democrats on the Populist ticket.24 
Thus the People's party in 1890 was more an uneasy coalition of 
former opponents temporarily united through dissatisfaction, dis-
tress, hope, and hard politics than a unified and cohesive political 
party. It had achieved substantial success through suppressing such 
divisive issues as prohibition and partisan traditions and muffling 
the attempts of old party leaders to activate the jealousy, suspicion, 
and distrust which they had carefully encouraged for decades and 
which now lurked within the People's party. To maintain its ad-
vantage, its own leaders would have to avoid antagonizing the 
various factions. And fusion with unrepentant Democrats made as 
much sense to the decisive Republican-Populists as fusion with the 
GOP would have pleased those Populists of Democratic background. 
Fusion would not be, as some Democratic-Populists in 1890 and 
some historians since believed, the salvation of Populism, but its 
destruction. 
24 Erie Republican-Record, August 8, 1890: Atchison Daily Champion, July 
25, August 24, 1890; Lawrence Gazette, July 24, 1890; Topeka Mail, August 15, 
1890; W. C. Jones to W. H. Sears, [early November 1890], Sears Papers. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The National Crusade 
KANSAS PoPULISTs learned much from the turbulent campaign of 
1890 and the subsequent senatorial election. To maintain momen-
tum and deprive the Republican party of its major political argu-
ment, the Populists had to increase the scope of their activities. 
They had to launch a national third party, both to push their re-
form goals and to prevent Kansas Republicans from charging that 
their independent action would result only in the national triumph 
of an unregenerate Democracy, entrenched as it was in the Solid 
South, where political independence was not permitted. The Pop-
ulist effort in 1891, then, had to be primarily an attempt to convert 
the South from its traditional Democratic allegiance to an accep-
tance of the new party they would organize. Senator-elect William 
A. Peffer, as the most conspicuous spokesman of the People's party, 
would play a major role in this dual effort in national politics. 
The task of organizing a national party received first priority. 
Various independent state parties based on Alliance strength had 
conducted reform campaigns in 1890 throughout the Northwest. 
Though the People's party of Kansas proved the most successful, 
these independents elsewhere elected numerous legislators, three 
congressmen, and one senator, James H. Kyle of South Dakota. In 
the South, alliancemen had carefully avoided such third-party 
action, but working through the Democratic party they elected four 
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governors, gained control of the legislatures of eight states, and 
pledged as many as forty-four successful congressional candidates to 
Alliance principles. Now the Kansas Populists hoped to consolidate 
this mass unrest into an integrated political party. As early as June 
1890, Peffer had predicted that the People's party would not remain 
strictly a Kansas movement but would develop into a major national 
party. Repeatedly he advocated the unification of the nation's 
reform organizations as a step toward that objective. He particular-
ly urged Southern alliancemen, at their December conference in 
Ocala, Florida, to follow the Kansas example of renouncing partisan 
prejudice in order to unite on new issues.l 
Others took a more direct role in organizing a national party. 
Led by William F. Rightmire, John H. Rice, and the Vincent 
brothers of the \1\Tinfield Non-Conformist, these men were almost 
invariably prominent in the Citizens' Alliance, a group formed by 
those ineligible for the Farmers' Alliance. These activists generally 
were more politically knowledgeable and experienced than their 
agrarian associates and frequently had a traditional third-party 
background. Together with C. A. Power of Indiana, they drew up 
a call for a national conference of all reform organizations to meet 
in Cincinnati in February 1891 and, after securing signatures from 
many Northern reform leaders, took it to Ocala. There the entire 
Kansas delegation, headed by Benjamin Clover, Rice, John Willits, 
and Stephen McLallin, attempted to commit the Farmers' Alliance 
to the third-party movement. Southern delegates, however, coldly 
rebuffed the Kansas effort, convinced that their political successes 
within the Democratic party in the 1890 elections portended even-
tual Alliance ascendancy without threatening white supremacy in 
the South. Charles W. Macune, editor of the Alliance's National 
Economist, proposed deferring decision on the third-party issue 
until 1892, and the outnumbered Kansans reluctantly agreed. Per-
haps as compensation, Clover was then elected national vice pres-
ident and Willits, nationa1lecturer.2 
When Republicans seized upon the Ocala decision as proof that 
1 John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (Minneapolis, 1931), pp. 152-85; Kansas 
Farmer (Topeka), June 25, November 5, 26, 1890. 
2 W. F. Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in Kansas-Origin of the People's 
Party," Transactions of the Kansas State Historical Society (Topeka, 1906), 9: 
6-7; Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 207-9; Topeka Advocate, December 24, 1890. 
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the Alliance served the interests of the Southern Democracy, Kansas 
Populists quickly renounced any intention of delaying action until 
1892. The Populist State Central Committee soon officially endorsed 
a national political organization and Peffer and other leaders an-
nounced their concurrence; \1\Tillits declared that his Alliance 
speeches would naturally reflect his Populist sentiments; and the 
Kansas Citizens' Alliance agreed to push plans for a national third 
party. On February 7, 1891, Rightmire, as secretary of the National 
Citizens' Alliance, reissued the call for the Cincinnati Conference, 
rescheduled for May 19, 1891, and now signed by Senator-elect 
Peffer, as the People's party's nominal leader; P. P. Elder, as the 
national chairman of the Union Labor party; most members of the 
Populist Kansas House of Representatives; and such customary 
third-party supporters as Ignatius Donnelly and James B. Weaver.3 
To ensure an appropriate response, Peffer and his fellow Pop-
ulists now actively promoted the cause of independent action. He 
pledged to avoid the caucuses of both old parties in the Senate and 
promised that the political cataclysm that had struck Kansas would 
soon sweep other states. He joined the five Populist congressmen 
to provide financial backing for the debt-ridden Advocate in order 
to have a vigorous Populist paper in Topeka. He and McLallin 
then helped organize the Kansas Reform Press Association (KRPA), 
which, like its national counterpart, would publicize and promote 
the cause of Populism. The new senator was elected the KRP A's 
first president and McLallin became secretary. Finally, Terence 
V. Powderly, Grand Master Workman of the Knights of Labor, 
visited Topeka to confer with Peffer and John Davis, the first 
Knights ever elected to Congress, on the subject of organizing the 
third party nationally. To their disappointment, he expressed his 
unwillingness to commit the Knights as an organization to any 
party, though he assured them of his personal cooperation.4 
In late February Peffer went to Washington to observe Congress 
and consult with other reform leaders, including Henry George, 
3 Girard Western Herald, January 10, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, December 
12, 1890, January 24, February 8, 1891; Topeka Advocate, December 17, 1890; 
Kansas City Star, January 14, 1891; Kansas Farmer, January 7, February 18, 
1891: Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement," p. 7. 
4 Topeka Daily Capital, January 29, 30, February 17, 25, 1891; Kansas City 
Star, February 25, 1891; journal of the Knights of Labor (Philadelphia), Feb· 
mary 19, 1891. 
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Laurence Gronlund, Macune, Kyle, and Polk. Together with Con-
gressmen John G. Otis, Davis, and Jerry Simpson, he spoke to the 
National Citizens' Alliance, the Nationalist Club, the Federation of 
Labor, and other reform groups. Peffer attracted a great deal of 
attention when he visited the Senate, for neither old party was 
ready to accept his claim to independent status and each sought 
him for its own caucus. Peffer's repudiation of the GOP encouraged 
the Democrats, who invited him to attend a celebration of Dem-
ocrat John M. Palmer's election as senator from Illinois. Already 
annoyed because Simpson had encouraged Illinois's independent 
legislators to vote for Palmer, Peffer brusquely declined, saying he 
had no reason to rejoice at a Democratic victory. His subsequent 
prohibition speeches also dismayed the Democrats, who had been 
originally elated over his election.5 
The persistent Populist effort to promote the formation of a 
national third party also irritated Democrats, especially Southerners. 
Peffer, Otis, and Simpson found little Alliance support of their 
intentions in Virginia and Maryland, while M. W. Wilkins of the 
Non-Conformist was rebuffed at the Texas Alliance state convention 
in his effort to line up delegates for the Cincinnati Conference. 
Indeed, the Kansas Alliance was not joined in its official endorse-
ment of the Cincinnati meeting by any other state body in the 
Southern Alliance. Macune and Polk announced their opposition 
to the conference and argued that action be postponed until 1892 
with the interval spent on an educational campaign. Other South-
erners were even more adamant and warned Peffer against ever 
forming a new party, declaring, "We are Democrats first and Alli-
ancemen next."6 
This Southern reluctance revealed the tenuous position of the 
Populists in Kansas, for as it takes two to argue it takes two to be 
reconciled. Kansans could not be expected to renounce partisan 
and sectional loyalties lest Southerners did likewise; their fear was 
that Southern resistance lay in a desire for the Democracy to reap 
the advantage of political independence in the North. That this 
5 Washington (D.C.) Post, March 3, 14, 27, 1891, April 8, 1891; Topeka Daily 
Capital, March 29, 1891; National Economist, March 14, 1891. 
6 Washington Post, March 6, II, 12, 1891; National Economist, February 21, 
April 4, 25, 1891; Robert Cotner, James Stephen Hogg (Austin, Texas, 1959), 
p. 257. 
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belief was more than a Republican stratagem was evident in re-
peated Populist statements, none more so than that of the new 
Alliance state president, Frank McGrath. Reacting to the pro-
nouncements of Southern Alliance spokesmen, McGrath specifically 
urged Southerners to attend the Cincinnati Conference and be 
prepared to act with a third party, and he scarcely veiled a threat 
that Kansas and other Northwestern states would swiftly return 
to the GOP if the Southern alliancemen did not join them. For 
McGrath, a major objective at Cincinnati would be to determine 
whether the South was ready to unite with the Northwest "or 
whether the South is working to divide the North and place the 
Democracy in unlimited power in our national affairs in 1892." 
McLallin attempted to soothe the situation in his Advocate, but he 
too believed that the South "must be held responsible for any 
further delay of the results of the conflict in which we are engaged 
in common."7 
For their part, the Kansas Populists would tolerate no further 
delay, and the Cincinnati Conference clearly depended upon them 
for its direction and motivating force. Of the 1,443 delegates, more-
over, 411 were from Kansas. Both the Farmers' and the Citizens' 
Alliances sent delegations, as did the Knights, the Farmers' Mutual 
Benefit Association, the Kansas Reform Press Association, the 
People's party, Union Labor remnants, and other organizations. 
Nearly all anticipated the immediate formation of a national third 
party. Peffer, a delegate of the Shawnee County Farmers' Alliance, 
outlined his plan for the conference. He wanted an unequivocal 
declaration of a new party, the adoption of a platform and a public 
appeal, and the selection of a national committee to supervise the 
party's campaign, deferring only the nomination of candidates 
pending a conference of all reform organizations scheduled for St. 
Louis on February 22, 1892.8 
Most delegates agreed with Peffer not to postpone the decision, 
but often for McGrath's reasons. Former Republicans from the 
Western states, one reporter noticed, "urged that this is the time 
to make the South show its hand. If the convention was postponed 
7 Kansas Farmer, April 15, 1891; Washington Post, April 15, 1891; Topeka 
Advocate quoted in National Economist, May 16, 1891. 
8 Topeka Advocate, May 27, June 3, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, April 4, May 
19, 1891; Kansas Farmer, November 26, 1890; Washington Post, May 13, 1891. 
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till '92," he continued, "it would then be too late to organize a 
third party, and the Southern farmers would find an excuse to 
stick to their own party, but at the same time encouraging the 
Republicans to vote for an independent ticket. Some of the Western 
men say they do not intend to be used to elect a Democratic pres-
ident, and unless the South shows up at the Conference many of 
the Republican farmers in Kansas and the West will return to 
their old party allegiance until the South is ready to join with them 
with an honest purpose to elect independent party men."9 
Though the Southern states were indeed poorly represented, 
Kansas Populists seized control of the convention from its beginning 
and directed it toward the creation of a national party. The 
immense Kansas delegation arrived in Cincinnati before any other 
group and immediately caucused. Declaring their intention to 
overwhelm any opposition to the new party, the Kansans shouted 
down Simpson when he argued for a discretionary postponement 
and then unanimously passed a resolution favoring the third party. 
"As goes Kansas, so will go the convention" was a popular expres-
sion at the conference, and other delegations in their own caucuses 
quickly agreed with the Kansans.10 
Kansans remained dominant when the National Union Confer-
ence opened officially on May 19, 1891. Rightmire called the meet-
ing to order, Sam Wood helped direct temporary arrangements, and 
even the entertainment was provided by the Kansas Glee Club. 
Peffer was elected permanent chairman of the conference, pleasing 
proponents of an immediate third-party declaration. After an 
afternoon devoted largely to committee sessions, a mass meeting was 
held in the evening with Peffer as the principal speaker. Respond-
ing to a thunderous ovation, he spoke movingly of the conference. 
"We come here as harbingers of a revolution ... to reestablish 
the authority of the people," he declared, and he urged the forma-
tion of a new party as their instrument of revolution.n 
Despite such appeals, many delegates were swayed by more con-
servative advice offered by Weaver, Simpson, and Polk. These men 
9 Topeka Daily Capital, April 21, 1891. 
10 Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette, May 18, 19, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, 
May 19, 1891; Washington Post, May 19, 1891. 
11 Kansas Farmer, June 10, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, May 20, 1891; Cin-
cinnati Commercial-Gazette, May 20, 1891. 
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hoped that by delaying action they could ultimately attract greater 
Southern support. The resolutions committee, chaired by Ignatius 
Donnelly, devised an acceptable compromise: The conference 
created a national People's party with an executive committee 
composed of three members from each state and directed this 
committee to attend the proposed St. Louis conference and promote 
a union with those reform organizations there assembled. If the 
St. Louis meeting objected to a third party, this committee was 
authorized to call a national nominating convention.12 
Although this decision pleased both factions, Kansans left no 
doubt that they regarded it as having established a national party. 
McGrath expressed his displeasure with Simpson's dilatory efforts 
but applauded Peffer for his constant third-party advocacy. "Every-
one opposing the third party," he grinned, "was run over."13 Pre-
siding over the birth of the party Peffer exulted, "We have started 
and there is no such thing as stopping us [A voice: "That's it!"], 
and the right thing to do is to keep in the middle of the road [A 
voice: "That's right!"] and to go ahead [More applause]."14 
With the organization of the national People's party accom-
plished, Kansas Populists turned to the second phase of their 
campaign plan, the extension of their political revolution through-
out the nation, with a special emphasis upon converting the South. 
The poor Southern attendance at Cincinnati greatly concerned 
Kansans. Levi Dumbauld, Populist state chairman, had repudiated 
McGrath's pronouncement before the conference, declaring "the 
People's party of Kansas is in the field to stay," but the real anxiety 
had scarcely been concealed by the repeated assurances that the 
popular fear of Southern nonattendance was unwarranted. When 
such hopes proved unfounded, Populist leaders were urgently 
12 Cincinnati Commercial· Gazette, May 21, 1891: Rightmire, "The Alliance 
Movement," pp. 7-8· Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 214-15. 
13 Topeka Dafly Capital, May 23, 1891; Kansas Farmer, May 27, 1891. 
14 Topeka Advocate, May 27, 1891. Previous students of Populism have found 
the term "middle-of-the-road" used no earlier than 1892. In fact, it was not an 
uncommon term before then, used to indicate an avoidance of both the Re-
publican and the Democratic parties (which were considered to be in the gutters 
of the political system-on each side of those who kept clean and honest in the 
middle of the road). Clearly, however, Peffer must have been the first to apply 
it to the People's party, doing so at the very conference that organized the 
party, and to suggest the policy that later came to be identified as the mid-road 
position within the party. 
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questioned as to the intentions of the South. Again they assured 
their followers with optimistic statements, maintaining that the 
South would join the Populist coalition and thereby guarantee 
victory in 1892. With such expectations, then, the Kansas Populists 
launched what the newspapers dubbed "the Southern crusade" of 
the "Kansas missionaries."15 
These third-party advocates scattered over the South during the 
summer of 1891. John Willits, as national lecturer of the Farmers' 
Alliance, had already begun his canvass of the South and, though 
circumspect, was, one observer noted, "gently leading the farmers 
to the point where a grand rush and a pull all together by the 
Kansas publicists would throw them clear over in the third party 
camp." Now Willits used the National Alliance's lecture bureau 
in conjunction with the Kansas Populist State Central Committee, 
the Populist National Executive Committee, and the Kansas Alli-
ance lecture bureau to place Populist spokesmen throughout the 
South, and to a lesser extent in the important political pivot of the 
Old Northwest. After making a few speeches in Kansas and such 
Eastern forums as New York's Cooper Union in early June, Peffer 
began a great swing through the South from West Virginia to Texas 
by the end of July. Simpson made two sorties, one into the Deep 
South of Alabama and Georgia with Mary Elizabeth Lease and 
Annie Diggs, and one into Arkansas and Texas. Otis concentrated 
on the bonier states, B. E. Kies on the Southwest. Innumerable 
minor figures of Kansas Populism joined these acknowledged leaders 
in their attempt to convert the South.16 
The political faith of the South was rooted in devotion to the 
Democratic party and its traditions. Leonidas F. Livingston, 
Georgia Alliance leader and congressman-elect, explained his sec-
tion's position. Southerners, he declared, "are naturally Democratic, 
and before organizing a third party want to wait and see what the 
Democratic party will do. If that party will recognize the Alliance 
demands, they will take no step toward a third party."17 
15 TojJeka Advocate, April 22, May 6, 1891; Girard Western Herald, May 30, 
June 13, 1891; .J. C. Ruppenthal Scrapbooks, 1: 427, KSHS; Topeka Daily 
Capital, July 18, 189!. 
16 Ruppenthal Scrapbooks, I: 427; National Economist, June 13, 1891; Kansas 
Farmer, July I, 1891; Topeka Advocate, July 8, 189!. 
17 Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette, May 19, 1891. 
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Such a course, however, would leave Kansas Populists in the 
predicament Republican alliancemen would have faced in 1890 had 
Kansas Democrats endorsed Alliance demands. That intolerable 
situation had forced the creation of a state party and now drove 
Populists to construct a national third party for their own survival. 
0. B. Deane of Meyers Valley, Kansas, explained to Southern alli-
ancemen why their Northern counterparts rejected the proposal to 
control the existing parties: Southern alliancemen were primarily 
Democrats, whereas Northern alliancemen were more evenly di-
vided as to political affiliation and had been unable to control 
either old party. To carry out the Southern proposition, Deane 
added, "We in the North would require a majority of both the 
old parties, because you can't make Republicans out of Democrats, 
nor Democrats out of Republicans, and to divide up is just what 
they both want us to do." Thus a separate, third party was necessary 
for success in the North, he concluded, "and if the South goes with 
us it will strengthen our hand, as it will put an end to the cry of 
Democratic aid society in the North and Republican aid society 
in the South." Another Kansan further described the tactical 
reasons behind the Southern tour of the Populists. The question 
that faced Kansas in 1890 now confronted all the states, J. T. Howe 
told the Bell Spring, Virginia, Alliance. How could Alliance 
principles be put into operation? 
Democrats say there is but little difference between Democracy and Alli-
ance principles, and we had better fall in line behind their banner and 
march on to victory. Well, Brother Democrat, that seems to be a fair 
proposition. Of course you extend this invitation to the large number 
of Republicans who belong to the Alliance? Do you expect them to accept 
it? Try the boot on the other foot. Suppose the Republicans would 
accede to our demands and extend the same invitation to you; would 
you accept? Of course not; [you] never can go into the Republican party. 
Well, then, what you will not do yourself you ought not expect them to 
do, because they feel that they make as great [a] sacrifice in leaving their 
party as you do in leaving yours. They have already made sacrifices 
by leaving their party and say they are willing to meet you halfway. 
Are you willing to go the other hal£?18 
Most observers predicted a negative answer. The New York 
Saturday Globe believed that "whatever else may come, the Dem-
18 National Economist, July 4, 1891. 
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ocratic party has nothing to fear from this [People's party] move-
ment. It draws its independent support from states in which only 
the Republican party can be injured. In the Democratic states of 
the South," it continued, "no power can, for the present, detach the 
sympathizers with the Alliance and its ideas from the Democ-
racy."19 It was this very task that the Kansas Populists set for 
themselves. 
There were two parts to their effort. First, as they had in Kansas, 
the Populists had to nullify the emotional prejudices that bound 
people to the old parties; second, they had to confront the Democ-
racy directly on the issues. The bloody shirt and prohibition found 
their Southern counterparts in the Lost Cause and white supremacy, 
and the Populists hoped to deal with them as effectively. From 
Maryland to Texas, they celebrated the defeat of the hated Ingalls-
the man, Simpson declared, "who had kept the Republicans of 
Kansas together by pleading sectionalism." They appealed to their 
Southern listeners to strike similarly against "sectional agitators," 
whose object, wrote Clover, was "self-aggrandizement and the service 
of an oppressive and unscrupulous combination of public robbers." 
Thus, he continued, "sectional hate and its other self, party prej-
udice, have been the means by which monopoly has been enabled 
to bind the people." It was in the South's own interests, then, to 
help the West bury the past and unite in pursuit of common goals. 
Indeed, Simpson wrote, it was to "set an example to the rest of the 
country, particularly to the South," that the Kansas Populists had 
"resolved to cast aside the chief apostle of this doctrine of hate, 
John J. Ingalls," after having discovered for themselves "that for 
long years they had been blinded to their own interests by designing 
politicians, who kept alive the old war issues and prejudices."2o 
The emphasis upon the defeat of Ingalls gave Peffer a natural 
leadership in the Kansas effort to influence the South. Even before 
his election, however, Peffer had begun to develop the Populist 
indictment of sectionalism which he repeatedly used thereafter. 
Sectional prejudices, inflamed by politicians for partisan purposes, 
19 Washington Post, May 25, 1891. 
20 Washington Post, March 6, 1891; Cotner, Hogg, p. 257; Benjamin H. Clover, 
"Sectionalism," and Jerry Simpson, "The Political Rebellion in Kansas," both 
in N. A. Dunning, ed., The Farmers' Alliance History and Agricultural Digest 
(Washington, D.C., 1891), pp. 253-56, 283; Dallas Morning News, August 8, 1891. 
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he charged, divided the West and South to the injury of both 
sections. The Populists, he maintained, opposed any effort to incite 
sectional animosities and instead sought Southern cooperation in 
solving pressing political and economic problems. The effort would 
require sacrifices, he admitted, especially the renunciation of par-
tisan loyalties, but more than 100,000 Kansans had already rejected 
such restraints, he pointed out, and Southerners must be equally 
committed. 21 
The issue of white supremacy presented greater problems. Peffer 
assured the South that Populists would never support legislation 
motivated by sectional hatred, and he felt that hypocritical "North-
ern lecturing" served no useful purpose, but he also believed that 
all citizens, black and white, must have equal protection of the 
laws. He maintained that the Kansas Alliance and Populists made 
no racial distinctions and urged the South to act likewise, realizing 
that the interests of the oppressed transcended color.22 Such words 
often fell on deaf ears. When Josephus Daniels interviewed Peffer 
in June 1891 about his intentions for the People's party in the 
South, for instance, his major concern was simply that the Populists 
would insure Negro domination by dividing the Democracy. Per-
sistently Peffer declared Daniels's anxiety an irrelevancy, for the 
People's party could not consider the effects of disrupting the 
Democracy in the South except insofar as it related to the triumph 
of Populist principles. Populists, he added, opposed as much the 
politicians' attempts to incite racial prejudice as sectional hatred, 
and they hoped to destroy both old parties. Daniels retorted that 
Democrats were not responsible for the wrongs against which Peffer 
inveighed and that the Democracy in control would solve the na-
tion's troubles.23 
This refusal to accept the inclusion of the Democracy in the 
Populist indictment of politics formed the dominant Southern 
response to the third-party proselytizers. But while most Alliance 
leaders were announcing their Democratic commitments, there 
21 Kansas Farmer, November 5, 26, 1890: William A. Peffer, "The Farmers' 
Alliance," Cosmopolitan 10 (April 1891): 699; Atchison Daily Champion, Jan-
uary 29, 1891. 
22 Kansas Farmer, November 26, 1890; Peffer, "Farmers' Alliance"; Topeka 
Mail, May 9, 1890; Atchison Daily Champion, January 29, 1891. 
23 Washington Post, June 10, 1891. See also Kansas Farmer, November 26, 1890. 
National Crusade 91 
were some hopeful signs. The Atlanta Southern Alliance Farmer 
proclaimed, "Our Western brethren have shown the faith by their 
works, and Southern Alliancemen should now meet them halfway." 
"With what consistency," it wondered, "can Alliancemen in the 
South ask their brethren of the North to throw the mantle of obliv-
ion over the dead past, and still keep aflame the old war feeling 
themselves?" Even this paper, however, reported Southerners re-
luctant to leave their party and willing to give it every opportunity 
to accept Alliance principles. L. L. Polk, increasingly inclined 
toward independent action, also considered the relationship be-
tween the new party and the Southern Alliance in his Progressive 
Farmer. "The new party has adopted the Alliance demands in its 
platform. Does anyone suppose intelligent Alliancemen will vote 
against the party that adopts these demands, and in favor of a 
party that not only fails to adopt, but resists these demands?"24 
The Populist obligation, then, was to demonstrate the incongruity 
of Democratic and Alliance principles and the inability of the 
Democracy to respond effectively to the new issues. Throughout 
the South, county alliances met in July to elect and instruct dele-
gates to the state Alliance meetings in early fall which would in 
turn determine the position to be followed at the National Alliance 
conference in Indianapolis in November. The Populists focused on 
these July meetings in their campaign to commit the Alliance as an 
organization to the People's party.25 Before these audiences they 
repeatedly pointed out that the Democrats often agreed with the 
Populist description of existing difficulties but could only blame 
Republican legislation and vaguely promise relief under a Dem-
ocratic government. Peffer hammered at the inability of the 
Democrats to promise specific and realistic remedies. They had 
only two suggestions to relieve economic depression and social 
polarization, he told his Alliance listeners in the South: tariff 
reduction and free silver. These promised measures of relief, he 
declared, "if they shall be forthcoming, which is doubtful, are 
wholly inadequate to the needs of the people." The Democratic 
Mills tariff bill had proposed only small reductions in tariff duties, 
he argued, while even free trade would produce a per capita net 
241Vational Economist, June 13, 1891: Girard Western Herald, July 4, 1891. 
25 National Economist, July 4, 1891; Ruppenthal Scrapbooks, 1: 427. 
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savings which would be insignificant m lightening the popular 
burden.26 
Peffer and his fellow Kansans equally arraigned the Democratic 
free silver stand. The amount of money free silver coinage would 
add to circulation, he declared, "is a mere bagatelle in comparison 
with the sum needed," and free silver would neither reach the core 
of the trouble in American society nor provide permanent relief. In 
1890-1891 silver was of distinctly minor importance to Populists, 
and they were emphatically hostile to it as a political or economic 
panacea. Free silver was a common demand in the West and even 
Ingalls was an eloquent champion of it. Indeed, Nevada Senator 
William M. Stewart had pled for the reelection of Ingalls because 
of his importance in the cause of silver, a plea the Populists plainly 
rejected. They demanded more fundamental changes.27 
Still, free silver often proved a popular issue on their Southern 
tour, as long as many of their listeners regarded themselves as silver 
Democrats. In such instances the Populists pointed out the incon-
sistency of silver men supporting such Democrats as Grover Cleve-
land. Indeed, Cleveland's public opposition to free silver, admitted 
the president of one Southern state Alliance, encouraged alliance-
men to view more favorably a third party because of the likelihood 
of his renomination in 1892. Populists also believed that between 
Cleveland's intransigence and the silver declaration of the Cincin-
nati Conference the Southern Democrats would be unable to retain 
Alliance support. Peffer's usual speech, then, not only emphasized 
Alliance and Populist demands for thorough reforms, especially 
financial reform involving greenbacks and banking, but also asserted 
that the Democracy dared not put even a free silver plank in its 
national platform and ridiculed the Democratic tariff position as 
"a fraud and a delusion." He invariably closed with a pledge that 
when Southern alliancemen failed to have their demands answered 
in the Democracy, they would then find the People's party "in the 
middle of the road."2S 
26 Kansas Farmer, July 29, 1891; Dallas Morning News, July 31, 1891. 
27 Dallas Morning News, July 31, 1891; Kansas Farmer, July 29, 1891; Peffer, 
The Farmer's Side (New York, 1891), p. 128; Topeka Daily Capital, January 28, 
1891; 0. Gene Clanton, Kansas Populism: Ideas and Men (Lawrence, Kans., 1969), 
p. 104. 
28 Girard Western Herald, August 1, 1891; James H. Davis to Ignatius Don-
nelly, June 3, 1891, Donnelly Papers; Washington Post, March 30, June 10, 1891; 
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More important than either the tariff or free silver as a wedge 
to separate alliancemen from the Democracy was the subtreasury 
proposal. An ingenious plan, not dissimilar to Peffer's Way Out, 
the subtreasury promised farmers short-term credit for agricultural 
products stored in government warehouses and offered the nation 
an increased and elastic currency supply. It was endorsed by the 
Alliance at its 1889 St. Louis national meeting and became the 
favorite demand of Southern alliancemen, who anticipated breaking 
out of the crop-lien system through its adoption. Involving cen-
tralized authority and government competition with local business 
interests, the subtreasury naturally provoked strong opposition from 
conservatives, especially on the traditional Democratic grounds of 
"paternalism." Democratic politicians, elected on Alliance plat-
forms in 1890, had promptly denounced the subtreasury once in 
office. Now in the summer of 1891 the subtreasury became the 
primary target of Southern critics of the Alliance and its third-party 
tendencies. 29 
Democrats encouraged the more conservative alliancemen to re-
organize their order on an anti-subtreasury basis. Led by the 
president of the Missouri Farmers' Alliance, Uriel S. Hall, an 
ambitious politician who wanted to manipulate the Alliance to 
promote Democratic interests, these men held a special Alliance 
convention in Fort "\Vorth in July to repudiate the subtreasury. 
Those in attendance who supported the subtreasury plan were not 
permitted to speak and ultimately were forced out of the convention. 
The Dallas Morning News found the speeches more "in the line of 
a political Democratic speech than a non-political alliance speech" 
and that the delegates cheered every reference to the necessity of 
remaining within the Democracy to remedy agrarian distress. One 
delegate told a reporter, "The truth of the matter is that there is 
a political split in the alliance. This [anti-subtreasury] wing is 
composed of Alliance Democrats ... and the other wing is crystal-
lized into an adjunct of the People's Party."30 
Indeed, an adherence to Alliance principles came necessarily to 
Dallas Morning News, July 27, 1891. See also Peffer, Farmer's Side, pp. 124-30: 
"Partisan Remedies Proposed." 
29 Davis to Donnelly, June 3, 1891, Donnelly Papers; C. Vann Woodward, 
Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge, La., 1951), pp. 239-40. 
30 Uriel S. Hall to Grover Cleveland, May 19, 1891, Cleveland Papers; Dallas 
Morning News, July 11, 12, 1891. 
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include an inclination toward the third party. Although a few 
Populists such as William A. Harris, himself a former Southern 
Democrat, opposed the subtreasury, most agreed with Peffer's strong 
endorsement of the plan and his determination to force the issue 
in the South. Frequently they regarded opposition to it as a 
Democratic scheme to destroy the Alliance's political influence. 
Moreover, as one newspaper reported, "The Kansas leaders fear 
this is but the beginning of a movement that will disrupt their 
organization in Kansas, as thousands of Republicans who affiliated 
with the People's Party last year will follow the course of their 
Southern [Alliance] brethren and go back to their old party." At 
the July Alliance meetings throughout the South, then, it was 
usually a Kansas Populist who advocated the full Alliance program 
while Southern Democratic leaders argued for the abandonment 
of the subtreasury. In Arkansas, for example, "\,Yillits and Simpson 
traveled the Alliance circuit supporting the subtreasury while the 
state's Democratic congressmen attacked the plan and urged the 
farmers to remain inside the Democratic ranks and not join the 
third-party movement. In Texas, too, the subtreasury was the basic 
issue which aligned Peffer, Willits, Simpson, and "a Mrs. McCarty 
of Kansas" against prominent Democrats in a series of debates 
before Alliance encampments across the state. Peffer was especially 
popular, for "everybody wanted to listen to the man who beat 
Ingalls, and he pleased his audience."31 
The Populist success in advocating the subtreasury in these 
debates with Democrats led one state Alliance after another during 
the summer of 1891 to endorse the full Ocala platform, causing 
Populists to expect ultimate Southern support. By the end of 
August eleven Southern state Alliance conventions had overwhelm-
ingly subscribed to the subtreasury. Another attempt by Hall to 
organize an anti-subtreasury Alliance in September was a total 
failure.32 
In response to the Populist campaign in the South, Democrats 
relied less on rational argument than on the dogmatic reassertion 
31 Topeka State Journal, July 10, 1891; Kansas Farmer, August 5, 1891; Dallas 
Morning News, July 12, 22, 23, 27-31, August 5-7, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, 
July 30, 1891. 
32 National Economist, August 29, 1891: Dallas Morning News, July 12, 1891; 
Woodward, Origins of the New South, p. 239. 
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of the old political ploys that the Populists had characterized as 
irrelevant to the needs of the people: sectional, racial, and partisan 
appeals. Arkansas Democratic congressmen replied to Simpson's 
discussion of the subtreasury by attacking the traditional Southern 
bete noire, outside agitators, and declaring that Arkansas would 
pursue its own course without any interference from Kansas. 
Peffer's interview with Josephus Daniels provoked both sectional 
and racial prejudice against the Populist. Demanding to know 
who had asked this "black republican" to invade the South anyway, 
a Raleigh paper urged its readers to "Send Him Back Wiser." 
Are the honest, manly White Southern farmers ready to receive their 
lessons in political science from such sources[?] Can they acknowledge as 
their leader a foreign-born fanatic like Peffer, or any Southern White man 
who hears his degrading race principles and still associates with him? 
We answer no. The farmers of the South will not follow such men. The 
chivalry of Anglo-Saxon manhood, reverence for the virtue of Southern 
women, and respect for ancestral and race pride, all condemn and repu-
diate such self-confessed demagogues.33 
The final admonition of the News and Observer was for Southern 
farmers to stay Democratic. This appeal to partisan loyalty formed 
the essence of the Democratic counterattack. The Democracy, its 
supporters argued, had always done what was best for the South, 
was able and willing to remedy social complaints, and alone pre-
served the integrity and protected the special interests of the South. 
"The advent into Georgia of Senator Peffer, Congressman Simpson, 
and Mrs. Mary Ellen [sic] Lease, apostles of the third party, is a 
serious matter," editorialized the Augusta Chronicle. Their inten-
tion was "to gain converts to the People's party, and thus impair, 
if not destroy, the unity and strength of the Democratic party." 
The possibility that the People's party might disrupt the GOP in 
the North provided another Southern argument to remain within 
the Democracy. "Our people should not play the fool now and 
throw away upon mere abstractions and distractions the only chance 
the Democratic party will probably have in many years to regain 
possession of the Federal government."34 
33 Dallas Morning News, July 28, 1891; Raleigh (N.C.) News and Observer, 
June 27, July 1, 9, 1891. 
34 Kansas Farmer, July 22, 1891; Louisville Courier-journal, July 14, 15, 1891. 
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The Populist threat and the Democratic defense appeared most 
clearly in Kentucky. The People's Party National Executive Com-
mittee decided in June to campaign extensively in Kentucky and 
Ohio where full state tickets were to be elected. Kentucky's election 
would reveal the willingness of Southern alliancemen to commit 
themselves to the third party and Ohio's would indicate how the 
important Midwest viewed the People's party. Kentucky in par-
ticular was vital to Populist hopes, for its election occurred in 
August, and a good showing there would presumably influence the 
later elections in Ohio, Iowa, and Nebraska. But if a good showing 
would encourage the People's party, many feared the reverse would 
also be true. A Kentucky Populist reported that a decisive defeat 
for the Populists "may belittle the reputation of the movement in 
this state as well as elsewhere and give the assertion strength, that 
you can't get the Democratic farmers in the South to support it." 
Another Populist campaigner admitted that the effort to poll a 
large vote in Kentucky was being made "in order to show members 
of the party in the Northwest that the Third party movement was 
taking hold in the South, as well as in that locality." He declared, 
moreover, that "the future growth of the party depended largely 
upon the results in Kentucky," because a failure there would give 
the movement "a black eye, and it would demoralize the party's 
strength in the West."35 
Led by John G. Otis and M. W. Wilkins, Kansas Populists ac-
tively organized the People's party in Kentucky. They used the 
same techniques they had employed in Kansas-"pic nics, Barbeques, 
Mass meetings of every description in every county and precinct in 
the state." Peffer entered the Kentucky campaign in mid-July with 
extensive publicity. Here he advocated the Alliance principles, 
emphasizing the subtreasury; but with a state People's party already 
in existence, he was also able to champion more openly the People's 
party qua party. Closely connected in the public mind with the 
party, he was more effective in Kentucky while others such as 
Simpson, who had opposed immediate formation of the People's 
party at the Cincinnati Conference, remained in the Deep South on 
35 Girard Western Herald, June 20, 1891; Robert Schilling to Donnelly, June 
26, 1891, Taubeneck to Donnelly, .June 27, 1891, Blanton Duncan to Donnelly, 
July 7, 1891, Donnelly Papers; Louisville Courier-journal, July 15, 1891. 
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speaking tours where he emphasized strictly Alliance principles.36 
Populist-Democratic debates in the Kentucky campaign resembled 
those elsewhere in the South. Peffer reported that Democrats were 
"quite as hard on us because of our alleged connections with the 
Republican party as our Kansas Republicans in Kansas were last 
year because of our supposed connection with the Democratic party. 
We are pounced upon and hammered by the predominant party, 
whatever it is, in the particular locality which we visit." In debate 
with Peffer, Democrats also denied that their party had any respon-
sibility for the nation's distress, declared that his proposals were 
paternalistic, castigated the Kansan for interfering in Kentucky's 
affairs, and contended that only through Democratic ascendancy 
could the nation's ills be remedied,37 
Such traditional appeals proved persuasive, and Democrats even 
encouraged the disbanding of suballiances to prevent defections. 
Lack of time and money also severely hampered the new party 
in Kentucky, and difficulties in organization and disagreements 
over procedures further weakened Populist chances. Herman E. 
Taubeneck, the Populist national chairman, went to Kentucky 
personally to manage the campaign, but the superior resources of 
the Democratic party easily prevailed.38 
The Democratic victory was not unexpected, of course, and while 
Southern Democrats and \Vestern Republicans rejoiced that the 
new party was practically moribund, Populist leaders expressed 
pleasure at their showing: thirteen legislators elected and a state 
poll of 25,631 votes (about 9 percent of the state's total) for their 
gubernatorial candidate. The Northern Republican press con-
sidered the election proof that Southern alliancemen would never 
desert the Democracy for the People's party, but Taubeneck 
asserted the Populists had gained a great victory, considering their 
limited time and funds. "The 'Solid South' is broken," he main-
tained. Kentucky Populists were also cheered by the results. One 
argued that the People's party had exceeded expectations: "Its 
36 Taubeneck to Donnelly, June 27, 1891, Duncan to Donnelly, July 7, 1891, 
Donnelly Papers: Topeka Advocate, July 22, 1891; Louisville Courier-Journal, 
July 14, 16, 18, 1891. 
37 Kansas Farmer, July 29, 1891; Louisville Courier-Journal, July 14-19, 1891. 
38 Schilling to Donnelly, June 25, 26, 1891, Duncan to Donnelly, July 7, 1891, 
Donnelly Papers; Louisville Courier-Journal, July 13, 1891. 
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friends felt that if twenty thousand votes were cast for it, it would 
make a respectable showing, and let the People's Party men in 
Kansas, Nebraska, and other Republican states know that the Dem-
ocratic farmers in Kentucky were willing to forsake their old party 
and take up with the new." The 25,000 votes, he contended, were 
15,000 more than their enemies had expected and 5,000 more than 
Populists had hoped for.39 
Populists, in fact, expressed a general optimism about their party 
in the South, for they were convinced that their Southern crusade 
had achieved a success which would be soon visible at the November 
national meeting of the Farmers' Alliance. Peffer announced that 
he and his fellow Kansas Populists had received a friendly welcome 
from all but the politicians, and he believed that both white and 
black Southerners were flocking to the People's party: "It is won-
derful how men are breaking away from the restraints which have 
held them. Our presence inspires courage among the doubting 
people." McGrath also anticipated that the People's party would 
receive the full black vote in 1892 and that by controlling the 
Alliance and neutralizing Democratic appeals the party would carry 
at least six Southern states in 1892. Even Simpson reported himself 
delighted with the results of his Southern tour and, convinced that 
the South would support the third party, reversed his earlier op-
position to the national movement. From :Mississippi \Villits 
exulted: "I want to tell you that the old bosses can no more hold 
the Alliance men in the south in the Democratic party in 1892 
than they held them in Kansas last fall. They are kicking over the 
traces and giving them a world of trouble everywhere I go in the 
South. I have been having big crowds and they have voted me 
thanks everywhere, and I have given them straight goods. . . . I 
know where they will stand in 1892."40 
\Vith such confidence in the South, Populists turned their atten-
tion to the Northern states where fall elections would be held. 
39 Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette, August 4, 1891; Chicago Tribune, August 
13, 1891; Kentucky journal (Newport), August 4, 5, 1891; Appletons' Annual 
Cyclopaedia (New York, 1892), p. 408; Journal of the Knights of Labor, Septem-
ber 17, 1891. 
40 Kansas Farmer, July 29, 1891; Indianapolis journal, September 7, 1891; 
Atlanta Constitution, July 14, 1891; National Economist, August 8, 1891; Dallas 
Alorning News, August 8, 1891; Topeka Advocate, August 5, 1891. 
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Willits had already canvassed Ohio in early spring and with Polk 
and Otis had helped organize the Iowa State Farmers' Alliance in 
March. In June, Simpson and Polk made a quick swing through 
\1\Tisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, organizing 
alliances, encouraging local reform groups to align with the larger 
movement, and gauging potential Alliance political strength. That 
strength the Kansans sought to transform into Populist votes.41 
Ohio was the first target of the Populists. Senator John Sherman, 
one of the architects of the nation's financial policies against which 
the Populists argued, faced reelection, and they hoped to " 'Kan-
sasize' Ohio" and send him the way of Ingalls. They also hoped 
to disrupt the presidential ambitions of William McKinley and 
James Campbell, opposing candidates for governor in the important 
state, as well as to test their own strength. Peffer opened the Ohio 
campaign with a speech in Cleveland on July 30, 1891, before the 
People's party was even officially organized in the state. He con-
tinued to emphasize the necessity for sweeping reform and stig-
matized free silver, half-heartedly supported by Ohio Democrats. 
"Free coinage of silver," he declared, "is but a drop in the bucket 
which must be filled." Willits, Otis, Rightmire, Wilkins, and Mrs. 
Diggs followed Peffer through Ohio in early August and helped 
organize the Ohio People's party at Springfield on August 5. Peffer's 
speaking engagements prevented his attendance, but he wrote a 
letter to the convention, advising the endorsement of the Cincinnati 
platform and the nomination of a full state ticket. The convention 
applauded this letter and proceeded to follow his advice.42 
Though Peffer was optimistic about Ohio's prospects, the Pop-
ulists made little impact upon the campaign. Their ticket did 
frighten Republicans enough to import a Kansas Republican, 
Governor Humphrey, to counter the appeals of the Kansas Pop-
ulists, but in general the old-party response to the new was familiar. 
Democrats self-righteously demanded the support of those who 
sincerely favored free silver; Republicans denounced the Populists 
as Democratic allies and even raised the outside-agitator clamor. 
41 Washington Post, March 21, April 7, June 8, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, 
June 11, 1891. 
42 Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette, August 1, 5, 6, 1891; Chicago Tribune, 
August 3, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, August 6, 1891. 
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Outside agitator Humphrey conceded that Peffer had some success 
in organizing the People's party "here and there in the country 
districts," but the Populists, despite their initial promise, hardly 
out-polled the Prohibitionists in the November election.43 
In the Iowa election, too, the Populists suffered disappointment. 
A state convention on June 3, 1891, with Willits and Otis playing 
prominent roles, had organized the Iowa People's party and nom-
inated a full ticket. Iowa Populists planned extensive use of Kansas 
speakers and sent a representative to Topeka to arrange for speeches 
by Peffer and all five Populist congressmen plus Willits, Rightmire, 
and others. Peffer campaigned through Iowa for two weeks in 
August and September, but found surprisingly little interest. As 
in Kansas, prohibition was a divisive issue, and when the Iowa 
Populists proved unable to neutralize it there were virtually ignored 
in the election, capturing only two legislators and about 3 percent 
of the vote. Dissension between the established, more conservative 
Northern Farmers' Alliance and the new Southern Alliance also 
hurt the Populist cause, while Republicans worked the sectional 
ploy, emphasizing that the People's party was "a stool pigeon trap 
of the Democratic party, in Iowa and all other Northern states," 
and that Populists were merely Democratic agitators.44 
From August through October, Kansas Populist leaders cam-
paigned extensively elsewhere outside their state. They helped 
organize state People's parties in other midwestern states and even 
arranged the transference of the Non-Conformist from ·winfield, 
Kansas, to Indianapolis to advocate Indiana's new People's party. 
They urged alliancemen to align with the new party in still other 
states. Peffer debated Senator Palmer in Illinois, a Republican 
congressman in Pennsylvania, and minor politicians of both parties 
in Indiana. He addressed a Labor Day crowd in Indianapolis, 
urged Missouri alliancemen to repudiate Hall by endorsing the 
subtreasury, traveled to Nebraska and back to Ohio and made 
43 Indianapolis journal, September 7, 1891; Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette, 
August 12, 1891· Topeka Daily Capital, September 25, 1891; Appletons' Annual 
Cyclopaedia (1891), p. 693. 
44Jowa State Ree;ister (Des Moines), August 22, 26, 1891: Topeka Daily 
Capital, June 10, 1891; Topeka Advocate, August 12, 1891; Herman C. Nixon, 
"The Populist Movement in Iowa," Iowa journal of History and Politics 24 
(January 1926): 55-57. 
National Crusade 101 
plans to visit North Carolina and Alabama before winter. Peffer 
was most in demand, but other Populists were nearly as active in 
spreading the new gospel of political independence.45 
Exhausted by his rigorous schedule, Peffer was unable to return 
to the South in the fall of 1891, but Jerry Simpson did so, speaking 
for the People's party in North Carolina and Louisiana. He re-
turned even more certain that the People's party would dominate 
the South in 1892, that "the Southern bloody shirt, fear of Negro 
domination, can no longer be waved successfully to hold the white 
people of the South solidly in the Democratic party," and that the 
Populists would absorb the black vote as well.46 
Simpson also expected that alliancemen, after having spent the 
year vigorously fighting the Democracy over the subtreasury and 
other reform demands, would insist upon strict allegiance to Alli-
ance principles by Southern politicians. Many believed that Dem-
ocrats dependent upon Alliance support had deceived the farmers 
by opposing Alliance demands in their debates with Populists. 
These politicians had repeatedly argued that Southern alliancemen 
owed primary loyalty to the Democracy and not to their Alliance 
principles. After his fall canvass, Simpson believed that the Alliance 
would repudiate such narrow partisanship by requiring its con-
gressmen to caucus separately on the basis of adherence to the Ocala 
platform, thereby testing their sincerity. Support for this view came 
from the South too. Thomas E. Watson, a newly elected Alliance 
congressman from Georgia, launched the People's Party Paper on 
October 1, 1891, to defend the entire Ocala platform, denounce any 
compromise with temporizing Democrats, and support a strong 
West-South concord. Watson also wanted Alliance congressmen 
bound not to the Democratic party but to a caucus defined by 
observance of Alliance principles. Both Simpson and Watson at-
tended the Indianapolis meeting for that purpose.47 
45 Chicago Tribune, August 5, 7, 9, 10, 14, 22, 1891; Topeka Advocate, August 
26, 1891; Indianapolis journal, September 7, 8, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, 
September l, October 6, 13, 1891; Topeka State journal, September I, 1891; 
Ernest D. Stewart, "The Populist Party in Indiana," Indiana Magazine of History 
14 (December 1918): 353. 
46 Girard Western Herald, September 26, 1891; journal of the Knights of 
Labor, September 10, 1891; Washington Post, November 6, 13, 1891. 
47 Dallas Morning News, August 8, 1891; Washington Post, November 13, 
1891: Girard Western Herald, August 22. 1891: C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson, 
102 POPULISM and POLITICS 
The Populist crusade of 1891 culminated in success at the 
Indianapolis meeting in November. Kansans flocked to the con-
ference and of those of prominence only Peffer was absent, his poor 
health preventing his attendance, though he had been scheduled 
to deliver an address. His son, Elwood S. Peffer, however, an 
editor of the Indianapolis Non-Conformist} reported the conference 
for the National Reform Press Association and kept the senator 
informed of events. The active purpose of the meeting was to 
determine the attitude of the Alliance toward the People's party. 
The party's executive committee met in Indianapolis at the same 
time and worked to secure the Alliance's endorsement. Third-party 
sentiment among the Alliance delegates revealed itself in Polk's 
unanimous reelection as president of the order. Polk was con-
sidered a third-party man by this time, and his election came 
without opposition after the delegates learned that his potential 
opponent, L. F. Livingston of Georgia, opposed independent action. 
Populist leaders hailed Polk's election as a victory, but their success 
did not end there. A member of the People's Party National 
Executive Committee was elected vice president of the Alliance, 
and Willits, after a year campaigning for the People's party as 
national lecturer, was reelected. The delegates, in accordance with 
their instructions from the local Alliance meetings of the summer, 
reaffirmed their faith in the entire Ocala platform, including the 
subtreasury, now anathema to leading Southern Democrats. Simp-
son and Watson's Georgia supporters argued for a resolution in-
structing Alliance congressmen to shun any party caucus unless the 
principles of the Ocala platform were made the test of admission. 
The delegates enthusiastically passed the resolution, thereby, as 
Elwood Peffer believed, "drawing the party line on our Southern 
[Alliance] Congressmen." Finally, the FMBA, also meeting in 
Indianapolis at the same time, moved toward unification with the 
Alliance by revising its platform and constitution. Altogether, the 
results of the meetings assured the existence of a third-party ticket 
in 1892 supported by the Alliance and other farmers' organizations. 
Tom Watson declared in Indianapolis that the Alliance congress-
men would hold their own caucus and present their own candidate 
Agrarian Rebel (New York, 1938), pp. 182-87; Topeka Advocate, September 9, 
1891. 
National Crusade 103 
for Speaker. "Georgia is ready for a third party," he added, and, to 
the delight of his Populist listeners, he predicted the movement 
"will sweep the state."4S 
Certain that they had committed the Alliance to their party, the 
Populists looked forward to the campaign of 1892 with optimism. 
Six months after the organization of their party in Cincinnati they 
had broadcast its principles throughout the nation, established 
numerous state party organizations, and attracted implicit pledges 
of support from major agrarian and reform groups. The Kansas 
Populists also believed they had strengthened their position at 
home through their 1891 activities. By establishing a national 
party they weakened the Republican charge that a Populist vote 
in Kansas was ultimately counterproductive of reform as it merely 
strengthened the Democracy. Moreover, their Southern crusade 
convinced them that the Southern farmers would stand with them 
in opposition to the two old parties in 1892, and this was crucial 
for success in Kansas and the nation. The Topeka Advocate ex-
pressed the Populist conviction: Southern alliancemen were being 
swept into the reform movement, and "it will be absolutely im-
possible for them to avoid the support of a new party. . . . The 
refusal of the old parties to support Alliance measures will force 
them to make a stand, and there is absolutely no shadow of doubt 
as to what that stand will be."49 
48 Topeka Advocate, November 4, 1891; Stuart Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette 
Polk, Agrarian Crusader (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1949), p. 271: Indianapolis journal, 
November 18, 20, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, October 23, 1891; Kansas Farmer, 
December 2, 1891; Woodward, Watson, p. 187. 
49 Quoted in National Economist, May 16, 1891. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Betrayal of the Promise 
As THE Kansas Populists confidently awaited the election of 1892, 
others were preparing to deliver a series of blows which would 
cause great changes in the composition and direction of the new 
party. Before beginning their campaign to gain full control of the 
state government, the Kansans turned their attention to vVashing-
ton to observe proudly their representatives in the national govern-
ment and to witness the expected signs from Southern alliancemen 
in Congress that the Populist Crusade had converted the South. 
Senator-elect William A. Peffer left the 1891 campaign circuit for 
Washington and recuperation in November. The Washington Post 
announced his arrival with the observation, "Perhaps the most 
extensively advertised Senator that ever came to Washington is 
Hon. W. A. Peffer, of Kansas." Indeed, Peffer had burst into the 
public spotlight with his defeat of the famous Ingalls, and he 
remained a popular figure for interviews, articles, editorials, and 
cartoons. Not only his summer campaign for the People's party 
but his lectures in Washington, New York, and Boston had given 
him national exposure. He was so largely associated with the 
third-party movement in the public mind, in fact, that for a time 
he lent his name to it. Before the People's party movement became 
designated as Populism it was popularly referred to as Pefferism; 
and Populists were frequently termed Pefferites or Peffercrats. 
Gradually the term "Populist" became accepted in late 1891, and 
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"Pefferism" came to mean less the political movement and more 
the lamentation of distressing social and economic conditions-from 
the apocalyptic language of Peffer and other leading Populists. In 
this sense the term survived a number of years.1 
Peffer received added publicity and further identification with 
the People's party when admirers and enemies combined to give 
him a presidential boom during the summer of 1891. Kansas was 
so vital to the success of the new party that many assumed a Kansan 
would lead the ticket in 1892 and Peffer was the natural choice to 
lead the Pefferites. The New York Sun complained "the boom of 
Peffer Longbeard has been let loose already" and thereby indicated 
another aspect of Peffer's new notoriety: his appearance. He was 
tall and very thin and always dressed in black, wearing boots and 
a hat, but no collar or tie; above all, he had a beard that reached 
nearly to his waist. His general appearance, it was invariably noted, 
was "ministerial," but his beard attracted most attention, and 
"Whiskers" became his nickname, an appellation so compelling that 
Peffer is known even to historians almost solely as the possessor of 
his beard. His appearance naturally lent itself to caricature, and 
he became the political cartoonists' symbol of the People's party 
more consistently than either the donkey or the elephant served 
the major parties. Never commented upon before the senatorial 
election, his beard became the subject of political ridicule, and 
while his appearance suggested to his followers a patriarchal 
biblical figure, it encouraged his Eastern opponents to dub him a 
"new Visigoth."2 
The press observed at the time of Peffer's election that the 
People's party had disappointed those who had hoped for a senator 
who would bring derision upon the movement. Peffer, all conceded, 
was a respectable, honest, sensible man above reproach. Six months 
later he was regarded as the most bizarre of a collection of crazed 
fanatics that included "Sockless Jerry" Simpson and "the Milkman" 
John Otis. Such unfair criticism, arising from fear and hatred of 
1 Washington Post, December 8, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, July 1, August 
11, 29, 1891, February 17, 1895; Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette, August 10, 15, 
1891; Topeka Advocate, November 13, 1895, February 5, 1896_ 
2 Topeka Advocate, June 3, July 22, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, February 1, 
June 5, 1891; Dallas Morning News, July 23, 30, 1891; Peffer Scrapbooks, 3: 17, 
KSHS; New York Times, March 5, 1891; Hamlin Garland, "The Alliance Wedge 
in Congress," Arena 5 (March 1892): 447-57. 
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Populist principles as much as from the appearance and expressions 
of their advocates, has continued to affect adversely the historical 
portrayals of men who were, by and large, perceptive, shrewd, and 
extraordinarily able. A Washington Post reporter observed the 
Populists in their early days in the national capital and then con-
cluded that "no set of men ever merited less the ridicule that has 
been heaped upon them." Another newsman met Peffer "to 
describe the peculiarities of his personal appearance" for the paper's 
eager readers. From advance notices the reporter expected "a polit-
ical dime museum freak" but was astonished to find "a gentleman 
of a mild and benevolent countenance, of engaging manners, and 
of a gentle and persuasive voice." In looking for the celebrated 
beard, he continued, he saw "a patriarchal cataract of rippling 
hair instead of a tangled mass of coarse, straggling and unkempt 
locks in the wild man of Borneo style." Peffer may have had 
unorthodox ideas about society and finance, but he was an erudite, 
gracious, and sensitive individual.3 
Once in Washington, the newly elected Populist congressmen 
made their plans for the organization of Congress. Peffer repeated 
his pledge to avoid both the Republican and the Democratic 
caucuses and joined Senator James H. Kyle of South Dakota, who 
still considered himself an Independent rather than a Populist, to 
request proper recognition on the committees of the Senate. Peffer 
wanted to be named to the committees on finance, agriculture, and 
interstate commerce to advance Populist proposals, but he failed 
to win a seat on any of these. Although initially both parties 
courted Peffer, his determination to gain the People's party recogni-
tion through the organization of Congress caused the older parties 
to agree to ignore his specific requests and show him no particular 
favor. He was roundly denounced in the Democratic caucus, in 
fact, for "his anti-Democratic actions and speeches." Eventually the 
Republican caucus assigned him to the committees on claims, the 
census, railroads, and civil service, and the Democrats accommo-
dated Kyle.4 
3 Kansas City Star, January 27, 29, 1891; Topeka Mail, January 30, 1891; 
Washington Post, March 4, 1891: Topeka Daily Capital, March 8, 1891, Feb-
ruary 25, 1892; Washington Evening Star, October 12, 1893. 
4 Topeka Daily Capital, December 13, 16, 1891; Washington Post, December 
10, 1891. 
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Populist representatives in the House faced a different problem, 
and one more important to their party, that of securing adherence 
to the Indianapolis resolution instructing Alliance congressmen to 
avoid the old party caucuses. The five Kansas congressmen met at 
Peffer's apartment and decided to hold a caucus and nominate a 
candidate for Speaker, regardless of the action of others. Simpson 
expected at least four others to join the Kansans: Omar Kern and 
William McKeighan of Nebraska, Kittel Halvorson of Minnesota, 
and but one Southerner, Tom Watson of Georgia. Other South-
erners, Simpson commented ruefully, "had talked quite indepen-
dently during the summer" but now appeared to be solidly Dem-
ocratic. Benjamin Clover and other Kansans remained optimistic 
and hoped for at least twenty-five Southerners to join their cause.5 
A conference of the Alliance congressmen quickly shattered their 
illusions. The meeting broke into two bitter factions over the 
question of an independent caucus. Otis precipitated the uproar 
by reproaching the Southerners for their obvious reluctance to place 
principles before party, and Simpson arraigned the Democratic 
party while urging independent action. Led by Leonidas F. Living-
ston of Georgia, the Southerners retorted angrily that the Democ-
racy represented the best hope for securing relief and should be 
supported. Watson denounced Livingston as a betrayer of the 
farmers' trust, and after a few tense moments the conference ad-
journed in such an acrimonious atmosphere that Watson spoke of 
an "irrepressible conflict between factions." Indeed, with the ex-
ception of Watson, all Southern alliancemen entered the Democratic 
caucus on December 5, 1891, and were pledged to support for 
Speaker, Charles F. Crisp of Georgia, a conservative politician who 
opposed the subtreasury and other Alliance demands. The Kansans 
and their four allies then met again at Peffer's apartment where he 
called the first Populist congressional caucus to order. They unan-
imously endorsed the Indianapolis Resolution and chose Watson 
as their party's candidate for Speaker: the Populists still hoped to 
split the Solid South.s 
Other events soon added to the Populists' disappointment. The 
5 Washington Post, November 28, 1891; Girard Western Herald, December 
12, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, December 4, 10, 1891. 
6 C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel (New York, 1938), pp. 
190-93; Topeka Daily Capital, December 10, 1891. 
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Alliance's official newspaper, the National Economist, edited by C. 
W. Macune of Texas, an opponent of the third party, praised the 
Southern Alliance congressmen for not respecting the Indianapolis 
Resolution and described the election of Crisp as an Alliance 
victory. In mid-December, Stephen McLallin arrived in Washing-
ton to attend a meeting of the National Citizens' Alliance. The 
Kansas delegation accompanied him to a stormy interview with 
Livingston, whom McLallin upbraided for deserting the Kansas 
alliancemen. Livingston ridiculed the Kansans for ever imagining 
he or any other Southern allianceman intended to leave the Dem-
ocratic party. In the Senate, Peffer approached John L. M. Irby, 
leader of the Tillman political organization in South Carolina and 
elected by Alliance votes, and expressed his hope that they could 
work together. Irby stiffly replied, "Well, sir, we Alliancemen in 
the South are all Democrats." Alliance congressmen continued 
to meet for several weeks, but the split between the two factions 
widened. Livingston criticized the Kansans for attempting to force 
reformers into a party movement. The Populists responded that 
by subjecting themselves to the Democratic caucus the Southerners 
obviously had a different conception of the importance of the 
Alliance demands, and they refused to attend any more meetings 
called by Livingston.7 
Among the Populists in Congress, Peffer took the lead in pro-
posing legislation to enact Alliance demands. He announced his 
intention of ignoring the custom that freshman senators should 
not speak, and the prominent and the curious packed the galleries 
when he made his first speech. This initial effort was a superb 
discussion of the Populist financial position and an argument for 
the passage of a bill embodying the land-loan principle, and Pop-
ulists afterwards distributed copies of it as a major campaign 
document. Peffer also introduced bills and resolutions to prevent 
dealings in options and futures, to prohibit the formation of trusts, 
to increase the circulating medium through the issuance of paper 
money, to establish a bureau of irrigation, and to increase popular 
participation in politics.8 
7 National Economist, December 12, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, December 
15, 1891, February 7, 1892: Chicago Tribune, June 2, 1899; Washington Post, 
January 22. February 5, 1892. 
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The Kansas congressmen were also active in introducing bills in 
the House based on Alliance demands, but they received little real 
support from the Alliance congressmen of the South. Neither did 
Irby or Senator John B. Gordon of Georgia, also elected by an 
Alliance legislature, indicate any interest in joining Peffer in pro-
moting Alliance principles in the Senate. In particular the Southern 
alliancemen renounced the subtreasury and rejected the pleas of 
Otis to have a Southerner introduce a bill embodying the proposal. 
But, as one reporter observed, "they have cut loose from their 
Kansas brethren on everything. With the exception of Watson," 
he added, "the Southern alliancemen have agreed to act with the 
Democrats in everything; in fact they declare they never had any 
other intention. The Kansas men feel bad about it, and some 
who thought the Southern alliancemen would be with them in 
everything are really mad about it. They declare openly that the 
Southerners have gone back on them." Simpson explained further 
the Populist indignation: "When we went through the South last 
summer the meetings were large and enthusiastic. . . . [But now] 
These Congressmen since they have got to "\Vashington have for-
gotten the pledges they made the people and have forgotten the 
people, too."9 
Chagrinned to find the Southern congressmen "disposed to be 
Democrats first and alliancemen afterward," as one Kansas con-
gressman expressed his disappointment, the Populists turned their 
attention to the St. Louis conference of the Confederation of In-
dustrial Organizations in hopes of there gaining an explicit endorse-
ment of their party by the nation's reform organizations. Peffer 
and Watson remained in Washington on congressional business, but 
the other Populists and their Southern adversaries in the Alliance 
all attended. The Kansans were again optimistic, but once more 
Livingston dampened their spirits. "We don't care what they do 
in Kansas and other western states," he declared. "They can have 
a third party if they want one; in fact, a third party in Kansas is 
s Congressional Record, 52d Cong., 1st sess., vol. 23, pp. 35, 107, 357, 470-78, 
1171, 5443; Kansas Farmer (Topeka), January 20, 1892; National Economist, 
January 30, February 6, 1892; Topeka Advocate, January 6, 1892; Topeka Daily 
Capital, January 13, 22, February 3, 1892; Washington Post, June 14, 1892. 
9 Topeka Daily Capital, December 26, 1891, .January 20, 1892. 
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probably a good thing with which to overthrow the Republican 
party, and in that good work we wish them success; but in the South 
we want no third party."lO 
The Populists achieved mixed results at St. Louis. Those del-
egates favoring independent action won every contest over officers, 
credentials, and resolutions, and the convention appointed a com-
mittee which met with the Populist National Executive Committee 
to call a People's party national nominating convention for Omaha, 
July 4, 1892. This had been the Populists' objective since Ocala, 
but their joy was tempered by the large minority, overwhelmingly 
from the South, that opposed the third party. The declaration of 
the third party had been repeatedly delayed in order to gain 
Southern support, and now that support was not forthcoming. 
Southern Alliance leaders denounced both the People's party and 
the St. Louis convention, and entire Southern delegations refused 
to accept the convention's decision. One Tennessee delegate, how-
ever, welcomed the decision for a third party because, with the 
South certain to remain Democratic, "I think the Republican party 
is the sufferer."ll 
Following the St. Louis convention, the Populist hopes for South-
ern backing were less optimistic than desperate. Southern Dem-
ocrats refused to temporize with the Alliance in 1892 as they had 
in 1890. Democratic officials in at least Texas and Tennessee re-
quired alliancemen to renounce their Alliance principles before 
permitting them to enter party conventions and primaries; else-
where alliancemen were simply outmaneuvered or outvoted. One 
state after another rejected Alliance platforms and candidates and 
selected delegations to the Democratic national convention pledged 
to Grover Cleveland, who had repeatedly expressed his hostility to 
Alliance demands. South Carolina Democrats, under the dictation 
of Ben Tillman, did adopt an Alliance platform, but carefully 
promised to support the party's eventual nominee, even if he were 
Cleveland.12 
10 Ibid., January 20, February 9, 1892. 
11 Kansas Farmer, March 2, 1892: Topeka Daily Capital, February 24, March 
20, 1892; John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (Minneapolis, 1931), pp. 223-29. 
12 National Economist, February 20, May 28, 1892; Roscoe C. Martin, The 
People's Party in Texas (Austin, Texas, 1933), pp. 39-40; J. A. Sharp, "The 
Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party in Tennessee," East Tennessee Historical 
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Despite these rebuffs, however, few Southern alliancemen were 
willing to leave the Democracy, fearful that such action would 
only permit Negroes and Republicans to triumph. Alliance leaders 
Frank Burkitt of Mississippi and John H. McDowell of Tennessee 
did declare allegiance to the new party, but any real chance that 
Southern voters would follow ended when L. L. Polk suddenly 
died on June 11, 1892. Almost certainly he would have been 
named to the People's party national ticket and had the support 
of Peffer and many others for the first position, because, as Colorado 
Populist leader Davis Waite wrote, "in order for the People's Party 
to succeed, WE MUST BREAK THE SOLID SOUTH." Peffer, Otis, and 
Baker were among Polk's pallbearers in Raleigh, North Carolina, 
and with Polk the Kansans also buried their hopes for a Populist 
victory.13 
None of the Populist congressmen attended the Omaha national 
convention because important legislation was pending in Congress. 
Instead, they joined together to send a telegram, signed first by 
Peffer, an honor always accorded him as the party's ostensible 
leader because of his position as its first senator, urging the con-
vention to "select for our great party of the people standard bearers 
worthy of the time and occasion." There was some support for 
Peffer's nomination at the convention, but his repeated refusal to 
be a candidate, his continued delicate health, and the important 
position he already held kept his name from serious consideration. 
Willits and Davis of Kansas also attracted some interest, but the 
nomination eventually went to James B. Weaver of Iowa. James 
G. Field of Virginia received the vice presidential nomination as 
another move to engage Southern support. Embodying the Alliance 
principles on money, land, and transportation and advocating the 
expansion of responsive governmental power to promote the public 
Society's Publications, No. 10 (1938): 99-100, 104; Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork 
Ben Tillman (Baton Rouge, La., 1944), p. 206; Girard Western Herald, April 
29, May 6, 1892. 
13 Girard Western Herald, April 16, 1892; Washington Post, July 18, 1892; 
John Willits to L. L. Polk, April 21, 1892, and Paul Van Dervoort to Polk, 
April 12, 1892, L. L. Polk Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of 
North Carolina Library; Stuart Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk (Chapel Hill, 
N.C., 1949), pp. 284-94; John R. Morris, "Davis White: The Ideology of a 
Western Populist" (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, 1965), p. 260; National 
Economist, June 18, 1892. 
112 POPULISM and POLITICS 
welfare, the platform and its ringing preamble attracted much more 
enthusiasm than the candidates.l4 
Indeed, the Populist disdain for politicians also expressed itself 
in a unique resolution which repudiated politics in favor of pop-
ulism. The Omaha Ordinance for the Purification of Politics 
established as "fundamental party law" the principle that "no 
person holding office ... federal, state or municipal ... including 
senators, congressmen and members of legislatures . . . shall be 
eligible to sit or vote in any convention of this party." Populists 
were determined that the people and not the politicians should 
control their movement.15 
Certainly they felt the opposite held true at the Democratic 
convention. The nomination of the stubbornly obtuse Cleveland, 
although expected, caused many Southern alliancemen finally to 
consider seriously the call of the third party. So obviously hostile 
to their principles, Cleveland provoked revulsion among many 
alliancemen. A Virginia Alliance leader declared that Cleveland's 
nomination had "snapped the last cord which binds free men to 
the Democratic party," and in some places in the South, notably 
North Carolina, there was a chance of Democratic defeat.16 
The Democracy aggressively responded to the Populist challenge 
by ignoring even the tariff and financial issues to emphasize the 
sectional theme. "The old issue of sectionalism is confronting the 
South," declared the Atlanta Constitution, "and White Supremacy 
is more important than all the financial reform in the world." The 
Richmond Dispatch argued that "the present Democratic party in 
Virginia was formed ... for self-protection against sectional mis-
rule-and without any reference to economic questions." Support 
for the People's party, Southern politicians insisted, would cause a 
Democratic defeat, the passage of a force bill, and the establishment 
of Negro domination-issues upon which all Democrats could unite. 
The Populist attempt to play down race as a political issue and 
to create a popular front between black and white farmers merely 
reinforced Democratic racist charges against the People's party.l7 
14 Topeka Advocate, July 6, 1892; Topeka Daily Capital, April 10, June 30, 
1892: Washington Post, July 4, 1892. 
15 National Economist, July 16, 1892; Hicks, Populist Revolt, p. 236. 
16 National Economist, July 2, 1892; C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New 
~outh (Baton Rouge, La., 1951), p. 243. 
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Republican encouragement of the third party throughout the 
South, moreover, added to the Populist difficulty in attracting 
support from Democratic farmers. Eager to cooperate with the 
People's party in order to hurt Southern Democrats and offset the 
inroads the new party was expected to make in the Republican 
Northwest, Republicans actively entered into Southern Populist 
conventions, appeared on many Populist tickets, and sometimes 
avoided making separate nominations. This Republican activity 
prompted dissident Southerners to return to the Democracy, pre-
ferring the lesser evil of a conservative party hostile to economic 
reforms to the greater evil of "negro domination," and the third-
party movement never adequately expressed the extent of the 
Southern farmers' disaffection from the Democratic party.ls 
Added to the rhetorical attack on those Southerners who threat-
ened to be "traitors to their race" as well as to their party was 
a Democratic campaign of open violence. Mobs attacked and in-
timidated Populist leaders and meetings and even forced Weaver, 
Mrs. Lease, and others to cancel many of their Southern speaking 
engagements. Democratic politicians, Mrs. Lease complained, en-
couraged the lawlessness, intolerance, and violence that Populists 
had to face in the South.19 
In the face of such pressure, Populist strength in the South 
suffered a serious decline following the mid-summer peak after 
Cleveland's nomination. By the end of September, the Virginia 
Democratic state chairman was able to report that "the Third 
party is rapidly resolving itself back into the Democratic party 
from which it was mainly drawn." But as early as April the out-
come was clear. The Populist gubernatorial candidate received 
17 William DuBose Sheldon, Populism in the Old Dominion (Princeton, N.J., 
1935), pp. 72-73; Stanley P. Hirshson, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt (Bloomington, 
Ind., 1962), pp. 238-40; Washington Post, July 10, 18, 1892; National Economist, 
May 14, 1892; Woodward, Watson, pp. 222-23; Tom Watson, "The Negro 
Question in the South," Arena 6 (October 1892): 540-50. 
18 John D. Hicks, "The Farmers' Alliance in North Carolina," North Carolina 
Historical Review 2 (April 1925): 182-84; Sharp, "Alliance and People's Party," 
pp. 105-9; National Economist, May 6, 1892; Alex M. Arnett, The Populist 
Movement in Georgia (New York, 1922), pp. 150-51; Hicks, Populist Revolt, 
pp. 245-47; Sheldon, Populism in the Old Dominion, pp. 72-73; Albert D. 
Kirwan, Revolt of the Rednecks (Lexington, Ky., 1951), pp. 95, 101. 
19 Fred E. Haynes, James Baird Weaver (Iowa City, 1919), pp. 324-25; Wood-
ward, Watson, pp. 216-43; National Economist, October 1, 8, 1892. 
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fewer than 10,000 votes in Louisiana's state election on April 19, 
and only one Populist legislator was elected. In other state elections 
before November, the Populists were also easily defeated. In Ar-
kansas in September the People's party ran third behind the Re-
publicans, and in Georgia's state election in October the Democrats 
nearly tripled its vote despite Republican assistance. Arkansas's 
election had been expected to reveal the strength of the People's 
party in the South, and the easy Democratic victory was surprising. 
The election in Georgia, considered one of the best hopes of the 
new party, confirmed the observation that, since the summer peak, 
"the strength of the people's party [in the South] has gradually 
dissolved and disappeared until now the organization is but a 
shadow of its former self." Indeed, in November, the South voted 
overwhelmingly for Cleveland, and the Populist ticket frequently 
ran third, even in Texas where the party made its best showing. 
The champion of Southern Populism, Tom Watson, was rejected 
by his neighbors in his bid for reelection, and despite frequent 
fusion with Republicans no Southern Populist was elected to Con-
gress. The Populist hope that the Southern people would repudiate 
their political managers had failed utterly.2° 
The Louisiana People's party had issued an address to the public, 
praying that its vote might "break the 'solid south' and greet our 
great toiling brethren of the North and West with the cheering 
hope of industrial reform in the near future."21 Populists outside 
the South had depended upon that reassurance and anxiously had 
observed their movement in that crucial section. The full impact 
of the South's inability to overcome its special fears and frustra-
tions and accept a new compact responding to real and pressing 
issues would be felt in Kansas and the Northwest only after the 
revealing election, but earlier signs of apprehension and doubt 
were only too obvious, even when couched in words of confidence. 
The possibility that the South might refuse the Populist overture 
20 Sheldon, Populism in the Old Dominion, pp. 88-92; Lucia Daniel, "The 
Louisiana People's Party," Louisiana Historical Quarterly 26 (October 1943): 
1082-91; Topeka Daily Capital, September 17, 1892; Frank Leslie's Weekly, 
October 20, 1892, p. 275; Appletons' Cyclopaedia for 1892 (New York, 1893), 
pp. 5, 20, 308; Kirwan, Revolt of the Rednecks, p. 96; Sharp, "Alliance and 
People's Party," pp. 105-12. 
21 Melvin White, "Populism in Louisiana during the Nineties," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 5 (June 1918): II. 
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attracted great comment long before the elections of 1892. If the 
obvious Southern reluctance before the Cincinnati Conference to 
countenance the third-party movement disturbed Frank McGrath 
and other Kansas Populists, it delighted the Republican press, 
which reported every announcement of a Southern Alliance leader's 
intention to remain with the Democracy. Editorials explained 
Southern abstention by emphasizing the allegation that the People's 
party existed only to assist the Democracy: "Peffer will discover 
that it is one thing unconsciously to lead the farmers of Kansas 
into a southern Democratic trap, and another thing to turn that 
trap against its very makers. There will be no third party in the 
south." The Cincinnati Conference itself, argued papers through-
out the Northwest, was part of a scheme to divide the North so 
that Southern Democracy might prevail. And in Kansas, Populist 
and Republican papers engaged in editorial debate over both 
the number and the significance of Southern delegates at the con-
ference.22 
The press also followed the Southern crusade of the Populists 
closely. The Chicago Tribune, for example, detailed a reporter to 
dog Jerry Simpson's steps throughout the summer of 1891. North-
ern Republicans declared that the split over the subtreasury indi-
cated that Southern Democrats would refuse to support the new 
party and thereby doom it to failure. The Cincinnati Commercial-
Gazette, for instance, warned "Republican farmers in the North" to 
"look well into the situation in the South before consenting to give 
aid to the Third Party movement." Southern threats of violence 
against Peffer, Simpson, and other Populists received wide publicity 
as did "events occurring from day to day which plainly prove the 
loyalty of southern alliancemen and of their leaders to the Democ-
racy." The 1891 Kentucky election particularly convinced Repub-
lican spokesmen that, as Southern Democrats obviously refused to 
renounce their old party, "Republican farmers in the North with 
Alliance tendencies" should not remain in the third-party move-
ment.23 
The disputed impact of the People's party on the South became 
22 Topeka Daily Capital, March 20, April 11, 21, May 20, 1891; Cincinnati 
Commercial-Gazette, May 19, 1891; Girard Western Herald, June 13, 1891. 
23 Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette, August 3, 4, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, 
July 18, August 15, 16, 29, 1891; Chicago Tribune, August 13, 1891. 
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an important issue in the Kansas off-year elections of 1891. The 
Republican emphasis upon the expected ultimate failure of the 
Southern crusade provoked Populist leaders to extravagant pre-
dictions of their imminent success. Peffer toured Kansas, reporting 
on his Southern trips and assuring his Populist listeners that the 
South would stand by them in 1892. In another effort to embolden 
their followers, Populist leaders arranged to have Polk travel with 
Peffer and Willits in September to address party meetings in Kansas. 
This visit, some commented, was to "stiffen up the backbone of 
Kansas Populists who had about concluded that there was to be no 
Third Party in the South."24 
One remarkable feature of the Kansas elections of 1891 was 
Republican-Democratic fusion to defeat Populist candidates, re-
vealing both the hypocrisy with which party managers manipulated 
partisan appeals and the practical problems faced by the Populists 
in trying to create a coalition of two sections, each strongly dom-
inated by one party. Kansas Republicans were eager to regain 
their local political control and to strike the Populist heresy a 
deathblow before the 1892 national elections. Moreover, at stake 
were largely judicial offices, and conservatives were aghast at the 
prospect of a Populist judiciary. Democratic support for fusion 
with Republicans was more inspired by national politics. Georgia 
Congressman Charles Crisp declared in the fall of 1891, "If the 
damned Alliance, or the People's Party should carry Kansas this 
year, all hell can't hold the Alliancemen of the South; therefore it 
is necessary to break up the People's Party of Kansas, in order to 
preserve a solid South." Kansas Democrats thus agreed to cooperate 
with Republicans in hopes of discouraging third-party tendencies 
in the Democratic stronghold of the South. Republicans continued 
to denounce the People's party as an adjunct of the Democracy 
while cooperating with Democrats in a move designed to insure con-
tinued Democratic strength. Southern Democrats who denounced 
the People's party as an ally of the GOP urged Democratic co-
operation with Republicans who wanted to regain their regional 
ascendancy.25 
24 Girard Western Herald, September 19, 26, October 31, 1891; Topeka Daily 
Capital, September 12, 15-17, 1891; Hicks, "Farmers' Alliance in North Carolina," 
p. 180· Kansas Farmer, September 2, 1891. 
25 Topeka Daily Capital, August 18, 30, October 20, 22, 1891; Woodward, 
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The meaning of the 1891 election returns was clouded. The 
Populists, who had vigorously rejected any suggestion of fusion, 
welcomed the union of the old parties as a sign that there was no 
essential difference between them and that the new party was 
necessary for political and economic reform. But that combination 
reversed the 1890 outcome, and the Populists carried only 127 of 
404 local offices. Republican newspapers declared that the Populist 
defeat ended the Kansans' influence in other states and represented 
the repudiation of "the whole train of anarchistic schemes that 
belongs to this new party." Republican partisans were even more 
enthusiastic. In celebrating the apparent Populist defeat, a mob 
at Emporia dragged, shot, and burned effigies of Peffer, Polk, and 
Mrs. Diggs. The actual Populist vote, however, had increased 11 
percent. Defeat, Peffer and Willits maintained, stemmed merely 
from distortions by the partisan press and from old-party collusion, 
which could only help increase fhe Populist vote again in 1892.26 
Popular attention in the Northwest remained riveted on Populist 
overtures to the South. The failure to attract Southern supporters 
in Congress during the winter of 1891-1892 produced considerable 
comment. "If the Southern Alliancemen are sincere they must then 
cut their Democratic hawser and come into the Kansas People's 
Party," one newspaper asserted. "On the issue whether this will 
be their course or not hangs the future existence of the new party 
in Kansas." The campaign and various elections in the South in 
1892 bred further charge and countercharge, promises and pre-
dictions in the Kansas press. Populists rejoiced at every report 
of Southern gains, but the obvious general Southern reluctance to 
break away from the Democracy introduced a fretful note in their 
appeals to that section. "Are you going to cringe under the crack 
of a party whip? . . . Why should the South . . . hesitate any 
longer? The fight has to be made." Northern Republicans used 
this Southern resistance in 1892 in an effort to draw former Re-
publicans out of the People's party and back to the GOP. In May 
a Southern conference of the state presidents of the Farmers' Alli-
Watson, p. 186; National Economist, August 29, 1891; Girard Western Herald, 
August 29, 1891; Hicks, Populist Revolt, p. 223. 
26 Topeka State journal, July 10, 1891; Topeka Advocate, November IS, 
December 9, 1891; Topeka Daily Capital, November 5, 7, 1891; National Econo· 
mist, December 5, 19, 1891. 
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ance rejected pleas for an endorsement of the People's party by 
reaffirming the order's nonpartisan policy, and the Kansas Repub-
lican press trumpeted "the final judgment of Southern alliance 
leaders" as proof of the failure of Populist ambitions.27 
The aborted campaign trip of Weaver and Mrs. Lease through 
the South was also used in the Republican attempt to win back 
vote's from the People's party. Mrs. Lease had told Southerners 
that the Kansas Populists were "depending upon the people of the 
South to join with them in their revolt," and her forced withdrawal 
from the platform indicated the Populist dependence was mis-
placed. The Topeka Capital believed "this settles the people's 
party campaign in the solid south .... Gen. ·weaver's abandonment 
of the south is the most sensational incident in the campaign and 
a matter worthy of the serious consideration of his followers in 
Kansas. It must now be apparent to them that his election as 
president is out of the question. To give him the electoral vote 
of Kansas would result only in ... the election of Mr. Cleveland 
... [and] the continued supremacy of the solid south, procured 
by fraud and violence in contempt of free institutions." When 
Peffer attempted to minimize the significance of Weaver's Southern 
treatment, the volatile Mrs. Lease assailed the senator and de-
nounced the South in an interview widely circulated by Repub-
licans. But other Populists pointed out that their speakers suffered 
violent attacks in Kansas, too, and assured their fellows that the 
party remained strong in the South. "Let no Populist in Kansas 
be discouraged by these things nor by the use that Republicans 
are making of them."2S 
Kansas Populists had to keep up a brave front. From the first 
they had staked their eventual success upon Southern cooperation. 
If the South refused, declared the party's leading paper, McLallin's 
Topeka Advocate, "we confess, nothing but failure and defeat 
await us." Thus they continued to forecast sweeping success, per, 
haps in belief, perhaps merely hoping to shore up their local 
27 Topeka Daily Capital, December 26, 1891, January 19, 20, May 8, 17, 1892; 
Stephen McLallin to Polk, April 26, 1892, Polk Papers: Girard Western Herald, 
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followers. When the Democrats overwhelmed the People's party 
in Louisiana's April election, Kansas Populists dared the Repub-
licans to tell how wonderfully their party was doing elsewhere in 
the South. They denied that the defeat of an independent ticket in 
Alabama's August state election indicated actual Populist strength 
there. In late September Peffer still predicted that his party would 
carry a number of Southern states. The crushing October Dem-
ocratic victories in Georgia and Florida brought a Populist response 
that the party had never claimed it would win either state. Simpson, 
for example, valiantly told a reporter: "That Democratic majority 
in Georgia is not going to have the least effect on the People's Party 
vote in Kansas. They can't get the People's Party men in Kansas 
to go back into the Republican party by telling them that People's 
Party men in Georgia went back to the Democratic party. Because 
one man makes a mistake it is not an argument why another man 
should make one."29 
For all their bravado, however, Kansas Populists were downcast 
at their repeated Southern disappointments. "The people's party 
leaders in this community," noted one local observer, "have been 
thunderstruck at the result of the Georgia election and the effect 
it is having on the old time Republicans in that party. Quite a 
number here renounced their allegiance to the people's party in 
the last four days and came back to the Republican fold." Though 
there were such defections, however, more Populists agreed to 
postpone judgment until the general election. "Although the Re-
publicans are trying to make us believe that the people of Georgia 
are not with us," one wrote, "we still have confidence in the 
intelligence and fidelity of the people of Georgia, and feel confident 
that they will be found with the people of Kansas, in the middle 
of the road next November."30 
"Next November" made it clear at last that the South would not 
join Kansans in the middle of the road. The sweeping Democratic 
success in the South made a mockery of the efforts and hopes of the 
Kansas Populists and placed a Democrat in the White House. That 
29 Topeka Advocate, November 11, 1891: Topeka Daily Capital, May 17, 1892; 
National Economist, September 24, October 29, 1892; Girard Western Herald, 
May 27, August 12, October 14, 1892. 
30 Topeka Daily Capital, October 18, 1892; National Economist, October 22, 
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Democrat, moreover, was the hated Grover Cleveland, who opposed 
everything the People's party stood for. James G. Field, the Populist 
vice presidential candidate, added to their misery when he asserted 
that Cleveland owed his election to the existence of the People's 
party, which enabled him "to secure electoral votes by pluralities 
north of the Ohio which he could never have secured by majorities" 
in a two-party election.31 The Republicans and not the Populists 
had understood the South. The full impact of this upon the 
People's party would appear after November 1892. 
If the action of the South seemed to make the People's party in 
Kansas an ally of the Democracy as the Republicans had predicted, 
other events in Kansas during 1892 strengthened that opinion for 
many people, including for perhaps the first time substantial 
numbers of Populists. A series of political maneuvers engineered 
by small groups of Democratic and Populist politicians placed the 
two parties in an explicit partnership that began first to undermine 
the ethics and weaken the ideological justification of the new party 
and then to change its composition and modify its direction. 
Immediately after the 1890 election, Democrats began planning 
with the assistance of several Populists of Democratic antecedents 
to employ the new People's party to further Democratic ambitions 
in 1892. Several of these men discussed their thoughts with Grover 
Cleveland. George Glick, former Democratic governor, and Thomas 
Moonlight, 1890 Democratic congressional candidate, assured Cleve-
land that Kansas Democrats stood solidly behind him and were 
eager to do "all things that will best insure your election." That 
could best be accomplished, they maintained, by fusion with the 
Populists. "In four or five of the Western states it is possible to 
beat the Republican party in 1892 by uniting all the opposition 
upon electors and on union tickets for say, the People's nominee. 
This would not be for the Democratic nominee let us concede, but 
it would take at least thirty electoral votes from the Republican 
column, and secure the election through the Democratic House of 
the Democratic nominee had not we a majority of all the electors. 
This is an important consideration which must be borne in mind 
31 George H. Knoles, The Presidential Campaign and Election of 1892 (Stan-
ford, Calif., 1942), p. 235. 
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from this time forth." Moreover, they argued, the Democrats had 
little to lose in the effort, for the "Democracy of Kansas is hopelessly 
gone," its strength in rural areas and among labor organizations 
having been absorbed by the People's party. Democrats should 
therefore seek to direct the new party's course. "So much has 
been accomplished in the defeat of Ingalls and a general smashing 
up of the old Republican machine," Moonlight told Cleveland in 
January 1891. 
We Democrats could not as a party break up the huge machine by reason 
of the bitter prejudice attaching to the name "Democrat," but another 
organization with our indirect and almost silent help is doing the work, 
and I urge our men to aid and assist in the work, and when the smashing 
process is complete, we will gather up all the fragments, and strange as 
it may seem, they will all come to us. The Alliance in the meantime will 
almost destroy our party. . . . [In 1892] our western work must be to 
cause [Republicans] to lose four or five western Republican states through 
the power of the Alliance movement. . . . I confess a determination to 
use it for destructive purposes, and do not fear its future strength.32 
Although Democratic leaders thus conspired to use the People's 
party in 1892 for their own purposes, they opposed the new party 
in 1891 for the same reason. National political considerations 
dictated fusion with the Republicans rather than the Populists, 
and within the state Democrats wanted to avoid being totally 
absorbed by the third-party movement. The state's Democratic 
editors, for example, announced in their annual convention that 
the party would not consider fusion with the Populists. For their 
part, the Populists saw no reason to fuse. John Davis retorted 
sharply to the announcement of the Democratic editors, "Who has 
asked them to [fuse]? Last fall they begged for fusion .... It was 
kindly but firmly declined by the People's Party. That has been 
the uniform policy of the People's Party toward both wings of the 
\Vall Street party."33 
After the election of 1891, however, Democrats began to maneuver 
toward a working agreement with the state's Populists for the 
election of 1892. John Martin, David Overmeyer, and other influ-
32 George Glick to Grover Cleveland, November 27, 1890, A. N. Whittington 
to Cleveland, December 28, 1890, Thomas Moonlight to Cleveland, November 
27, 1890, January 31, 1891, Cleveland Papers. 
33 John Davis Scrapbook, vol. "0," p. 44, KSHS. 
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entia! Democrats immediately urged the creation of a coalition to 
defeat the Republicans, but on Democratic terms. The Topeka 
Kansas Democrat and the Wichita Beacon led the state's Dem-
ocratic newspapers in reversing their earlier stand. Such spokesmen 
believed the 1891 election demonstrated that the Democratic party 
held the balance of power in Kansas and could take advantage of 
this position to advance Democratic interests. Together, the 
Beacon suggested, the Democrats and Populists could elect men to 
every office. The obvious course was fusion, with members of both 
parties on a joint ticket. Glick announced his willingness even to 
allow the Populists the major offices on such a ballot in order to 
insure tacit Populist assistance in national matters.34 
These Democrats found support among a number of Populists 
who viewed the 1891 election as a warning to seek an accommoda-
tion with the Democratic party. vVith very few exceptions these 
fusion-minded Populists came from either the former Democrats 
or Union Laborites within the People's party. Both groups had 
traditionally regarded the Republican party as the enemy and had 
customarily fused against this common opponent in the past. Now 
they saw little reason to discontinue the procedure at a time when 
its success seemed assured. W. H. T. Wakefield corresponded with 
Moonlight on fusion arrangements, while such Populist newspapers 
as the Pleasanton Herald, edited by former Union Laborite J. E. 
Latimer, reprinted editorials from fusionist Democratic papers and 
strongly advocated cooperation with the Democrats on an abbre-
viated platform. Latimer suggested naming Glick, Martin, and two 
other Democrats to the ten-place state ticket and, as early as March, 
he placed his recommended ticket at the head of his editorial 
columns.35 
Particularly influential among Populists in promoting fusion were 
members of the Citizens' Alliance. Organized within the urban 
areas of Kansas, the Citizens' Alliance had much higher proportions 
of former Democrats and Union Labor men among its members 
than did the Farmers' Alliance, and these men were more experi-
34 Girard Western Herald, November 14, December 12, 1891; Topeka Daily 
Capital, November 14, 1891; Wichita Weekly Beacon, January 8, March 18, 1892. 
35 Moonlight to Wakefield, November 27, 1890, copy in Cleveland Papers; 
Pleasanton Herald, February 12, 19, March 18, 1892. 
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enced in the political deals and compromises of Kansas political 
life. Some Citizens' Alliances seem to have been established by 
Democrats in a direct effort to influence the People's party. In 
Hiawatha, for instance, a newly formed Citizens' Alliance listed 
among its ten officers seven Democrats and but one man who had 
previously affiliated with the People's party. Those who opposed 
fusion often directed their anger against such organizations, as did 
the Farmers' Alliance of Drywood Township, Bourbon County, in 
its June 1892 meeting, when all forty-eight alliancemen agreed that 
fusion with Democrats was incompatible with Populism and urged 
their representatives to "exert every possible means to defeat the 
fusion scheme of designing Democrats and characterless leaders of 
the Citizens' Alliance."36 
Indeed, opposition to fusionist sentiment was strong in the 
People's party and especially among its major leaders of 1890. As 
the debate over fusion developed in early 1892, Peffer advanced the 
radical, morally based position of the anti-fusionists when he warned 
his followers from Washington: "I am opposed to any sort of 
fusion, coalition, or understanding of any kind with the Democrats. 
An arrangement of that kind means compromise. We are either 
right or we are wrong. If we are right, we should stick to it, and a 
compromise cannot help us." McLallin believed fusion meant "a 
sacrifice of principle and an ultimate sacrifice of strength," and he 
argued, "Better defeat than victory at such a sacrifice." Willits and 
Mrs. Lease raged at the mention of fusion, and of the five Populist 
congressmen only Simpson announced his support of the proposi-
tion.37 
Simpson had already irritated many of his fellow Populist leaders. 
A Union Labor-Democratic fusion candidate in 1888, he had relied 
heavily upon continued Democratic backing for his 1890 election 
as a Populist, and he repeatedly made clear his intention to have 
such assistance in his reelection bid in 1892. His open concern for 
Democratic sensibilities annoyed Populists who viewed their party's 
very existence as a result of the treachery of both old parties. 
36 Grant Harrington, Annals of Brown County (Hiawatha, Kans., 1901), p. 261; 
Topeka Daily Capital, June 8, 1892. 
37 Topeka Daily Capital, February 21, 1892; Topeka Advocate, July 15, 1891, 
April 20, 1892. 
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Simpson's lobbying for the senatorial election of Democrat John 
Palmer of Illinois particularly upset Peffer; his initial resistance 
to the establishment of a national third party angered others, 
especially McGrath; and his abrasive personality alienated Clover 
and strained relations with Peffer in their first months together in 
Washington. By early 1892 Democratic newspapers were praising 
Simpson as "rapidly becoming an ultra Democrat" while denounc-
ing Peffer and other Populists for "their unfavorable attitude 
towards the Democracy."3S 
Many party officials and political actives in the People's party 
inclined more toward Simpson's position than Peffer's. Concerned 
most immediately with organizing an election victory, they argued 
for "using a little political sense this year" and announced that the 
anti-fusionists "ought to know that three state tickets insures the 
election of the entire Republican ticket." Some like Latimer 
recommended placing Democrats directly on the Populist ticket 
while others such as Levi Dumbauld, chairman of the State Central 
Committee, merely favored the nomination of those Populists with 
Democratic backgrounds who would attract Democratic support. 
This second proposal was more popular and placed William A. 
Harris and John Ives in the forefront of speculation.39 
These fusionists frequently met with Democratic politicians in 
early 1892 in hopes of reaching an agreement. The Democratic 
Tilden Club of Wichita, for example, invited fusion Populists to 
its meetings for discussion about possible joint action to defeat the 
common enemy. More important were the private meetings between 
leaders of the two parties on every level. In early January Populists 
of Democratic antecedents led by Van Prather, a founder of the 
National Citizens' Alliance, met straight Democrats in Kansas City 
and arranged to publicize fusion sentiment through Populist papers 
to be subsidized by Democrats. In March Glick and several Populist 
committeemen met in Atchison to divide offices between the two 
parties in order to construct a joint ticket. In April the Second 
Congressional District committees of the two parties met in Fort 
38 Topeka Daily Capital, May 23, 1891, January 6, February 21, 25, April 5, 
1892; Karel D. Bicha, "Jerry Simpson: Populist without Principle," Journal of 
American History 54 (September 1967): 294-96, 304. 
39 Pleasanton Herald, March 11, 1892; Wichita Weekly Beacon, April 15, 1892. 
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Scott to choose a mutually acceptable candidate who could be 
placed before their actual nominating conventions in the summer. 
Party leaders of a number of counties likewise held private sessions 
in the spring in an effort to design local fusion tickets.40 
At no time, however, did the Democrats indicate their agreement 
with the Populists on principles. Democrats based fusion proposals 
only on calculations of political bargaining and practical politics 
and not on ideological grounds. The same meeting of the Tilden 
Club that applauded fusion advocates heard a speaker recite the 
history of Democratic fusion maneuvers, each forged solely in 
response to the ambition and pride of Democratic candidates. 
Leading Democratic fusionist papers, moreover, argued that the 
tariff was the only issue in the coming campaign. Most importantly, 
Kansas Democrats stood as a unit behind Grover Cleveland in his 
quest for another presidential nomination. Glick, one of the lead-
ing Democratic fusionists, was Cleveland's best friend and advocate 
in Kansas and made frequent political trips in the former president's 
interest. In March the Democratic State Central Committee voted 
overwhelmingly for both fusion with the Populists and the nomina-
tion of Cleveland. The Democratic state convention in April 
selected a Cleveland delegation to the national convention with 
instructions to vote as a unit for him as long as his name was before 
the convention. The Kansas Democracy, Glick assured Cleveland 
afterwards, was "unanimous for you."41 
As fusion arrangements between the two parties became more 
likely, Peffer repeatedly issued admonitions against the course. 
"Any bargain and sale of the offices which might be arranged by 
the Democrats and a few of the leaders of our party," he predicted 
in April, "would never be accepted by the thousands of alliancemen 
who went into the third party because they were done with the 
Democratic and Republican parties for all time. They did not 
40 Wichita Weekly Beacon, April 1, 1892; Paola Times, May 5, 1892; Miami 
Republican (Paola), May 6, 1892; Topeka Daily CajJital, March 22, April 3, 5, 
20, 26, 1892; Van Prather to Charles Robinson, January 10, 1892, Robinson 
Papers. 
41 Wichita Weekly Beacon, February 26, April 1, 1892; Kansas Agitator (Gar-
nett), January 14, 1892; Girard Western Herald, April 16, 1892; Topeka Daily 
Capital, May 12, 1892; Glick to Cleveland, March 2, 10, 17, April 21, May 9, 
1892, and Glick to Daniel Lamont, December 28, 1891, Cleveland Papers. 
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go into the People's party to assist by combination or coalition in 
the election of either Democrats or Republicans; they went into 
the new party as a matter of principle." A week later, after the 
Democratic House had voted down a silver bill, Peffer declared 
that Democratic duplicity as much as Republican injustice and 
corruption had caused the establishment of a People's party, and 
it was "now more apparent than ever that to fuse with either of 
the old parties simply because some politicians want office, would 
be to surrender principle for spoils and constitute a ridiculous 
blunder and one that would do great injury to the movement." 
Populism, he maintained, aimed "to benefit the whole people and 
not a few scheming ... politicians who ... spend their entire 
time in seeking to form combinations to get nominations and 
then devise ways and means to secure the office at the polls."42 
The reaction of Populists to Peffer's pronouncements against 
fusion seemed to depend largely upon their attitude toward the 
movement in general. Those who viewed politics in broad, national 
terms and thus considered the national ramifications of Kansas 
action and who most strongly believed that the People's party 
would become a national force to remake society typically opposed 
any proposition to fuse with Democrats in Kansas. Clover, for 
example, agreed with Peffer that Democratic dissemblance in Con-
gress, "if there was no other reason, ought to prevent any combina-
tion between the Democrats and alliancemen in Kansas or any 
other state."43 With the exception of Simpson, other national 
figures among Kansas Populists also concurred with Peffer's anti-
fusion views. Brought into prominence in 1890 by a mass movement 
which repudiated the old parties by its very existence, they saw no 
valid reason to retrogress. Furthermore, they were primarily re-
sponsible for launching the party into national politics. Editors 
like McLallin, who considered reform from a national perspective, 
or like W. C. Routzong who sought to preserve the ideological 
purity and idealistic fervor of the movement, provided effective 
public support for the middle-of-the-road position. 
Rather than indicating a conservative policy, the term "middle 
of the road" had its origin in Peffer's admonition at the Cincinnati 
42 Topeka Daily Capital, April 5, 1892; Kansas City journal, April 13, 1892. 
43 Topeka Daily Capital, April 5, 1892. 
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Conference to avoid the siren calls of the old parties, and thereafter 
it referred to those radical Populists who rejected fusion and its 
inevitable compromises of principles. Populism, these men and 
women logically argued, demanded national action to correct na-
tional abuses, and the party could not expect to create the necessary 
dissolution of the Solid South if it cooperated with the Democracy 
in Kansas. Moreover, Populism condemned both old parties, for 
they had combined, in the Populist viewpoint, to oppress the people 
through a confusion of real interests and plays on prejudice. The 
Populist intention, after all, was to destroy both old parties, which 
were corrupt in outlook and malevolent in operation, and coopera-
tion with either would mean the betrayal of the promise of the 
people's movement; the adoption of the sordid practices of voter 
manipulation for offices and spoils that Populists believed they had 
abandoned with their former partisan allegiances; the admission 
that the motivating hope of a glorious political reformation in 
America was groundless, that the period of increasing acceptance 
of reform principles had ended, that the assistance of the unre-
generate was necessary. The people's movement had developed as 
a political rebellion against the cynical methods as much as the 
callous objectives of the old parties, the mid-roaders remembered, 
and their political reformation could not with reason adopt the 
methods of the old parties without acknowledging failure of its 
objectives as well. "If it was merely to turn Republicans out of 
office, a fusion of the People's and Democratic parties would be 
both desirable and sensible," conceded mid-roader W. 0. Champe. 
"[But] the offices are only a means to an end. To turn Republicans 
out of office, and then admit others not friendly to the reform 
movement, would be a piece of egregious folly. If the Democratic 
party believed in People's Party principles, or did the Republican 
party, then the organization of the People's Party was folly to begin 
with, and to fuse with either party is virtually an admission that 
the People's Party is not needed, has no distinct principles, and 
would stamp it as being merely a political excrescence."44 
Fusion Populists, on the other hand, were usually politicians 
concerned with strictly local and state political matters. They had 
little or no regard for the wider consequences of their immediate 
44 Kansas Agitator, May 26, 1892. 
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actions, in respect to either national politics or party principles. 
They represented less the party's evangelistic, idealistic, and morally 
motivated wing, personified by Peffer, and more the pragmatic 
operators, long experienced in the hard politics of compromise and 
expediency. Indeed, while mid-roaders predominated within the 
'Vashington contingent and perhaps the inarticulate mass of the 
People's party, it was party officials and activists on state and 
county committees that usually adopted the fusionist rationale, 
thus making the fusion position stronger in the actual party orga-
nization than in either the highest leadership or the rank and file. 
To further consolidate their control over the party apparatus, 
fusionists attempted to isolate mid-roaders or undermine their 
influence. Willits claimed to have discovered "an organized effort 
by the People's Party fusion-fixers" to suppress him upon his return 
from his Alliance lectures in the South, and a mid-road member 
of the State Central Committee complained that the fusionist 
majority of the committee refused to notify the mid-roaders of 
committee meetings.45 Fusionists liked to consider themselves as 
realists and mid-roaders as "cranks," devoid of political sense and 
hopelessly utopian. Their arguments for fusion with the Dem-
ocratic party never considered subjects of political or doctrinal 
consistency but merely emphasized the probable Republican plu-
rality in a three-sided contest. Indeed, fusionists claimed that those 
who were most concerned with the preservation of distinctive 
Populist principles were Republicans seeking only to prevent the 
fusion of their two dissimilar opponents. Populist hostility to such 
a coalition was proof to the fusionists of both the Democracy and 
the People's party that the mid-roaders were working in the interest 
of the GOP, either as traitors or as dupes.46 This low allegation 
that anti-fusionists were crypto-Republicans proved perhaps the 
most effective weapon of these practical men. 
Thoughtful mid-roaders objected to the fusionist appropriation 
and interpretation of the term "practical politics." A strict ad-
herence to that conception of practical politics, after all, would have 
avoided the quixotic tactic of forming a third party in the first 
45 Topeka Advocate, May 26, 1892: Washington Post, May 27, 1892. 
46 Pleasanton Herald, January 15, March 18, April l, 1892; Paola Times, 
May 5, 1892; Wichita Weekly Beacon, June 10, 17, 1892; Topeka Daily Capital, 
May 12, 1892; Leavenworth Evening Standard, July 11, 13, 16, 1892. 
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place. The anti-fusionists now argued that a truly practical policy, 
designed to achieve the complete objective, required total separa-
tion from the old parties: without traditional sources of support 
such as the old parties boasted, Populism must necessarily em-
phasize its distinctiveness. Mid-roaders in particular rejected the 
fusionist contention that political common sense dictated coopera-
tion with the Democrats. The party's primary problem since its 
inception, they reminded all Populists, was to combat the idea that 
the People's party was "a Democratic aid society, or that it was in 
collusion with Democracy in any way." This fundamental necessity 
had forced them to establish a national third party and attempt to 
destroy the Democratic South in an effort to produce a partisan 
stability among their adherents who had only with difficulty broken 
the powerful emotional ties to the GOP. "In separating from the 
Republican party, Kansas farmers have had no intention of aligning 
themselves with the enemy whom they so long opposed and de-
spised," declared one newspaper, and the ardently anti-fusion 
Kincaid Kronicle added that such Republican-Populists "look upon 
the Democrat party as being even worse than the party they left. 
It is folly to expect these men to vote to increase the power of a 
party they consider the worst that ever existed."47 
Despite such strong resistance to their proposed course, fusionists 
of both parties evolved a plan for collaboration in a series of 
meetings in late spring. The details varied, but the main features 
were constant. Democrats would name candidates for a joint con-
gressional ticket in two districts and receive two places on the 
state ticket, probably congressman-at-large and associate justice, 
in exchange for their endorsement of the remaining Populist can-
didates on congressional, state, and electoral tickets. Published 
reports generally accorded David Overmeyer and John Martin the 
Democratic spots on the state ticket, and while only the First and 
Second Congressional districts were to be given to Democratic 
candidates, the Democrats made it clear they would not support 
Clover or Otis in the Third and Fourth.48 Simpson was more than 
47 Kansas City Journal, April 12, 1892: Kincaid Kronicle, June 17, 1892. 
48 Kansas Democrat (Topeka), July I8, 1892; Leavenworth Evening Standard, 
June I, I892; Kansas City Star, June I, 2, I892; Topeka Daily Capital, May I8, 
June 2, I892: J. M. Jones to Charles Robinson, April 28, 1892, Robinson Papers: 
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acceptable, and in the two remaining districts, represented by Davis 
and Baker, the Democrats did not even have the balance-of-power 
strength necessary to make demands, though they objected to both 
congressmen. 
The party managers, both elected and self-constituted, had ar-
ranged for the disposition of Populist votes, but there remained 
doubt as to whether the rank and file would accede. Prather ad-
mitted that "the rub will be with the people's party in controlling 
the conventions." Glick expressed optimism but added, "Some 
crank though may spoil our plans." And another Democrat hope-
fully discussed fusion with Robinson: "Such an arrangement, I 
am assured the People's Party generally desire, (there are a few 
cranks in every party who have no practical sense) but the sensible 
element is now in control."49 
The various Populist nominating conventions soon revealed that 
those anti-fusion "cranks" were stronger than either Democrats or 
fusion Populists had hoped, but also that in their inexperience and 
ignorance they were at the mercy of the fusionists, for whom politics 
was often a profession. The result was frequently the appearance 
of nonfusion coupled with the actuality of fusion. In May Populists 
began to hold county conventions and overwhelmingly instructed 
their delegates to the state convention to vote against fusion plans 
and candidates. Particularly averse to fusion propositions were the 
Populists of north-central and northwestern Kansas, where ex-
Republicans greatly predominated in the party. There the Sixth 
Congressional District convention of the People's party renominated 
Baker on June 2 with strong expressions of anti-fusion sentiment 
and hostility to the possible gubernatorial nomination of Ives, 
whom it considered too Democratically inclined and weak on 
prohibition.5o Such an outcome was expected, however, and the 
first test of the fusion scheme came in Holton the same day when 
the First Congressional District convention met. 
The question of fusion immediately split the convention, with 
the mid-road faction led by former Republican Ezra Cary and the 
49 Kansas City Journal, April 12, 1892; Topeka Daily Capital, May 24, 1892; 
Prather to Robinson, January 10, 1892, and Jones to Robinson, April 28, 1892, 
Robinson Papers: Glick to Cleveland, March 17, 1892, Cleveland Papers. 
50 Wichita Weekly Beacon, April 15, 1892; Topeka Daily Capital, May 24, 1892; 
Washington Post, May 24, 1892; Kansas City Star, June 2, 11, 1892. 
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fusionists led by former Democrat J. W. Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald 
even declared he would not accept the convention's decision unless 
he thought it would attract Democratic support. Toward that end, 
Leavenworth Democratic leader S. F. Neely, arriving directly from 
a major conference in Kansas City between fusionist leaders of the 
two parties, intervened in the Populist convention to advocate the 
nomination of William A. Harris, promising that the Democrats 
would accept him as their own. But a division within the fusionist 
ranks among the supporters of Harris, Fitzgerald, and Everard 
Bierer, another former Democrat, led to the surprise nomination of 
Fred J. Close, a mild mid-roader and a stockholder with Peffer 
and McLallin on the anti-fusion Advocate. The swing to Close 
began when one Populist refused to "be a party to the Democratic 
scheme to nominate Colonel Harris," and added, "I have never 
been a Democrat and I pray to God I never will be a Democrat, 
and I don't propose to be led into the Democratic camp at this 
time."51 The defeat of Harris disappointed fusionists of both 
parties and caused many to fear that no agreement at all would 
be reached. Charles Robinson more calmly observed that elsewhere 
fusionists would act less arrogantly and stupidly and the anti-
fusionists would prove unable so easily to stampede conventions. 
Glick was also unperturbed, and he predicted that by October the 
Populists would honor the fusion arrangements by withdrawing 
their competing candidates. "This cannot be done in the con-
vention," he was ready to concede, "but it will be done by the 
committees later in the campaign."52 
Before the state convention, the Populists held three more con-
gressional nominating conventions. As expected, the Fifth District 
in north-central Kansas made no concessions to Democratic sensi-
bilities and unanimously renominated mid-roader John Davis. 
Congressman Otis was not so fortunate. Democrats were stronger 
in his district and Populists weaker, and his harsh anti-fusion 
statements had alienated the Democracy. The district's Democratic 
convention met in late May, resolved in favor of fusion, and then 
adjourned until June 14 at Emporia, the scheduled time and place 
51 Kansas City Star, June 2. 3, 1892; Topeka Daily Capital, June 3, 1892. 
52 Leavenworth Evening Standard, June 3, 6, 1892; Kansas City Star, June 3, 
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of the Populist convention, thereby pressuring the People's party 
to nominate a Populist other than Otis. Overmeyer joined Martin 
as the guiding spirits of the convention in this attempt to force 
fusion upon the Populists. The Democrats signaled that while 
Otis was unacceptable they would support Levi Dumbauld, a 
former Democrat and, as chairman of the Populist State Central 
Committee, a leading fusionist.53 
Dumbauld had already initiated a campaign to succeed Otis but 
had only succeeded in angering many Populists who then called a 
meeting in Emporia to demand an explanation. Dumbauld con-
fessed to his critics that the Populist State Central Committee had 
met with the Democrats in hopes of arranging fusion and had 
agreed, among other things, to replace Otis with Dumbauld and 
nominate Overmeyer for congressman-at-large. The indignant Pop-
ulists replied, one of them later wrote, "that the committee were 
either fools or traitors ... , and that the people were able to 
make their own ticket without the help of the bosses, and further 
. . . that Otis had done his part by us and we would stand by 
him first, last, and all the time, and Overmeyer would have to 
bid good-by to the Democrats before we could support him."54 
Though Populists were determined to reject Dumbauld and 
explicit Democratic dictation, many of their leaders remained ready 
to make some concession to attract Democratic support in the 
normally Republican Fourth District. The Populist convention 
consequently turned down both Otis and Dumbauld and selected 
E. V. ·wharton, a Yates Center physician and a Democratic-Populist. 
The Democratic convention, which, as Otis later explained, had 
"hung around our convention all day, threatening to nominate a 
candidate twenty minutes after I was named," immediately ap-
plauded Wharton as "a good, sound Democrat," ratified the nom-
ination, and "gleefully adjourned."55 
Otis and the other mid-roaders bitterly condemned these pro-
ceedings. Otis warned that Populism was "jeopardized by this gang 
of unscrupulous office-hunting gluttons. Fusion means our ruin. 
53 Kansas City Star, June 6, 9, 1892; Topeka Daily Capital, May 17, 25, 26, 
1892. 
54 U. C. Spencer to John G. Otis in National Economist, June 25, 1892. 
55 Kansas City Star, June 14, 1892; Topeka Daily Capital, June 15, 1892; 
Emporia Tidings, June 18, 1892; National Economist, June 25, 1892. 
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It is only the office-seeker who wants fusion and if our people allow 
themselves to be used in this way they will be pulling chestnuts 
out of the fire for others," he continued. "These fusion candidates 
won't come as near being elected as the candidates who made a 
straight fight on the Alliance platform and depend fully on the 
Alliance for support." Otis even hinted that he might run for 
Congress as an independent, for he believed that had the people 
still controlled the People's party he would have been renominated. 
Farmers particularly objected to the displacement of the "Milkman" 
by the nomination of Wharton, "who never farmed a day in his 
life, and probably never did a day's physical labor," and many 
supported a plan to defeat the fusionist politicians of the district 
by having an independent convention nominate Otis. Otis re-
mained unreconciled, proud that "I was too much a middle-of-the-
road man for the Democracy," but abandoned his plan of running 
independently.56 
Others accepted the defeat of Otis more willingly. The Populist 
convention of the Seventh Congressional District, meeting in 
\Vichita on June 14, cheered the news of \Vharton's nomination. 
Former Democrats had more influence in the People's party of 
southwestern Kansas than generally elsewhere, and the district, 
represented by the agreeable Simpson, was strongly pro-fusion. 
Straight Democrats had promised to endorse Simpson if Populists 
outside the district cooperated with Democratic plans and candi-
dates, and the rejection of Otis seemed to insure Simpson's dual 
nomination. Simpson had actively sought Democratic support, 
promised to encourage Populists to endorse Democratic candidates 
in other districts, and assured his Democratic backers that if 
Cleveland were elected they could control the district's patronage. 
Simpson easily won renomination at the Populist convention, and 
shortly thereafter the district's Democrats adopted him as their 
own candidate as well,57 
The Populist state convention opened in Wichita on June 15, 
1892, amidst intense discussion over fusion. The very selection of 
56 National Economist, June 25, 1892; Emporia Weekly Republican, June 23, 
1892: Topeka Daily Capital, June 18, August 20, 1892; Washington Post, June 
17, 1892. 
57 Kansas City Star, June 13, 14, 1892; Wichita Weekly Beacon, April 22, June 
17, 1892; Washington Post, May 23, 1892; Topeka Daily Capital, June 5, 1892. 
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Wichita by the Populist State Central Committee, some believed, 
involved a bid for Democratic support, as did the choice of John 
Breidenthal for convention chairman. A former Union Laborite, 
Breidenthal provoked some opposition because a caucus of party 
officials had determined his nomination, but after seconding speech-
es by Wakefield and the popular Simpson he was elected. The 
issue of fusion entered into the consideration of candidates too, 
but as many fusionists had feared, the ungovernable convention 
apparently rejected their arrangements. The alleged fusionist can-
didate for governor, John lves, had lost most of his backing because 
of his involvement as attorney general in reducing railroad taxation, 
and Lorenzo D. Lewelling, a "Wichita produce dealer, received the 
nomination. Martin lost to Stephen H. Allen for associate justice, 
and W. A. Harris received the nomination for congressman-at-large 
instead of Overmeyer.5s 
The apparent defeat of the schemes for Democratic cooperation 
encouraged the mid-roaders and misled historians. Others were not 
deceived. If the Populists had rejected what would have been 
blatant examples of political manipulation in the proposed nomina-
tions of Martin and Overmeyer, they had allowed themselves to be 
led under Breidenthal's skillful direction into an unwitting implicit 
endorsement of fusion. The Populists' policy of letting the office 
seek the man, combined with their relative lack of access to the 
news media, resulted in the nomination of a number of surrepti-
tious fusion candidates. Allen had been presented as the mid-road 
alternative to Democrat Martin and was elected easily; ten days 
previously he had been the unsuccessful straight Democratic can-
didate for Second District congressman in opposition to a Democrat 
who favored fusion with the Populists! Harris, who filled the other 
position promised to the Democrats, had been a Democrat, was 
perhaps the leading fusionist among the Populists, was very popular 
in his heavily Democratic home county of Leavenworth, and op-
posed the more radical elements of Populism while accepting little 
more than free silver from its financial program. Following his 
nomination, moreover, Harris declared that he was still "a good 
Democrat." Populists with Democratic backgrounds received other 
spots on the ticket as well, including Prather for state auditor. 
58 Kansas City Star, June 13-16, 1892; Wichita Daily Beacon, June 15, 1892. 
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Even Lewelling, though a former Republican, represented a bid 
for Democratic support. Relatively new to Kansas, he had never 
worked with the GOP; promoted by Simpson, he was chairman of 
the fusionist Sedgwick County People's party and certain to receive 
the critical backing of Wichita Democrats. In addressing the con-
vention, moreover, Lewelling clearly indicated his desire to co-
operate with "honorable allies."59 
Generally, the Democratic press expressed pleasure with the 
Populist ticket. "An investigation of the political antecedents of 
the men who were nominated by the People's Party convention" 
convinced the Leavenworth Evening Standard that the Populists 
were actively "bidding for Democratic success." It especially ap-
plauded the nomination of Harris. The Wichita Beacon, although 
disappointed that no Democrat qua Democrat was on the slate, 
described six of the nine candidates as former Democrats and 
urged Democratic support of the ticket, especially Lewelling. More-
over, the Beacon argued, such endorsement would place the People's 
party in the Democracy's debt from which Democrats might reap 
future benefits. The Garnett journal likewise declared the majority 
of the Populist nominees "good Democrats," rejoiced that the 
"cranky element" of the People's party "has been relegated to the 
rear," and advocated Democratic fusion. Most Democratic politi-
cians agreed. Martin praised the Populist ticket, and Glick prom-
ised that the Democrats would fulfill their part of the fusion 
agreement. 60 
In their own state convention in July, the Democrats divided into 
three groups, all for fusion but in varying degrees. One favored 
total fusion; one advocated electoral fusion and fusion on state 
candidates who were formerly Democrats; and the third favored 
only electoral fusion. Harris, Allen, John T. Little, the Populist 
candidate for attorney general, and other leading fusion Populists 
actively sought Democratic endorsement and repeatedly conferred 
with Martin, Glick, and Robinson. After a long debate, the con-
vention declared for complete fusion and nominated the entire 
59 Lawrence Daily Journal and Evening Tribune, June 7, 1892· Topeka Daily 
Capital, June 16, 17, 18, 1892; Topeka Advocate, June 22, 1892; Topeka State 
Journal, July 6, 1892. 
60 Leavenworth Evening Standard, June 17, 1892; Wichita Weekly Beacon, 
June 24, 1892; Garnett Journal, July 15, 1892. 
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electoral and state ticket of the People's party. Democrats made no 
false statements of their motives for endorsing the Populist slate, 
and C. F. Diffenbach, the Democratic leader of Barton County, was 
remarkably candid: "The People's Party is fast becoming a part 
of the Democratic party and in two or three years we will have it 
all. Two years ago they would not have anything to do with us. 
Now they are glad to work with us, and the time is not very far 
ahead when the two parties will be one and the same, and it 
will be a Democratic party. That's why I favored the nomination 
of Jerry Simpson, and it is why I have favored fusion this year. 
It will eventually bring the new party into our camp."61 
Elsewhere, Populists and Democrats attempted to complete fusion 
arrangements. In the Third District the issue was clear. Clover 
was unacceptable to the Democrats and the converse, and fusionists 
had agreed to replace him with a Democratic-Populist. At the con-
vention only two candidates were presented: Clover and Thomas 
Jefferson Hudson, a lawyer and former Democrat. But Clover's 
feud with the popular Simpson, his publicized marital troubles, 
and his increasing passivity weakened his position, and the con-
vention nominated Hudson with less contention than marked those 
struggles which were overt disputes over fusion. Hudson called 
himself a Populist in 1892, but Democratic papers still considered 
him a Democrat and praised him as the best candidate the Populists 
had ever nominated except for Harris. Subsequently, Third District 
Democrats gratefully nominated Hudson.62 
Politics in the Second District proved more difficult and well 
illustrated the problems of the People's party. The district had 
been one of those specifically granted to a Democratic candidate 
by the fusionists, and the Democrats were determined to defeat the 
Republican incumbent, Edward H. "Farmer" Funston. As early 
as March the district committees of the Democratic and People's 
parties had conferred about naming a joint candidate, and fusion 
leaders constantly thereafter tried to restrain anti-fusion activities. 
Mid-roaders were increasingly vocal, however, and complained that 
their party officials had not been authorized to consult the Dem-
ocrats or to usurp the rights of a nominating convention.63 
61 Topeka Daily Capital, July 5, 7, August 19, 1892. 
62 Ibid., May 18, June 4, 1892; Wichita Weekly Beacon, July 1, 1892. 
63 J. B. Chapman to Robinson, March 26, 1892, Robinson Papers; Topeka 
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The Democrats forced the issue by rescheduling their convention 
to meet prior to the Populist convention and by nominating Horace 
L. Moore, a Lawrence banker. They then demanded Populist 
endorsement of the Democrat as the "only road to success" and 
denounced those who resisted as working in Funston's behalf. Pop-
ulist indignation was intense. The Kincaid Kronicle censured the 
proposed "unholy alliance" and recited the past treachery of the 
old parties, specifically condemning the Democracy's deceitful 
practice of making platforms to gain votes with no intention of 
fulfilling its promises: "It is said that Moore is in favor of the 
reforms demanded by the people. If that is correct why is he not 
in the people's party?" \V. 0. Champe, veteran editor of the Garnett 
Kansas Agitator and one of Peffer's staunchest political friends, 
also implored Populists to keep in the middle of the road for the 
sake of principle and Southern support. Southern Democrats 
believed, he wrote, that fusion in Kansas would destroy the People's 
party in the South, and Champe declared he had received letters 
from Southern Populists urging Kansans not to fuse with the party 
that they were fighting to the death.64 
The Populist congressional convention met in Garnett on June 
22 amidst a crowd of lobbying politicians. Moore and Robinson 
arrived from Lawrence to plead the Democratic cause, and they 
were supported by Populist state candidates Allen and Little who 
hoped thereby to promote wider fusion. Willits, Champe, and other 
mid-roaders of the district argued against Moore. "If we go into 
the business of helping to elect Democrats to office," Willits told 
his listeners, "we might as well quit and go back into the old 
parties." Many Populists agreed with their formidable leader. 
One mid-road delegate, for example, declared, "These fusion del-
egates ... come here in the interest of the Democratic party and 
have no right here. I will not stand it, and am going home to 
vote the Republican ticket." Willits rallied the mid-roaders to 
reject the fusionist arguments, and S. S. King of Kansas City 
received the nomination.65 
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Democrats and fusion Populists complained vehemently. Robin-
son severely criticized Willits for preventing Populist endorsement 
of various Democratic candidates, especially Moore. Other Dem-
ocrats, just returned from helping nominate Cleveland at their 
national convention, remaining willing to fuse on the electoral 
ticket in his behalf but announced their new opposition to en-
dorsing other Populist candidates. Latimer, Little, and Allen 
continued to support Moore even though King had the Populist 
nomination, and they promised the Democrats of the district to 
have King removed from the race. Latimer's Herald announced 
that Populists needed votes and should therefore accept Moore to 
attract Democratic backing elsewhere in the state. Latimer de-
nounced those who opposed this course as not possessing "the least 
particle of political sense" and as working in the interests of the 
GOP. In advocating fusion, he maintained, he was working for 
principles. 66 
Other Populists refused to accept these fusionist rationales. The 
Kansas Agitator condemned Latimer for helping arrange and de-
fend the fusion agreement between Populist and Democratic 
committees. These actions by Populist leaders were not authorized 
by the rank and file, and "if anyone promised Moore an endorse-
ment," added the Kincaid Kronicle, "they promised him something 
which was not theirs to give." The mid-roaders were especially 
harsh toward the fusionists who, "having failed to accomplish their 
nefarious designs," were "now trying to thwart the will of the 
people as expressed by their chosen delegates in convention assem-
bled." The anti-fusionists ripped the reasoning of Latimer and 
his allies who argued for fusion as "anything to beat Funston." A 
banker who stood on a Democratic platform and supported Cleve-
land for president was no improvement over a Republican farmer, 
and his election would merely add to the Democratic majority in 
Congress which had already refused to aid the people. An honor-
able defeat would not injure Populism as much as such a victory. 
"To be consistent," one mid-roader charged, the fusionists who still 
intended to support Moore "should oppose Weaver because the 
Omaha convention did not endorse Cleveland." 
66 Washington Post, June 27, 1892: Wichita Weekly Beacon, July I, 1892: 
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The mid-road Populists were particularly annoyed that the as-
sumptions and actions of the fusion leaders usurped the rights of 
the popularly chosen delegates. The fusionist attitude that votes 
were to be bartered by those who better understood the political 
situation ran directly counter to the original Populist demands 
that the people should participate directly in political decisions 
and that democracy should be effective within parties as much as 
within other elements of the social system. The dictatorial approach 
of the Democrats angered Populists as much as the arbitrary actions 
of their own leaders: "Who ever before heard of the politicians of 
one party trying to control the nomination of another party as 
was done at Garnett?" Moore's appearance before the Populist 
convention and his request for the nomination, they maintained, 
made him honor-bound by the convention's decision. Having failed 
to secure the nomination, however, he now attempted to subvert 
that decision. Fortunately for their party, they rejoiced, it was one 
thing to sell the Populists of the Second District, but quite another 
to deliver them. The unconditional Populist would resist illegit-
imate authority even when his leaders demanded obedience as 
necessary to the success of their schemes. 67 
Those who demanded fusion as "practical politics" further irri-
tated the mid-roaders of the Second District. "If the convention 
had endorsed Col. Moore," Champe pointed out, "such action 
would have driven thousands of voters, formerly Republicans, back 
into the old party; and the failure to endorse him is being used to 
drive Democrats away from the Populists. It would seem that men 
of ordinary shrewdness could have foreseen this difficulty," he 
believed, "and have avoided it, by each party strictly minding its 
own affairs. The parties are certainly separate organizations, with 
principles and aims that widely differ; therefore, any attempt to 
fuse could only lead to a vast amount of friction, without advancing 
the cause of either party." Moreover, if the fusionists proved 
successful in removing King from the ticket, Champe predicted, 
Moore would not receive one-quarter of the district's Populist votes, 
for real Populists could not vote for a Democratic banker. Truly, 
he concluded, Funston could not have asked for a better situation 
than the expedient, practical, and sensible fusionists had created-
67 Kansas Agitator, July 7, 14, 1892; Kincaid Kronicle, July 15, 1892. 
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that is, a sharply divided and bickering, quarreling opposition.6s 
The fusion Populists did not renounce their schemes. Democrats 
assisted them by promising to endorse Populist candidates elsewhere 
in Kansas if King were withdrawn. And Moore pointed out that 
he could finance a campaign himself while the Populists as a party 
were nearly penniless. Both groups pressured the Populist District 
Central Committee to replace King with Moore. The new Populist 
state chairman, John Breidenthal, an able exponent of "practical 
politics" and the separation of political principles from daily ac-
tivities, also worked to remove King. Finally in July, the harried 
King grudgingly informed Breidenthal that he would withdraw 
if the party thought it best. Breidenthal immediately called a 
meeting of the Populist committee to accept King's offer. Although 
the "\Vyandotte County committeeman asserted that King's with-
drawal would drive all former Republicans among his county's 
Populists back to their old party, the committee conferred with its 
Democratic counterpart and then substituted Moore for King on 
the Populist ticket. A Populist who had ably advocated his party's 
financial and social arguments in his book Bondholders and Bread-
winners was thus replaced in a contest against a Republican farmer 
by a Democratic banker who insisted that the tariff was the real 
political issue. 69 
Disaffection among Populists was severe. The Kincaid Kronicle 
asserted that the committee had no authority to set aside the will 
of the people as expressed in their convention, and it refused to 
accept Moore as the party's nominee. Its editor arraigned the 
political managers of the People's party for being as arrogant and 
manipulative as any in the corrupt old parties and denounced the 
committee for actions traitorous to the people and the cause it 
claimed to represent. Others joined in the indictment of the 
machinations of Populist leaders. The Agitator, for example, 
declared the Populist bosses had deliberately usurped the rights of 
the people and subverted their wishes. Most dissident Populists 
68 Kansas Agitator, July 14, 1892. 
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eventually though reluctantly accepted Moore as the Populist can-
didate because they saw no alternative, but they continued to cen-
sure the politicians of their own party. The Kronicle, however, 
proved unable to reconcile its campaign for political reform with 
the chicanery involved in this arrangement. Another expressed the 
paper's position well: "The great reformation movement for the 
purification of politics has fallen into the control of tricksters. 
Principles have been traded for expedients. The high moral plane 
has been abandoned." A Coffey County paper agreed: "What 
started out as a great uprising of the people for reform, a crusade 
against the evils of which both old parties were alike guilty, thus 
turns out to be a stupendous and perfectly shameless traffic for 
offices." The Kronicle suspended publication and expired.7° 
The transformation of the People's party evident in the differ-
ences between 1890 and 1892 was obvious to many. In 1890 ideal-
istic and utopian-minded reformers had led discontented farmers 
in a movement to purge a corrupt society and political system as 
much as to reform financial legislation. In 1892 these men such 
as Peffer, Clover, Willits, McLallin, and Otis were either more 
involved in national politics or shunted aside on the state level. 
Technicians replaced ideologues as a mass movement was ration-
alized into an organized political party. Efficiency, expediency, and 
opportunism were adopted by "practical-minded" bureaucrats such 
as Breidenthal as either methods or objectives in their quest for 
immediate, tangible gains rather than the proposed reformation of 
society. Perhaps this was an inevitable process, but it might be 
argued that a reform movement demanded a clear vision of its 
purpose more than it required an efficient management of its ad-
herents. Enveloped in the problems of organization, coordination, 
and administration of a political campaign, the professional activists 
succumbed to the ultimate enticement-victory at the polls-and 
concerned themselves little with the principles and ideas that 
originally had impelled the movement. These too often were 
merely obstacles in the path of fashioning a coalition that might 
prove successful. The tension between these two attitudes within 
the Populist coalition surfaced when such mid-roaders as Champe 
70 Kincaid Kronicle, August 19, 26, 1892; Kansas Agitator, September I, 1892; 
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spoke of the basic differences between movement and party. A. J. 
R. Smith, radical mid-road editor of the Topeka Populist, in fact, 
described the degeneration of Populism as a direct result of the 
transformation of the mass movement into a structured party, with 
its institutional imperatives diverting politicians from reform to 
deceitful manipulation.71 
Although many Populists believed that their party officials sub-
verted the ideals of Populism in their cynical disregard of the 
concept of popular control and their arrogant defiance of the limits 
of their proper authority, more immediately disturbing was the 
obvious Democratization of the party, stemming in part from the 
undemocratization of the movement. In 1890 Populists had spurned 
Democratic advances, and fusion had occurred only on Democratic 
initiative and through Democratic endorsement of Populist candi-
dates. In 1892 Populist leaders had actively sought out Democratic 
leaders; proposed and agreed to fusion; repudiated movement 
figures such as Otis and Clover and replaced them with Democrats 
or Democratic-Populists; nominated others whose principal qual-
ification was their ability to attract Democratic votes. The party 
of the people was now committed to support a middleman in farm 
produce against a prohibitionist farmer for governor and a banker 
against a farmer for Congress. It had refused congressional re-
nominations to two ex-Republican farmers and named two former 
Democrats, one a lawyer and the other a physician. On the insis-
tence of Democrats, it had removed from its ticket another Populist, 
duly nominated, and replaced him with a declared Democrat. 
The Mound City Progress made the obvious conclusion: "Alli-
ancemen would not believe Republicans two years ago when they 
told them that they were only playing into the Democracy's hands, 
but now the evidence is too plain to longer doubt it." The fusion 
policy in Kansas and other Western states, together with the in-
creasingly apparent Southern intention to remain with the Dem-
ocratic party, convinced many that they had indeed been playing 
the fool's part, and they rebelled against the dictation of their 
leaders. In some instances this took an organized form. In the 
Fourth Congressional District, many former Republicans denounced 
71 See especially Kansas Agitator, May 26, 1892, and Topeka Populist, March 
3, 1893. 
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the deals made by the fusionists and asserted that "they did not 
leave the Republican party to go body and soul over to the Democ-
racy; that if it has to be one of the old parties they will return 
to the one they naturally belong to." Many of these encouraged 
Otis to run as an independent candidate after Wharton received 
the Populist nomination. In the Third District, the discontented 
Populists did more than talk. They organized an Abraham Lincoln 
Republican party, a halfway house similar to the Jeffersonian 
Democrat factions organized in the South by others bound by 
partisan allegiance. Composed largely of Alliance farmers, the 
Abraham Lincoln Republicans objected to the nomination of the 
Democratic-Populist lawyer Hudson, but refused to rejoin the GOP 
to support his opponent, Governor (and banker) Humphrey. They 
proposed to nominate a straight Alliance farmer for Congress.72 
Many individuals protested Democratic influence so strongly that 
they did not hesitate to return to full Republican fellowship. Most 
importantly, Frank McGrath disavowed the People's party after 
Harris's nomination and urged alliancemen to follow him back into 
the GOP. "The evidences are numerous in the conventions held 
this year," he announced, "that the middlemen, jackleg lawyers, 
and town loafers are more influential in directing and controlling 
the people's party than farmers. The success of the Democratic 
party seems to have become necessary with many leading People's 
Party leaders and to secure the defeat of the Republican party these 
leaders in the People's Party and the Democratic party are ready 
to lay aside their principles and by fusion secure the offices." This 
party emphasis upon politics rather than Populism drove many 
others back to the GOP, including John H. Rice, one of those 
most prominent in orgamzmg the national People's party. Ben-
jamin Matchett, Speaker pro tern of the 1891 legislature, also 
renounced the People's party and campaigned actively for the 
Republicans. He objected specifically to Populist support of mid-
dlemen like Lewelling in opposition to farmer candidates. The 
president of the Rawlins County Alliance similarly based his 
decision to return to the GOP upon the action of the Populist 
conventions in nominating, not farmers, but men of those classes 
72 Pleasanton Herald, July 22, 1892; Topeka Daily Capital, July 20, 1892; 
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alliancemen had condemned as parasitical. He also vigorously 
decried the Populist "truckling" to the Second District Democrats. 
"I was a Republican and from this time on hope to be." Many 
other Populists, from such prominent leaders as Judge W. S. Cade 
of Anthony to the twelve delegates in the 1892 Marion County 
Republican convention who had voted Populist in 1890, to those 
who had supported the party only with votes, followed the path 
back to the GOP, complaining of Democratic influence and elite 
manipulation.73 
While the Kincaid Kronicle had discontinued rather than support 
a debased ticket, other Populist newspapers determined in their 
disillusionment to support the GOP directly once again. One 
Marion paper declared that the Populist party organization itself 
had repudiated Populism through its manipulations, bribery, and 
other tactics designed to arrange fusion. Methods condemned in 
the old parties, the paper continued, should not be adopted by 
the new one, and the Populist ticket formed by such methods 
should receive the support of "no man who is in the party for the 
honesty, principles, and purification of politics and the betterment 
of mankind." The Populist nomination of Harris, declared the 
Goff Advance, "settles it with us," and the Advance then revealed 
the tenuous success of the Populist conversion efforts among old 
Republicans steeped in years of partisan prejudice: "the people's 
party is [thus shown to be] hand in hand with and was created 
for the purpose of aiding the Southern brigadiers in fulfilling their 
threat of vengeance. Right here we foreswear all allegiance to the 
People's Party. We must be honest with ourselves. Hereafter we 
shall be found battling for square-toed, stalwart Republicanism. 
We would rather belong to the Republican plutocrats than the 
Southern brigadiers."74 
Other Populists, watching events in the South, agreed with the 
Advance's conclusion about the relative merits of Republicans 
and Confederates. Samuel \Northington, a Populist who had pro-
posed in the state convention that all Union veterans present second 
73 Topeka Daily Capital, June 26, July 28, August 14, 27, 31, September 1, 4, 
and passim, 1892. 
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the nomination of Harris, decided after the Democratic victories 
in the Southern state elections to return to the GOP. He had 
supported Harris, he explained, "not because of any love for the 
ex-Confederate soldier, but because I wanted to show the South 
that we were willing to lay down the bloody shirt and ready to 
shake hands over the bloody chasm, but recent developments in 
Georgia show that they are not willing to do the same. It has 
been made perfectly clear to me," he added, "that the South is 
still solid, and that there is no possible show for the people's party 
in a single southern state." Therefore, he believed, "by voting with 
the people's party this year I would help to send Democrats to 
Congress, and help elect a Democratic president. The Democratic 
party is a party of negation and we can never hope to accomplish 
anything through it."75 
D. G. Ollinger, chairman of the 1890 Populist First District 
Central Committee and chairman of the 1892 district convention, 
expressed even more clearly the persistent strength of sectional 
prejudice. In October 1892, reacting against the Southern violence 
toward Populists, he urged Republicans and Populists to unite 
their national committees and "consolidate the north against the 
solid south." Shortly thereafter he withdrew from the People's 
party to rejoin the GOP, explaining that "the people's party is 
only a Democratic sideshow, the principal object of which is to 
beat the Republican party out of the presidency." In a letter to 
Populist state headquarters, Ollinger commented further that a 
vote for Weaver represented a vote for Cleveland. Reform was 
still needed, he agreed, but without the South ·weaver would be 
unable to win, and Cleveland as president would retard all good.76 
Many other Populists announced in the autumn that election 
results in the South, Southern treatment of Weaver, Mrs. Lease, and 
other Populists, and the possibility of aiding the election of the 
monstrous Cleveland-all encouraged them to support the Repub-
lican ticket. There was no room for three parties in the North, 
they decided, when there was room for only one in the South.77 
These apostates, however, largely involved only those superficially 
75 Topeka Daily Capital, November 2, 1892. 
76 Ibid., October 4, 5, 30, 1892. 
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converted from the politics of prejudice and passion, and came 
from only the former-Republican faction of the People's party. 
The ex-Union Laborites, perhaps, entered the campaign with fewer 
illusions about politics; and the former Democrats had vociferously 
welcomed fusion with their erstwhile comrades and did not so 
strongly object to a national Democratic victory. Moreover, where 
the Populists had been strong enough in 1890 to elect their entire 
ticket, they often merely renominated their candidates by acclama-
tion in 1892 and remained free from fusion politics. Especially in 
the heavily Populist Fifth and Sixth districts, where ex-Republicans 
formed the dominant faction of the party, did the Populists display 
the same cold attitude of 1890 toward the Democrats. If many 
Populists returned to the Republican party by 1892, many others 
did not yet believe the only choice was between "Southern brig-
adiers" and "Republican plutocrats"; that Populism involved no 
more principle than its leaders conceded; that choosing the lesser 
of evils was an adequate philosophy for political action; that the 
People's party was only "a great recruiting camp for the Democratic 
party."78 They were prepared to wait for the South to register its 
decision against Cleveland in the national election, perhaps under-
standing the Southern reluctance to oppose the Democracy in 
strictly state elections. They were willing to give the People's party 
an opportunity to govern the state and trusted its declarations. 
They hoped that their radical ideals of 1890 would yet be fulfilled. 
The actual campaign in Kansas in 1892 differed little from that 
of 1890. The issue of prohibition played only a minor role, though 
Republican gubernatorial nominee A. W. Smith's image among 
Democrats as "an intolerant and pernicious prohibitionist" en-
couraged their endorsement of Lewelling. Republicans tried to 
attract Republican-Populists, and except on financial issues their 
program was nearly as radical as that of the Populists, advocating 
government control of railroads and communications, mortgage 
redemption laws, taxation reform, abolition of child labor and 
labor blacklistings. The Topeka Kansas Democrat, in fact, believed 
the Republican platform "as wild and visionary as that of the 
People's Party." The Republicans awarded their nominations as 
the Populists had done in 1890 (and had conspicuously failed to 
78 Ibid., June 26, August 12, September 25, 1892. 
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do in 1892): Besides Smith, the leader of the agrarian reform 
faction within the GOP and Peffer's personal choice for governor 
four years earlier, the Republicans named a farmer for lieutenant 
governor, a black for auditor, and a laborer for state treasurer.79 
Republicans continued to incite bloody-shirt prejudices against 
the Populists and Democrats as in 1890 and 1891: "Cleveland's 
substitute should be withdrawn. A vote for Weaver is a vote for 
the solid south." The Republican state chairman pressed his 
party's workers to emphasize "arguments on the political situation 
from a soldier standpoint." Republicans also sought to prevent 
former Confederates from voting.80 In conjunction with such ac-
tivity, they persistently stressed the increasingly plausible charge 
that the People's party served the interests of the Democracy. "If 
by any possibility the fusion ticket succeeds in Kansas and other 
\~\!estern states," warned one paper, "the effect will be to elect a 
Democrat president." Republican campaigners focused on con-
vincing farmers that in state politics, too, the People's party "is 
rapidly degenerating into a tail to sail the Democratic kite." The 
Newton Republican, for example, saw in the policy of fusion the 
same course that Democrat C. F. Diffenbach anticipated: though 
apparently the People's party had swallowed the Democracy, in 
reality it was the reverse. "It has been very skillfully manipulated. 
To allow a handful of Democrats to control the great number 
that composed the people's party shows good generalship on the 
side of the Democrats. . . . In reality [the People's party] is the 
Democratic party under another name .... How do you [Populists] 
like it, you who were formerly Republicans?" Republicans also 
revived the old charge that agrarian radicalism injured the state's 
credit and economic development.81 The calamity howls of Peffer-
79 Leavenworth Evening Standard, July 1, 1892; James Smith to J. H. White, 
October 11, 1892, Humphrey Papers, KSHS; Raymond C. Miller, "The Populist 
Party in Kansas" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1928), pp. 222·25. 
80 Topeka Daily Capital, September 17, October 19, 1892; J. M. Simpson to 
County Committeemen and Precinct Organizers, August 29, 1892, J. M. Hum-
pluey to George Angle, February 20, 1893, and W. A. Owen to Angle, December 
9, 1892, George C. Angle Papers, Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas; 
G. W. Shook to L. U. Humphrey, [1892], Lyman U. Humphrey Papers, Spencer 
Research Library, University of Kansas. 
81 Topeka Daily Capital, June 15, 17, 26, July 9, September 28, October 9, 25, 
28, 30, 1892; Bishop W. Perkins to P. H. Coney, June 23, 1892, P. H. Coney 
Papers, KSHS. 
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ism infuriated the Republican press, but personal abuse of Populists 
remained the easiest and most popular response, with Peffer's 
beard, Simpson's feet, and Mrs. Lease's tongue attracting the most 
attention. 
The Populists, too, largely duplicated their earlier campaign 
except in increasing organization by the party and less dependence 
upon the Alliance. Breidenthal established a Populist lecture 
bureau under his own direction in order to coordinate campaign 
speakers, and he arranged for Weaver and other party leaders 
from outside Kansas to address the state's Populists. The issues 
remained essentially unchanged, with emphasis upon governmental 
favoritism, economic depression, political corruption, and social 
alienation. Peffer was again among the speakers most in demand, 
and despite ill health and national speaking commitments, he con-
ducted a grueling tour of Kansas after Congress adjourned. He 
consistently stood by the early Populist positions of 1890 on finance 
and social relations and, more than other leading Kansas Populists, 
provided their ideological justification. He again rejected free 
silver as a panacea and even denied the metallic basis of money; 
he restated Populist demands for government ownership of rail-
roads and communications; he denounced Pinkertonism as one 
manifestation of legally sanctioned, class-directed violence while 
discussing the Homestead strike as an illustration of existing social 
inequalities.s2 
On the matter of politics, however, Peffer was less comfortable. 
He called upon Kansans to respond rationally to the issues raised 
and urged them to ignore the impulses of prejudice. He asked 
them to support Harris, not for what he had done, but for what 
he would do. And he implored them to avoid the abuse and 
vituperation that threatened harmonious action and to understand 
the peculiar nature of Southern politics. But Peffer refused to 
approve the fusion schemes, already in effect by the time of his 
return to Kansas, and he also declined to comment on questions 
about the actions and motivations of Populist fusion leaders. He 
publicly expressed regret that Otis had not been renominated and 
82 Topeka Advocate, July 22, September 7, 14, 21, 28, 1892: Topeka Daily 
Capital, July 22, September 4, 24, October 2, 12, 19, 21, 1892; Garnett Journal, 
September 23, 1892; Ruppenthal Scrapbooks, 3: 39. 
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pointedly had Otis accompany him on his campaign tour. He 
avoided endorsing Moore, even when Breidenthal billed them 
together in the fusionist stronghold of Pleasanton. Instead, ap-
pearing to a reporter to be "ill at ease," he discussed his role in the 
Senate. At least once, Peffer provoked criticism from politicians 
of both parties by attacking the policy of fusion from the stump; 
and he objected to Democratic participation, arranged by Breiden-
thal, in a grand Topeka rally on the eve of the election.83 
By November, however, the Democrats had few objections to 
appearing with Populists. The adoption of the policy of fusion, so 
admirably suited to their needs and desires, had dissolved most of 
their opposition to the radical rhetoric of their allies. Even a 
group of conservative Democrats, who held an October convention 
to denounce fusion because it deprived them of the pleasure of 
voting directly for Cleveland, dropped their plans to name a 
separate ticket. Indeed, Peffer's staunch opponent, Edward Carroll, 
now Democratic candidate for Congress in the First District, 
withdrew in favor of the Populist nominee before the election, 
while Glick and Martin urged Democrats to vote for Populist 
candidates even where Democrats had a separate ticket.S4 
Both Populists and Republicans confidently predicted success 
before the polls opened. The day after the election, both parties 
believed their predictions had been fulfilled: "KANSAS REDEEMED" 
the Topeka Capital rejoiced, while the Advocate announced "cA-
LAMITY OVERTAKES THE APOSTLES OF PLUTOCRACY." The confusion 
over the results indicated the closeness of the contest. When the 
full returns were in, the Populists emerged as the victor, but their 
margin over the GOP was slight. Weaver carried the state by 
fewer than 6,000 votes and Lewelling by only 4,432. Though Davis, 
Baker, Simpson, Harris, and Hudson were elected to Congress, 
·wharton lost Otis's Fourth District by a solid margin, and in the 
First and Second districts the Republicans made spectacular gains. 
83 Garnett Journal, September 23, 1892; Topeka Daily Capital, September 2. 
4, 14, 15, 24, October 27, November 4, 1892; Kansas City Star, October 6, 1892; 
Topeka Advocate, October 26, November 16, 1892. 
84 Wichita Weekly Beacon, July 22, 1892; Kansas City Star, September 23, 
October 7, 8, 1892; Samuel Feller to Cleveland, September 21, 1892, Cleveland 
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Close was overwhelmed and Moore won election only after con-
testing the results. Moreover, control of the legislature was 
uncertain. Populists easily dominated the senate, but the house 
apparently had a slight Republican majority. In 1890 the opposi-
tion to the Republicans had received 59 percent of the state's votes; 
in 1892 the fusion ticket drew but 50 percent of the poll.85 
Obviously the Republican appeals and the pressure of events in 
both Kansas and the South had driven many former Republicans 
from the People's party back into the GOP. The campaign and 
the election results dealt a serious blow to the grand Populist 
hopes. Enemies and transient allies alike heralded the death of 
Populism. "The disintegration which began long before it was 
in evidence that the South had not kept its bargain to help in 
bridging the bloody chasm will proceed more rapidly now," one 
Republican paper announced in reminding its readers that the 
Advocate itself had said only failure and defeat awaited the People's 
party without the South. The Capital surveyed the results of the 
national elections and decided "the people's party has reached the 
end of its rope. The man who rises majestically above the wreck 
is Senator Peffer." Democrat Glick predicted that "the People's 
Party will soon begin to fade and in four years it will contain only 
the cranks."86 
Populists, of course, publicly interpreted the election returns 
differently and looked forward to the inauguration of "The First 
People's Party Government on Earth." But pure Populism in 
Kansas had clearly suffered severe blows from the twin impact of 
fusion in Kansas and rejection in the South. Though much of the 
effects of the first had been felt before the election, the full force 
of the second came only in November. Each reinforced the implica-
tions of the other and might be expected to encourage the drift of 
disappointed Republican-Populists back to the GOP. How the two 
administrations, Lewelling's in Topeka and Cleveland's in Wash-
ington, placed in office by these dual aspects of the campaign of 
1892, used their power and for what ends would help to determine 
the future of the People's party. 
85 Washington Post, November 7, 1892; Report of the Secretary of State of 
Kansas (Topeka, 1892). 
86 Topeka Daily Capital, November 13, 15, 17, 1892. 
CHAPTER SIX 
That Iridescent Dream 
THE CAMPAIGN and election of 1892 revealed serious weaknesses 
in the Populist strategy and grave disagreements over the direction 
the party should follow. Some Populists were tolerant of the in-
fidelity of the South. Only the corrupt tactics and force of "the 
old bosses," they believed, had prevented the true voice of the South 
from registering itself. Other Kansas Populists were less charitable 
toward the South. The postelection discovery that Charles W. 
Macune and J. F. Tillman, both on the National Executive 
Committee of the Farmers' Alliance, had distributed Democratic 
campaign literature as official Alliance material in the South 
particularly incensed these Populists, who already considered that 
Southern alliancemen had betrayed them and their cause. At the 
annual national meeting of the Farmers' Alliance in Memphis in 
late November 1892, John Otis threw the delegates into an uproar 
by demanding that Macune be replaced or "we of the West will 
have to withdraw from the national order, for we have had enough 
of the purchased allies of the Southern Democracy."1 
The election results also provoked disagreements as to the future 
of the People's party. Jerry Simpson, for one, believed with many 
commentators of the old parties that the "mission of the party is 
ended" and that Populists should follow him into the Democracy 
to enact the reforms they espoused. W. A. Peffer sharply contra-
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dieted Simpson and declared that Populists would stand by their 
party and its principles until success was achieved. Later, in 1893, 
Peffer advanced his own opinion on "The Mission of the Populist 
Party," one that neither Simpson nor any other Populist would 
ever be able to reconcile with the Democratic party. Writing in 
the North American Review, Peffer condemned as distractions the 
political debates like that of gold versus silver, describing a specie 
basis for money as a form of barbarism. The real issue was the 
existence of privileged arrangements like the national banking 
system. Populism, he maintained, meant that "the functions of 
government shall be exercised only for the mutual benefit of all 
the people. It asserts that government is useful only to the extent 
that it serves to advance the common weal," he continued, and 
"that the public good is paramount to private interests." The 
mission of the party, then, was to promote popular rights, encourage 
the aspirations of the common man, and provide for the equitable 
distribution of society's products. Populists distinctly did not 
advocate paternalism. "They only demand," he wrote, "that public 
functions shall be exercised by public agents, and that sovereign 
powers shall not be delegated to private persons or corporations 
having only private interests to serve."2 
The divisions within the People's party since its formation, only 
partially papered over during the campaign, thus became more 
apparent again as the Populists debated their future. As the 
senatorial contest resulting in Peffer's election two years earlier 
had exposed Populist factionalism, the impending election by the 
new legislature to fill the remaining two years of the late Senator 
Preston B. Plumb's term further revealed the instability of the 
Populist coalition. Believing that the party had come to the end 
of its rope apparently did not frighten Simpson away from the 
scaffold, and he made a bold bid for the senatorial seat himself. 
Opposition to Simpson was strong, however, encouraged by both 
1 Girard Western Herald, November 11, 1892: Mary E. Lease, "My Recent 
Trip through the South," Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly 76 (March 16, 1893): 
161, 166-67; Topeka Advocate, November 23, 30, 1892; National Economist, 
November 26, 1892. 
2 Girard Western Herald, November 25, 1892; National Economist, December 
3, 1892; Washington Post, November 16, 1892; Peffer, "The Mission of the 
Populist Party," North American Review 157 (December 1893): 665-78. 
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those reluctant for the party to lose his congressional seat and 
those who objected to his Democratic and fusionist inclinations. 
Mary E. Lease, in particular, protested Simpson's candidacy, declar-
ing that he had become a straight Democrat who merely used the 
unsuspecting Populists for his own interests. Simpson shortly with-
drew from consideration but publicly advocated the election of a 
Democrat because, as he said, "they played fair with us this time, 
and we will need them in the future." Other Populists, including 
Governor-elect Lorenzo D. Lewelling, also supported Democratic 
claims to senatorial recognition, and Democrats naturally demanded 
the election of a fellow partisan. Anti-fusion Populists, of course, 
opposed any such candidates and were determined to have a senator 
from their own ranks. From Washington, Peffer urged Populists 
to shun Democratic assistance as they had in his election, so that 
the new senator would have no obligations to any party but his 
own.3 
When the legislature convened on January 10, 1893, however, the 
issue of the senatorial nominee was distinctly secondary to that of 
the very organization of the house. Despite the election of their 
state ticket and their easy control of the senate, the Populists found 
themselves in the minority in the house according to the returns 
certified by the State Board of Canvassers. Populists believed that 
Republican officials had fraudulently given control of the house 
to their own partisans, and they presented a good case. A Haskell 
County Republican, for example, was awarded the election cer-
tificate from the 12lst District because of the transposition of 
voting totals with his Populist opponent, a maneuver of the county 
clerk that the State Board of Canvassers acknowledged but refused 
to correct. Other Republicans declared elected included ineligible 
postmasters and nonresidents, and the Populists challenged still 
others on the basis of illegal votes, bribery, and miscount of ballots. 
The Populists wanted to bar from participating in the organization 
of the house all those whose seats were being contested, which 
would give the Populist representatives a majority; the Republicans 
demanded that the house ignore contests until organization had 
been completed and a special committee could be appointed to 
3 Washington Post, November 16, December 25, 1892; Kansas Agitator, Decem-
ber 29, 1892. 
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investigate. Under these circumstances, of course, the Republicans 
would control both the house and the special committee.4 
In a tumultuous session, Republicans and Populists each orga-
nized the house, with conflicting leadership and membership, the 
Republicans swearing in all members whose seats were contested 
and the Populists enrolling their claimants to the contested seats. 
For a month this unprecedented situation continued amidst na-
tional publicity as "the legislative war." The state constitution 
gave the governor and the senate the power to determine the legality 
of the other house of the legislature, and Lewelling and the state 
senate recognized the Populist house. The Republicans refused 
to disband, and the Democratic members joined the Republican 
house. Thereafter the two groups alternated in Representative Hall, 
Republicans using it in the morning and Populists in the afternoon, 
as Lewelling tried to arrange a compromise. Finally on February 
14 the Republicans forced matters by declaring the chief clerk of 
the Populist house in contempt of their body and attempting to 
arrest him. After a struggle, the Populists managed to free the 
clerk and retire to the capitol. 
The situation then deteriorated rapidly. After their adjournment 
that evening, the Populists locked themselves into Representative 
Hall and asked the sheriff of Shawnee County to provide a force 
to protect the house and preserve the peace. The Republican 
sheriff refused, so Lewelling commanded the adjutant general to 
place guards in the capitol to maintain order. In the morning, 
however, the Republican legislators pushed their way past these 
guards and battered down the door to the legislative chamber with 
a sledge hammer. The Populists, frightened at such fierceness, 
retreated from the chamber, and the Republicans requested the 
Santa Fe railway company to send men from its railroad shops to 
defend the Republican house. Lewelling called out the militia to 
remove the entrenched Republicans, but the commanding officer, a 
strong Republican partisan, refused to obey the legal orders of the 
governor, and instead stationed soldiers and gatling guns on the 
capitol grounds to support more than a thousand armed Repub-
4 Topeka Advocate, January 18, 1893; House Journal (Topeka, Kans., 1893), 
pp. 7, 69, 82, 125, 127, 175; William E. Parrish, "The Great Kansas Legislative 
Imbroglio of 1893," Journal of the West 7 (October 1968): 472. 
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lican "deputies" from the Republican stronghold of Topeka who 
were posted everywhere. Armed support for the Populists would 
be slower to arrive from outlying rural districts.5 
The possibility of mass violence frightened none more than 
Lewelling, a sensitive man of Quaker background. On the snowy 
night of February 16, despite Peffer's advice to stand by the Populist 
house as the legal body, Lewelling made concessions to a committee 
of Republican legislators to end the conflict, concessions that 
guaranteed ultimate Republican victory: all militia, deputies, and 
assistant sergeants-at-arms were to be dismissed; Republicans were 
to retain possession of Representative Hall and the Populists find 
other quarters; and the decision as to the legal house would be 
made by the Republican-dominated state supreme court. The court 
made the expected decision, and on February 28 the Populists who 
met with Republican approval entered the Republican house.6 
The legislative war was over, but only two weeks remained in 
the session, and little work had been accomplished. What the 
legislature thereafter achieved resulted naturally enough from 
Republican initiative and interests. The reform demands made in 
the Populist platform fell short of realization. The Populists had 
promised much and produced little and, after declaring theirs a 
righteous cause, had agreed to surrender to opponents whom they 
had characterized as evil and unprincipled. Moreover, with the 
assistance of the Republican-controlled news media, the Populists 
had given substance to the classic Republican charge that they were 
anarchistic cranks, not to be trusted with the responsibility of 
governing. Democrats agreed with Republicans that, as Thomas 
Moonlight wrote, the legislative war "is a fatal blow to the people's 
party."7 
What the Populists had failed to accomplish discredited their 
movement, but something they had managed to finish hurt them 
even more. Before the legislative imbroglio was resolved, both 
houses and the senate met in joint session to elect a United States 
5 Parrish, "Legislative Imbroglio," pp. 473-84; Joseph K. Hudson, Letters to 
Governor Lewelling (Topeka, Kans., 1893). 
6 Parrish, "Legislative Imbroglio," pp. 484-87; Washington Post, February 17, 
1893. 
7 0. Gene Clanton, Kansas Populism: Ideas and Men (Lawrence, 1969), pp. 
135-36: Thomas Moonlight to P. H. Coney, January 18, 1893, Coney Papers. 
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Senator. Although Populists had a clear majority of the legislators 
on joint ballot, the party was split over the fusion question. John 
Martin, the state's most prominent Democratic fusionist, actively 
sought the Populist nomination for senator and he received en-
dorsements from many fusion Populists, including Lewelling. From 
Washington, Simpson maintained that it would be "good policy" 
to elect Martin, both as a reward for his fusionist role and because 
the Democratic majority in the United States Senate would seat 
Martin but might reject a Populist elected in the three-house 
legislature. s 
Mid-road opposition to Martin was intense. Led by John Willits 
and Mary Lease, the anti-fusionists demanded that the Populists 
end their Democratic dalliance and name a straight Populist. 
Willits argued that it was better to lose with a Populist candidate 
than to win with a Democrat, and a Topeka mass rally agreed, 
resolving that the legislature should send no senator to Washington 
rather than a man committed to one of the corrupt old parties. 
The Populist caucus divided over Martin as the symbol of fusion, 
and gradually mid-road sentiment centered on former Republican 
Frank Doster. The caucus struggled for two days before Martin 
won a narrow decision when Breidenthal's supporters joined forces 
with the Democrats rather than the mid-roaders. Martin accepted 
the nomination with the announcement that he remained a Dem-
ocrat and would enter the Democratic caucus in the Senate.9 
On January 26, 1893, the Kansas Populists elected Democrat 
John Martin to the United States Senate. Eight Populists refused 
to accept Martin and scattered their votes. One representative 
explained his dissenting vote by noting that "he thought last night 
he was going to a Populist caucus, but found he had been entrapped 
into a Democratic stronghold." Populists outside the legislature 
were still more vocal against the party's choice. Peffer regretted 
Martin's election because his Democratic principles were in "direct 
antagonism" to all that true Populists considered "fundamental and 
vital" and because his adherence to the Democratic party militated 
against eventual reform. Mrs. Lease was more emphatic in dis-
8 Topeka Daily Capital, January 22, 24, 1893. 
9 Kansas City Star, January 23-25, 1893; Michael Brodhead, Persevering 
Populist: The Life of Frank Doster (Reno, Nev., 1969), p. 79. 
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cussing the impact of Martin's election. "This is a death blow to 
the People's Party, both state and national. It will drive 100,000 
Populists in the South back into the Democratic party, and in 
Kansas and in the North thousands will return to the Republican 
party. John Martin's election killed our party, and that is all 
there is to it." A Populist in the state of Washington testified to 
the wide impact of Martin's election when he lamented that it 
seemed to verify what Populists had been struggling to deny-the 
Republican assertion that the People's party was but an adjunct 
of the Democracy. The nation's Populists, he wrote, had watched 
Kansas for another senator like Peffer "only to have their fond 
hopes dashed to pieces." In the election of Martin, Kansas failed 
in its duty to stand firm and thus be an example for Populists 
elsewhere.w 
Other Populists, of course, viewed Martin's election differently. 
Simpson announced, "I am so pleased I hardly know what to do." 
National fusionist sentiment was expressed by the party's 1892 
presidential candidate, James B. Weaver, who had advocated fusion 
with the Democrats throughout his career as a third-party leader. 
The choice of Martin, declared Weaver, represented "the very 
best possible result" because, as he fatuously continued, Martin 
"has for years been openly in accord with the doctrines of the 
People's Party."n 
The furor over Martin's selection and the legislature's failure to 
achieve any significant reforms encouraged the development of a 
vocal anti-fusion movement within the People's party in early 1893. 
That Democrats had sided with the Republican house at the same 
time that Populists elected a Democrat to the Senate intensified the 
anti-fusion sentiment. With the legislature still in session, protests 
began to rise against the fusionist rationale. "Beware of the man 
who says: 'Let us get power first. Then we can reform,'" warned 
one Populist. "The party that uses dishonest and corrupt practices 
to get into power, will be obliged to use the same means to retain 
power. Let us win our battles honestly or be defeated." Even 
10 House journal [Populist] (Topeka, Kans., 1893), pp. 123-25; Kansas City 
Star, January 25, 26, 1893; Chicago Tribune, June 9, 1899; National Economist, 
February 11, 1893; American Non-Conformist (Indianapolis), February 23, 1893. 
11 Kansas City Star, January 26, 1893; Fred Haynes, ]ames Baird Weaver (Iowa 
City, 1919), p. 346. 
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stronger mid-road statements came from Cyrus Corning in his 
newspaper, The People. The local fusionist Populist committee 
in Paola had repudiated his position during the 1892 campaign, 
and in 1893 he moved to Topeka where he continued his un-
compromising editorials. He consistently distinguished between 
Populists and fusionists and maintained that "fighting fusion is not 
fighting the People's Party any more than fighting prostitution is 
opposing virtue." Through its fusion maneuvers, Corning believed, 
the People's party had "brought its worst elements to the front 
from Governor down the line. Its committees betrayed their trust. 
Its candidates, those who were privy to the infamous deal, sold 
out in advance of the election. Fraud has become the prominent 
ingredient in their make up."12 
If these bitter words grated too harshly on sensitive Populist ears, 
anti-fusion sentiment was also conspicuous among more "respon-
sible" papers such as the Topeka Advocate) which retained its 
respectability by refusing to believe the actualities of the fusion 
arrangements in Kansas. Fusion in 1892, for example, was, ac-
cording to editor Stephen McLallin, "all on the Democratic side, 
and we [Populists] were in no way responsible for it." Nevertheless, 
Populists should avoid fusion in the future: "The People's Party 
stands for certain principles which will never be endorsed by those 
who are in control of either of the old parties, and if we would 
draw to our support the dissatisfied elements of both parties from 
the ranks of honest voters, we must keep clear of all entangling 
alliances. A straight-forward, middle-of-the-road course is the only 
rational course to pursue."13 
In many local elections in 1893 anti-fusion Populists followed 
this advice and often ran tickets counter to the regular Populist 
slates, which reflected the fusionist domination. Others, however, 
announced their intention to support the Republican ticket, either 
in an effort to purge their party of the contaminating effects of 
fusion or as an end in itself. These intransigents defended this 
action as being more justifiable than joining "the political cesspool 
of ignorance and prejudice called Democracy" through fusion ar-
12 Ruppenthal Scrapbooks, 3: 87; Topeka People) March 25, 1893; Topeka 
New Era, April 8, October 21, 1893. 
13 Topeka Advocate, April 26, 1893. 
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ranged by "the dangerous set of conspirators who are scheming to 
have us bound to the Democrats."14 
The actions of the Kansas Democracy strengthened the mid-road 
determination to avoid any connection with it. The Democratic 
anti-fusion convention of October 1892 had resolved to reorganize 
the party on a conservative basis, and as the more reform-minded 
Democrats increasingly drifted into the People's party these stalwart 
Democrats came to dominate their party's machinery. Led by Balie 
P. Waggoner and Edward Carroll and their supporters among the 
railroad and banking circles of northeastern Kansas, they even 
opposed the election of Martin to the Senate and continued to 
fight his influence in the party. One stalwart expressed their dim 
view of Democratic fusionists: "They have prostituted the Dem-
ocratic party in Kansas, and have brought the State into bad odor 
among the financiers of the country. They have done much to 
arrest our development, injure prosperity, and make times hard." 
The conservatism that characterized the anti-fusion Democrats was 
evident in their intention to establish a newspaper that would 
oppose "Populism, prohibition, woman suffrage, and all the com-
munistic and latter-day fads that have run the State crazy. It will 
oppose any compromise with third partyites by which they are 
given control of affairs. It will advocate," this stalwart explained, 
"the development of the State's resources, better treatment of the 
railways ... , the establishment of manufactories, the extension of 
a cordial invitation to capital. . . . It will support an honest 
dollar, and in this respect, as in respect to all other policies of 
national scope, will be a Grover Cleveland paper all the way 
through."15 
By early spring 1893, representatives of this Democratic faction 
had gained control of the State Central Committee, and reorga-
nization of the Kansas Democracy proceeded, with only stalwarts 
being placed in strategic positions on the various committees at 
all levels. Where the party organization was in strict control, the 
stalwart attitude prevailed among the Democracy's rank and file. 
Atchison County Democrats, for instance, resolved in October in 
14 Kansas Commoner (Wichita), June 15, August 24, 31, 1893; Wichita Star, 
September 2, 1893. 
15 Kansas City Star, October 8, 1892; Washington Post, May 2, 1893. 
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favor of the Cleveland administration and against prohibition, 
woman suffrage, and fusion. The Democrats of Norton County, 
however, where the party was considerably weaker and necessarily 
depended upon Populist cooperation to achieve any success in 
local politics, resolved "That we severely denounce the adjuncts 
to the Republican party known as 'Stalwart Democrats.'" Such 
dissension was but one sign that the votes which the Democratic 
party organization could deliver had decreased greatly. Indeed, 
while Populist leaders worried because so many ex-Republicans 
from their ranks were returning to the GOP, stalwart Democrats 
lamented the flow of fusionist Democrats to the People's party. 
The Sedgwick County stalwarts explained the process, naturally 
emphasizing Democratic maneuvers more than Populist concessions: 
"Through the machinations of so-called Democratic leaders with 
Populist tendencies, and the smooth, oily and deceptive utterances 
of John Martin of Topeka, many Kansas Democrats ... have left 
the party and joined the Populists while others have gone over 
to the support of the Populists under the assumed name of Dem-
ocrats.''16 
Democratic loss was Populist gain in only a limited sense, for 
the composition and direction of the People's party continued to 
change. This increasing Democratization of the party was but one 
part of a vicious circle in which the party found itself: The more 
the Democrats were attracted to the party by the concessions of 
the Populist leaders and the repugnant nature of the Cleveland 
Gold Democrats, the more the former Republicans withdrew from 
the organization, denouncing this Democratization of the party, 
the arbitrary actions of Populist officials, and the policy of fusion, 
which both contributed to Cleveland's election and furthered the 
Democratization of the Kansas People's party. And the more the 
former Republicans withdrew, the more willing and able were the 
remaining Populists to adopt the political tactics of fusion, and 
the more attractive the party became to Democrats. 
Fusion with the residual, conservative Democracy was, at the 
least, ill-considered, but Lewelling, Breidenthal, and other Populist 
16 Girard Western Herald, February 10, June 16, October 6, 1893; Washington 
Post, April 11, 1893; Norton Liberator, April 14, 1893; Kansas Commoner, July 
13, November 2, 1893. 
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leaders were determined to continue the policy. They believed 
that Democratic support was necessary if their administration were 
to stay in power and felt that through their policies they could 
attract more Democrats to their party than they would alienate 
former Republicans from their ranks. Consequently, they at-
tempted to deemphasize Populist interest in prohibition and woman 
suffrage, issues anathema to Democrats and their immigrant follow-
ers but considered vital by most Populists of Republican ante-
cedents, and they rewarded their Democratic allies with state 
patronage and cooperation on other matters. 
The very success of the 1892 fusion arrangements and Lewelling's 
course in office created grave difficulties for the party, however. 
Democrats naturally expected and demanded patronage as payment 
for their assistance, and Lewelling's unhesitating distribution of 
offices to them angered Populists, who regarded the process as 
ignominious, without satisfying the Democrats, for they could never 
get as much as they wanted. Democratic leaders, in fact, warned 
Lewelling that unless he granted "our Democrats" more recogni-
tion, any future effort at fusion was doomed,17 Factions in both 
parties to the fusionist coalition, then, became annoyed with the 
Populist fusion leaders. 
Lewelling's appointments, moreover, were often ill advised, even 
apart from their partisan implications. His adjutant general, for 
example, had been disbarred by the Colorado Supreme Court after 
being accused of perjury and bribery. Lewelling finally removed 
him after an investigation revealed irregularities in his accounts. 
Some observers considered other appointees to be anti-labor, and 
Senator Peffer's son Douglas, as president of the Topeka Typo-
graphical Union, protested to Lewelling against at least one such 
appointment. The selection of municipal police commissioners 
eventually proved more damaging to the administration. These 
commissioners were charged with the enforcement of prohibition, 
and the natural instincts of the Lewelling fusionists were to relax 
regulation in an effort to please their wet Democratic allies. Some 
17 For Lewelling's appointments and disappointments, see especially L. C. Uh1 
to Lewelling, April 17, 1893, V. W. May to Lewelling, April 12, 1893, W. H. T. 
Wakefield to Lewelling, April 13, 1893, and Lewelling to Mrs. E .S. Marshall, 
May 10, 1893, Lorenzo D. Lewelling Papers, KSHS. 
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evidence indicated that the administration had also taken money 
from Kansas City gamblers in return for naming acceptable police 
commissioners. Other scandals or charges of corruption tainted 
Lewelling's appointments to the state penitentiary, the School for 
the Deaf, and the State Board of Charities, while members of the 
governor's personal staff were implicated in questionable financial 
schemes.18 
Another aspect of the fusionist program also caused discord and 
resentment. Fusion leaders in 1892 had arranged for the transfer 
of the Democratic Fort Scott Daily Press to Topeka to advocate 
fusion. After the election the Populist administration promised to 
reward this Democratic paper with the contract for the state 
printing. This brought protests from many Populists, who felt 
that Populist printing should go to the party's official paper, the 
Topeka Advocate, which had long struggled financially. Indeed, 
it depended upon Peffer's frequent assistance, as his senatorial 
salary made him a backer of many ventures among the poor Pop-
ulists. After Martin's election, Lewelling and his associates con-
cluded that further immediate major concessions to the Democrats, 
such as naming a state paper, would be a political mistake, for, as 
Lewelling conceded, "it would endanger the situation and drive 
away a great many supporters of our cause in return for what 
we might gain by this action." Although the Advocate secured the 
state printing, which provided enough income to keep the advertis-
ing-poor paper alive, Lewelling promised to contribute personally 
to the Press and suggested that in the future it might receive the 
state contract.19 
Finally, the administration's opposition to woman suffrage and 
prohibition irritated many Populists. The two issues were long 
important in the reform movement and were inextricably linked 
in the minds of both their supporters and opponents. The People's 
party in 1890 had avoided an explicit demand for prohibition, but 
18 Lewelling to H. H. Artz, February 23, 1894, Lewelling to D. M. Peffer, 
March 13, 1894, J. B. Welch to Lewelling, July 10, 1894, A. Clark to Lewelling, 
June 19, 1894, Lewelling Papers. See also Topeka Advocate, March 15, 29, 1893, 
February 28, 1894; Topeka Daily Capital, May 31, 1894; Walter T. K. Nugent, 
The Tolerant Populists (Chicago, 1963), p. 149. 
19 Lewelling to G. W. Marble, April 18, 1893, Lewelling Papers; Chicago 
Tribune, June 9, 1899. 
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its leaders such as Peffer, Otis, and Willits were popularly connected 
with prohibition, and the party's state chairman in his official 
capacity had asked for a special session of the legislature to enact 
more effective prohibitory laws. Now woman suffrage appeared 
the more important. The 1893 legislature had drafted a constitu-
tional amendment giving women the right to vote, and the measure 
would be the subject of a referendum in the 1894 general elections. 
Democrats strongly opposed equal suffrage, largely because it an-
tagonized the immigrant groups that formed their base of strength. 
But woman suffrage had long been a favorite reform objective of 
most third-party members and of many Republicans, who had 
already achieved the triumph of prohibition. In the 1891 legisla-
ture, for example, the Populist house had approved a bill allowing 
women to vote and hold office. All Democrats opposed the bill and 
a majority of Republicans did likewise. Among the Populists, those 
of Republican antecedents favored the bill by thirty to seven, those 
of a traditional third-party background by twelve to one, and those 
formerly Democrats by only nine to six. The 1892 Populist state 
convention had apparently adopted by an overwhelming vote an 
endorsement of woman suffrage, but Breidenthal's parliamentary 
maneuvers resulted in merely announcing the party's support for 
a referendum on the question. This pleased suffragists while allow-
ing Breidenthal and other politicians to contend that it did not 
strictly commit the party to equal suffrage. Thus, woman suffrage 
was not an issue alien to Populism in 1894 but was a logical demand 
of large sections of the party. Such Populists reminded those less 
zealous that if the party "ignored the rights of our sisters," it 
would be denying the essence of Populism and the meaning of a 
people's party. The Norton Liberator, for example, believed in 
1894 that "thus far the cause of woman has been solely championed 
by Populism. We demanded the amendment [in 1892], we enacted 
the amendment [in 1893], now let us ... ratify it."20 
With the governor and party chairman against them, the suffra-
gists looked hopefully to Senator Peffer for assistance. He had long 
20 S. W. Chase to L. U. Humphrey, October 20, 1890, Humphrey Papers, 
KSHS: House journal (Topeka, Kans., 1891), pp. 490-91; Legislative Blue Book 
(Topeka, Kans., 1891); Kansas City Star, June 16, 1892; Norton Liberator, June 
15, 1894. 
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advocated woman suffrage as a matter of simple justice, had worked 
with suffragists in Washington, and had supported the inclusion 
of an equal suffrage plank in the Omaha Platform. Unfortunately, 
as one suffragist lamented, Peffer was now involved in Senate work, 
politically unable to advance the cause of woman's rights in Kansas 
because Martin and Lewelling obstructed his efforts in their de-
termination to promote fusion. Once again it seemed that politics 
precluded populism.21 
Increasingly, then, some Populists began to fear that Lewelling 
and Breidenthal intended to prove the truth of Ingalls's contention 
that the "purification of politics is an iridescent dream." And most 
of those believed that the desire to continue the policy of fusion 
in the election of 1894 lay behind the sorry record the Populist 
administration was compiling. Perhaps the most important dis-
affection was that of Mary Lease. As chairwoman of the State Board 
of Charities she resented Lewelling's efforts to have Democrats 
named to positions nominally under her jurisdiction. She publicly 
attributed Populist losses in the 1893 elections to the policies of 
the Lewelling administration, seeing in the Populist defeat "a loud 
and effective protest against corrupt men and their measures and 
fusion with the Democrats." Shortly thereafter Lewelling attempted 
to remove Mrs. Lease from her job, but she countered with a suit 
against him, contending that his action was not based on her 
official performance but on her opposition to his political plans 
for fusion. In February 1894 the state supreme court ruled that 
Lewelling could not remove Mrs. Lease without cause, and the 
administration dropped the matter. Mrs. Lease, however, continued 
to arraign the fusionist course of Lewelling and Breidenthal, con-
tributing to Corning's new mid-road paper, the New Era, and 
charging the administration with cooperating with Kansas City 
gamblers and accepting bribes from railroad companies. The ad-
ministration retorted with questions as to her sanity, innuendos 
about her personal life, and claims that the GOP had bought her.22 
Although the Lease-Lewelling contest seemed to be a mutually 
21 Topeka New Era, April 14, 1894. 
22 Topeka Daily Capital, November 11, 1893: Kansas City Star, January 2, 27, 
1894; Pleasanton Herald, January 26, 1894; 0. Gene Clanton, "Intolerant Pop-
ulist? The Disaffection of Mary Elizabeth Lease," Kansas Historical Quarterly 
34 (Summer 1968): 189-200. 
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damaging stalemate, other prominent Populists joined the mid-
roaders like Corning in forming a People's party in exile_ John 
vVillits was an important addition after his criticism of the fusionists 
and their Democratic allies cost him his position on the State Board 
of Pardons. W. F. Rightmire and Noah Allen, another discharged 
officeholder, revived the Citizens' Alliance as an anti-administration 
organization. John Otis also became a supporter of the more un-
compromising radicals among Lewelling's Populist opponents. By 
early 1894 these Populists had come to believe one of Corning's 
statements a year earlier: "By virtue of the unholy alliance [i.e., 
fusion] the elective officers have for the most part surrounded 
themselves with a set of political adventurers whose only claim to 
recognition is cheek and a willingness to barter away the rights 
of the people. Fusion means boodle, fraud and corruption."23 
Corning's New Era led the radical mid-roaders against the Pop-
ulist administration. In its first issue in 1894 the newspaper set 
forth their position: I) The 1892 Populist campaign was based on 
fusion engineered by Breidenthal and others and implicitly en-
dorsed by leading Populists; 2) Breidenthal excluded mid-road and 
female campaigners from the canvass so as not to antagonize 
Democrats; 3) the Lewelling administration rewarded Democrats 
and fusionists but harassed those who adhered to the Omaha Plat-
form; 4) "the Populist campaign of 1892, in point of morals, 
bossism, and party lash driving, on account of the perfidy of trusted 
leaders, was the lowest ever made in the state of Kansas, ending 
in Democratic ascendancy." In attacking the elite dominance and 
political manipulation which he believed characterized the People's 
party more than the old parties, Corning invariably pointed to 
Breidenthal's role in the Second District in 1892, where the people's 
"sovereign right to name their candidates" had been denied. 
Lewelling's activities to promote continued fusion demonstrated 
to Corning that the governor's "sole aim has been to wreck the 
People's Party in the hopes of building up [the] Democracy. The 
New Era is right; Mrs. Lease is right; middle-of-the-road Populists 
are right; anti-administration Populists are right; the administra-
tion frauds must be turned under or Populism is forever doomed."24 
23 Topeka People, March 25, 1893: Nugent, Tolerant Populists, pp. 156-57. 
24 Topeka New Era, January 6, February 24, 1894. 
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There were other Populists in 1894 who also opposed fusion 
but who carefully disassociated themselves from the vociferous 
Corning and his condemnation of the Lewelling administration. 
Proud of having a people's government at least, they objected to 
any criticism that might endanger its reelection, yet remained in 
their own eyes steadfastly opposed to compromise and fusion. "I 
have always thought your administration wise and statesmanlike," 
wrote one such Populist to Lewelling. "Fusion, of course, is out 
of the question." The Topeka Advocate took a similar position. 
As the party's official paper, it loyally supported the administration 
against the charges of Corning and his associates while it asserted its 
opposition to any fusion whatever. Corning believed that McLallin 
decried fusion only under instructions from Peffer, backed by a 
threat to take control of the Advocate Publishing Company and 
secure direction of the paper's policy, but McLallin was a sincere 
mid-roader, mired in the impure quicksand of responsibility with-
out authority and allegiance without commitment. He consistently 
placed the Advocate against compromise and fusion but blindly 
refused to believe Corning's indictment of the fusionist tendencies 
of the Lewelling-Breidenthal group. Other Populists made public 
their hostility to fusion through papers even less suspected of 
association with the radical mid-roaders and usually based their 
position on moral principles or national implications, for they 
emphasized adherence to the Omaha Platform.25 
Despite such vocal anti-fusion sentiment, the People's party con-
tained a more sizable group that prided itself on its alleged 
pragmatism and believed that fusion provided the only hope for 
the Lewelling administration to be reelected. Throughout 1893 
Lewelling carefully expressed his appreciation for the Democratic 
support of the 1892 Populist ticket, which he believed had been 
crucial to his victory. Relying on "political wisdom," moreover, 
he renounced any suggestion that fusion and Populism were in-
compatible, and with Breidenthal sought to secure Democratic 
25 George W. McKay to Lewelling, May 22, 1894, and J. D. Bradley to Fred 
Close, June 7, 1894, Lewelling Papers· Topeka New Era, March 31, June 2, 1894; 
Topeka Advocate, November 22. 1893, April 4, May 23, 1894: Kansas Commoner, 
March 22, May 31, 1894. For McLallin and the Advocate, see also Topeka 
Populist, May 19, 26, 1893; but for evidence of Peffer's increasing realization 
of the Populist predilection for fusion, see Pittsburg Messenger, March 16, 1894. 
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assistance m 1894. Early in the year, for example, Lewelling con-
ferred with Democratic fusionist William H. Sears, son-in-law of 
Charles Robinson and confidant of W. A. Harris, as to prospects 
for Democratic support and received assurances that mutual com-
promises between the two parties would again insure fusion. Ad-
ministration appointees canvassed other Democrats to gain backing 
for Populist officials, and administration Populists and Democrats 
alike advocated the manipulation of nominations to guarantee 
fusion, with a popular suggestion being to include Harris on the 
state ticket as the ultimate enticement to reluctant Democrats.26 
By 1894, however, the question of fusion involved much more 
than the tactics of one campaign. At stake was the directio:1 and 
commitment of the entire reform movement. Fusionists wanted to 
narrow the party's platform to the lowest common denominator, 
financial reform, and to avoid all other issues that might alienate 
various blocs of voters. The more determined the fusionist, the 
lower was his common denominator, and by 1894 it was clear that 
a demand for free silver even apart from considerations of national 
banks, irredeemable paper money, government loans, and other 
Populist demands within the entire issue of financial reform would 
receive the support of nearly everyone in a state in which all 
political parties had demanded free silver for more than a decade. 
Anti-fusionists, on the other hand, were committed to a wide range 
of demands across the whole spectrum of reform and argued that 
emphasis upon a single issue like the money question distorted the 
realities of America's problems and might prove counterproductive 
to the larger issue of the regeneration of society as a whole. Thus 
anti-fusionists advocated woman suffrage and prohibition; the 
democratization of the political system through expanded suffrage, 
direct election of senators and the president, and the adoption of 
the initiative and referendum; and the democratization of the 
economy through government ownership or control of the trans-
portation system, communications, and natural monopolies and 
through the recognition of broad labor rights. 
The party split not only over the principles which encouraged 
26 Lewelling to Dave Dale, .June 6, 1893, William Wykes to Lewelling, May 
11, 1894, and Harry Freese to Lewelling, [May or June 1894], Lewelling Papers; 
W. H. Sears to Lewelling, March 8, 1894, Sears Papers. 
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or prevented fusion but also over the expected consequences of 
the policy. Fusionists were concerned with strictly immediate 
results, the election of candidates to office. They argued that re-
forms came only with political power and that free silver would 
merely be the reform foot in the door of the status quo, a necessary 
first step in the march toward full enactment of the party's reform 
demands. Anti-fusionists considered that free silver alone meant 
nothing-indeed that it was the least important aspect of the party's 
demands for financial reform; that the achievement of such a 
minor reform might prevent acceptance of more thorough, radical, 
and necessary reforms; that the election of state officials through 
fusion had no bearing on national financial matters anyway; that 
cooperating with allies committed only to silver gave the party 
political power only to achieve silver coinage; that unconverted 
candidates, even or especially if elected, could injure the party; 
that the direction and ultimate success of the party could be 
compromised through concessions to gain short-run fusion. 
On the most practical level, the argument over fusion was really 
an argument over the merits of the Democratic party.27 Mid-road 
Populists came overwhelmingly from the Republican-derived wing 
of the People's party and had an intense aversion to Democrats 
and the Democracy. Not surprisingly, considering the nature of 
American politics for the entire period in which they had lived, 
much of this animosity was based on emotional and blind prejudice. 
Mrs. Lease, for example, a Republican until she entered the reform 
movement, had lost two brothers in the Union Army during the 
Civil War, and her father had died at the infamous Andersonville 
prison. These cruel memories of her childhood shaped her whole 
27 Nugent, Tolerant Populists, p. 152, is quite mistaken in believing that 
fusion on the most pragmatic level was an argument over woman suffrage and 
prohibition-it was over the merits of the Democratic party. Suffrage and 
prohibition were but aspects of this, as was the silver issue; the first were 
sometimes instruments to frustrate fusion and the other an instrument to en-
courage fusion. Nugent's well-warranted determination to demonstrate that 
Populism was not nativistic leads him to interpret anything that might alienate 
immigrants as unessential to Populism and to assert that fusion (or, as he 
revealingly defines it on p. 153, "the presence of ethnic support") was the 
necessary, rational, and logical part of Populism. Such a view of fusion, in 
turn, leads him to deny the existence of differences between Populists and 
Democrats over other issues-an untenable position, particularly for the early 
years of Populism. 
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life, she insisted, and she was unable to forgive the Democratic 
party for its role in the sectional conflict-an inability on her part 
and millions of others' that the Republican party had encouraged 
as a matter of policy for all her adult life. "I respect and esteem 
Mr. Martin as a man, as a lawyer and as a gentleman," she an-
nounced in 1894, "but he is a Democrat, and you know I HATE 
DEMOCRATS. I AM DONE WITH DEMOCRATS AND FUSION."28 By 1894, 
those Populists psychologically incapable of working with the 
Democracy had largely returned to the Republican party as Pop-
ulism underwent Democratization, bitter that their hopes had been 
blighted by those who believed that cooperating with the malignant 
Democratic party would somehow result in a new and better 
political society. 
Others based their objection to collaboration with the Democratic 
party on the realistic basis of concrete political proposals. Dem-
ocrats opposed prohibition and woman suffrage, hoary issues with 
many Populists, and were committed to little beyond free silver in 
the Populist economic program. The subtreasury and government 
loans to farmers, the activating economic demands of original 
Populism, had already fallen victim to Democratization and fusion 
with the election of their bitter opponents Harris and Martin. 
Neither paper money nor government ownership of railroads at-
tracted any support among Democrats. By 1894, moreover, Kansans 
who remained in the Democracy were, with notable exceptions, 
closely tied to the national administration and often hostile even to 
free silver. Fusion with such an organization could only be for 
office, not principle, even to the most flaccid Populist. 
The most thoughtful Populists objected to the Democratic party 
because of its general attitude toward government and society. If 
parties had changed absolutely since the days of Jackson it was 
nevertheless true that the Democratic party remained relatively 
more committed to a strict construction of the responsibilities and 
possibilities of the national government than either the GOP or 
the People's party. As Peffer believed, "the foundation ideas" of 
Democracy and Populism were in direct contradiction. "Populists 
believe in the exercise of national authority in any and every case 
28 Pittsburg Messenger, January 12, 1894; Clanton, "Intolerant Populist?" pp. 
195-96, 200. 
170 POPULISM and POLITICS 
where the general welfare will be promoted thereby. The Dem-
ocratic party is opposed to this." Too, he pointed out that many 
of the basic Populist ideas came from Republican antecedents, 
especially in financial legislation; Populists merely wanted the 
exercise of national government authority to be by and for the 
people rather than the manufacturing and financial classes. Prom-
inent Democrats understood clearly this difference between the 
attitudes of the two parties. David Overmeyer, for example, argued 
that Populism was not the solution to the nation's problems, which 
he believed were the results of too much government. Other 
Democrats argued that Populism was merely Republicanism carried 
to its logical conclusion.29 With such basic philosophical differ-
ences, any hope that a combination of the two parties for campaign 
purposes would further the cause of ultimate Populistic reform 
was seriously ill-founded. 
Despite these major objections to cooperating with the Democ-
racy, there were of course those within the People's party who 
favored fusion. Former Democrats, try as they might, could see 
little evil in the Democracy. Its traditions, principles, and attitudes 
were largely acceptable; at best, in the time-honored custom of 
politics, they denied that the Democracy of 1894 followed Dem-
ocratic principles. Perhaps most had entered the new party only 
as part of an effort to create a political majority against the tra-
ditional enemy, the GOP; many others had joined the People's 
party only on the basis of its free silver advocacy following Cleve-
land's forced repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act in 1893. 
They saw no reason not to limit the Populist appeal to free silver 
as that represented their total attachment to the new party. Many 
Populists of traditional third-party antecedents, while perhaps more 
in agreement with the former Republicans within their party as 
to goals and ideals, had consistently fused with Democrats in the 
past and for the most part were willing to continue the practice. 
Still another factor complicated the issue of fusion in 1894. 
Fusionists such as Latimer, Harris, and Breidenthal continued to 
form a cohesive faction, but those opposed to fusion split into 
two groups. The first included those like McLallin, Peffer, and 
Doster, who rather blindly viewed fusion in 1892 as primarily a 
29 Brodhead, Persevering Populist, p. 67; Chicago Tribune, July 7, 9, 1899. 
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Democratic maneuver, achieved after the People's party had nom-
inated straight Populist candidates, and who now believed that the 
Lewelling administration should be renominated but that further 
entanglement with Democrats should be strictly avoided. The 
second and far smaller group included those like Corning who 
believed that fusion in 1892 had been as much a Populist as a 
Democratic scheme; that the Lewelling-Breidenthal fusionists had 
so subverted the goals and ideals of the movement that in and of 
themselves they represented fusion and compromise, whether or 
not they secured the endorsement of the Democratic organization 
in 1894; and that therefore they must be defeated and purged from 
positions of power and influence within the party in order to save 
the movement. Corning and his uncompromising associates, then, 
would oppose not only Lewelling's renomination but also, if 
nominated, his reelection. 
As the June 1894 Populist state convention approached, the 
radicals made final preparations. On May 31, Noah Allen, president 
of the National Citizens' Alliance, and W. F. Rightmire issued a 
circular calling on Populists to use every means possible to defeat 
the Populist administration. "We warn the members against the 
traitors in our camp," the circular read, "those who have control 
of the People's Party organization of this state, who for the sake 
of the emoluments of office have contracted to surrender the 
principles of the reform cause in this state to the British financial 
Hessians, the Democrats of Kansas, who endorsed and supported 
Cleveland and the gold standard." Breidenthal, Prather, and 
Lewelling had agreed with Democratic leaders, Allen charged, to 
name Democrats for secretary of state and associate justice of the 
supreme court and to renominate all other state officials in ex-
change for a Democratic endorsement of the entire ticket. Allen 
asked all alliancemen to meet and name a straight ticket if the 
Populist officials managed to produce such a fusion. Shortly after 
this appeal, the radical mid-roaders organized the Anti-Fusion 
People's Party League of Kansas, with Otis as chairman and 
Corning, Willits, and W. H. Bennington, another Populist prom-
inent in 1890 as secretary of the original Citizens' Alliance, as 
lesser officials. In a last maneuver to prevent the administration 
from obtaining a fusionist convention, the People's party of Shaw-
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nee County, strongly anti-fusionist because of the influence of 
Peffer, Otis, Corning, McLallin, and their friends in Topeka, 
unsuccessfully demanded that the state convention be held under 
the "Omaha Ordinance for the Purification of Politics," which 
forbade all officeholders from participating in the party's conven-
tions.30 
The governor and his supporters countered with their own 
arrangements. Lewelling lieutenants worked in the local conven-
tions preceding the state meeting to secure endorsements of the 
Populist administration and to discredit the mid-roaders as merely 
disappointed office-seekers trying to disrupt the party. The selection 
of the June date for the convention by the party leadership had 
already revealed that the fusionists were in control, for the Dem-
ocrats had previously chosen July 3 for their convention and the 
earlier date gave the Populist politicians important leverage to 
promote a JOint ticket.31 Lewelling and Breidenthal wanted a 
platform limited to demands for economic reform, avoiding the 
issues of woman suffrage and prohibition. They also hoped to 
renominate the ticket that had been acceptable to the Democrats 
in 1892, made perhaps a little more attractive, and thus present 
the Democratic convention with both a platform and a slate it 
could embrace. 
The Populist state convention opened in Topeka on June 12, 
1894, with an immediate challenge to the administration's plans by 
the combined forces of the suffragists and the mid-roaders. The 
convention rejected the administration's choice for temporary 
chairman and elected Ben Henderson, a firm supporter of a suffrage 
plank. After urging the adoption of such a plank, Henderson then 
introduced a series of suffragettes, including Susan B. Anthony 
and Carrie Chapman-Catt, who pleaded with the delegates to 
support a cause essential to a people's movement. The committee 
on resolutions ignored the question, but a minority report placed 
it before the convention where it provoked a vociferous debate. 
Administration spokesmen argued against the inclusion of the 
30 Kansas Commoner, June 7, 1894; Topeka New Era, June 9, 1894; Topeka 
Advocate, March 28, 1894. 
31 Topeka Daily Democrat, March 14, 1894; Kansas Commoner, June 7, 1894; 
L. C. Clark to Fred Close, May 28, 1894, Lewelling Papers. 
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suffrage demand on the grounds that it would alienate the immi-
grant voters of the state and thus destroy the possibility of fusion. 
In short, it was politically expedient to avoid the subject. Hender-
son, an ex-Republican, retorted that the party was not making 
platforms for Democrats but for Populists; Doster, another ex-
Republican, asserted that the foreign vote and the Democratic vote 
were not important but that principle was, and declared, "I stand 
against regarding this as a question of expediency." Otis announced 
that the question involved was merely, "Shall the people control 
the People's party or shall the politicians control it?" \-\Then Annie 
Diggs routed the ideological arguments of suffrage opponents, the 
convention accepted the plank.32 
Although the radical anti-fusionists had won this battle against 
Breidenthal by uniting with those who supported equal suffrage 
regardless of their attitudes toward fusion, it was their only victory. 
The 1892 fusion ticket was renominated with two exceptions, 
Lieutenant Governor Percy Daniels and Secretary of State Russell 
Osborn, both former Republicans. Daniels had repeatedly dis-
agreed with Lewelling's policies and then conditioned his candidacy 
on the party's adoption of his own graduated taxation proposals; 
Osborn declined renomination and was replaced by J. W. Amis, a 
former Democrat whose candidacy had Democratic backing. A 
new opening, for associate justice of the supreme court, was filled 
by the nomination of George Clark, "a sterling Democrat" accord-
ing to the Democratic Newton journal. Clark's nomination over 
former Republican W. C. Webb and M. B. Nicholson was another 
sign of the Populist willingness to fuse. Nicholson denounced the 
"schemes" of the Populist "manipulators" who had, he said, "pre-
determined to nominate Mr. Clark as a sop to the Democrats." 
Indeed, in these nominations, the convention largely followed the 
fusion line predicted by Noah Allen. Lewelling was renominated 
by acclamation, Breidenthal was easily reelected party chairman, 
and Mrs. Lease's bid to oppose Harris for congressman-at-large 
failed completely. Apart from the suffrage plank, which was not 
solely a fight over fusion, then, the convention stayed under 
32 Ottawa journal and Triumph, June 21, 1894; Topeka Advocate, June 20, 
1894; Kansas City Star, June 12, 13, 1894; Nugent, Tolerant Populists, pp. 158-61. 
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Breidenthal's control and the few extreme mid-roaders had little 
infiuence.33 
If Breidenthal expected Democratic endorsement he was to be 
surprised. And if the adoption of a suffrage plank did not represent 
an intentional repudiation of fusion by the Populists, neither did 
it alone inspire the Democratic state convention to field a straight 
ticket on July 3. Once again national considerations were im-
portant. In addressing the convention, the party state chairman 
described the 1892 fusion as simply a tactic to insure the election 
of the Democratic national ticket and pointedly added, "no such 
condition exists today." But not only were there no factors dictat-
ing fusion, there existed a need to defend the national Democratic 
administration from virulent Populist attack. As early as January 
the Pittsburg Messenger denounced the very suggestion of fusion 
as untimely wavering from support for Cleveland. Indeed, Dem-
ocratic newspapers strongly condemned fusion throughout 1894. 
The Topeka Democrat, ]unction City Sentinel, Paola Western 
Spirit, and other leading Democratic organs consistently opposed 
fusion. Democratic newspapers that had advocated the policy in 
1892 were set determinedly against it in 1894. "Democrats today in 
Kansas," declared the Wichita Beacon, "have no sympathy with 
socialism. They do not believe in paternalism. They are not 
greenbackers. They oppose every form of government aid."34 
In pointing out the characteristics of "Democrats today" the 
Beacon disclosed the party's conservatism in 1894. Most of the more 
liberal Democrats had already joined the People's party, a result the 
Beacon blamed on fusion, and remaining Democrats generally 
viewed the tumult of the 1890s with dismay. George Glick, who 
had advocated fusion in 1892 simply to advance Democratic political 
ambitions, complained in 1894 about the "isms that have injured 
the state" and declared that the party should campaign on tariff 
reform and sound money and avoid any connection with Populists. 
Glick also charged fusion with causing many Democrats to be 
33 Kansas City Star, June 14, 17, 1894; M. B. Nicholson to Lewelling, June 23, 
1894, Lewelling Papers; Pittsburg Messenger, June 22, 1894: Fort Scott Daily 
Monitor, June 16, 21, 1894; Topeka Advocate, June 20, 1894; Kansas Biographical 
Scrapbook, 3: 134, KSHS. 
34 Pittsburg Messenger, January 12, 26, April 6, June 15, September 28, 1894; 
Topeka Daily Capital, July 4, 1894; Topeka Daily Democrat, March 13, 1894. 
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subsumed in the People's party. Even Overmeyer, who had opposed 
fusion in 1892 because of partisan loyalties and not political issues, 
believed that fusion in 1894 was out of the question, for it would 
mean Democratic endorsement of the anarchism and revolution 
revealed in Populism during the legislative war. The Coxey move-
ment and Populist support for it in the spring of 1894 particularly 
alarmed Democrats and strengthened their opposition to fusion. 
Overmeyer declared, "Populism has now reached a stage where it 
is simply Coxeyism, and Coxeyism is incipient revolution super-
induced by organized vagabondage and militant scoundrelism." 
With most party positions under the control of stalwart Democrats, 
it was clear that Democrats would reject fusion even before the 
Populist state convention endorsed woman suffrage.35 
The suffrage plank, in fact, made little difference. Lewelling 
Populists reported to the governor that most Democrats took lightly 
the Populist declaration and that many immigrants favored en-
dorsing the Populist ticket because they feared the Republican 
nominees would enforce prohibition stringently. S. W. Chase as-
sured Lewelling that there was little complaint over the suffrage 
plank in heavily immigrant Leavenworth County and that the 
Populist convention's denunciation of the nativistic American Pro-
tective Association would attract more immigrant voters than would 
be alienated by the suffrage stand. Indeed, Friedrich W. Frasius, a 
prominent German Democratic politician, announced in late July 
that he had joined the People's party and would campaign for its 
ticket.36 
If the action of the Populist convention on suffrage caused the 
defeat of fusion, as historians have charged, then there should have 
been Democrats who supported fusion before the Populist con-
vention and opposed it afterwards. In reality there were few if any 
such political creatures. The Democratic Atchison Patriot) in fact, 
before the Populist convention, expected a non-fusion campaign, 
then ignored the Populist convention stand on woman suffrage, and 
finally became mildly fusionist before the Democratic state conven-
35 Marshall County Democrat (Marysville), January 5, 1894; Pittsburg Mes· 
senger, January 26, 1894: Fort Scott Daily Monitor, July I, 1894. 
36 Rufus Cone to Lewelling, June 22, 1894, S. W. Chase to Lewelling, June 20, 
1894, and I. P. Campbell to Lewelling, June 9, 15, 1894, Lewelling Papers; Kansas 
City Star) July 25, 1894. 
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tion. The Democratic Central Committeemen of the Seventh Con-
gressional District unanimously agreed in May that there would be 
no state level fusion-despite their simultaneous expectation that the 
Populists would dodge woman suffrage and prohibition. Less formal 
polls of Kansas Democrats before the Populist convention found 
them "well-nigh unanimous for a straight-out Democratic state 
ticket." Clearly, anti-fusion sentiment dominated the Democratic 
party, not the People's party, and regardless of Populist declarations 
on woman suffrage, a straight Democratic ticket was assured.37 
The failure of fusion in 1894, unlike earlier years, lay with the 
Democrats and not the Populists. The middle-of-the-road Populists 
were more vocal than numerous by 1894, whereas the stalwart 
Democrats dominated their party. The Democratic state convention 
nominated a full ticket headed by Overmeyer and wrote a tradi-
tional platform emphasizing strict construction and the tariff while 
endorsing the Cleveland administration and denouncing the legisla-
tive war. Stalwart control failed only when the convention adopted 
a minority report favoring free silver. After his nomination, Over-
meyer addressed the convention and argued for states' rights and 
limited government concepts. Many delegates regarded Prather "as 
a reasonably good Democrat notwithstanding his present party 
affiliation" and sought to have him endorsed. Even more favored 
accepting the Populist nominations of Harris and Clark. Several 
Democrats announced their opposition to cooperating with the 
People's party and still argued for the endorsement of Harris. The 
majority, however, rejected this "bait thrown out to Democratic 
suckers" and named a complete straight ticket.3S 
This rejection of fusion by the Democratic state convention did 
not end collaboration between Populists and Democrats in Kansas 
in 1894. Populists reaffirmed their intentions to gain Democratic 
support and eagerly made concessions for it. Lewelling and Brei-
denthal actively intervened in local Democratic conventions through 
Democratic-Populists to promote fusion arrangements, and the gov-
ernor's Democratic appointees worked similarly to gain him Dem-
37 Atchison Patriot, June 2, 30, August 18, and passim, 1894; Wichita Weekly 
Beacon, May 25, 1894: Topeka Daily Democrat, May II, 17, 31, 1894. 
38 James Malin, A Concern about Humanity (Lawrence, Kans., 1964), p. 41; 
Topeka Daily Capital, July 3, 4, 1894; Fort Scott Daily Monitor, June 21, 1894; 
Topeka Democrat, June 15, 1894; Pittsburg Messenger, June 15, 22, 1894. 
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ocratic backing, a task apparently imposed on them as a condition 
of their original appointment. Lewelling also conferred privately 
with Democrats at their state convention in hopes of winning 
endorsement despite the unanimity of state Democratic leaders 
against fusion. Other Populists were less circumspect, and at least 
two state candidates, former Democrats Prather and Clark, lobbied 
openly at the convention for fusion, as did several of Harris's 
lieutenants. With the encouragement of the party leadership, 
Populists also took the initiative in proposing local fusion, and 
their county and legislative conventions carefully named Democrats 
directly to their own tickets in efforts to compel the Democrats to 
accept fusion. In one county this even resulted in the Populists 
placing on their five-man ticket four Democrats, including the 
chairman of the Democratic County Central Committee and a 
member of the Democratic State Central Committee. Even so, the 
Democratic county convention endorsed this "Populist" ticket only 
after "a hot fight."39 
The conduct of the Populist congressional conventions of the 
First and Second districts indicated the change the party had 
undergone since 1892. In that year the First District Populists had 
refused to accept the fusion arrangements and rejected Harris for 
a mid-roader. In 1894 they attempted to force fusion upon the 
Democrats by nominating H. C. Solomon of Atchison. Solomon 
was described as "a genuine Democrat" and not "merely a Populist 
of Democratic antecedents." Indeed, stalwart Democrats had al-
ready declared Solomon their favorite for the nomination. The 
Democratic congressional convention subsequently praised the Pop-
ulist capitulation as "prudent, wise, and sagacious" and then also 
nominated Solomon.4o 
In the Second District, where in 1892 the Populists had struggled 
so long to maintain the integrity of their party, the surrender was 
not so complete. Rather than forcing fusion on reluctant Democrats 
as in the First District, the Populist politicians merely sought joint 
39 R. B. Drury to Lewelling, July 3, 25, 1894, Joseph Pomeroy to Lewelling, 
June 21, 28, 1894, and A. Clark to Lewelling, June 19, 1894, Lewelling Papers; 
Pittsburg Messenger, July 13, 1894; Kansas Commoner, July 26, 1894; Marshall 
County Democrat, August 31, September 7, 1894. 
40 Pittsburg Messenger, April 27, 1894: Atchison Weekly Patriot, June 9, 30, 
July 7, 28, August 11, 1894. 
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consultations. The Populist convention met in June, well before 
the Democratic convention, but the chairman postponed the meet-
ing until July in order to act in conjunction with the Democrats. 
A few mid-roaders introduced a bitter resolution censuring this 
arbitrary action, but most Populists were complaisant and refused 
to pass it. In July, however, the Populists were not yet ready to 
nominate an acknowledged Democrat like Horace L. Moore and 
instead named Frank Willard as their candidate. Nevertheless, the 
Populists expected fusion through Moore's withdrawal, and Willard 
attended the Democratic convention to obtain an endorsement. 
Although he had some support, the Democrats turned him down. 
Thus again the absence of fusion was largely the result of Dem-
ocratic not Populist actions.41 
This pattern held for the other districts as well. In each instance 
the Populist convention met first and the Democrats second, and in 
all but the Fourth District the Populists renominated a candidate 
that had been fused on by the Democrats previously. In each case 
in 1894 the Democrats refused the opportunity to enact the fusion 
they had welcomed earlier. They even declined to endorse Hudson 
and Simpson. Hudson's association with the despised Coxey move-
ment, which he had served as a lawyer, was instrumental in alienat-
ing Democratic support. Simpson's rejection demonstrated the 
simple Democratic determination to avoid fusion in 1894, for, as 
one Democrat admitted, Simpson voted consistently with the Dem-
ocrats in Congress and had strong political support from Democrats, 
both fusionist and stalwart. But like Willard, and unlike Solomon, 
he was a Populist not a Democrat.42 
The relative absence of explicit fusion arrangements failed to 
mollify the radical mid-roaders. Unconcerned with Democratic 
reactions, they considered that the willingness of People's party 
leaders to compromise to achieve fusion represented compromise 
and fusion even if Democrats spurned the efforts. In 1890 the Dem-
ocrats had sought fusion and had regularly been rebuffed; in 1894 
it was the supplicant Populists who were rebuffed. To the mid-
41 Atchison Weekly Patriot, June 30, 1894; Kansas City Star, June 22, July 13, 
1894: Leavenworth Herald, July 21, 1894; Paola Times, July 19, 1894; Fort Scott 
Daily Monitor, July 18, 19, 1894. 
42 Atchison Weekly Patriot, August 18, 1894; Emporia Tidings, June 22, 1894; 
Pittsburg Messenger, August 24, 1894. 
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roaders this revealed the deterioration in the ideals and practices 
of Populism. Mid-road Populists objected to both Simpson and 
Hudson, regarding them as fusion candidates even with Democratic 
opposition. As in 1892, Populists in the Third District who could 
not accept anyone other than a straight nonfusion Populist formed 
an Abraham Lincoln Republican faction, which refused to support 
Hudson or the Republican nominee. These rigorous mid-roaders 
also believed that Lewelling himself personified fusion and had 
to be repudiated to cleanse the party. Corning responded readily 
to the question of the effect of mid-road opposition to Lewelling: 
"The answer is simple and easily given. The Populist ticket will 
be defeated and it ought to be." Willits agreed: "The Lewelling 
state ticket is unworthy of the countenance and support of the 
Populists of Kansas." Percy Daniels concurred, and from the 
vantage point of the administration itself: "The trouble with our 
present leaders is they want office more than they want to aid 
the masses."43 
Defeat would have wholesome effects for the party, they con-
cluded, for the reelection of the administration Populists would be 
counterproductive to substantive changes in the political system. 
The Democratic party ruled through Lewelling and Breidenthal, 
they charged, making true reform impossible while permitting 
political manipulations, corruption, and the deterioration of the 
party. "The membership of the People's Party is blinded by party 
zeal," announced Corning's New Era, "and in convention, this 
membership, through its delegates, endorsed all these infamies, 
and declared to the world that sucH IS POPULISM. Defeat of the 
People's Party, therefore, is the only thing that will open the eyes 
of an honest membership and cause them to rise as men and 
patriots and rescue the principles of the party from the hands of 
incompetents and traitors." Freed from these debilitating influ-
ences, the People's party could carry out its mission. Defeat, Corn-
ing believed, would purify the party by driving out the expedient 
Democrats and "fusion pimps." Continued fusion would destroy 
the People's party.44 
43 Kansas City journal, September 25, 1894; Girard Western Herald, September 
and October 1894, passim; Topeka New Era, June 30, 1894; Pittsburg Messenger, 
September 14, 1894. 
44 Topeka New Era, June 30, 1894. 
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These mid-roaders considered themselves the real Populists, com-
mitted to the entire Omaha Platform and the ideals that had 
ignited the Populist prairies in the beginning. They objected to 
Breidenthal's contention that they had left the party rather than 
the reverse. Ben Henderson, for example, long disturbed by ev-
idences of fusion and its crippling effects, joined the mid-road 
element after the state convention but made clear that he remained 
a Populist and would support Populist nominees other than Lewell-
ing, Little, and Breidenthal, whom he considered corrupt and 
detrimental to the interests of Populism. In October the anti-
fusionists filed an independent, "Middle-of-the-Road Populist" 
ticket headed by Corning for governor. Breidenthal formally pro-
tested to the secretary of state, complaining that the Corning ticket 
had chosen its name to deceive People's party voters. A board 
composed of administration officials agreed and refused to allow the 
mid-roaders a place on the ballot. Many regular Populists saw in 
the actions of the mid-roaders evidence of Republican influence 
and money; even Mrs. Lease returned to Lewelling's side following 
Corning's ultimate defiance of the administration. Two weeks 
earlier she had denounced Breidenthal as "the man who betrayed 
the party that had elevated him to his position. They put him 
in charge to run the machinery of the People's Party and he ac-
know I edged their kindness and regarded their confidence by selling 
the party out wholesale to the Democrats."45 
Other anti-fusion Populists decided the proper road to take led 
back to the GOP rather than to the People's party of Chairman 
Breidenthal. Most prominent of these was former congressman and 
twice vice president of the National Farmers' Alliance, Benjamin 
Clover. Nationally and locally, he argued, Democrats opposed 
reform even while using Populists to secure political power for 
their own party. And the People's party, he believed, "has fallen 
into the hands of a dictator, whose power is absolute; who in 
practice of corrupt and disreputable political methods has out done 
all other political managers that have ever risen. . . . There is 
45 Kansas City journal, September 25, 1894; Pittsburg Messenger, September 
21, 1894: Ben Henderson to Lewelling, April 12, 1893, and Lewelling to Hender-
son, April 18, 1893, Lewelling Papers; Kansas Commoner, October 25, 1894; 
Populist Party Clippings, 1: 332, KSHS; Walter T. K. Nugent, "How the Populists 
Lost in 1894," Kansas Historical Quarterly 31 (Autumn 1965): 254-55. 
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not a single idea that was advocated by us in 1889 and 1890, when 
we were laboring in the cause of reform, that is now adhered to by 
the populist party." Populism, Clover reminded Kansans, had 
declared for honesty and justice in politics, but Populists in power 
practiced the opposite. To retain his own self-respect, Clover con-
cluded, he had to leave the People's party and return to the GOP, 
which he hoped had seen the error of its ways. Another important 
figure in original Populism, A. F. Allen of Vinland, the party's 
Second District congressional nominee in 1890, also returned to 
the Republican party, disgusted with the policies of the new leaders 
of the People's party.46 
While the People's party thus continued to lose members to the 
GOP, it also became increasingly indebted to Democrats. During 
the course of the 1894 campaign Martin, Glick, and other Dem-
ocratic politicians began to argue as Democrats for the election of 
Populist candidates, even over opposing Democratic nominees, in 
order to defeat the GOP. John Eaton, a Democratic chieftain, an-
nounced, "I will not be misled into the idea that either woman 
suffrage or prohibition are important issues in this campaign"; he 
agreed to canvass as a Democrat for the Populist ticket under 
Breidenthal's direction. Influential Democratic newspapers began 
also to urge support of Populists, while Populists in turn made 
special appeals to Democrats to "vote with friends." By late 
October a Populist paper believed that the Democratic voters 
were "rapidly concentrating on the Populist state ticket, and in 
addition ... fusion has been effected in enough legislative districts 
to carry the legislature against the Republicans."47 
Populists made their inroads into Democratic strength principally 
by emphasizing the issue of silver coinage. Free silver had been 
endorsed by all three Kansas parties, and Populists capitalized on 
the inconsistency of Democrats supporting Cleveland and silver 
and of Republicans favoring silver while adhering to a national 
party that clearly favored gold monometallism. In addition, the 
Republican candidate for governor, Edmund N. Morrill, was un-
sympathetic to silver, and Populists easily gained the backing of 
46 Leavenworth Herald, August 18, 1894; Paola Western Spirit, June 15, 1894. 
47 Marshall County Democrat, October 5, 12, November 2, 1894: Kansas City 
Star, October 20, 24, November 4, 1894: Kansas Commoner, October 11, 18, 25, 
November 1, 1894; Girard Western Herald, August 3, 1894. 
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silver Democrats for Lewelling. Even Senator Peffer, after he 
arrived in Kansas in September, stressed silver more than formerly, 
although he still was at pains to deny the intrinsic value of money 
and to demand paper money, government loans, and the destruction 
of the national banking system, while strongly advocating suffrage 
and equal rights for women. Most Populists in 1894 were not so 
conscientious and began to push silver as the panacea that the party 
had rejected earlier.4S 
~While Populists thus attempted to focus on national issues, 
especially silver and secondarily labor and government during 
the depression, Republicans were content to attack the sorry record 
of the Lewelling administration. Morrill declared that he was 
"ashamed of Kansas" and urged voters to "redeem" the state 
from Populism. The scandals, alleged and real, of the Lewelling 
administration and the legislative war furnished all the campaign 
ammunition needed to shoot down Populist hopes. By late October 
Cy Leland, the Republican state chairman, stopped estimating his 
party's possible plurality and started to speak of an overall majority. 
Populists recognized the signs too. Mrs. Lease felt that the people 
were less interested in politics than during the earlier evangelistic 
campaigns; Breidenthal feared a sharp drop in turnout.49 
The Republican victory was nearly complete. The entire state 
ticket was elected, the lower house of the legislature became over-
whelmingly Republican, and every Populist congressional candi-
date but William Baker was defeated, and he retained office by 
fewer than 200 votes of more than 35,000 cast. The Great Bend 
Democrat gloated that "those Populists who told us that they could 
carry Kansas without the aid of the despised Democrats need not 
feel so sore about the results. They still have the state senate, and 
... Peffer."50 But in truth the full Democratic vote delivered to 
the Populists would have made no difference: the GOP commanded 
once again a majority of Kansas voters. Indeed, explicit state 
fusion might have increased the margin of Republican victory by 
48 Marshall County Democrat, October 5, 12, 1894; Raymond C. Miller, "The 
Populist Party in Kansas" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1928), p. 267; 
Topeka Advocate, September 12, October 24, 31, 1894; Girard Western Herald, 
September 14, 1894. 
49 Topeka Daily Capital, August 21, September 6, 1894; Kansas City Star, late 
October and early November 1894, passim. 
50 Quoted by Pittsburg Messenger, November 30, 1894. 
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driving more Republican-Populists back to the GOP and, strangely 
but naturally, forcing stalwart Democrats to the same course. 
Populists proposed a variety of reasons for the results. Jerry 
Simpson attributed Populist reverses to a large emigration from 
southern Kansas into the Cherokee Strip. Others blamed a large 
stay-at-home vote. Lewelling believed that he had lost the support 
of both "the prohibition element" and "the liquor element." 
Breidenthal argued that the depression injured the party in power, 
the Democrats nationally but the Populists in Kansas. Mrs. Lease 
charged the defeat to "the disgraceful compromise with Democracy 
two years ago and to the treachery perpetrated upon the people 
by the election of John Martin." These and other instances of "the 
bulldozing methods and treachery of state chairman Breidenthal" 
cost the party the support of many who formerly voted the Populist 
ticket. 51 
Other Populists looked for hopeful signs in the election. Peffer 
pointed to the large increase in the party's national vote as a sign 
of Populist vitality. Lewelling found even in the Kansas results 
some evidence that the party had not suffered an absolute loss in 
votes when he compared his return with that of Willits in 1890.52 
The weakness of this interpretation was that it depended upon 
analysis of the change in the poll for governor, from I 06,000 for 
Willits when he ran behind his ticket because of Robinson's in-
fluence, to 118,000 for Lewelling when he ran well ahead of his 
ticket, apparently because of Morrill's reputed gold tendencies. A 
more accurate index of party strength, the vote for secretary of 
state, showed an actual decline, though slight, from 115,933 (or 
39.42 percent) to 112,664 (or 38.19 percent). 
The election results not only caused bravado or despair, they 
also served as a guide for future action. The mid-roaders hoped 
that the election made both the Democracy and fusion "beyond 
hope of resurrection." A more common attitude, expressed by the 
fusionists of both parties, was that the Republicans had triumphed 
"due to the fact that the Democrats and Populists would not 
51 Washington Post, December 8, 1894; Lewelling to Davis Waite, December 
19, 1894, Davis Waite Papers, Colorado State Archives and Public Records; 
American Non-Conformist (Indianapolis), November 15, 1894. 
52 American Non-Conformist, November 15, 1894; Washington Post, December 
8, 1894; Lewelling to Waite, December 19, 1894, Waite Papers. 
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combine against the common enemy. . . . In the future they 
will do so. They have learned a careful lesson, by which they 
will profit hereafter."53 
The election returns also revealed a significant transformation 
of the People's party and raised questions concerning the ultimate 
efficacy of fusion and the nature of any future cooperation between 
Populists and Democrats. Most obviously, the maintenance of Pop-
ulist strength had been accomplished by the virtual destruction of 
the Kansas Democracy. From 102,951 votes (31.19 percent) in 1888 
the party shrank to 27,785 votes (9.42 percent) in 1894. Between 
1890 and 1894, the Democrats lost 28,088 votes, the Republicans 
gained 28,432 votes, and the Populists remained relatively stable 
(a 3,269 vote decrease). The superficial conclusion, that Democrats 
left their party and voted with the Republicans, is highly improb-
able. Perhaps a few did, but there is little evidence to suggest that 
it was more than an isolated instance, especially with the traditional 
Democratic platform and ticket of 1894. 
It is more likely that those who withdrew from the Kansas 
Democracy between 1890 and 1894 went overwhelmingly into the 
People's party and were counteracted by an approximately equal 
number of original Populists who returned to their old parties, 
predominantly to the GOP. It is perhaps as likely, in fact, that the 
state totals which erroneously suggest the direct transformation of 
Democrats into Republicans mask the very real possibility of a 
nearly direct, one-to-one, ratio of Democrats becoming Populists 
and original Populists turning Republican. Many prominent Pop-
ulists made public returns to the Republican party during these 
years, while equally prominent Democrats made the trek to the 
new party. There is virtually no evidence that Democrats joined 
their traditional opponent, the GOP, or that Populists transferred 
to the Democracy, although a few scattered Republicans continued 
to join the People's party, their highly publicized explanations 
based on national events. Contemporary observers agreed that the 
People's party during these years underwent severe Democratiza-
tion through this infusion of former Democrats and the departure 
of former Republicans. 
53 American Non-Conformist. November 15, 1894; Washington Post, December 
2, 1894. 
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Analysis of election results confirms this interpretation.54 Using 
county level data, the simple (Pearsonian) correlation between the 
decrease in the Democratic percentage point share of the vote 
from 1890 to 1894 and the increase in the Populist share of the 
vote for the same years is .724. Because Democrats lost support 
generally while Republicans gained, it is not surprising that the 
correlation between the Democratic decrease and the Republican 
increase is also positive, but it is a vastly weaker relationship (.219) 
than that with the Populist figure. The correlation between the 
Populist increase and the Republican increase for these years is 
-.510, indicating that those who left the People's party returned 
predominantly to the GOP. Further demonstrating Populist de-
pendence upon Democratic recruits and Populist losses to the 
Republicans is an examination of those counties with a very 
stable but quite small Democratic vote during these years. These 
two qualifications make it likely that the Democrats included only 
those hard-core partisans who rejected all overtures to vote other 
than Democratic and clarify the relationship between the other 
parties. This is illustrated in Table 5. 
TABLE 5 
From Populist to Republican: 
Changes in Party Support for Selected Counties, 1890-1894 
Republican 
Democratic Populist loss gain 
Democratic % instability ± (points) (points) 
County 1890 1890-1894 1890-1894 1890-1894 
Mitchell 6.34 0.40 10.81 9.04 
Norton 6.43 0.84 9.59 8.86 
Osborne 5.74 0.68 10.45 9.22 
Ottawa 6.28 0.49 11.52 9.81 
Rooks 4.63 0.31 13.43 10.74 
Smith 5.45 0.98 6.23 5.91 
Table 6 indicates the relationship between the Democratic and 
People's parties when the Republican vote of a county remained 
relatively stable. 
54 The same definitions and explanations of terms and variables developed in 
Chapter 3 are used in the following discussion. 
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TABLE 6 
From Democrat to Populist: 
Changes in Party Support for Selected Counties, 1890-1894 
Republican Democratic loss Populist gain 
instability ± (points) (points) 
County 1890-1894 1890-1894 1890-1894 
Comanche 0.74 11.31 10.57 
Edwards 0.10 5.49 4.70 
Gove 0.29 8.28 7.70 
Hodgman 0.29 21.59 19.36 
Lane 0.28 5.92 4.00 
Sherman 0.36 -1.16 -2.12 
Stanton 0.79 -2.18 -3.99 
Much more common than these two types of counties were those 
that exhibited the same misleading pattern that the state totals 
did: those that registered clear Democratic decreases and Repub-
lican gains with the Populists making minor shifts either way. As 
county level analysis reversed an apparent inference, however, so 
does inspection of local voting units reveal that impressionistic 
evidence was correct in predicting Democrat to Populist and Pop-
ulist to Republican transformations. In Neosho County, for ex-
ample, the Democrats decreased by 6.57 percentage points from 
1890 to 1894 while the Republicans increased by 7.57 points. The 
Populists lost 1.43 points. Yet using rural township and urban ward 
voting districts as the level of analysis, correlations reveal that 
Democratic losses were not related to Republican gains. Rather, 
Republican gains and Populist losses were related as were Dem-
ocratic losses and Populist gains. The rank-order correlation 
between Republican increases and Democratic decreases between 
1890 and 1894 is -.031; between Republican increases and Populist 
decreases is .440; and between Democratic decreases and Populist 
increases is .862. 
Similarly, analysis of local voting districts in Brown County, 
which experienced a major Democratic decrease (14.46 points), a 
sharp Republican increase (10.63 points), and only a slight Populist 
increase (2.99 points), reveals little connection between Republican 
gains and Democratic losses (rank-order correlation of .077) but 
significant association between Democratic losses and Populist 
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gains (.767) and Populist losses and Republican gains (.482).55 
Further evidence of the Democratization of the Brown County 
People's party is in simple (Pearsonian) correlations which reveal 
that the Populists of 1894 were more related to the Democrats of 
1888 than were the Democrats themselves in 1894 (.457 to .182). 
By determining the differences between each party's actual vote 
in 1894 and its expected vote, given its 1890 vote and the voting 
turnout differential of the two years, one can estimate the changes 
in the absolute numbers of members of the three parties in the 
intervening years. A comparison of this estimate with the calculated 
composition of the People's party in 1890 by previous party affilia-
tion reveals the extent to which Democratization had overtaken the 
party of the people. Considering that, as seems clear, the bulk of 
Democrats who departed the Democracy went into the People's 
party and that the bulk of the GOP's accessions came from its 
former partisans temporarily within the People's party, by 1894 the 
Kansas People's party was overwhelmingly of Democratic anteced-
ents, with the possible composition shown in Table 7. Even con-
ceding the most generous passage of "Democrats" of 1890 into the 
GOP of 1894, considering the influence of the Resubmission Re-
publicans in particular, it seems unlikely that more than perhaps 
2,500 would change in the Populist composition estimate from a 
55 Apparent indications that urban Democrats turned Republican are mis-
leading. Leavenworth County is an example of such an instance, with but 15.50 
percent Populist in 1890, a Populist gain of only 4.95 percentage points between 
1890 and 1894, plus a Democratic loss of 32.43 points and a Republican gain of 
26.49 points during those same years. Obviously if all 15.50 Populists of 1890 
returned to the GOP in 1894 there would still have to be approximately eleven 
points from 1890 Democrats to produce the Republican gain. However, in 1890 
many Republicans who favored Resubmission voted Democratic, and they were 
largely concentrated in areas (such as Leavenworth) that produced this pattern. 
In 1888 Leavenworth had but 49.09 percent Democrats; in 1890 11 percent more, 
60.36 percent. In all probability these 11 percent were Resubmission Republicans 
who then returned to the Republican ticket (though not necessarily through 
the People's party) in 1894. This suggests either a total transformation of the 
Leavenworth People's party from Republican/Union Labor origins (the Leaven-
worth Republican vote dropped by 21.66 points between 1888 and 1890, which 
indicates that approximately 10.50 Republican points joined the Union Labor 
1888 poll of 4.64 percent to create the 1890 Populist result) to an overwhelming 
Democratic composition; or that Populism was originally more dependent upon 
former Democrats than previously estimated (that more than eleven Republican 
points went Democratic in 1890 and that necessarily, then, Democrats voted 
Populist in 1890). In either case, however, the People's party in Leavenworth 
County in 1894 was composed overwhelmingly of former Democrats. 
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TABLE 7 
Estimated Composition of People's Party in 1894 













Democratic to a Republican heritage-far from challenging the 
majority position of ex-Democrats within the party (Table 8).56 
Combined with a relatively constant vote from the Union Labor 
wing, this Democratic-Populist strength made the People's party 
after 1894 highly susceptible to fusion or to party instability if the 
Democracy became even superficially committed to Populism. 
The predilection of Populists to return to the Republican party 
seemed to depend upon the local strength of the Democracy, 
though correlation coefficients are not high because of the influence 
of those counties which experienced substantial Democratic votes 
from Resubmission Republicans in 1890. This naturally raised the 
index figure of Republican strength within the People's party for 
1890, but since these wet Republicans probably returned largely 
to the GOP for the 1894 election the surface indication was a 
Republican exodus from a local People's party firmly in the control 
of former Republicans. Despite this complication there is a tetra-
choric correlation of -.168 between the index of Republican 
strength within the 1890 People's party and the proportion of 
Republican strength lost between 1888 and 1890 that was regained 
by 1894. This suggests that, at least to a limited extent, the stronger 
were Populists of Republican antecedents in their county's People's 
party, the less likely they were to rejoin the GOP. By excluding 
only those four counties with indexes of Republican strength ex-
ceeding 100, this figure changes greatly to -.351. The return of 
Republican-Populists to the GOP apparently also depended upon 
56 If fairly substantial parts of the Republican vote loss of 1888-1890 did 
indeed enter the Democratic party in 1890, then the People's party depended 
upon Democratic recruits to a slightly greater extent than estimated before, but 
the total number of Democrats among the Populists would not change signif-
icantly by the passage of Resubmission Republicans back to the GOP. See 
previous note. 
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'rABLE 8 
Alternative Estimation of the Composition of the 













the residual strength of local Democrats. The proportion of the 
Republican vote loss 1888-1890 regained by 1894 had tetrachoric 
correlations of .421, .393, and .206 with the Democratic votes of 
1890, 1888, and 1894, respectively. The more likely, then, that 
Democrats could either carry the county as a separate party or 
gain control of the local People's party, the more likely it was for 
Republican-Populists to rejoin the GOP. Rank-order correlations 
suggest that this tendency was stronger in those regions less eco-
nomically disturbed. Severe depression continued to drive disparate 
groups together in a demand for change. 
Indeed, election results indicate a distinct difference in economic 
conditions between those counties that voted Populist in 1894 and 
those that voted for either old party. The transformation of a large 
part of the membership of the People's party because of political 
maneuvers and emotional appeals had removed many of the sharp 
differences evident in the 1890 figures, which in turn may again 
suggest the primacy of political motivation in the Populist expe-
rience. Nevertheless, on nearly every economic variable examined, 
the Populists were ranged on one side, the old parties on the other. 
This is demonstrated in Table 9. The old parties, in fact, were 
differentiated only on cultural variables. 
The relative insignificance of the Democratic correlations with 
the economic variables in Table 9 reveals the Democratic depend-
ence upon ethnic support. The Democratic vote correlated with 
the foreign-born population by .167, with Catholic population by 
.445, and with Protestants by -.318. Neither Populists nor Repub-
licans correlated significantly with the variables reflecting Protestant 
or foreign-born populations, though Catholics were related to Pop-
ulists by -.253. For all these variables, the sign of the Republican 
correlation was opposite that of the Democratic one. 









Correlation Coefficients between 1894 Party Votes 
and Economic Variables 
Economic variable Republican Democratic 
Mortgaged farm families -.301 -.222 
Proportion of average acre- -.107 -.051 
value under mortgage 
Interest rate -.172 -.010 
Average value of a farm acre .300 .047 
Average value of farm .097 .054 
products per farm 
Per capita assessed valuation .156 .128 
All this suggests that, generally, Populism remained the refuge 
of the economically distressed; that the greater were the economic 
difficulties the more the Populists held to their party and rejected 
the emotional appeals to return to the GOP; and that those who 
refrained from leaving the Democracy were either somewhat better 
off than their erstwhile fellow partisans or felt that religious or 
ethnic associations were more important. 
What the voting statistics do not reveal was the nature of Populist 
dependence upon Democratic sources, within and without the party, 
and how that dependence circumscribed the direction the party 
would be able to take. Though the Democrats had an independent 
ticket, many Democrats voted Populist, still claiming to be, as one 
declared, "as good a Democrat as I ever was." Another silver Dem-
ocrat vowed that "while I do not endorse some of the things of 
our Populists (and many of them will be dropped in time to come) 
I shall vote the [Populist] ticket." John Eaton, while campaigning 
for the People's party, announced, "I will advocate free silver but 
not fiat paper money."57 Thus the People's party in 1894 depended 
upon straight Democrats as well as the superficial Democratic-
Populists, who held little belief in anything other than silver in the 
Populist platform. Should the national Democratic party ever 
commit itself to silver (and Eaton declared his "faith and con-
fidence in the national Democracy"), the People's party would be 
57 Kansas Commoner, October 18, November 1, 1894; Marshall County Dem-
ocrat, October 26, 1894. 
Iridescent Dream 191 
m danger of losing its remammg strength. By 1894, then, the 
People's party rested upon instability and depended upon a con-
tinuation of hostile attitudes toward the silver issue by the national 
Democratic party. No longer was Populism really a vital, positive, 
and aggressive reform force on its own; it had lost the initiative 
and could only react to the postures of others. 
Republicans were perhaps more prescient. On November 13, 
1894, they staged an elaborate public funeral in Topeka symboliz-
ing the death of Populism. And indeed, Populism in its original 
form, creative nature, and radical motivation was dead. Populists 
may not have recognized it, and there would be some agonizing 
death throes, but Populism had failed to break the bonds of the 
American political system and had suffocated within. Dependent 
now upon those who cared little for it, Populism threatened to 
become only an adjunct of the Democratic party, united on an issue 
of little basic importance to the party's creed in order to sustain a 
political life. Populism, as Kansas had known it in the days of its 
pentecostal fervor to remake society, was no more. The Crusade 
had ended; Kansas was redeemed.fiS 
58 See Miller, "Populist Party in Kansas," p. 280. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Silver Panacea 
Against Omaha Populism 
As PoPULISM underwent significant changes in the state of its birth, 
the national movement was also steadily transformed. There were 
some among the Populist national leadership, as in Kansas, who 
believed that the party could best succeed by suppressing the 
comprehensive reform aspirations expressed in its earlier days of 
enthusiasm and optimism and by then cooperating with those who 
were prepared to accept such limited objectives though they were 
hostile to the sense of the initial movement. Again as in Kansas, 
some of these accommodators were men of hoary reform credentials 
who thought they saw the main chance, but many others were 
recent converts to the People's party. Peffer remained among the 
most prominent Populist leaders, but he became increasingly less 
representative of the party as it drifted from its original intentions, 
his interests and desires opposing the process and its potential result. 
Indeed, Peffer seemed to draw a distinction between Populism 
and politics. After 1891 he played a less active role within his 
party and rarely attended the frequent conferences of Populist 
politicians. Moreover, apart from campaigning for the Populist 
ticket each fall, he largely avoided direct intervention in Kansas 
political affairs except to issue his consistent warnings against 
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fusion. He maintained that he gave "very little attention to the 
personnel of politics, as this thing of figuring how Jim, John or 
Jake would act in front of the enemy was very distasteful."1 Instead, 
attending to the senatorial work for which, he always remarked, 
he had been elected, Peffer proved an indefatigable worker for 
Populist reform measures. Speaking of "the mass of Pefferian bills 
which daily fall into the hopper," one reporter commented in 
1894 that "the fecundity of Senator Peffer in the matter of intro-
ducing bills has passed into a proverb." The conservative Harper's 
Weekly observed that Peffer "serves as a patient channel for the 
interjection into the Senate of impossible theories of legislation 
and barren ideas of finance." It added, however, that despite the 
visionary nature of his proposals, "he is sincere and honest in his 
views." Others agreed, and one observer noted that Peffer "seems 
to have won the respect and esteem of his colleagues, and to have 
convinced them that he represents a high standard of citizenship." 
Nor was his activity limited to the Senate chamber. He spent much 
of the summer of 1892 not campaigning but examining national 
bank failures. Immediately after the election he led a special com-
mittee from Chicago to Pittsburgh investigating the Pinkerton 
Agency and the Homestead riots. Most of the summer of 1893 he 
labored as the only active member of a Senate subcommittee in-
specting agricultural conditions from coast to coast. This work 
resulted in his memorable report, Agricultural Depression; Causes 
and Remedies.2 
The depression Peffer found in agriculture rapidly became a 
nationwide calamity of great magnitude in 1893. As banks closed 
their doors, businesses failed, and industries laid off workers, the 
nation turned to a fuller discussion of those economic issues that 
the destitute farmers of the \Vest and South had already raised. 
In the Populist reform triad of land, money, and transportation, 
the issue of financial reform held clear priority. The subtreasury 
1 Kansas City Journal, April 13, 1892. 
2 Washington Post, January 17, 1893; December 5, 1894; Harper's Weekly 38 
(March 10, 1894): 232; "The Populists in Congress," Review of Reviews 10 (July 
1894): II; L. B. Richardson, William E. Chandler, Republican (New York, 1940), 
p. 442; Pittsburgh National Labor Tribune, December I, 1892; Chicago Tribune, 
November 17·22, 1892; Topeka Advocate, May 10, 1893; Topeka State journal, 
February 28, 1896; W. A. Peffer, Agricultural Depression; Causes and Remedies 
(Washington, 1895). 
194 POPULISM and POLITICS 
and land-loan principles, after all, were the most prominent and 
peculiarly Populist of the movement's demands, and Peffer, Mc-
Lallin, and other leading Populists had expected that the party 
would make the first fight primarily upon finance. But the money 
question to the early Populists distinctly did not mean free silver 
alone. They repeatedly emphasized that free silver was a minor, 
even insignificant reform, and none did so more than Peffer, who 
constantly denied altogether the metallic basis of money and the 
importance of silver coinage as a relief measure. Although regarded 
in the Senate as a staunch silverite, he often seemed to damn free 
silver with faint praise, declaring that "as long as we use metals 
for money I favor their unlimited use" and silver was as good as 
gold. Fiat paper money remained the ultimate objective. Peffer 
even bearded the silver lion in its own den when he spoke to the 
convention of silver men that organized the American Bimetallic 
League in Washington in May 1892. After warning them that 
free silver as a panacea was hopelessly inadequate to meet the 
requirements of the people, he asserted that the Omaha convention 
would not limit its demands to a one-plank silver platform.3 
Although Populists considered silver as a minor reform, others 
viewed it as a major evil. Grover Cleveland and his financial 
advisers, in fact, even argued that the limited silver coinage pro-
vided for by the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 had largely 
caused the depression. The Treasury purchases of silver, they 
believed, encouraged gold hoarding, speculation, and the with-
drawal of needed foreign capital and ultimately threatened the 
maintenance of the gold standard. Cleveland consequently decided 
that Congress had to repeal the Silver Purchase Act. Such an 
action, he was convinced, would restore the confidence of business 
leaders in the nation's monetary system and thereby end the de-
pression. Cleveland's inaugural address in March 1893 emphasized 
the financial issue as paramount, and shortly thereafter he called 
a special session of Congress for August to repeal the Sherman Act.4 
Populists determined to accept Cleveland's challenge, but not 
3 Topeka Daily Capital, May 13, 1891, February 18, 1892; Indianapolis Journal, 
September 7, 1891; Emporia Tidings, June 18, 1892. 
4 National Watchman (Washington, D.C.), April 13, 1893; J. Rogers Hollings-
worth, The Whirligig of Politics: The Democracy of Cleveland and Bryan 
(Chicago, 1963), pp. 10-11. 
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all were careful to indicate that free silver alone did not represent 
the Populist commitment to financial reform. James B. Weaver, 
in fact, did not even wait for Cleveland to demand repeal before 
he accepted the primacy of silver. Free silver, he decided early in 
1893, "is the line upon which the battle should be fought. It is the 
line of least resistance and we should hurl our forces against it 
at every point." Weaver was joined by Herman E. Taubeneck, the 
Populist national chairman, and together they took prominent 
parts in an August meeting of the American Bimetallic League. 
Taubeneck even accepted appointment to a committee instructed 
to act as a silver lobby during the congressional session. He 
optimistically believed that the People's party could benefit from 
the nonpartisan silver men and should work closely with the 
League.5 
Other Populists were also ready to compromise their party and 
their principles in order to take advantage of the silver excitement. 
As always before, Jerry Simpson favored the easier course and 
urged Populists to join with silverites of the old parties and make 
the fight on silver alone. "I know that some will cry out against 
the apparent abandonment of other and greater reforms," he 
conceded, "but the people must remember that in reforming great 
national abuses, we cannot afford to be in haste." W. A. Harris 
was even more agreeable, being willing to approve as a compromise 
a devalued silver coinage ratio, perhaps 20 to 1 rather than 16 to I, 
a proposal popular among Silver Democrats but anathema to most 
Populists.6 
In contrast, Peffer denied silver's importance. He pointedly 
avoided the various meetings of the Bimetallic League and an-
nounced his intention to vote with the silverites against repeal of 
the Sherman Act only after stating his disagreement with "their 
premises and conclusions." Nevertheless, in the bitter struggle in 
the Senate, Peffer played a major role among the opponents of the 
administration. He led the counterattack when he offered uncon-
ditional free coinage as an amendment to the repeal measure. 
5Fred E. Haynes, ]ames Baird Weaver (Iowa City, 1919), p. 347; Chicago 
Tribune, August 1-4, 1893; Herman E. Taubeneck to Ignatius Donnelly, July 8, 
1893, Donnelly Papers. 
6 National Watchman, July 27, 1893; New York Herald, August 8, 1893; L. D. 
Lewelling to W. A. Harris, August 25, 1893, Lewelling Papers. 
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Despite poor health, he also did his share in the desperate eighty-
day filibuster, delivering what one newspaper termed "his 'three 
weeks' speech." Still, he did not restrict himself simply to silver; 
he spoke on other financial problems in the depression as well. 
As for the Harris ratio proposal, Peffer steadfastly rejected it as 
an unacceptable compromise of principle. "Though we be captured, 
we will not surrender," he declared, "and compromise is surren-
der."7 
Cleveland likewise refused to compromise, though repeatedly 
urged to do so for the sake of party harmony. With ruthless use 
of patronage and other pressure he persuaded the Silver Democrats 
to stand aside. On October 30, the Senate finally voted for repeal, 
with only Peffer making more than a perfunctory protest. Cleve-
land's policies seriously disrupted his party without achieving the 
promised economic improvement and contributed to making silver 
the major political issue splitting the country. The vote on repeal 
had been largely sectional, not partisan, in nature, and thereafter 
Southern Democrats in particular recoiled from Cleveland, feeling 
that he had betrayed them. The South had been encouraged in 
1892 to believe that in office Cleveland would accept free coinage 
and, as Peffer had predicted, the president's repudiation of it 
created "a rebellion among the farmers of the south." When the 
depression continued to deepen, the silver men of the South and 
West felt vindicated and aggressively moved to reinstitute silver 
coinage.s 
The increased emphasis upon the importance of silver also 
threatened to disrupt the People's party. Weaver, Taubeneck, 
Kyle, and other Populist politicians continued to make clear their 
support for a reduction of the Omaha Platform to the single issue 
of silver and for a fusion with silver men within the old parties. 
The 1893 elections, which revealed a swing away from the Dem-
ocratic party, further emboldened these men. They attended large 
bimetallic conferences during the fall and winter of 1893 to press 
7 Chicago Tribune, August 3, 1893; New York Times, July 4, 1893: Topeka 
Advocate, July 5, September 20, October 25, 1893: Kansas Commoner (Wichita), 
August 31, 1893· W. A. Peffer to Davis Waite, October 25, 1893, Waite Papers. 
8 Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage (New York, 1932). p. 
547: Elmer Ellis, Henry Moore Teller (Caldwell, Idaho, 1941), pp. 229-32; 
Washington Post, November 16, 1892. 
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the silver issue, and most of the congressional Populists signed a 
public address denouncing Cleveland's dictatorial actions and urg-
ing the American people to take up the cause of silver.9 On the 
other hand, the National Watchman, founded by the Populist con-
gressmen in 1892 in order to have a party organ in Washington, 
warned, "During all this excitement and discussion over the silver 
question it might be well to remember that the People's Party 
platform contains other, and we will add greater, principles than 
free coinage of silver." The Watchman also pointed out the lesson 
of the special session for Populists: the silverites were always 
prepared to compromise principle and cared for nothing but silver. 
"All they seem to want is free coinage with as little harm to the 
two old parties, and as little good for the Populist party as 
possible." It was therefore imperative, concluded the Watchman, 
for Populists to protect their party and "not suffer it to come 
under the domination of these so-called silver men." Peffer, John 
Davis, and other Populists joined in announcing their opposition 
to the silverite course, and even John Breidenthal expressed his 
disappointment "in the action of General Weaver in attempting to 
sidetrack the People's Party." Tom ·watson implored the readers 
of his People's Party Paper to instruct every delegate they sent to 
any convention in order to keep the party in the middle of the road 
and prevent politicians from altering the party's platform or manip-
ulating its voters, an intention that Watson recognized as "but too 
plan" on the part of some Populist leaders.1o 
This strong counterattack temporarily quieted the Populist clam-
or for a silver campaign, though the silver organizations continued 
the agitation. For his part, Peffer continued to press other issues 
during 1894. He agreed to introduce Jacob Coxey's proposals into 
the Senate and also advocated various relief measures of his own. 
After the administration used federal troops to suppress the Pull-
man strike during that summer, Peffer called for government con-
9 Topeka Advocate, November 8, 15, 1893; Washington Post, February 23, 24, 
1893; James Kyle to Waite, October 24, 1893, Waite Papers: John R. Morris, 
"Davis Hanson 'Vaite: The Ideology of a Western Populist" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Colorado, 1965), pp. 263-65. 
10 National Watchman, September 22, December 1, 1893; John Breidenthal to 
Waite, February 13, 1894, and Waite to James B. Weaver, February 28, 1894, 
'Vaite Papers: Topeka Advocate, November 22, December 6, 1893; People's 
Party Paper (Atlanta), January 12, 1894. 
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trol of railroads and coalfields, added his constant plea that all 
money be issued directly by the government, and concluded with 
the general position that all public functions should be performed 
by and through public agencies. Denounced as treasonous by 
frightened Eastern conservatives, this sensational speech castigated 
both old parties for precipitating the nation's troubles and promised 
eventual relief through the adoption of Populist policies. ·without 
mentioning silver, Peffer presented a statement on the nature of 
Populism and the problems of America so compelling that hundreds 
of thousands of copies were ordered by labor unions and reform 
organizations. In speaking around the country after the Senate 
adjourned, Peffer continued to avoid an emphasis on silver. He 
received strong praise from the radical Southern Mercury> for 
example, when he spoke in Dallas on the eve of the election and 
stressed the old Populist triad of land, money, and transportation.U 
If some Populists thus rejected the silver panacea, silver advocates 
gained strength in the other parties. Democrats like Ben Tillman, 
Richard P. Bland, and William Jennings Bryan and Republicans 
like John P. Jones, William Stewart, and Henry Moore Teller 
promoted the silver movement throughout the South and West. In 
1894 such politicians began to gain greater prominence in silver 
organizations like the American Bimetallic League, where Populists 
had been conspicuous in 1893. The league held a major conference 
in Washington in August 1894, with Jones, Bland, and Bryan as 
primary speakers. The conference declared that silver repeal had 
failed to provide economic recovery, urged voters to make silver 
the decisive consideration in the fall elections, and recommended 
holding regional meetings to advance the bimetallic cause.12 
Increasingly, too, these silver advocates began to put pressure 
upon the People's party. Senators Jones and Stewart did renounce 
the Republican party and declare themselves Populists, but most 
disdained any suggestion to break their party affiliations. They 
wanted silver and were willing to use the Populists while remaining 
11 American Non-Conformist (Indianapolis), June 7, July 12, 19, 1894: Topeka 
Advocate, January 10, 24, March 21, 1894: Southern Merwry (Dallas), November 
8, 1894; Congressional Record> 53d Cong., 2d sess., vol. 26, pp. ll76, 7231-37. 
12 Silver the Dominant Issue. Report of the Action of the Bimetallic Con-
ference ... Washington, D.C., August 16-17, 1894 (pamphlet in the Lemuel H. 
\'Veller Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin). 
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within their own party. Some, like Eaton in Kansas, were ready 
to campaign for nominal Populist candidates on the sole issue of 
free silver while maintaining their devotion to the Democracy, but 
others wanted a Populist fusion on Democratic candidates. 
There were Populists willing to be used too, though they believed 
the situation was different. As Breidenthal, Harris, and Simpson 
prepared to make concessions in Kansas, other Populists maneu-
vered to arrange fusion elsewhere. Chief among these was Weaver, 
whose entire career as a third-party advocate had been based on 
belief in the value of fusion. Admittedly ready to cooperate with 
the silver movement, Weaver directed Iowa Populists toward a 
fusion with Democrats and accepted for himself a fusionist nomina-
tion to Congress. Although he spoke of other issues, he based his 
own campaign on free silver. Perhaps more significantly, he corre-
sponded with Nebraska's Silver Democratic leader, Bryan, in an 
effort to promote a wider fusion between the two parties. Criticiz-
ing anti-fusion Populists for "making the mistake of their lives," 
W"eaver urged holding "a sort of interstate consultation over the 
situation in Neb, Dak & Iowa" to devise a silver fusion to prevent 
Republican success. He arranged speaking engagements for Bryan 
in Iowa while he helped campaign for the Democrat in Nebraska. 
Bryan himself actively advocated fusion between Populists and 
Democrats in Nebraska and found eager associates in Populist 
Senator William V. Allen, elected in 1893 with the help of Dem-
ocratic votes, and Populist Congressman William McKeighan, a 
former Democrat elected on a fusion ticket in 1890 and 1892 and 
running as a fusion candidate in 1894.13 
Bryan made no secret of his intentions and thereby provoked 
strong reaction from the nation's anti-fusion Populists. The Topeka 
Advocate, for example, repeatedly denounced Bryan as "an enemy 
to the People's Party and to all true financial reform," because of 
his silver monomania. If the Populists restricted their platform to 
13 Haynes, Weaver, pp. 346, 356-61; Herman C. Nixon, "The Populist Move· 
ment in Iowa," Iowa journal of History and Politics 24 (January 1926): 25-26; 
Weaver to W. J. Bryan, September I, 30, 1894, W. H. Lanning to Bryan, 
September 18, 22, 1894, M. B. Gearon to Bryan, October 3, 1894, C. J. Smyth to 
Bryan, October 13, 1894, C. D. Casper to Bryan, March 6, 1893, William Jennings 
Bryan Papers, Library of Congress: Paola E. Coletta, William jennings Bryan: 
Political Evangelist (Lincoln, Nebr., 1964), pp. 99-103; Non-Conformist, August 
2, 1894; National Watchman, June 15, 22, 1894. 
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silver, the Advocate believed, it "would be a backward step that 
would be absolutely fatal." Moreover, Bryan's additional proposi-
tion to attract Populist votes, the issuance of paper money, was 
nullified by his qualification, "redeemable in coin"-an attitude at 
total variance with the financial position of genuine Populists. The 
inequitable financial system had to be changed, argued the Advo-
cate; it was futile merely to plate it with silver. Even Nelson A. 
Dunning of the National Watchman, much less hostile than Mc-
Lallin to an emphasis upon the money question, condemned Bryan 
as "a Democrat and nothing else," who had never helped the 
People's party and whose plans for fusion involved the destruction 
of Populism. Perhaps even more the Watchman censured \tVeaver, 
Allen, and McKeighan for their "high-handed proceedings" in 
attempting to "force such schemes down the throats of square 
Populists." The Nebraska fusionists turned with such ferocity on 
Dunning that mid-roaders were astonished and Peffer, as president 
of the Watchman Company, felt it necessary to support Dunning 
publicly.l4 
Strangely, Dunning defended the fusion course of Southern Pop-
ulists in 1894. Although theoretically, he conceded, fusion in the 
South with Republicans was no worse than fusion in the West with 
Democrats, extenuating circumstances made the first permissible. 
"Fusion in the West has for its object the one single purpose of 
gaining office," he explained, "while in the South it is not a fusion 
at all, but instead it is a uniting of all elements in favor of an 
honest ballot." Regardless of Dunning's tortuous reasoning, fusion 
was a popular tactic in the South. If often on Republican initiative, 
it had been virtually as widespread in the South in 1892 as in the 
West. In 1894 it was even more so. Dunning's defense of Southocn 
fusion intimated that any Populist, given the nature of the struggle 
in the South, would endorse fusion, and indeed few Southern 
Populists rejected the plan. The most prominent fusionist was 
Marion Butler, a young North Carolinian who had succeeded to 
Polk's place in the state's Alliance and People's party. In 1892 
Butler had proposed fusion with the Democrats despite Polk's 
objections; thereafter he maneuvered to secure fusion with the 
14 Topeka Advocate, August 22, 1894; National Watchman, June 15, 22, July 
20, August 3, 10, 1894; Non-Conformist, July 12, August 2, 1894; Chicago Tribune, 
June 22, 1899. 
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Republicans. In this he was successful, and the fusionist legislature 
elected in 1894 sent him to the United States Senate to continue 
his "adroit political leadership."15 Some fusion arrangements were 
established between Populists and Republicans in at least North 
Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Arkansas. Tom Wat-
son was one of the rare Southern Populists who vigorously opposed 
fusion, and even he profited from indirect fusion when Georgia 
Republicans failed to nominate a candidate against him. However 
few they were in either section by 1894, mid-road Populists in the 
West opposed fusion; too often Southern mid-roaders merely op-
posed fusion with Democrats.16 
Following the 1894 elections, moreover, even fewer Populist lead-
ers were inclined to stay in the middle of the road. Although the 
party attracted vastly more votes than in 1892, they were generally 
disappointed that not more was achieved. Despite substantial 
inroads made in the South, the region remained heavily Democratic; 
in the \Vest the party lost congressmen and state officials if not 
votes. Particularly obvious to these Populists was the loss of the 
silver states of Nevada, Colorado, and Idaho, all of which had 
voted for the Populists in 1892. The only substantial results in the 
form of elected officers came from North Carolina, where Butler's 
fusion policy had placed a Populist and a Republican in the Senate 
and three Populists and two Republicans in the House. A policy 
of fusion beckoned thus more seductively, and silver seemed to be 
the logical basis for it. 
\Veaver spoke out freely after the election. He described the great 
national Democratic losses as a natural consequence of the re-
vulsion against Cleveland's policies and the depression; but the 
resultant Republican triumph was unearned, for the GOP had no 
policies to solve the nation's problems. The People's party, he 
15 National Watchman, August 17, 1894; Robert F. Durden, The Climax of 
Populism: The Election of 1896 (Lexington, Ky., 1965), pp. 7-10; Abbott Swinson 
to L. L. Polk, June I, 1892, and J. L. Ramsey to Polk, June I, 1892, Polk 
Papers; Stuart Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk, Agrarian Crusader (Chapel 
Hill, N.C., 1949), pp. 278, 289-90; Theodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the 
South (Berkeley, Calif., 1960), pp. 142-45. 
16 Pittsburg Messenger, August 31, 1894; John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt 
(Minneapolis, 1931), pp. 245-47, 329-33: William DuBose Sheldon, Populism in 
the Old Dominion (Princeton, N.J., 1935), pp. 109, Ill; Fred E. Haynes, Third 
Party Movements since the Civil War (Iowa City, 1916), p. 280; C. Vann Wood-
ward, Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge, La., 1951), pp. 275-76. 
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declared, represented the hope of the future. Yet he was prepared 
to restrict this party that had done so well. He urged Americans 
not to believe "the ill-considered utterances of some of its over-
zealous, radical and unbalanced men. . . . All reform movements 
attract to their ranks men of radical and extreme views." Weaver 
then made clear his definition of radicalism when he urged a 
combination of men on the basis of silver. Privately, moreover, 
he expressed his willingness to meet with Bryan and Allen to "shape 
things properly."I7 
Herman E. Taubeneck, national chairman, was equally ready to 
check radicalism within the party. In mid-November he advanced 
his interpretation of the failure of Populism to sweep the nation 
in the past election and his determination for its future position. 
"I regret deeply that the people's party has been honeycombed and 
undermined by all sorts of schemes, fancies and abstractions. But 
for this unfortunate condition," he declared, "the people's party 
would have largely triumphed at the late election, but by rainbow 
chasing and endless freaks and foibles, we drove thousands upon 
thousands who are with us heart and soul on the money issue, into 
the ranks of the opposition." So believing, Taubeneck suggested 
that the party limit its platform to the single issue of silver. "No 
socialism nor anarchism," he added, sounding like an old party 
politician, "indeed no 'isms' of any nature or side issue, nothing 
but the fight for bimetallism against the single gold standard." 
Later in the month Taubeneck attended a conference of the 
American Bimetallic League in St. Louis to coordinate the activities 
of the silverites and Silver Populists in preparation for the 1896 
election. At the conference Taubeneck denounced the "cranks, 
anarchists, and socialists" in the People's party and recommended 
that they be purged to create a "pure silver" party. Silver leaders 
such as Adoniram J. Warner, president of the league, praised 
Taubeneck's intentions but refused to tie silver to the People's 
party, which so many silverites found objectionable. That refusal 
merely encouraged some Populists to fashion a more conservative 
image for their party by subordinating all other issues to silver. 
As one declared, "If we are to carry this country in 1896 we must 
17 Haynes, Weaver, pp. 362-65; Weaver to Bryan, November 9, 1894, Bryan 
Papers. 
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satisfy the average man that we are reasonable and right." He 
therefore requested the party to suppress the impractical and 
visionary men within its ranks.lB 
Peffer was uncertain as to the course Populists should follow. He 
had always regarded the money question as the most important of 
the Populist economic demands. But he meant paper money, 
government issue, the abolition of national banks, the cessation of 
bond issues, and free silver when he spoke of the money question 
and he was unwilling to restrict it, even implicitly, to free silver 
alone, as Taubeneck, W'eaver, and the silver leaders desired. He 
was prepared to accept Populist cooperation with such men, how-
ever, provided the coalition dissolved old names and organizations 
and first adopted a basic principle which "can be constantly applied 
to new phases of civilization as we advance. The central idea of 
Populism is that public functions should be exercised by public 
agents, and that basis is broad enough to include a discussion 
and a solution of every economical problem now in sight." That 
position, however, was no concession to Taubeneck and the silver 
men, who wanted to avoid just such broad principles. It represented 
Peffer's original position in the party, unchanged by the demands 
of the silver schemers. Moreover, only a week later Henry Demarest 
Lloyd, a leader of the most radical wing of the People's party, 
wrote Clarence Darrow of his plans to incorporate the nation's 
socialists into the Populistic movement: "If we will come out 
with a good budget of municipalizations and nationalizations in 
our platform, and a general principle like Peffer's-'Public owner-
ship of public utilities' -or something similar, the Socialists will 
'jine' as they say in Kentucky, and we will get up a head of steam 
possible in no other way."19 
Lloyd, of course, already believed that "the People's Party plat-
form is socialistic, as all democratic doctrine is," and it was to 
precisely this aspect of Populism that Taubeneck objected. Six 
months earlier, in fact, at the Illinois Populist state convention he 
18 Southern Mercury, November 29, 1894; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 
27-29, 1894; P. W. Couzins to H. D. Lloyd, December 30, 1894, Henry D. Lloyd 
Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin; Joseph C. Sibley to Waite, Decem-
ber 13, 1894, Waite Papers; Morris, "Davis Waite," pp. 266-67; Martin Ridge, 
Ignatius Donnelly: The Portrait of a Politician (Chicago, 1962), pp. 337-40. 
19 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 14, 1894; Lloyd to Darrow, November 
23, 1894, Lloyd Papers. 
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had sharply criticized Lloyd's Chicago Populists for their "socialism" 
and demanded that they leave the party. Now Taubeneck decided 
to hold a conference of Populist leaders in St. Louis in order that 
the party could "make known the fact that it has outgrown many 
of the 'isms' that characterized its birth and early growth, and 
take a stand on the financial question that will make it worthy 
of the support of those who ... have not cared to support the 
party on account of its wild theories." He publicly hinted that 
the St. Louis meeting would entirely remove the subtreasury and 
related demands from the Populist platform, and he particularly 
urged "conservative" and "level-headed" Populists to attend this 
critical meeting in December.2o 
Virtually all the "Washington Populists" agreed with the decision 
to curtail the Omaha Platform. Except for Peffer, few original 
Populists remained in the nation's capital. Kansas had replaced 
men like Otis and Clover with men like Harris and Hudson; 
Southerners sent political opportunists like Butler rather than 
early, unswerving Populists like Watson. Those like Simpson and 
McKeighan who did remain from the first Populist contingent had 
always run on fusion tickets and were willing to grant concessions 
to the Silver Democrats in their states. Kyle, the only other senator 
besides Peffer chosen in the first Populist election, had been sent 
to Washington with Democratic votes and considered himself under 
some obligation to that party; furthermore he felt no commitment 
to Populism, either party or doctrine. Another new type of Populist 
was the far western Silver Populist like Lafe Pence of Colorado or 
Senators Jones and Stewart of Nevada, who joined the People's 
party in the first place only because of its silver declaration. Thus, 
products of direct fusion or inspired by silver zeal, Populist con-
gressmen took a decided stand in support of Taubeneck's proposal. 
Pence agreed that "the time has come to drop all weak 'isms' " 
and Allen expressed his hope that the conference would "abandon 
all questionable doctrines and non-essentials." Dunning continued 
his erratic course on the Watchman by endorsing Taubeneck. 
"Leave the cranks at home. Leave the impracticables at home," he 
20 Lloyd to Darrow, November 23, 1894, and Taubeneck to Lloyd, December 
10, 1894, Lloyd Papers; National Watchman, November 30, 1894; Chester 
McArthur Destler, American Radicalism, 1865-1901 (Chicago, 1966), pp. 170, 228. 
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urged in reference to the St. Louis meeting. "Let us have no more 
sidetracks, no more three column platforms .... We can never 
expect to gain success when platforms are extended to take in the 
pet hobby or conciliate every crank in the nation. If the late 
election has taught us anything it is to push less issues with 
increased vigor. "21 
Peffer alone refused his consent. He was willing to emphasize 
the money question but unwilling to jettison "any proposition or 
principle which I have heretofore advocated." Although Butler, 
Allen, Stewart, and most of the other Washington Populists made 
plans to attend the conference, Peffer decided to stay in ·washington. 
And in December, while others met in St. Louis to trim the Populist 
platform to silver, he introduced bills in the Senate to have the 
government control the railroads, to provide an increased and 
flexible currency, to relieve the destitute and dispossessed on public 
lands, to revoke the administration's authority to issue bonds.22 
Other Populists outside Washington more directly moved against 
Taubeneck's scheme to purge the party of its distinctive character. 
The Southern A1ercury even demanded that the national chairman 
resign if he refused to stand upon the party's platform. The Topeka 
Advocate denounced the "determination on the part of a few men 
who have identified themselves with the People's Party to narrow 
its platform to a single issue." Proclaiming its hostility to any 
such movement inspired by the Silver Populists, the Advocate de-
clared that "Taubeneck can go with a free silver party if he chooses, 
but he will find that he cannot carry the People's Party with him." 
Davis Waite launched a letter campaign against the conference, 
asserting that only another regular national convention and not a 
group of self-appointed political managers had the authority to 
alter the party's platform. He received strong support from such 
mid-roaders as Ignatius Donnelly, Paul Van Dervoort, and George 
'1\Tashburn, who recognized that silver was too narrow a basis upon 
which to build the party and condemned the "self-constituted 
21 Non-Conformist, December 6, 1894; National Watchman, November 30, 
December 7, 1894; Henry L. Loucks to Waite, July 30, 1895, Waite Papers; W. 
M. Stewart to H. E. Taubeneck, December 25, 1894, William M. Stewart Papers, 
Nevada State Historical Society. 
22 Non-Conformist, December 6, 1894; Topeka Advocate, December 12, 1894; 
Washington Post, December 4, 1894. 
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crowd" for its short-sighted arrogance. Washburn also urged 
Donnelly to attend the meeting to counteract Weaver's influence. 
"General ·weaver is credited with political discernment, and yet, 
Mr. Donnelly, I recall the fact that from the beginning of the 
Populist movement, whenever an emergency has arisen, he has 
been on the wrong side, while you have been on the right side ... ; 
and in this coming meeting, I believe our past experience will 
be repeated."23 
Lloyd was also concerned about the obvious determination of 
"some of our leaders ... to take narrower ground and throw the 
radicals in the party overboard." He wrote of his anxiety that 
"revolutions never go backward. If the People's Party goes back-
ward it will prove that it is not a revolution, and if it is not a 
revolution, it is nothing." From his friends, Lloyd received news 
that confirmed his fears. Henry Legate, a leading Bellamyite in 
Boston, wrote that the avowed purpose of the St. Louis conference 
was to eliminate the radical features of the Omaha Platform; and 
George H. Gibson, editor of the Lincoln (Nebraska) Wealth Makers, 
warned that Taubeneck had secured a large delegation of Silver 
Populists from the West and had avoided inviting the more 
steadfast Populists. Both pressed Lloyd to attend "to eloquently 
plead for the great truths and show up the folly of what the narrow 
minded leaders and politicians will insist on,"24 
So encouraged, Lloyd, Van Dervoort, and other radical Populists 
went to St. Louis, determined to defend the entire Omaha Platform. 
On the first day the Silver Populists found, to their dismay, that 
they were in a minority. Weaver failed first to secure a secret 
meeting and second to grant Taubeneck the power to appoint the 
resolutions committee. The discussions revealed a strong distrust 
of the party leaders by many in attendance, culminating in a mid-
road denunciation of a proposed national campaign committee as 
"a political monopoly, the worst of all monopolies, led by office-
23 Southern Mercury, November 29, 1894; Topeka Advocate, December 12, 19, 
1894; Donnelly to Waite, December 14, 1894, Paul Van Dervoort to W'aite, 
December 15, 1894, Waite to Robert Schilling, December 17, 1894, Waite Papers; 
Waite to Donnelly, December 11, 1894, George F. Washburn to Donnelly, 
December 22, 1894, Donnelly Papers. 
24 Lloyd to C. A. Powers, December 16, 1894, George H. Gibson to Lloyd, 
December 19, 1894, Henry R. Legate to Lloyd, December 19, 1894, Lloyd Papers. 
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seeking men, who care more for politics than for principle and 
have office in view, and when that is had all that is wanted is at 
hand." Behind Lloyd's leadership, the conference rejected all 
attempts to shorten the Populist program and reaffirmed the party's 
adherence to the Omaha Platform.25 
Staunch Populists everywhere welcomed the decision. Milton 
Park, editor of the Southern Mercury, happily reported that Taube-
neck and ·weaver left St. Louis wiser than they had arrived, 
and he trumpeted that "the effort of a few designing demagogues 
to sidetrack the Omaha demands in the interests of the bullionists 
at the St. Louis conference, proved a complete failure." Van 
Dervoort expressed his pleasure to Lloyd that they had been able 
to preserve the Omaha Platform. But he knew that Taubeneck 
and others still favored a one-plank platform; he cautioned, "We 
will have to meet this issue at the National Convention in 1896. 
It is not dead yet."26 
Van Dervoort was more prescient than Park, for the conservative 
Populists refused to accept as binding the declarations of the St. 
Louis meeting and continued to advocate the overthrow of the 
original Populist principles. Senator Stewart regretted the St. Louis 
decision and voiced his fear that "it will be impossible for the 
People's Party or any party to succeed on the main issue unless it 
is made the sole issue." Dunning's National Watchman represented 
the opinion of most Washington Populists when it expressed dis-
appointment in the St. Louis meeting and reproached "the over-
zealous and the crank," "the socialists and world savers," for their 
alleged lack of common political sense. The paper urged all the 
party's conservative members to attend future conventions to pre-
vent another such folly, and it promised to campaign for the one-
plank platform anyway. Later Dunning repeatedly complained of 
"the wicked and foolish surrender to the Chicago socialists by the 
St. Louis meeting" and called on Populists to set aside their idealism 
in favor of a commonsense approach to politics.27 
25 Thomas F. Byron to Lloyd, April 8, 1895, Lloyd Papers: Washington Post, 
December 30, 1894; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 26-30, 1894; Southern 
Mercury, January 10, 1895. 
26 Paul Van Dervoort to Lloyd, January 1895, Lloyd Papers; Southern Mercury, 
January 10, 1895. 
27 National Watchman, January II, 25, 1895. 
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The faithful Populists were astounded. How could a reaffirma-
tion of the Populist creed be a surrender or a mistake? The Amer-
ican Non-Conformist was bewildered by Taubeneck's claim that 
the leading Populist papers had "committed an offense by urging 
the St. Louis conference to stand by the Omaha platform and not 
attempt to change it." The Non-Conformist wondered "when it 
became wrong for a Populist paper to uphold the Omaha plat-
form," and editor Charles X. Matthews added, "\1\Te were always 
under the impression that the supreme test of Populism was the 
acceptance of that platform and that anyone who rejected it thereby 
proved that he was no Populist. But it seems that this notion is 
out of date." The charge that socialists had captured the St. Louis 
conference particularly irritated the straight Populists who replied 
that rather than being captured the mid-roaders at St. Louis had 
prevented others from seizing the party. The allegations about the 
"Socialist capture," Matthews explained, "originated with a small 
clique who went to the St. Louis conference for the purpose of 
running it and became disgruntled because they did not succeed." 
And having failed to transform the People's party into a silver 
party, they "have been wailing ever since. As usual the twelfth 
man on the jury is complaining that the other eleven are 'very 
contrairy.' "28 
The Silver Populists responded readily that the Non-Conformist, 
Advocate, and similar newspapers were themselves socialistic. The 
Watchman, in particular, viciously attacked McLallin and others 
who objected to Taubeneck's policy, declaring that their animus 
stemmed from Taubeneck's opposition to socialism and their own 
commitment to the disgusting doctrine. Fusionist papers such as 
the Kansas Commoner were less vitriolic but no less determined to 
defend Taubeneck, gently suggesting only that he and McLallin 
"honestly differ, somewhat, as to the best methods to pursue in 
accomplishing the same purpose."29 
Taubeneck needed no assistance in defending himself or his plans. 
[n two letters toW. Scott Morgan, an unswerving Arkansas Populist 
28 Non-Conformist, February 7, 21, 1895; Southern Mercury, February 21, 
1895; Topeka Advocate, January 23, 1895. 
29 National Watchman, February 15, April 5, 1895; Non-Conformist, February 
21, April II, 1895; Kansas Commoner, February 14, 1895. 
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who edited the Populist readyprints, the national chairman pro-
vided a classic exposition of the attitudes of the compromising, 
expedient, practical politician. On January 10, 1895, Taubeneck 
responded to Morgan's questioning of the Silver Populist proposals 
with the blunt assertion that "the party will either adopt my policy 
or we will never succeed as a party." ·when Morgan complained 
of his dictatorial tone and obvious indifference to Populist prin-
ciples, Taubeneck replied on January 29: 
The trouble, Mr. Morgan, is, that you are dealing with theories and ab-
stract ideas which are as pliable as the paper upon which you write. I 
have to deal with men and conditions. That is the difference between you 
and I [sic]. Mine is a cold-blooded, practical politics, and yours is a dream· 
land, living on theories and abstract ideas. I have never made a single 
mistake, when I followed my own views, and I made none at St. Louis, 
nor in calling a meeting of the committee. I have made mistakes in the 
past, I admit, when I listened to the council [sic] of others. 
Taubeneck then claimed that those who insisted upon strict ad-
herence to the original Populist demands were ruining the party 
by making it "impossible for Senator Stewart, Jones, and the silver 
men in our party to remain with us." He specifically condemned 
the Wealth Makers, the Farmers' Tribune, and the People's Call 
for doing "us infinite harm." And then he lashed out again: "The 
Topeka 'Advocate' is on the same line-you cannot tell whether 
it is a single-tax organ, a socialist paper or a People's Party paper. 
The 'Non-conformist' is gone. It has joined the socialists." Tau-
beneck finally concluded by repeating his charge "that our press 
is drifting toward extreme socialism which the American people 
will not endorse. I am not a socialist or communist in the remotest 
sense, and I will fight it to the bitter end."3o 
Taubeneck's ideas of socialism may have been strange indeed, 
but he clearly used the term not so much in a descriptive as 
in a derogatory sense. The Southern Mercury, among the most 
constant of Southern Populist papers, complained that Taubeneck 
and the Watchman adopted the "old party howls of socialism" 
against the straight Populists in an effort to discredit them, just 
as reactionary leaders of the Democratic and Republican parties 
30 Taubeneck to W. S. Morgan, January 10, 29, 1895, Waite Papers. 
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employed smear tactics to undermine legitimate protest. The Non-
Conformist responded sensibly to the fraudulent charges of the 
pseudo-Populists: 
The Populist press is no more Socialistic now than it always has been. It 
is advocating precisely the same things it has been advocating all along. 
Neither is the Omaha platform any more Socialistic than when framed. 
How absurd, therefore, to say that because this press refused their consent 
to a change in their platform by an irresponsible conference of undelegated 
individuals, that it has gone over to extreme socialism. Clearly, it is not 
the Populist press ... that has changed. It is those who thought it a 
brilliant stroke of statesmanship to swap horses while crossing the stream, 
to pull down their colors in the face of the enemy, to change front while 
the battle was in progress. 
Itself thoughtfully critical of doctrinaire socialism, the Non-Con-
formist hoped that Populism would go forward, "without dictation 
either from extreme socialists or those who think they see socialists 
behind every bush that obstructs their way."31 
In early January 1895 Weaver wrote privately of his dissatisfac-
tion with the outcome of the St. Louis conference. He was con-
vinced that Populists had to seize upon the currency question as 
their sole issue if they were to succeed. "One battle at a time is a 
universal law in the science of conflict," wrote the old soldier. "We 
can no more settle the three fold contention of the Omaha plat-
form in a single struggle than we could fight three battles at one 
and the same time with a single body of troops." Weaver and 
Taubeneck then corresponded concerning the possibility of holding 
a private conference of those Populists willing to limit the party's 
platform to one issue ("our wisest heads," wrote Weaver). Such a 
conference could then publish a declaration favoring that course 
without facing the possibility of being outvoted on the issue again.a2 
As an apparent result of such discussions, Weaver went to ·wash-
ington in late January with an address he had prepared for publica-
tion. This manifesto urged Populists to concentrate their energies 
on the financial question and to cooperate with all who opposed 
the gold standard, regardless of their attitudes on other issues. 
Weaver called a meeting of the Washington Populists to discuss 
31 Non-Conformist, February 21, March 7, April II, 1895. 
32 Weaver to Donnelly, January 13, 1895, Donnelly Papers. 
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and sign the address. His arguments there satisfied all but Peffer, 
who objected that rank-and-file Populists would legitimately believe 
the address called for a concentration on silver alone, which, the 
senator noted, was but a small part even of just the financial 
question; that under existing circumstances, Populists would con-
sider such advice as representing a move for Populist-Democratic 
cooperation; that such an address, especially after the St. Louis 
conference, would cause Populists to believe that their party leaders 
were attempting to dictate to them and manipulate their loyalties 
in an effort to arrange fusion. 
Weaver replied that the Silver Democrats were preparing to raise 
the silver issue and it would be politically wise for the Populists to 
do so first. Peffer answered that the Populists already had raised 
the issue of free silver in the Omaha Platform in 1892, and that if 
the Democrats were so concerned about its importance they could 
join the People's party. After much discussion the meeting ad-
journed until the following day at Senator Allen's office. When 
Peffer arrived, he found only Weaver, but with the manifesto 
already signed by all the other congressional Populists plus the party 
officials like Taubeneck. Peffer spurned Weaver's entreaties and 
refused to sign, angrily protesting that Weaver's actions would lead 
to the destruction of the People's party through entanglement with 
Democrats over an unimportant issue.33 
In publishing the address, the National Watchman confirmed 
Peffer's suspicions of Weaver's intentions. Sanctimoniously declar-
ing its ignorance of why Peffer had not signed the document ("but 
presume it was through accident"), the Watchman announced its 
pleasure that its editorial position on the merits of a one-plank 
platform had been endorsed by the Populist leaders. Accordingly, 
it expected that "some of our papers ... may raise objections to 
the proposed lines of this address," but it warned these mid-road 
papers not "to antagonize the propositions laid down in this man-
ifesto." Denouncing faithful adherence to the full Populist program 
as "socialism," the Watchman argued for the repudiation of vision-
ary schemes and for cooperation on one issue. "Let us be conser-
33 Topeka Daily Capital, February 15, 1895; Kansas Biographical Scrapbook, 
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vative and consistent in order to secure the support of the business 
men, the professional men, and the well to do."34 
The Watchman's prediction of editorial objections to the policy 
proposed by the party officials was quickly fulfilled. The radicals 
voiced their complaints in the annual meeting of the National 
Reform Press Association (NRPA), which began in Kansas City, 
February 22, 1895, just one week after the publication of ·weaver's 
address. Accusing Taubeneck of dishonesty, McLallin and other 
editors expressed their apprehension that the chairman and his 
associates planned to betray the People's party to the "Philistines." 
Morgan's reading from his correspondence with Taubeneck created 
an uproar at the editorial meeting. Taubeneck's bluntly stated 
intentions to abandon "the socialistic features" of the Omaha 
Platform and his arrogant assumption that those who disagreed 
with him had no recourse brought outraged cries for his resigna-
tion. But after extended discussion, the editors drew up resolutions 
designed to leave the public impression of harmony within Populist 
ranks. They declared that no authority existed to alter the Omaha 
Platform except another popularly elected national convention, and 
that while one question or another might seem most pressing "true 
Populists" should not ignore the other demands of the Omaha 
Platform. \Vhen many radical editors denounced these resolutions 
as a whitewash of Taubeneck and the National Committee, the 
NRPA appointed a committee to go to \1\Tashington to investigate 
Taubeneck's activities, determine the intentions of the party leaders, 
and warn them against trying to make silver the dominant issue. 
Even so, some Populists left the meeting disgusted that the NRP A 
had not openly condemned Taubeneck. "These editors," reported 
the Kansas City Star, "say that if the Populist Party abandons the 
Omaha platform now and makes free silver the only issue the party 
will be swallowed up by the Democratic party which is sure to 
declare for free silver in 1896."35 
Taubeneck explained his views of the dispute between Populist 
politicians and editors to a Washington reporter. The NRPA, he 
34 National Watchman, February 22, 1895. 
35 Kansas Commoner, February 14, 1895; Topeka Advocate, February 20, 1895: 
Non-Conformist, March 14, 1895; Kansas City Star, February 22, 23, 1895; Kansas 
City Gazette, February 23, 1895. 
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declared, "is an advocate of the most radical socialistic ideas, govern-
ment ownership of land, general paternalism, and all that sort of 
thing. The Populist party don't [sic] give a continental for social-
ism, don't [sic] want any of it in any shape, and that is where the 
trouble with the editors come [sic] in." Having cried thief as loud 
as he was able, the practical-minded national chairman then added 
of his party, "So far as there being any danger of its being absorbed 
by the Democratic party on account of its free silver plank, that 
is all nonsense."so 
To the NRPA committee itself, however, Taubeneck proved less 
hostile. With the secretary of the National Committee, J. H. 
Turner, he agreed to sign a statement acknowledging that only a 
national delegate convention could revise the Omaha Platform, 
and he entertained the editors at national headquarters and con-
vinced them that the People's party was prospering under his able 
direction. The committee also met with the Populist congressmen 
who had signed Weaver's address and secured their written pledge 
that they had no intentions of abandoning any of the Omaha 
Platform. The NRP A committee then publicly reported that all 
within Populist ranks was harmonious, that the Associated Press 
had misrepresented the position of the party leadership in an 
attempt to divide Populists, and that in fact the committee had 
not gone to Washington to investigate Taubeneck but to assure 
him that the Populist editors appreciated his efforts and stood 
by him.37 
Yet this comforting report brought no end to the intraparty 
struggle over the direction Populism was to take. The Silver Pop-
ulists continued their schemes to subvert the movement, and the 
mid-road editors persisted in their opposition to those who argued 
for a dilute Populism. Taubeneck's mouthpiece, the National 
Watchman, filled each issue with articles denouncing as invidious 
socialists not only Lloyd but anyone who opposed the plans of the 
Silver Populists, and it constantly ranted about "this socialistic 
conspiracy to obtain possession of the machinery of the People's 
Party." Furthermore, the Watchman continued to recommend 
36 Washington Post, February 28, 1895. 
37 Topeka Advocate, March 13, 1895; Non-Conformist, March 7, 1895; Southern 
Mercury, March 7, 1895; Washington Post, February 28, 1895. 
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trimming the Omaha Platform to one plank, as though neither the 
St. Louis conference nor the NRP A had ever met. McLallin de-
scribed the degradation of Populism evident in the approach of 
the Silver Populist press: "The single-plank advocates have adopted 
the methods and the arguments of the old parties against Populists 
who insist that a broader and more comprehensive platform is 
necessary .... The National Watchman and Mr. Turner's new 
paper, the Record Review, week after week reiterate their non-
sensical charge that socialism dominates the great body of Populists 
who still insist upon supporting other things besides financial 
reform. Not only this, they resort to the same unscrupulous methods 
of misrepresentation and deception that have ever characterized the 
plutocratic press." Taubeneck himself disregarded his pledges to 
the NRPA. In July, for example, he urged one Populist state 
convention to "build a platform making the 'money question' the 
great central idea, unencumbered with details or side issues." 
Moreover, he began a correspondence campaign to undermine the 
Omaha Platform.3s 
Weaver even more actively promoted the silver panacea among 
Populists. In a series of public letters in the spring of 1895 he 
advocated campaigning in 1896 on "the money question alone, 
unincumbered [sic] with any other contentions whatsoever." He 
traveled to Colorado to encourage a union of all silverites for the 
1896 election, declaring that Populism on its own could never attain 
victory. In June he dominated a Des Moines conference designed 
to unite all silver men. He also attended an Iowa conference of 
Silver Democrats and tried to arrange a Democratic-Populist fusion 
for the state elections of 1895. Weaver later attempted to consign 
the Populist state convention to either fusing with the Democrats 
on a silver platform or supporting any ticket committed to silver, 
but he was thwarted by the straight Populists led by former Repub-
lican Thomas F. Byron.39 
Most ominously, Weaver endeavored to stifle the opposition to 
38 Non-Conformist, March 7, April 11, 1895; National Watchman, March 29, 
April 5, 12, 1895; Topeka Advocate, May 1, 1895; Thomas F. Byron to Lloyd, 
April 8, 1895, Lloyd Papers; Southern Mercury, July 11, 1895. 
39 Haynes, Weaver, pp. 365-73; Non-Conformist, June 27, 1895: Southern 
Mercury, April 11, 1895; Fort Scott Daily Monitor, June 12, 1895; George Muller 
to J. B. Weaver, March 5, 1895, James B. Weaver Papers, Iowa Department of 
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his silver schemes. Publicly he unctuously refused to "quarrel with 
any person within the party, use hard names or hurl epithets at 
others who may differ with me." But privately he tried to oust 
Byron from his editor's position on the Des Moines Farmers' Tri-
bune, a middle-of-the-road Populist paper opposed to "the one-
plank clique (of alleged Populists)," as Byron described Weaver 
and Taubeneck. They in turn objected to Byron, not only because 
of his editorial hostility to their plans but also because at the 
St. Louis conference it was he who first saw through Weaver's 
parliamentary maneuvers to have the party endorse the silver 
panacea and began the successful counterattack of those who sup-
ported the retention of the Omaha Platform. With the assistance 
of other silverites, Weaver now used both financial and political 
pressure to have the Tribune's owner forbid Byron to criticize "the 
single-plank shouters in the People's Party." At the same time, 
Byron wrote Lloyd, "while I am silent, Weaver is to advocate the 
'stripping the platform to one plank,' as he lately put it, in letters 
to the Tribune. He has one going in this week, on which I am not 
allowed to comment." The Weaver Silver Populists then promised 
to pay the difference between Byron's salary and the salary neces-
sary to attract a new editor acceptable to them. Finally, in May 
1895, Byron was removed as editor and the Farmers' Tribune 
dropped its opposition to single-plank Populism.4o 
Among the Silver Populists, moreover, Weaver was one of the 
foremost supporters of the plans of the American Bimetallic League 
(ABL) to organize a silver party. Taubeneck apparently hoped to 
prevent the creation of an independent silver party by transform-
ing the People's party into a silver party itself. He wrote to a 
protesting radical Populist in January, for example, that were a 
silver party organized, "no new recruits will come to the Populist 
ranks, except from the socialists and communists, and we will lose 
a great number of the best element in our party." But Weaver 
viewed a possible silver party with favor, anticipating that it would 
draw silver men who might object even to Silver Populism and 
that the two parties would fuse on a joint ticket in 1896 anyway. 
·weaver met with the silver men of the ABL in Washington in late 
40 Haynes, Weaver, p. 371; Thomas F. Byron to Lloyd, April 8, May 5, 28, 
1895, Lloyd Papers. 
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February 1895 and at the same time also discussed with Bryan 
and other Silver Democrats the possibilities for a silver cam-
paign. Out of these discussions came two important developments, 
though Weaver was publicly connected with neither. First, Silver 
Democrats in Congress, led by Bryan and Bland, issued a public 
address advocating free silver and the reorganization of the Dem-
ocratic party to accomplish the restoration of silver coinage. Despite 
this indication that silver was regarded as an issue to be resolved 
within the Democratic party, the Washington Post reported that 
the Silver Populists were willing to enter a fusion campaign in 
1896 with these Silver Democrats.41 
The second development in Washington's winter of 1895 was the 
launching of the long-anticipated silver party, christened the Amer-
ican Bimetallic party. The silver leaders of the ABL after a 
conference on February 22, 1895, issued a public address declaring 
that neither the Democratic party nor the Republican party seemed 
likely to support silver and calling for all bimetallists to join in 
a new party with silver as the only issue. The conference suggested 
Joseph C. Sibley, a Pennsylvania Democratic congressman, for its 
tentative candidate for the new party's 1896 presidential nominee. 
Although the address made no mention of the People's party, the 
two Nevada senators, Jones and Stewart, nominal Populists both, 
signed the document and thereby demonstrated the extent of their 
commitment to Populism. Immediately after this conference, Sibley 
began to tour the country, campaigning more for silver than himself. 
Warner, Weaver, and other leading silverites and Silver Populists 
frequently accompanied him.42 
The unswerving Populists strongly protested these developments. 
They had objected before to Taubeneck's warnings that a silver 
party would be formed if Populists did not restrict themselves to 
silver and they bitterly resented the attempts to make Populism 
palatable to those who might be expected to embrace this new 
41 Taubeneck to Morgan, January 29, 1895, Waite Papers; William .Jennings 
Bryan, The First Battle (Chicago, 1896), pp. 155-57; Washington Post, February 
28, 1895; Southern Mercury, March 7, 1895. 
42 Bryan, First Battle, pp. 154-55: Washington Evening Star, March 6, 1895; 
Topeka Advocate, March 13, 1895: William M. Stewart to Waite, September 19, 
1895, Waite Papers; Stewart to [?] .Julien, March 29, 1895, Stewart to Tom 
Watson, March 22, 1895, Stewart to G. S. Nixon, March 13, 1895, Stewart to 
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party. "If these Republican and Democratic free silver men cannot 
stand on that [Omaha] platform," editorialized the Southern Mer-
cury, "they are still in the bonds of iniquity, and have not given 
their whole heart to the reform cause." The Advocate sharply 
rebuked the silver party as a party of "ultimate redemption," which 
meant that in its only demand it accepted the theory of intrinsic 
value, anathema to original Populists. McLallin further flayed the 
"practical politicians" of the People's party for ignoring the fact 
that Populism was far more than free silver and for encouraging 
Populist connivance with the silver party. Mid-roader Gaspar C. 
Clemens of Topeka denounced the silver party as a plan of the 
silver mineowners, who had as much to lose as other monopolists 
if the Omaha Platform were successful, and he described it as "a 
fair-seeming hypocrite, pretending to succor when it means to 
destroy." "So long as there lives in this land a Henry D. Lloyd or 
a William A. Peffer," Clemens added, "the common people are 
not driven to take Sibley of Pennsylvania as their leader."43 
The various positions of prominent Populists and silver leaders 
regarding the nature of the 1896 election campaign became clearer 
in March 1895. In response to questions from the New York World 
as to whether there would be a new party in 1896 and, if so, its 
basis and chances of success, Peffer, Watson, Weaver, Taubeneck, 
Butler, Warner, Sibley, and Alabama Populist Congressman Milford 
W. Howard replied for publication. Sibley and Warner alone 
argued that the new party already existed in the American Bimetal-
lic party. They predicted that the silver issue would split the old 
parties and drive silver advocates into the new party rather than 
the People's party with its more comprehensive and radical plat-
form. But Populists too would ignore all issues except financial 
reform, these silver leaders argued, and thus also join the new party. 
Weaver, Taubeneck, and Butler represented a second position, 
differing only slightly from the first. They agreed that the money 
issue should be paramount and that Populists would disregard all 
other issues and join bimetallists of both old parties on a common 
ticket in 1896. "Those who desire to retard monetary reform by 
loading us down with other issues will, with the Socialists and 
43 Non-Conformist, February 7, 1895; Southern Mercury, January 31, 1895; 
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Communists, go to the rear," Taubeneck announced. Butler spe-
cifically declared that the People's party would not be the agency 
of union because its "minor issues" would repel silverites of the 
old parties, but he believed Populists would leave their party to 
join bimetallists in a new party yet to be formed. Weaver and 
Taubeneck may not have seemed as ready as Butler to jettison the 
People's party, but the practical effect of their proposals was the 
same: fusion of bimetallists outside existing party lines. 
Watson and Howard represented Southern Populism. They 
believed that no new party would be formed but that Populists 
and other bimetallists could form a united front against the finan-
cial policies advocated by the dominant leaders of both old parties. 
Howard carefully noted that Populists could not leave their party 
to join men who would be satisfied to return to the old parties 
after achieving silver coinage, but he declared his belief that Pop-
ulists would freely emphasize the money question. The sincere 
bimetallists could then work with the Populists. Watson also 
expressed both his unwillingness to sacrifice any principle and his 
readiness to cooperate against Cleveland's financial policies. 
Peffer provided the last position among those responding to the 
World. He wrote of his expectation that a new party would be 
organized, "but it will be built on a foundation deeper and broader 
than 'free silver' or 'bimetallism,' for those terms express nothing 
that reaches the core of the troubles which confront us." Free 
silver, he argued, would be useless if the prevailing system remained 
unchanged. Describing the miseries of depression America and the 
nature of corporate America, with the legal and extralegal force of 
the military and Pinkertons available to maintain the system and 
suppress the people, he scoffed at the suggestion that free silver 
would prove the salvation of the oppressed. "The new party," he 
declared, must be "founded on broad principles that will appeal 
to the public conscience, and its objects will be responsive to the 
people's wants. Anything short of this can only be preliminary 
to the work of organizing the great party that shall accomplish what 
we most need." Not free silver but that original Populist triad 
Peffer demanded: the destruction of the land monopoly, explained 
in its broadest sense; the abolition of the transportation monopolies 
through "public ownership and control of all means and facilities 
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for the general movement of persons and property from place to 
place"; the overthrow of the money power through the destruction 
of banks of issue, the abolition of interests and rent, and the govern-
ment issue of fiat paper money directly to the people.44 
Two other positions held by opponents of the gold standard were 
not represented in the World. The first of these was that of the 
Silver Democrats such as Bland and Bryan who rejected the sugges-
tion of leaving their party to achieve free silver and who trusted 
to their ability to reorganize Democracy on a silver basis. They 
wanted no formal fusion: all Populists and Silver Republicans 
were to enroll in the cause under the Democratic banner. Mid-road 
Populists such as McLallin and Park championed the final position. 
They differed little from Peffer, objecting primarily only to his 
declaration that a new party would be formed. McLallin praised 
Peffer, for example, for being the only one of the writers in the 
TV orld with "a comprehensive view of the evils or the needs of the 
hour." Apart from his belief that a new party would be organized, 
"we find little else in his letter with which we cannot fully agree." 
On the other hand, McLallin criticized Taubeneck for stupidity 
in politics and blindness in principles. These mid-roaders believed 
that Populists should adhere strictly to the Omaha Platform and 
remain within their party, that Populism and not a new party, 
however based, provided hope of political reform. Peffer himself, 
however, considered that his TV orld letter contained "not a single 
utterance ... at variance with the Omaha demands" and added, 
"I have never at any time faltered in my allegiance to the cause 
of populism."45 
Throughout the remainder of 1895 these various groups cam-
paigned to gain acceptance of their viewpoints. Sibley, Warner, 
and the silver men traveled and spoke extensively and through their 
various organizations helped to subsidize a great outpouring of 
silver literature. In September the leading silver groups began 
discussions designed to bring about a merger for a joint silver effort 
in 1896. Such Silver Populists as Weaver and Stewart often co-
operated in these activities. Weaver, for instance, traveled with 
44 New York World, March 24, 1895. 
45 Coletta, Bryan, pp. 96-97; Topeka Advocate, April 10, 1895; Dallas Morning 
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Sibley and Warner to Denver to boom the American Bimetallic 
party and even attempted to persuade recalcitrant Populists such 
as Davis Waite that the new party could be trusted. The silverites 
and Weaver had only mixed success, for Waite later told Donnelly, 
"Our populist dems [Democrats], whose populism never included 
anything but the free coinage of silver, are quite enthusiastic for 
the new party, but I think the populists proper will continue to 
stand on the Omaha platform." With even a closer view of Weaver's 
cooperation with the silver men, Byron commented that ·weaver 
was "ruthlessly intriguing to turn over the Populist organization in 
this state, and also that in the nation, to the monopolistic Sibley 
outfit. ... Weaver's view [is] that we should express ourselves as 
ready to unite with anything or anybody for silver."46 
The Silver Democrats also actively canvassed in 1895. They called 
special conventions in several states to agitate the currency question 
and to resolve for free silver. In June they held a national con-
vention in Memphis, attended by most prominent silver advocates. 
Although allegedly nonpartisan, the Memphis meeting was ar-
ranged, promoted, and controlled by Democrats. Much of the dis-
cussion centered upon the problem of keeping Democratic silver 
sentiment within the party and consequently also of attracting Pop-
ulists to the Democratic party for a silver campaign in 1896. In 
August, many of the same Democrats met in Washington to estab-
lish a silver organization within their party, the Bimetallic Dem-
ocratic National Committee. Declaring that the Democratic party 
was the traditional champion of bimetallism, they clearly revealed 
their intention to turn the silver movement into the Democratic 
party. Actually hostile to Populism, many of them favored a silver 
Democracy, for one reason, to undercut the People's party by en-
ticing Democratic-Populists back to the Democratic party.47 
Yet some Populist lambs were prepared to lie down with the 
Democratic lion. Butler, for one, attended the Memphis conven-
tion, described silver as more important than his party, and asserted 
46 Marian Silveus, "The Antecedents of the Campaign of 1896" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Wisconsin, 1932), pp. 13-15; Waite to Donnelly, April 22, 1895, 
Donnelly Papers; Non-Conformist, June 27, 1895; Byron to Lloyd, May 5, 1895, 
Lloyd Papers; Donnelly to Waite, August 28, 1895, Waite Papers. 
47 Hollingsworth, Whirligig of Politics, pp. 35-41; Washington Post, August 
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Silver Panacea 221 
his willingness "to sacrifice for the time all other policies of the 
Populist platform." Harry Skinner, a North Carolina Populist 
elected to Congress on a fusion ticket that Butler had helped 
arrange, also hoped that the convention would lead to a fusion 
of all silver forces in 1896. His candidate for president on such a 
ticket, he declared, was William Jennings Bryan. On the other 
hand, some Populists feared the increasing activity of the Silver 
Democrats as a threat to their party. Even Taubeneck began 
slowly to realize the possible results of his efforts to make silver the 
only issue for Populists. He attended the Illinois Silver Democratic 
Convention, for example, and protested that "the Democrats are 
trying to steal our platform, and I am here to object. The People's 
Party is the only simon-pure silver party."48 But by 1895, free silver 
as a political issue had a dynamic all its own and no one could 
control it. Taubeneck forgot his fears and continued to advocate 
a silver-only Populism. 
The genuine Populists also recognized the drift of events, but 
were not as complacent. One anti-fusion editor argued that "the 
thing for the Populist press to do now and henceforth, as it appears 
to me, is to gradually belittle silver from its unduly imagined 
dimensions of the national panacea . . . ; this course would tend 
to keep our voters from following the band-wagon of the free-silver 
fakirs." Such Populists ridiculed Taubeneck's claim that he only 
played practical politics by demanding a one-plank platform. Truly 
practical politics would suggest either emphasizing the distinctive 
features of Populism rather than that one issue held in common 
with other political groups, in order to maintain the party as a 
separate organization; or emphasizing substantive reforms or a 
general but significant demand as Peffer had suggested, to make 
a worthwhile contribution to the reformation of society should the 
party lose its independent identity in a larger movement. The 
policy of the Silver Populists, however, seemed to be that of stoop-
ing to be conquered. If an old party adopted a silver platform, 
after the Populists declared silver all important, the People's party 
48 Southern Mercury, June 27, 1895; Woodward, Origins of the New South, p. 
282; Harry Skinner to Bryan, June 10, 1895, Bryan Papers; J. U. Devine to 
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would be doomed, either because it would have to consent to being 
subsumed in the larger organization, or because its adherents would 
naturally vote with the party most likely to be able to put that 
"essential" reform into practice. But since silver actually counted 
for little in Populism and represented no necessary part of the new 
order the Populists had promised, the party would have died with-
out just reason or without adding anything to American political 
life-even if free silver were achieved. Thus, the course of the 
Silver Populists, argued the loyal Populists, was a suicidal move 
without practical purpose.49 
Jerry Simpson attempted to ridicule those Populists unwilling to 
consent to a reduction of Populism to silver. "Now if I was starving 
for a square meal and some one should offer me a crust of bread 
I would deserve to die if I did not take it. So it is with the radical 
ones." The "radical ones," however, saw matters differently. They 
argued that if a crust of bread was all that they received, they 
would soon starve to death anyway-and those with whom Simpson 
proposed to fuse wanted to order no more from the Populist menu 
than the one silver crust of bread. Some such as McLallin even 
believed that the crust offered so generously by the enemies of 
Populism was poisoned: silver, he argued, "unaccompanied by 
other reforms which are more essential in themselves, would result 
in injury rather than benefit."50 Such Populists were determined 
to hold out for the whole square meal, and they believed that it 
would be served soon after the people tired of begging for the thin 
crust and turned to demand their rights through Populism. 
Senator Peffer was as active as any Populist in the defense of 
original Populism during 1895, campaigning once again extensively 
throughout the country. As McLallin anticipated, he had to 
explain his prediction of a new party. He clearly had not meant, 
Peffer answered, that he favored the creation of a silver-only party. 
Indeed, he was adamant that Populists should avoid the new silver 
party and he warned Dunning against the Watchman's warm wel-
come for it. Nor did he favor the fusion of silver forces in 1896. 
49 Thomas F. Byron to Lloyd, May 5, 1895, Lloyd Papers; Topeka Advocate, 
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Rather, he foresaw that eventually there would be a political re-
alignment from which Populists would emerge as dominant in the 
principal party, which might have a new name for the sake o( 
political sensibilities but which would be formed about Populism. 
He expected and would accept no major revision of Omaha Pop-
ulism. "Our doctrines reach the disease from which the country 
suffers; our declarations are responsive to the people's needs. Let 
us stand by them, teach them, and vote them." He would accept, 
Peffer repeated, an actual union of all political elements sincerely 
in favor of reform-Populists, Socialists, and Prohibitionists surely, 
plus those Republicans and Democrats who had heretofore resisted 
Populism because of the strength of partisan ties rather than a 
philosophical aversion-such as had happened when similar ele-
ments had combined to form the People's party itself; but he 
strongly opposed a fusion of distinct organizations, each with its 
own prejudices and incompatible traditions, and especially on the 
sole basis of so insubstantial an issue as free silver. If some mid-road 
Populists rejected the possibility that the nation's genuine reform 
forces would have to coalesce once again into another party as had 
happened so often before, they nevertheless were pleased to have 
Peffer speak for them.51 
Throughout the spring and summer Peffer toured the South and 
Midwest, speaking at Populist camp meetings, county fairs, chau-
tauquas, and labor assemblies. Frequently he was billed together 
with Governor Waite, and at least once in Texas Weaver and Peffer 
appeared before the same audience. Weaver recommended sub-
stantial modification of the Omaha Platform, including the total 
omission of the subtreasury plank, which he declared "should never 
have been put in the platform at first." In contrast, Peffer advocated 
strict adherence to Omaha Populism and predicted success for 
faithful Populists in the future. Moreover, Peffer pointedly warned 
Populists against trusting Weaver's proposed allies, the Silver 
Democrats. Such politicians, Peffer noted, were precisely the men 
the original Populists had debated in 1891 from the same platform, 
and they still placed party above both principle and people; reform 
51 Non-Conformist, September 19, 1895; Topeka Advocate, August 14, Septem-
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could come about only by getting into the middle of the road.52 
Peffer explained the extent of his silver commitment to a Kansas 
City reporter in May. Silver, the senator contended, was only a 
temporary demand, necessary to redeem those government bonds 
which required payment in coin. Thorough Populists opposed 
silver as much as gold, for they denied the intrinsic value theory 
and the metallic basis of money altogether; free silver was acceptable 
only as a preliminary step toward an inflationary economy. He 
refused to comment on Coin's Financial School, the silver bible of 
Bryan and other bimetallists, but left the reporter with the im-
pression that he considered it a superficial and inadequate account 
of financial problems. The journalist also recorded that Peffer 
"declares for the same old fiat system of paper currency upon which 
the Populist party was born." The editor headlined the story, 
"Opposed to Silver /Populists Are Not in Favor of the White 
MetaljPeffer Virtually Admits It."53 
Such opaque reporting combined with either the partisan or the 
financial bias of much of the press often left the actual position of 
many Populists unclear.54 In late summer, Peffer was reported first 
to have told a New York audience that silver no longer attracted 
attention in the West; to have told Kansans that he opposed free 
silver and favored a currency based only on land; to have announced 
his withdrawal from the People's party and the formation of a new 
party of his own. Peffer was kept busy denying all such absurd 
statements, attributing them to the partisan press, which he re-
garded as unreliable whenever reporting Populist opinions. Other 
Populists understood the situation. A Minneapolis Populist de-
scribed the Associated Press stories of Peffer's conversions as "inven-
tions of our diabolical enemies. They are equal to anything. The 
52 Dallas Morning News, August 6, 8, 9, 1895; Non-Conformist, August 15, 
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safe rule is not to believe a word they say." The Non-Conformist 
commented more calmly that "press dispatches concerning Populists 
must always be verified before they can be believed." 5G 
Precisely because of this necessity to verify stories carried by the 
major news services, the NRPA attempted to establish a Populist 
news agency, centered in Kansas City. George C. Ward, a Kansas 
City mid-roader, was an able and popular writer for the "patent 
sides" that the Populists provided for their local newspapers. In 
September he wrote a long article which placed Peffer in the Pop-
ulistic perspective. The various news stories had distressed Ward 
greatly, he wrote, for Peffer was "the leading exponent and advocate 
of populism and a commanding figure in the political arena." 
Ward therefore corresponded with the senator to investigate the 
reports of his apostasy. Peffer replied, "I am a Populist and approve 
the Omaha platform in its entirety, without mental reservation." 
The senator recited the planks of the platform as his own position, 
but provided a system of government banks as the "some better 
system" allowed to be substituted for the subtreasury plan, but 
designed to accomplish the same end of distributing money directly 
to the people at low interest rates. Ward gladly reported to his 
readers that "there is nothing uncertain or vacillating" about Peffer 
and urged them to support "the man who led the revolt ... and 
first gave to populist principles a prominent position in national 
politics. "56 
Before Congress convened again in December, Peffer made two 
more forceful defenses of unconditional Populism. In early Octo-
ber, he took control of the Advocate Publishing Company and 
announced that, though McLallin would remain as active editor, 
he would henceforth direct the paper's editorial policy. He intended 
to include more miscellaneous matter, especially dealing with ag-
riculture, but he would not change McLallin's middle-of-the-road 
political position. "In politics," Peffer declared, "the Advocate will 
be a broad-gauged Populist paper. Populism means a great deal 
more now-more than ever before," he added: this was no reduction 
of issues. Although he again expressed his willingness to cooperate 
with sincere reformers he reaffirmed his unalterable opposition to 
55 Non-Conformist, August 5, 22, September 12, 1895. 
56 Kansas City Star, February 22, 1895; Topeka Advocate, September 18, 1895. 
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surrendering the isms of Omaha and to accepting free silver as a 
panacea. Moreover, he would continue to direct the Advocate 
against fusion and the dictation of party managers. The Advocate, 
he wrote, would oppose "any and every sort of dickering or trading 
with enemies. . . . If the populist party would win and retain 
the respect of the people it must respect itself. What it denounces 
in other parties it must not tolerate within itself."57 
Shortly after this announcement, Senator Stewart argued in his 
Washington paper, The Silver Knight, that Populists should discard 
all their reform demands except silver in order to create a coalition 
against the gold standard advocates. Any other planks might drive 
away silverites, Stewart contended. J. H. Turner, secretary of the 
Populist National Committee and a leading proponent of single-
plank Populism, asked Peffer for his opinion of Stewart's editorial. 
Peffer replied in a widely reprinted letter, saying that he had no 
objection to "a union of the friends of monetary reform under the 
banner of the Populist party," but that he would never agree to 
an abridgement of Populist doctrine. Peffer conceded the Omaha 
Platform was not perfect, but he gave no encouragement to Turner 
or Stewart for he stood by his former position. Over the sub-
treasury and government ownership of railroads, in particular, re-
formers disagreed, Peffer wrote; but Populists believed in the 
principles behind those propositions and required the incorporation 
of those principles in the "some better system" allowed, such as his 
own proposal for a government banking system. Peffer, then, was 
willing to revise the Omaha Platform, but the Populist demands 
would have to be fully covered; indeed, he felt that Populism could 
not restrict its creed, for new subjects had developed since 1892 
that the party should consider, including government by injunction, 
executive interference with Congress, the illegitimate use of federal 
troops to suppress labor strikes, the need to establish an income tax 
over the Supreme Court's obstructionism, and many more issues. 
Thus any acceptable revision of the Omaha demands would have to 
be on the basis of broad, general, and easily applicable principles, 
as Peffer had repeatedly maintained before, and not on one narrow 
and self-conclusive demand like free silver. Peffer then suggested 
57 Topeka Advocate, October 9, 1895. 
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that "the one great, basic principle underlying the movement which 
is culminating in the formation and growth of the Populist party 
is the equality of human rights-first, to the rights of the people as 
individual persons, and second, to the rights, powers, and duties 
of the people as a whole, when organized in communities, states, 
and nations." Such a general principle applied to the problems of 
the government, the economy, and the society at large would 
satisfy Peffer and the loyal Populists who followed him. To such 
a Populist vision he urged reformers to dedicate themselves, and 
he scorned the suggestion to make concessions and compromises 
to attract support from those committed only to the comparatively 
ignoble cause of free silver coinage.58 
Despite Peffer's pronouncements, the silver issue continued to 
dominate political discussion when the Fifty-fourth Congress con-
vened in December 1895. The 1894 election reversal left no party 
with a majority in the Senate, and six Populists held the balance 
of power. Silver Republicans Fred Dubois and Henry Teller were 
reported willing to organize the Senate on silver rather than partisan 
lines. Immediately Butler, Stewart, and Allen professed their 
readiness to combine with other silverites, while Peffer forlornly 
argued that the Populists should not align themselves with members 
of the old parties. The Populist caucus voted against Peffer's 
position and drew up a call inviting all alleged bimetallists in the 
Senate to a meeting to discuss organizing the Senate on silver lines. 
Committed to act with his fellow Populists, Peffer signed his name 
to the call, but insisted upon placing it last upon the document 
rather than first as usual.59 
The possibility that elements favoring silver might unite to 
organize the Senate faded rapidly. Even Dubois declared that one 
thing he was "certain of, and that is neither party will enter into 
any combination with the Populists." In fact, Dubois suggested that 
perhaps Republicans and Democrats could come to an understand-
ing on the Senate offices and patronage in order to eliminate Pop-
ulist influence. Other indications of silverite antipathy to Populism 
came from a Washington Post interview with an Idaho silver advo-
58 Ibid., October 30, 1895. 
59 Washington Post, October 13, 16, November 16, 1895; Congressional Record, 
54th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 28, pp. 421-25. 
228 POPULISM and POLITICS 
cate. "Here in the East," he asserted, "you seem to think that we 
away out West, especially in the free silver states, all look to 
Populism as a savior, a last resort. Nothing of the sort. We indorse 
the free silver plank in the Populist party, but regard [Populism] 
... as empty theory, and hollow, dreamy Utopianism." Peffer was 
not disappointed with such reports. "As a matter of fact," he re-
marked, "the very thing I want to see, as a Populist, is a combina-
tion of the Democrats and the Republicans in the organization of 
the Senate. That will enable us to tell our people again, as we 
have told them in the past, that the two old parties are practically 
one."6o 
The silver meeting proved a failure. Of the fifty-two senators 
invited only four attended: the Democrat Benjamin Tillman and 
Silver Republicans Teller, Jeter Pritchard, and Lee Mantle. The 
Republicans simply indicated their refusal to break party lines 
and left at once. Tillman was only slightly more friendly and no 
more prepared to leave his party to act with the Populists. Peffer 
noted after the meeting that party ties were too strong to permit 
a silver caucus, but Allen maintained that something might yet 
come of this "preliminary meeting." And, indeed, in their action 
the Populists had finally agreed to come down to silver and work 
with members of the old parties on silver alone, without regard 
to party identity. But the Populist offer to cooperate outside party 
lines was not enough: surrender would have to be unconditional.61 
For like the Alliance Democrats in the Fifty-second Congress, the 
silver men refused to place principles before party. The Repub-
licans organized the Senate when the Populists would not vote on 
the issue at all, except for Kyle who sided with the Democrats. 
Following the vote, silverites of both parties gave their answer to 
Populism. Democratic Senator Isham Harris condemned the Pop-
ulists for their abstention and asserted that he was as much an 
advocate of free silver as any Populist but that he would never 
break party lines to achieve it. Senator Dubois then declared that 
although the Silver Republicans favored bimetallism, they did not 
endorse an irredeemable currency as espoused by Peffer or the 
other Populist principles on land, money, and transportation. 
60 Washington Post, November 4, 12, 16, 1895. 
61 Non-Conformist, December 5, 1895; Washington Post, December 3, 1895. 
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Silver Republicans, he concluded, simply were not in sympathy 
with Populism and would never cooperate to advance any Populist 
proposal. Even on silver the two groups disagreed, for Republicans 
accepted it as basic money while the official Populist position ac-
corded only expediency to silver and rejected the notion of ultimate 
redemption.62 
Outside Congress too, as the election year of 1896 began, silver 
advocates had little use for Populists except for their votes, as 
Peffer caustically remarked. In Kansas, for instance, both old parties 
enthusiastically supported silver and yet recoiled from all other 
Populist reform proposals. Silver Republicans reacted bitterly to 
any suggestion that free silver was a Populist position and hastened 
to draw a definite line between themselves and the despised calamity 
howlers. Free silver was a reform to be accomplished within the 
Republican party. Only a few Silver Republicans threatened to 
bolt the party if it repudiated their position, and even these could 
not reconcile themselves to the "minor questions" of Populism.63 
The silver craze affected Kansas Democrats perhaps even more 
than it did Republicans, yet they too were determined to stay 
within their party in advocating bimetallism, especially after silver 
men regained control of the party's state organization. The Fifth 
Congressional District's Democrats, heretofore dominated by stal-
warts, illustrated this determination in their 1895 convention. 
They announced their support for free silver, demanded the re-
organization of their party on a bimetallic basis, and asked for a 
state party conference to insure that Silver Democrats need not 
abandon their party. Democratic newspapers which had supported 
the Populist party in 1894 because of its silver advocacy now 
devoted themselves to silverplating the Democracy so that such a 
course would not be necessary in 1896. Their editors began by 
denying that Cleveland represented the party and promising the 
nomination of Silver Democrats only. Hence, there would be no 
need for a new silver party nor for a further dalliance with a Silver 
62 Congressional Record, 54th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 28, pp. 421-29, 906-8; Wash-
ington Post, January 24, 1896. 
63 A. L. Sponsler to P. H. Coney, May 20, August 8, 1895; William P. Hackney 
to Coney, March 2, 1895, Coney to William H. ("Coin") Harvey, August 9, 1895, 
Coney to C. V. Eskridge, August 10, 1895, J. W. Ady to Coney, February 8, 1895, 
Coney Papers. 
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Populism because true Democracy was a silver party. Besides, 
Populism had "too many side issues for us to grapple with." 64 
Democratic leaders scrambled onto the silver bandwagon. John 
Martin attempted to convince the party's officeholders, who largely 
owed their appointments to him, to repudiate Cleveland and follow 
him into the silver camp. After his senatorial term expired in 1895, 
he announced his candidacy for Peffer's Senate seat in 1897 and 
made clear his intention to create a silver Democratic party, "with 
a Populist annex." Even more significant in illustrating the rela-
tionship of Silver Democrats to Populism was the politician who 
became the state committeeman of the Bimetallic Democratic Na-
tional Committee, the group Bryan accorded the most honor for 
transforming the party in 1895 and 1896: David Overmeyer. 
Inveterate foe of Populism, a seconder of Cleveland's 1892 nomina-
tion, opponent of active government, collaborator with Republicans, 
Overmeyer personified the Democratic antithesis of Populism.65 
To restrict Populism to silver in an effort to gain such converts 
was to deny the very essence of the original movement; to agree 
to fuse with such politicians or to enter into their Democratic 
party for the sole purpose of achieving silver coinage would be 
to make of suicide a burlesque. Had Populism deteriorated so 
much since its days of pride and hope? 
Both friends and enemies of Populism recognized the transforma-
tion of the movement, though they disagreed as to its nature and 
import. The severe changes wrought by the failure to convert the 
South and by the fusion and related policies of the party leadership 
from 1892 to 1894 were only accelerated by the increasing emphasis 
upon silver as a panacea. Taubeneck's determination to narrow the 
Populist program to silver found expression among Kansas Populists 
as well. State Senator Michael Senn, for instance, suggested that 
Populism could attract wider support by forgoing its comprehensive 
reform proposals to concentrate upon the single issue of free silver. 
The Lyndon People's Herald well symbolized the new Populism. 
Once a staunch organ for Populist radicalism, the People's Herald 
came under new editorial management in 1895. Rejecting the fervor 
64 Marshall County Democrat (Marysville), February 1, March 1, 8, May 17, 
July 5, September 20, 1895. 
65 Washington Post, November 13, 1895; Non-Conformist, April 18, 1895; 
Bryan, First Battle, pp. 162·63. 
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and goals of the early Populists, the new editor promptly renounced 
any intention "to set the world on fire" and advocated stressing 
free silver as "the fundamental issue" with all other Populist 
demands relegated to only "minor consideration." The People's 
Herald was no calamity howler, and even in the continuing de-
pression it recommended Populist support for candidates it proudly 
described as a farmer "without a cent of debt whatsoever," a doctor 
who "is now enjoying a lucrative practice," another "successful and 
well-to-do farmer," and "a man of shrewd, keen and splendid 
business ability."66 
There remained of course some original Populists who continued 
to reject the demand for Silver Populism and its accompanying 
predilection for fusion. These came predominantly from the dwin-
dling number of Populists of Republican antecedents. Percy 
Daniels provided a comprehensive arraignment of the entire drift 
of the People's party in a public letter in July 1895. "The free 
coinage of silver will not right the wrongs of a plundered people," 
he declared; the party should not avoid the more vital issues it 
had promised to settle and which still demanded attention. Fusion 
he denounced as self-defeating, unprincipled, and unfurling "the 
banner of Populism that bears the hopes of the oppressed from sea 
to sea, on the wormy and crumbling stump of the Democratic flag-
ship." Those Populists who promoted such a policy deserved cen-
sure for adopting "the reprehensible practices of the old parties,-
bad habits which they promised to abandon when they joined the 
reformers. The party has halted to trade for votes when they should 
have pushed ahead on their march. In their success they have 
shown some of the same greed for spoils of office that they have 
so justly condemned in their adversaries." The 1894 Populist 
defeat, Daniels averred, had been a deserved repudiation of Pop-
ulist leaders, not a condemnation of Populist principles. The party 
had been organized to purify political life, and Populists would 
"not deserve success until their leaders show they have resumed 
their allegiance to this purpose, and are governed by the same 
spirit of uprightness and candor as inspires the men in the ranks." 
66 Topeka Advocate, December 12, 1894; 0. Gene Clanton, Kansas Populism: 
Ideas and Men (Lawrence, 1969), pp. 182-83. Clanton provides a good discussion 
of Populist "metamorphosis" but one that leaves the inaccurate impression that 
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The faithful Populists, he concluded, must reform their own party 
and rebuke those who had strayed from the straight path.67 
Those Populists who agreed with Daniels were few indeed. As in 
the early days, the unconditional radical found expression in the 
Farmers' Alliance. ·with Willits and Otis as state officers, the 
Alliance condemned those who sought to discard its "trinity of 
principles" for silver alone. The anti-fusionist Kansas Populist 
League, composed largely of the same men, resolved in September 
1895 that it opposed the stress on silver and stood by the entire 
Omaha Platform. But the Kansas Reform Press Association repre-
sented the more popular Populist position when it resolved in the 
same month to make free silver thenceforth the major political 
issue in Populist papers. The editors then discontinued their 
association with the Populist readyprint firm because its material, 
written by Taubeneck's mid-road adversary Morgan, "does not make 
the free silver idea prominent enough."68 
Republicans delighted in pointing out the metamorphosis of 
Kansas Populists. After local Populists named six Democrats to 
their eight-place county ticket in 1895, the Girard Press commented 
that "the 'middle of the road' Populist seems to have departed 
from Crawford county. He was very vociferous a few years ago, 
but now calmly and smilingly wears the Democratic yoke." The 
Populist Girard Western Herald could only lamely reply that at 
least the candidates were not Republicans. Another editor took 
special aim at those Populists who were attempting to promote 
fusion on the basis of silver. "There is nothing of the old Alliance 
Puritan cry for reform in these men," observed William Allen 
White. "Has not the whole fabric of the reform party, its heroes, 
its aspirations, its ambitions, its lofty desires fallen among thieves 
on the Jerico road?" he asked. "Where is the Alliance man with the 
courage to deny that his party that was going to reform the world 
has made a 'deal' that would have been hissed out of the first 
farmers convention in the year of our Lord 1890?"69 
To this there was no reply, and the Populists awaited 1896. 
67 Girard Western Herald, August 14, 1895. 
68 Topeka Advocate, February 6, October 2, 1895: Kansas City Gazette, Feb-
ruary 23, 1895; Topeka Daily Capital, September 18, 1895. 
69 Girard Western Herald, September 20, 1895; Clanton, Kansas Populism, 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Reaping the Whirlwind 
As THE PoPULISTS prepared for the election of 1896, the first matter 
they had to consider was the place and date of the national con-
vention. While such decisions of the old parties were based on 
financial promises and geographical location, that of the People's 
party held deep significance for the direction the party would take 
in the campaign, which both the Silver and the Omaha Populists 
recognized. As was clear from past experiences in state politics, a 
Populist convention held before either the Democrats or Repub-
licans met would encourage an independent ticket or else cause 
any fusion to be on Populist conditions and candidates; a conven-
tion after those of the old parties would facilitate fusion on a 
silver candidate already selected or promote a silver-only campaign, 
as the party would be influenced by silver accessions from the old 
parties which rejected bimetallism. Middle-of-the-road Populist 
papers such as Peffer's Advocate, the Chicago Express, and the 
Dallas Southern Mercury all came out in October 1895 for an 
early convention. The Express explained that "an early convention 
will head off and give a quietus to the movements of the 'new silver 
party,' and will force into line or out of the party those ambitious 
populists who advocate leaving the middle of the road." Further-
more, an early convention would still the fears "that our party 
machinery is being manipulated in the interests of the enemy." 
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Radical Populists such as Davis Waite and Henry L. Loucks 
agreed that the convention should be held "the sooner the better" 
in order to prevent Silver Populists from determining the Populist 
course, certainly before the old parties met and perhaps even in 
late 1895.1 
For opposite reasons, Silver Populists such as James Weaver, 
Herman Taubeneck, and Marion Butler favored a late convention. 
They believed that the Republican party would adopt a gold plat-
form and that the Cleveland administration would control the 
Democratic convention, or at least prevent a strong silver man 
from receiving the presidential nomination because of the con-
vention rule requiring a two-thirds vote to nominate. Nevertheless, 
to proceed even on that basis meant that they were willing to make 
the campaign on silver rather than Omaha Populism and were 
prepared to accept silverite influence upon the People's party. 
Those who argued for a late convention already had surrendered 
to silver as a panacea, either financial or political. 
The Silver Populists worked closely with other silver advocates 
to force the People's party to adopt that course. The various silver 
groups had already scheduled a conference for Washington on 
January 22, 1896, to prepare for the campaign, and they urged the 
Populists to meet with them and agree to joint action and a late 
convention. Speaking for the Silver Democrats, William Jennings 
Bryan also pressed the Populists to delay their convention in order 
to assure a fusion silver campaign. Butler answered Bryan that 
he hoped to secure a fusion of all silver elements, and together 
with William M. Stewart he corresponded with the silverites toward 
that end. Weaver expressed his pleasure that Bryan's suggestions 
were "exactly in accord with the plan which Mr. Taubeneck and 
myself have been working to for some months past." The next 
step, as Stewart declared, was to have the Populist National Com-
mittee accept the plan at its meeting in St. Louis on January 17. 
The Silver Populists were determined, Weaver wrote privately, to 
achieve this objective. "We have had quite enough middle of the 
road nonsense, and some of us at least think it about time for the 
1 Topeka Advocate, October 30, 1895; Southern Mercury (Dallas), October 10, 
1895; Henry L. Loucks to Davis Waite, September 20, 1895, Waite Papers. 
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exhibition of a little synthetic force if we would accomplish any 
good purpose."2 
The Washington Populists joined in this decision. Of the thirteen 
congressmen in the Populist caucus, eleven favored creating an 
alliance with the Silver Democrats for the 1896 campaign and 
consequently wanted a late convention. Only Peffer and Howard 
objected, arguing that such an arrangement with those essentially 
hostile to the spirit and greater demands of Populism would cause 
the destruction of their party and the suppression of more important 
issues and principles. Eventually Peffer agreed to sign his name to 
the caucus message advising a late convention, but he refused to 
place his name first on the document and glumly declared his 
belief that the People's party would soon be submerged into the 
Democratic party. Weaver's errand to Washington and his man-
ifesto of the previous year, Peffer commented ruefully, had proved 
fruitful.3 
At St. Louis the opposition to the schemes of the Silver Populists 
was just as ineffectual. Neither Washburn nor Lloyd attended, 
and Donnelly no longer opposed Taubeneck, but expressed his 
readiness to trim the Omaha Platform to emphasize silver. G. C. 
Clemens presented the most complete critique of the policy of 
the Silver Populists. Declaring that, "with the pertinacity of sordid 
men seeking selfish ends," Taubeneck and silver leaders had plotted 
for over a year to subvert the People's party, Clemens appealed to 
true Populists to "at once assert their supremacy over their party 
machine." A single-issue, fusion silver campaign, Clemens argued, 
would delay or destroy the triumph of the Omaha demands. 
These traitors to the holy cause of the people would have us abandon, as 
they have already abandoned, every aim of our party, in order that we 
may secure the accession of old party politicians, who, we are coolly in-
formed, are too ignorant or too capitalistic even to endure the mention of 
all our other reform demands. . . . About all these things we are to be 
2 W. J. Bryan to Waite, December 2, 1895, Waite Papers; Marion Butler to 
Bryan, January 8, 1896, and J. B. Weaver to Bryan, December 31, 1895, January 
3, 1896, Bryan Papers; W. M. Stewart to Ignatius Donnelly, December 20, 1895, 
Stewart to H. E. Taubeneck, December 12, 16, 1895, Stewart to M. C. Rankin, 
December 26, 1895, Stewart and Butler to Joseph C. Sibley, January 6, 1896, 
Stewart Papers. 
3 Washington Post, January 18, 1896; Chicago Tribune, June 25, 1899. 
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silent, lest we hurt the feelings or shock the barbaric prejudices of our 
proposed allies. And what mighty achievement is to justify this sacrifice 
of principle? ... 
We can put silver back where it was in 1873, but we cannot put the 
world back there. And, in the world of today, with its gigantic trusts and 
combinations-none of which our proposed allies permit us to touch-
would free silver restore the conditions of twenty-three years ago? What 
folly to even dream! Yet to demonstrate this folly and make a few men 
rich, we are to give up agitation of our really important principles .... 
And why are we to do this wicked thing? Because . . . "The people 
are not ready for more radical reforms; and they are ready for free silver." 
Perhaps they are readier still for no reform at all, and so we had better 
all unite with the Republican party which seeks to prevent all change .... 
What shall we do? The crisis is here. We are at the parting of the 
ways .... We are asked to turn back into the Valley of Desolation where 
bleach the bones of other parties which, tempted by sorid ambition, have 
been false to the hope they had inspired. Shall we submit and turn back? 
or rebel and push on?4 
Clemens's plea fell on deaf ears. The Populists at St. Louis in 
1896 were not those original Populists, filled with a revolutionary 
zeal to remake the world, ready to respond to the pentecostal ap-
peals of such men as Clemens, Peffer, Willits, and Otis, and dis-
dainful of suggestions that compromises might be the practical 
policy. Taubeneck spoke at the meeting of the necessity for a "new 
departure" in Populism, and the new Populists who listened were 
either those such as Taubeneck himself, who had long since for-
gotten why he had been named national chairman at the Cincinnati 
Conference in 1891, or those such as Thomas Patterson, who was 
participating in his first national Populist meeting. Patterson, 
editor of the Denver Rocky Mountain News} had been a prominent 
Democrat but turned Populist in 1893 on the sole basis of free 
silver. The Taubenecks and Pattersons were agreed that all isms 
should be dropped in favor of silver and that those Populists who 
objected-those true Populists to whom Clemens appealed-should 
be purged and forced "into the society of red anarchists and self-
satisfied communists."5 
Taubeneck, Weaver, and Butler had full control of the National 
4 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 17, 1896; Washington Post, January 16, 
1896; Gaspar C. Clemens, An Appeal to True Populists (Topeka, Kans., 1896). 
5 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 16, 18, 19, 1896. 
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Committee. They had taken advantage of the poverty of most 
committee members and secured the proxies of those unable to 
attend, giving them fifty-one of the eighty-seven total votes. The 
compliant committee then followed their script exactly. It sched-
uled the party's convention after the dates already selected by the 
old parties and postponed a decision on the precise day until party 
leaders could meet with silverites at their Washington conference. 
It also obediently named Weaver, Butler, Patterson, and like-minded 
Populists to represent the party in those discussions. Finally, the 
committee adopted an astounding resolution for an allegedly in-
dependent political party with distinct principles. It urged all 
those favoring financial reform, "but who are not ready to become 
members of our organization," to hold a separate convention at 
the same time and place that the Populists would choose so that 
there could be a fusion on candidates. Taubeneck even hoped 
that the conventions themselves would meet together to name 
their candidates on a single platform. One prominent Silver Pop-
ulist surveyed these actions and announced, "The one and vitally 
important thing we have done here is the determination arrived 
at to join forces with the silverites and ignore all side issues of 
whatever nature."s 
So determined, the Silver Populists then left for Washington to 
help shape the silverites into a group with which they could 
combine in July. But the initiative the Populists had cherished 
as the vanguard of reform in the early 1890s was now completely 
gone, and the Silver Populists maneuvered into a rather subservient 
cooperation with the nonpartisan silver men. After consultation, 
both groups called their national conventions to meet on July 22, 
1896, in St. Louis. Subsequently Stewart announced in his Silver 
Knight that union of all those who favored free silver was now 
assured. Similarly pleased, Taubeneck termed the Washington 
silver meeting "a grand success."7 
6 Paul Van Dervoort to Waite, January 20, 1896, Ralph Beaumont to Waite, 
.January 19, 1896, E. I. Burdick to Waite, .January 31, 1896, Waite Papers; St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, January 16-20, 1896; American Non-Conformist (Indi-
anapolis), .January 23, 1896; Southern Mercury, January 30, 1896. See also 
Marion Butler to J. J. Mills, January 4, 1896, a form letter request for proxies, 
providing a blank form to return. Butler Papers. 
7 People's Party Paper (Atlanta), February 7, 1896; Washington Post, January 
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The measure of the change m Populism was evident in the 
comparatively mild protest against the actions of the Silver Pop-
ulists in St. Louis and Washington. Those frustrated in their 
efforts at St. Louis to obtain an early convention and so preserve 
the independence of the party privately lamented afterwards that 
"the silver element ran things and we are to have our convention 
after the others have had theirs. We are to modify our principles 
so as not to hurt the sensitive feelings of the dissatisfied of the 
two old parties." Frequently they condemned as well the dictation 
of the Silver Populists and their manipulation of proxies. "As the 
situation is now," one wrote, "the so-called practical politician is 
in control. And principles are to be simply a foot ball to [be] tossed 
and kicked all about." From his experience, the old allianceman 
concluded, "I think I am too blunt for a politician and am 
simply an agitator." Peffer's Advocate, still opposed to the reduc-
tion of the Omaha Platform, reproved Taubeneck and the National 
Committee: "To be the successful head of a great party requires 
more ability than is necessary to fix up telegrams appointing 
proxies to suit the chairman, and more candor and truthfulness 
than has been exhibited by the chairman for the past two years. 
And it does not require any great ability or skill for a committee 
to wait and see what some other party is going to do." But the 
Advocate believed the committee had merely made an error in 
judgment and that Populists could only wait and hope for the best.8 
Among major Populist newspapers, in fact, only the Southern 
Mercury stridently denounced the Silver Populists for deliberately 
planning to submerge Populism into the silver movement. Tau-
beneck and Patterson bore the brunt of the attack, but following 
the St. Louis meeting the Mercury wanted the whole committee 
revamped. Harry Tracy and Milton Park, publisher and editor 
of the Dallas newspaper, did not blame the silverites for intriguing 
with Populist leaders, "because that faction is composed of old 
party politicians who naturally cling to old party methods." They 
had a sharply different view, however, of Populists who favored 
22, 23, 1896; Stanley L. Jones, The Presidential Election of 1896 (Madison, 
Wis., 1964), p. 85; Silver Knight-National Watchman, January 30, 1896; H. E. 
Taubeneck to Ignatius Donnelly, February 18, 1896, Donnelly Papers. 
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the same course. "As a reform party, seeking to deal honestly by 
the people and eradicate the abuses, corruption and rottenness that 
festers in the government, a result of old party rule, the people's 
party must pursue an open, honest course with the people, or it 
will fail in accomplishing the reforms it champions." Some local 
mid-road papers such as the Kansas Agitator similarly believed that 
the Populist politicians had betrayed Populism through their ar-
rangements with the silver men, who, the Agitator pointed out, 
had declared their intention to nominate a silver candidate only 
if neither old party did so. "The leaders of this [Bimetallic] league 
have no sympathy with the demands of the Omaha platform ... 
and the only use they have for our party is to pull their chestnuts 
out of the fire."9 
The annual meeting of the NRPA in Dallas on February 22, 1896, 
vividly revealed how completely the Silver Populists had succeeded. 
Exactly one year earlier, the editors had held a tumultuous session, 
denouncing Taubeneck and his schemes, demanding his resignation, 
and appointing a committee to investigate him and his fellow 
one-plank Populists in Congress and on the National Committee. 
In 1896 Taubeneck attended the editorial meeting, expressed his 
preference for a silver campaign and fusion with other silver 
groups, and encountered no opposition. Pleasantries rather than 
diatribes and newspaper problems more than politics characterized 
the session. Taubeneck later wrote Donnelly of his success. "The 
Reform Press Association did good work," the chairman related. 
"Mr. Park and Tracey [sic] feel somewhat disappointed in not 
having things their way, but the sentiment for a union of forces 
was so strong that they could not stem the tide."lo 
While the mid-road papers were generally silent or moderate, 
moreover, the single-plank papers remained on the offensive. Per-
haps most effective was Stewart's own Silver Knight, which he 
combined with the National Watchman after buying out Dunning 
in late 1895. Dunning himself continued to advocate Silver Pop-
ulism in a weekly column published in many Populist papers. Just 
as vigorously, Dunning still denounced "socialists" and warned of 
9 Southern Mercury, January 30, 1896; Kansas Agitator (Garnett), January 
24, 1896. 
10 Dallas Morning News, February 21-24, 1896; Taubeneck to Donnelly, 
February 29, 1896, Donnelly Papers. 
240 POPULISM and POLITICS 
the "secret organization which they have inside our party" which 
might gain control of the convention and insist on issues other 
than silver! Immediately after the National Committee meeting 
at St. Louis, Dunning even countered mid-road complaints by 
suggesting that socialists, being "well-supplied with money," might 
buy proxies to gain their ends. "For one," wrote Dunning, "I hope 
to see the time when 'short-haired' women and 'wild-eyed' men 
will no longer be a directing force in the reform movement."ll 
These views met an increasingly receptive audience. Not just in 
the West but throughout the South, Populists advocated a union 
with the silverites and declared their readiness to repudiate all 
reform demands save silver. Although the Advocate, Southern 
Mercury, and Non-Conformist continued to oppose Silver Populism, 
most politicians and papers submitted to the plans of Taubeneck, 
Weaver, and Stewart until an anguished Davis ·waite could cry 
out against "Populist Paralysis" in late spring. "The paralysis that 
has befallen the People's Party," he complained, "-that has silenced 
every rostrum and halted all party progress in the most triumphant 
march ever made by a new political organization, is occasioned by 
a spirit of cowardly compromise and desertion of principle by 
those who were put in charge of party affairs on account of their 
presumed loyalty to the Omaha platform."12 
In the meantime, Silver Populists worked to secure compliant 
delegations to the Populist national convention. In Texas in 
February, Taubeneck addressed the Populist State Committee, 
which then resolved in favor of a union of all silver advocates and 
praised him for his efforts. Taubeneck gloated to Donnelly that 
"the Delegation from Texas, in spite of the Southern Mercury, will 
be instructed for a union of forces. All the members of the State 
Committee including some fifty local papers have declared for it. 
The Southern Mercury does not represent the Populist Party of 
Texas." With Stewart he encouraged fusion in Oregon's early 
~tate election as another step toward an obedient delegation to the 
11 Southern Mercury, February 20, 1896; Silver Knight-National Watchman, 
January 23, 30, 1896: Effie M. Mack, "Life and Letters of William Morris Stewart" 
(Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1930), pp. 277-78; People's Party Paper, 
January 3, February 7, 21, April 3, 1896. 
12 W. M. Raymond to Henry Lloyd, February 28, 1896, Lloyd Papers; People's 
Party Paper, May 8, 1896. 
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national convention, and Weaver campaigned there in the interests 
of Silver Populism, warning mid-roader Jacob Coxey to withdraw. 
Elsewhere, one state after another instructed its delegates for silver 
fusion until Taubeneck exulted on February 29 that "everything 
now is facing in that direction." By early spring he estimated that 
375 of the 400 delegates already chosen had been instructed for 
fusion "on a purely silver platform, in which other questions 
should be ignored." The Iowa Populist convention, under Weaver's 
and Taubeneck's personal management, was atypical only in its 
lack of pretense. After Taubeneck told the Iowans to "do nothing 
by word or action to offend the silver wings of the two older 
parties," they specifically voted down a minority report that called 
for a reaffirmation of the Omaha Platform, and instead enjoined 
their delegation to support silver fusion.13 There would be no 
need to stampede the Populist national convention for silver and 
fusion; it was already so instructed. 
In Kansas, the Populists met to select delegates on March 18, 
1896. Taubeneck attended to urge Populists to cooperate with all 
silver elements, and he appeared before the resolutions committee 
and helped secure a weak platform, emphasizing financial reform 
and ignoring the old Populist demands. A few Populists warned 
that Taubeneck's course would destroy their movement, but under 
the direction of Breidenthal, Harris, Lewelling, and Simpson, the 
convention rejected mid-road proposals and adopted the platform, 
called for a union of all those opposed to the gold standard, and 
instructed the chosen delegates accordingly. The Silver Populists 
were delighted with these results. The Silver Knight was partic-
ularly pleased that the fusionist delegation to the national con-
vention "will be headed by John W. Breidenthal, whose principle 
in politics is to get there if possible." This silver newspaper dis-
missed the radical challenge as easily as had the convention: "A 
few old style Alliance men who came to the convention are dis-
gusted and disheartened, but they are no longer at the head of 
the organization, and they will be whipped into line." The con-
13 Southern Mercury, February 27, May 14, 1896; Taubeneck to Donnelly, 
February 18, 29, May 15, 1896, Donnelly Papers: Stewart to Sylvester Pennoyer, 
March 13, 26, 1896, Stewart Papers; Topeka Advocate, April 29, 1896; Des Moines 
Leader, April 23, 1896. 
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vention's action further elated Taubeneck, Breidenthal, and Simp-
son, the paper reported, for it opened the way to state and national 
fusion. 14 
Indeed, a desire for fusion in Kansas to promote personal political 
ambitions was a major factor helping Taubeneck's position prevail. 
As early as February, one prominent politician remarked that if 
Taubeneck and his allies managed to control the national con-
vention and nominate a silver-only candidate, then fusion on a 
state ticket would be forced upon the Populist and Democratic 
parties in Kansas. This promised consequence of national fusion 
was welcomed by those who believed it would assure their own 
political success. Harris and Lewelling both coveted the guberna-
torial nomination; Simpson hoped to secure again joint nominations 
for Congress; and Breidenthal desired Peffer's seat in the Senate. 
Together these four men aided in shaping the convention to stress 
popular financial reform, slight other Populist issues, and appeal 
for a union of silver forces,15 
The control of silver and fusion sentiment within the People's 
party was nowhere so evident as in the virtual absence of discussion 
as to the probable Populist presidential candidate. Though in 
comparison to the old parties, Populists had shown little interest 
in possible nominees in 1892, in 1896 they considered the question 
even less. Those men mentioned, moreover, revealed the bankrupt 
nature of the program of the Silver Populists, for they were over-
whelmingly not Populists. Even Taubeneck, the party's chairman 
and foremost architect of the policy of capturing silver sentiment, 
responded to a reporter's question about possible candidates with 
three names: Sibley, Bland, and Bryan. Most Populists, whether 
consciously or not, were already playing a passive, defeatist role in 
national politics. Only the few isolated mid-roaders recommended 
Populists for the party's nomination in the spring of 1896. Peffer 
actually received more presidential endorsements in 1896 than in 
1892 simply because of his loyal adherence to original Populism 
and because only mid-road papers were disposed to make sug-
14 Kansas City Star, March 18, 19, 1896; Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital (Topeka), 
March 20, 1896; W. Scott Morgan to Waite, April 1, 1896, Waite Papers; Southern 
Mercury, April 23, May 7, 1896. 
15 Kansas Semi- Weekly Capital, February 18, March 20, 24, 1896; Kansas 
Agitator, January 17, 1896. 
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gestions. The Ohio Populist, for instance, proposed a ticket of 
Peffer and Eugene Debs. "Of all the populists who have figured 
prominently in public life," it declared, "none have 'wobbled' 
less than Senator Peffer. None have been more fearless and out-
spoken in defense of the whole principles laid down in the Omaha 
platform. Not once has he ever dodged, apologized, or 'flunked.' 
He has stood squarely on the whole populist platform, and has 
bravely defended it in its entirety."16 
Such endorsements were only complimentary, however, for they 
ran distinctly counter to the drift of the party. Peffer continued 
to oppose a fusion of existing parties and the disavowal of any 
fundamental Populist principles. He particularly objected to the 
Populist surrender implicit in the suggestions of the Silver Populists 
that the party would accept a pure silverite as its candidate. Pop-
ulists should determine their own course and nominate true Pop-
ulists, not silverites, Peffer argued in his Advocate_ He did not 
exclude converts, but he was adamant against those men who 
proposed to stand apart from Populism regardless of political 
developments. "The People's Party is in more danger from pro-
fessed silver friends than from any other source," he wrote, "and 
if we will but look closely after our own beliefs and see that they 
are not bartered for promises of doubtful validity, we will retain 
our own self-respect and win the admiration of honest men of 
all parties."17 
The Populist leadership, of course, did not recognize the wisdom 
of Peffer's statement, but the wily John Martin verified its accuracy 
with a perceptive comment of his own. "If the Democrats nominate 
the right kind of man on a proper platform," he declared in March, 
"the free silver Pops and free silver Republicans will vote with us. 
Those parties are not being conducted on logical plans and by 
proper action the Democrats will gain the support of thousands 
of the members of those parties.''1S 
That the Democrats would take "proper action" and thus attempt 
to swallow the People's party without imbibing Populism seemed 
clear to Peffer by April 1896. In that month, as Democratic con-
16 Southern Mercury, January 30, July 2, 1896. 
17 Topeka Advocate, March 25, April 22, 1896. 
18 Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, March 24, 1896. 
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ventions of state after state declared for silver, he asked in the 
Advocate) "If the Democratic National Convention Declares for 
Free Silver Coinage, then What of the People's Party?" Silver 
Democrats had no intention of bolting their party to join the 
People's party, he asserted; they proposed to control their own party. 
He believed, moreover, that they would be successful and name 
a silver candidate on a silver platform, thereby creating a crisis 
for the People's party. Criticizing those Populists who had helped 
bring on this difficulty by working with the Democrats, Peffer 
lamented that the Populist national convention should have been 
scheduled before those of the old parties. Nevertheless, he decided 
that Populists should make their own platform and name their 
own candidate as a distinct party, regardless of what the other 
parties did, and not "run away after false gods."19 
Other Populists became similarly concerned over the possibility 
that the Democrats might declare for silver. L. D. Raynolds, mid-
road editor of the Chicago Express) anticipated that "the charge 
will be that we are not consistent friends of silver if we refuse to 
fuse and if we do fuse it means death. The mistake I think is 
dawning on the minds of every true populist that was honest in 
the opinion that a late convention was best." Raynolds, however, 
did not consider Taubeneck or Weaver either true Populists or 
honest in their opinions. In fact, Taubeneck, writing over two 
weeks later, still expected that "the gold bugs" would control the 
Democratic as well as the Republican convention and believed 
the Populists would receive large numbers of Silver Democrats into 
the ranks. ·weaver had come to realize the strength of the Silver 
Democrats, but a Democratic candidate on a silver platform held 
no fears for him. He did advise Bryan in late May to have the Dem-
ocratic national convention make only provisional nominations but 
promised to do "all in my power" at the Populist convention to 
bring about fusion regardless. He had already expressed his willing-
ness to have the Populists endorse Bryan if the latter received the 
Democratic nomination, and Weaver encouraged Iowa Populists 
to view favorably a Silver Democrat for president.2o 
19 Topeka Advocate, April 29, May 6, 1896. 
20 L. D. Raynolds to Waite, April 30, 1896, Waite Papers; Taubeneck to 
Donnelly, May 15, 1896, Donnelly Papers; Weaver to Bryan, May 29, 1896, 
and L. W. Rissler to Bryan, May 16, 1896, Bryan Papers. 
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Throughout May and June, Peffer used the Advocate to fight 
the possibility that the Populists would be subsumed in a Silver 
Democracy. He repeatedly denied any connection other than silver 
between the two parties and instead linked the Democracy to the 
GOP as an avowed foe of Populism. The Populists should therefore 
keep in the middle of the road, he asserted, even if the Democrats 
declared for silver. Rather than ignoring issues other than silver, 
Peffer even announced that throughout July he would write a series 
of articles on "Government Ownership and Management of Rail-
roads." The Topeka Capital acutely remarked, "Senator Peffer is 
too old-fashioned. He should come home, put his ear to the prairie 
and get in touch with the 'new Populism,' which long ago outgrew 
the government ownership fad."21 
The party leadership moved to protect that new Populism from 
the attacks of the original Populists. In late May, Senator \,Yilliam 
V. Allen denied in the Senate that Populists had ever believed in 
irredeemable money. This capped a long series of Allen senatorial 
speeches designed to illustrate Populist conservatism and permit 
Populist-Democratic fusion on silver. Also in May, the National 
Committee established a news bureau to provide Populist readers 
with a stream of propaganda advocating one-plank silver Populism 
and fusion, supporting the decision for a late convention, and 
creating presidential booms for old party silverites. The Cleveland 
(Ohio) Citizen denounced this "alleged news agency" established 
by "Taubeneck and his satellites," and the Missouri World com-
plained that its weekly newsletter represented "little less than a 
constant attack upon the proposition to adhere to the principles 
of our party." Taubeneck then renewed his attack on the anti-
fusion Populist press and again hinted that the Topeka Advocate 
was a socialist, not a Populist, newspaper.22 
Mid-roaders hastened to reply. One loyal Populist paper in 
Kansas defended the Advocate against Taubeneck with a bitter 
countercharge that the chairman was "a dickering, trading, self-
seeking politician." Another censured "the double-dealing of our 
21 Topeka Advocate, May 13, 20, June 17, 24, 1896; Topeka Daily Capital, 
May 28, 1896. 
22 Southern Mercury, January 31, 1895, May 7, June II, 1896; Kansas Agitator, 
May 15, 1896. See especially Congressional Record, 53d Cong., 3d sess., vol. 27, 
pp. 971-82. 
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national chairman, H. E. Taubeneck, and his little coterie of self-
appointed leaders, Weaver, Turner, and others, who would willing-
ly turn the People's Party over to the Democrats for the chance of 
a little political preferment and patronage." The Kansas Agitator 
recalled that "Judas betrayed Christ for thirty pieces of silver. 
Will those Judases who would betray the People's Party (for silver?) 
still further follow his example-go and hang themselves?"23 
Thus, divided and bickering, the People's party awaited the first 
of the national conventions of 1896. But both factions knew which 
held the upper hand in the party. The Silver Populists not only 
controlled the party's organization but also included nearly all 
prominent Populists and a large majority of the convention del-
egates in their ranks. Not surprisingly, the Silver Populists ex-
pressed confidence. Raynolds spoke the fears of the mid-roaders 
when he wrote Waite, "I am afraid that matters will go badly 
astray" at the Populist national convention. Both groups, how-
ever, were in an awkward position because of the late convention. 
The party's Illinois state chairman expressed the Populist predic-
ament best: "Of course we cannot say with any degree of certainty 
what the result will be but this I do know the present is fraught 
with great possibilities for our Party; However just at this time 
it is more or less subject to contingencies over which we have no 
control."24 
The Republican national convention opened in St. Louis on 
June 16 under the complete domination of the political forces of 
William McKinley. Declaring itself "unreservedly for sound 
money," the convention nominated McKinley and jeered Senator 
Teller and other silverites out of the hall. The bolters then 
organized the Silver Republican party and publicly called all those 
who favored bimetallism to unite behind Teller as a joint pres-
idential candidate.25 
The Silver Populists at once recognized the barren nature of 
their policy, though they had long anticipated McKinley's nomina-
tion, the gold platform, and the Silver Republican bolt. If the 
23 Kansas Agitator, May 15, 22, 1896: Girard World, May 21, 1896. 
24 Raynolds to Waite, April 30, 1896, Waite Papers; A. L. Maxwell to Lloyd, 
May 13, 1896, Lloyd Papers. 
25 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 17, 19, 1896; Jones, Election of 1896, pp. 
169-73. 
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Democrats declared for silver, as now appeared likely, the People's 
party would be destroyed. In the far West, Populists had never 
been more than silverites with a few exceptions such as Waite, 
and now Patterson and Stewart led the region's Populists; they 
would vote with either major party that advocated silver. In the 
Midwest and Plains, the Populists by 1896 overwhelmingly de-
pended upon former Democrats for their strength and were ac-
customed to fusion campaigns with the Democrats under the 
leadership of Weaver, Allen, Breidenthal, Harris, and others; these 
Populists too would prefer a Silver Democrat candidate to tenacious 
adherence to a Populist program and nominee. Even in the South, 
a Silver Democratic ticket would weaken Populism severely, for 
though Populists and Democrats held bitter feelings for each other, 
the silver education of the past three years would convince many 
Populists that their traditional party had returned to proper Democ-
racy and so should they; moreover, the foremost Southern Populist, 
Butler, was completely committed to a free silver campaign, and 
much of the alleged Populist strength in the South was anticipatory 
only, dependent upon a Democratic rejection of silver which now 
seemed improbable. 
The Silver Populist leadership seized upon Teller's projected 
candidacy as the only opportunity to redeem at least partially its 
position and retain some influence in the prospective silver union. 
Some conferences between Silver Republicans and Populists had 
already been held before the Republican convention, resulting in 
a tentative understanding that, suddenly, the interests of the two 
groups were similar and could be best met by concerted action to 
secure Teller's nomination first by the Democratic national con-
vention and then by the Populists and the silverites. Taubeneck, 
Patterson, and other members of the Populist National Committee 
were in St. Louis to observe the Republican convention and, after 
conferring with the Republican silverites following their bolt, the 
Populist officials issued their own address urging Populists and all 
other silver groups to nominate Teller.26 
Speaking of the impending Democratic convention, Taubeneck 
26 Elmer Ellis, "The Silver Republicans in the Election of 1896," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 18 (March 1932): 524-27; M. C. Rankin to Donnelly, 
June 9, 1896, and Taubeneck to Donnelly, June 20, 22, 1896, Donnelly Papers; 
People's Party Paper, June 26, 1896; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 20, 1896. 
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declared that the Democrats "must take Teller." Such a position 
was politically unrealistic. The Silver Democrats were the masters 
of the situation and would not waste their efforts of the past few 
years by nominating a Republican. This desperate maneuver of 
the Silver Populists only revealed more clearly how their own 
earlier unreasonable and perverted actions had trapped them. De-
ception had become self-deception.27 
Unswerving Populists quickly denounced the Populist Teller 
address. Peffer declared that Teller deserved praise but not the 
Populist nomination for leaving the GOP. The party must have 
a Populist candidate, he asserted, and not merely a silver candidate. 
Moreover, Peffer objected to Taubeneck's continuing willingness 
to dictate to the party, especially on the eve of the national conven-
tion, and considered such action arrogant and "treacherous." 
Robert Schilling, the veteran \1\Tisconsin Populist, also opposed 
Taubeneck's new scheme, declaring, "I am raising hell about the 
Teller address. They wanted me to sign it, but I refused point 
blank. These fellows run off after strange gods at every opportu-
nity."28 
Once again Clemens provided the most fitting mid-road critique 
of the policies of the Silver Populists. "I warned the People's Party 
that its managers were pursuing a dangerous course in giving undue 
prominence in their campaigns to free coinage," he wrote, "that, 
should the Democrats nominate free silver candidates on a free 
silver platform, our resolutions and papers would enable them to 
condemn us out of our own mouths for even keeping up our party 
organization instead of joining them." For, he continued, selfish 
politicians had proved faithless to Populism and had instead 
proclaimed "the paramount and pressing importance of a union 
of all in favor of free coinage." "But I was not heeded," Clemens 
reminded others. "I was 'an extremist.' I was not 'a practical 
politician.' "29 
Clemens believed that the Populists had become the "dumb 
27 Taubeneck to Donnelly, June 20, 1896, Donnelly Papers; Jones, Election of 
1896, p. 208; Paul W. Glad, McKinley, Bryan, and the People (Philadelphia, 
1964), pp. 129-30. 
28 Tof,eka Advocate, June 24, 1896; New York Times, June 26, 1896; Kansas 
Agitator, July 3, 1896; Robert Schilling to Donnelly, June 22, 1896, Donnelly 
Papers. 
29 Topeka Advocate, June 17, 1896. 
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chattels" of autocratic leaders such as Taubeneck and Weaver, and 
indeed, the Silver Populists brushed aside criticism of their new 
course and offered to deliver Populist votes to a Republican candi-
date on a Democratic ticket. Taubeneck and Butler, in particular, 
insisted that the Democrats nominate Teller or be responsible for 
the disruption of the silver forces. Other Populists joined them in 
Chicago in early July to pressure the Democrats. Simpson promised 
Democrats that the People's party would ratify the Democratic 
nomination of Teller, while Taubeneck and Weaver issued a 
manifesto demanding that Democrats rise above partisanship and 
name Teller as a nonpartisan candidate upon whom the Populists 
and other silver elements could unite. A reporter for the Chicago 
Tribune aptly described the Populist maneuvers as "a grand game 
of bluff" and declared that "this is an evident case of the tail 
making strenuous efforts to swing the dog, but it not only will 
not work but is manifestly ridiculous. "30 
Teller must have agreed with the reporter, for from the start 
he never believed in the delusion to which the Silver Populists 
clung. Convinced that the Democrats would never nominate a 
Republican, Teller announced that the Silver Republicans would 
support a Silver Democrat and contended that his own nomination 
would be unwise. His announcement sent the short-sighted Silver 
Populists reeling again, for they finally recognized that their lavish 
praise of Teller would simply backfire if he supported a Democrat. 
Teller's slim chances in Chicago soon died altogether with the rise 
of ·william Jennings Bryan.31 
Bryan had long worked assiduously if quietly toward the Dem-
ocratic presidential nomination. No one in the Democracy had 
better silver credentials, and the Chicago convention was a silver 
convention. He received the nomination on the fifth ballot and an 
Eastern silverite, Arthur M. Sewall, a Maine banker and ship-
builder, balanced the ticket as the vice-presidential nominee. The 
platform unequivocally repudiated Cleveland in declaring not only 
30 Taubeneck to Butler, July 2, 1896, Butler Papers; Butler to Stewart, June 
24, July 6, 1896, and Stewart to A. J. Utley, July 2, 1896, Stewart Papers: Chicago 
Tribune, July 1, 2, 5, 7, 1896: St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 8, 1896; Taubeneck 
to Donnelly, June 20, 1896, Donnelly Papers; Elmer Ellis, Henry Moore Teller 
(Caldwell, Idaho, 1941), p. 270. 
31 Ellis, Teller, pp. 269-72; Chicago Tribune, July l, 1896; Butler to Stewart, 
July 6, 1896, Stewart Papers. 
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for silver, but against bond issues and government by injunction 
and for an income tax and stricter federal regulation of railroads 
and trusts.32 
Bryan's nomination on a silver platform threw the People's party 
into a turmoil. Some Southern Populists recoiled from the notion 
of cooperating with the Democrats, fearing that a Populist endorse-
ment of Bryan would destroy their party and subject them to still 
further humiliation, discrimination, and violence at the hands of 
the Democrats. "Don't be deceived," warned the Southern Mercury. 
"Experience should teach us to 'fear the Greeks even when bearing 
gifts.'" Those "gift" planks, Southern mid-roaders argued, were 
inconsistent with the record of the Democratic party and were 
therefore designed only to attract Populist votes and eliminate the 
only important opposition to continued Democratic control of the 
South. And yet, with very few exceptions, Southern Populists were 
not opposed to fusion in theory. They had frequently fused with 
Republicans in the South and had eagerly cooperated with both 
Silver Republicans and the silver party; they had disproportionately 
supported Taubeneck's scheme to arrange a fusion on Teller and 
some still favored the Populist nomination of the Republican. The 
expedient Butler, moreover, was already considering plans for 
fusion with the Democrats in North Carolina before Bryan's nom-
ination, and inclined toward the Populist acceptance of the Nebras-
kan after initial reluctance. Other prominent Southern Populists 
also urged Bryan's endorsement, including James G. Field of 
Virginia, the party's 1892 vice-presidential candidate, and Reuben 
Kolb, who as Alabama's foremost Populist had probably suffered 
as much from Democratic practices as any white Southerner. Truly 
less radical than the original Western Populists, moreover, South-
erners had generally supported the scheme to narrow Populism to 
silver, particularly Butler and John H. McDowell but also such 
alleged mid-roaders as Cyclone Davis and Harry Skinner.33 
32 Glad, McKinley, Bryan, and the People, p. 130; William Jennings Bryan, 
The First Battle (Chicago, 1896), pp. 406-9. 
33 Southern Mercury, July 16, 1896; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 20, July 13, 
1896; New York Times, July 21, 1896; Robert F. Durden, The Climax of Pop-
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Butler, June 5, 1896, W. S. Bailey to Butler, June 8, 1896, Butler to C. A. Nash, 
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The urban, radical Populists of the upper Midwest also opposed 
Bryan's endorsement, but again like the Southerners their opposi-
tion too often had no durable foundation. Many of them favored 
the nomination of either Eugene Debs or Jacob Coxey, but neither 
would consent to run against Bryan, and members of this faction 
slowly drifted to the Democrat. Even George Washburn, the 
Massachusetts Populist who had consistently fought Weaver and 
Taubeneck, decided that the Populists had no choice but to 
nominate Bryan. Henry D. Lloyd remained the sharpest critic of 
the Silver Populists and the Bryan boom. Even before Bryan's 
Democratic nomination, Lloyd complained that the delegates 
chosen by the Silver Populists for the national convention would 
never insist upon Populism, and he castigated Taubeneck for his 
misguided schemes. 
The simple truth is Taubeneck has been flim-flammed. The politicians at 
Washington got hold of him, persuaded him that "free silver" was the 
supreme issue .... They got him to turn all the party maneuvers into 
building up this silver issue. Then they sweep in at Chicago, pocket the 
whole thing for themselves, and leave us at St. Louis only the Hobson's 
choice of sinking ourselves out of sight and resurrection in the Democracy; 
or, of beginning, de novo, within a few weeks of election, the task of 
making an issue and finding followers. The masses have been taught by 
us that "silver" is the issue, and they will of course have the common sense 
to give their votes to the most powerful of the parties promising it. If the 
management of the party had been in the hands of really practical politi-
cians, instead of "Glaubenichts" like Taubeneck, the full Omaha platform 
could easily have been made the issue that would have held us together 
for a brilliant campaign, but now that cannot be done. If we fuse, we 
are sunk; if we don't fuse, all the silver men we have will leave us for the 
more powerful Democrats. And this is what Glaubenichts Taubeneck calls 
politics! Curious that the new party, the Reform party, the People's Party 
should be more boss-ridden, ring-ruled, gang-gangrened than the two old 
parties of monopoly. The party that makes itself the special champion 
of the Referendum and Initiative tricked out of its very life and soul by 
a permanent National Chairman-something no other party has! Our 
Initiative and Referendum had better begin, like Charity, at home. 
Three days later, Lloyd again denounced the party officials and 
leaders for having diverted attention from real issues by emphasiz-
ing silver. Moreover, "the way in which the managers of the P. P. 
have schemed to deliver it first to the Republican Teller, then to 
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the Democratic Bryan, is one of the most amazing exhibitions of 
'politics' I ever heard of."34 
The Populists of the Midwest and prairies generally felt no such 
qualms about either Bryan or the importance of silver. By 1896, 
these Populists were largely of Democratic antecedents, accustomed 
to fusion campaigns with the Democrats, and fully committed to 
Silver Populism; and they eagerly greeted Bryan's nomination and 
anticipated uniting behind him with the Democrats. Weaver 
announced for Bryan while still in Chicago seeking Teller's nomina-
tion! Senator Kyle strongly advocated the Populist nomination of 
Bryan. The Nebraska Populists, led by Bryan's friend Senator 
Allen, welcomed the new opportunity to work with the Democrat.35 
Nearly all Kansas Populist leaders announced at once in favor 
of the Populist nomination of both Bryan and Sewall. Simpson, 
Harris, Breidenthal, and Lewelling, leaders of the state's delegation 
to the Populist national convention, all declared their intention to 
secure the nomination of both Democrats. Lewelling, eloquent as 
ever in the defense of compromise, declared that if the Democratic 
platform did not provide "all the measures which we have sought, 
we will by the election of Bryan, at least be able to strike a light 
by which we shall see our way clear to the ultimate triumph of 
the people over their oppressors." Breidenthal did not even regret 
the absence of Populist measures from the Democratic platform. 
He asserted that "the Populists could scarcely have done any better 
if they had been given full control of the Chicago convention," 
and he described the Democratic platform as "right in line with 
Populist principles and ... acceptable to the great majority of 
Populists of the \Nest." Even those such as John Davis who had 
recommended an early convention and a middle-of-the-road course 
reluctantly consented to fusion on Bryan, remarking that the posi-
tion followed by the party leaders left the Populists with no choice. 
Populist county conventions throughout the state met hurriedly 
to endorse Bryan and instruct their delegates accordingly.36 
34 Ray Ginger, The Bending Cross: A Biography of Eugene Victor Debs (New 
Brunswick, N.J., 1949), pp. 188-90; New York Times, July 21, 1896; Lloyd to 
R. I. Grimes, July 10, 1896, and Lloyd to Bayard Holmes, July 13, 1896, Lloyd 
Papers. 
35 L. W. Rissler to Bryan, May 16, 1896, and Kyle to Bryan, July ll, 1896, 
Bryan Papers; People's Party Paper, July 31, 1896. 
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Strong support had existed among Kansas Populists for a fusion 
campaign even before Bryan's nomination. In fact, Breidenthal 
announced before the Republican convention that Populists would 
yield to Democrats and endorse their candidate if he subscribed 
to silver. Harris likewise hoped to arrange both national and state 
fusion on the sole issue of free silver. His lieutenant, William H. 
Sears, a former Democrat and now a nominal Populist, wrote Bryan 
before the Democratic national convention, advocating a fusion 
on the Democratic nominee and urging him to induce the Populists 
to accept such a course. Many Populists indicated their readiness 
in the numerous June conventions that resolved in favor of a 
national silver fusion with the Democrats. The July Democratic 
nomination of Bryan merely fired such Populists with more en-
thusiasm.37 
Silver Populists of the Far West were just as unreservedly for 
Bryan. The state chairman of the Colorado People's party declared 
that the state's delegation to the Populist national convention would 
support Bryan, and other Colorado Populists such as Patterson 
and Pence similarly advocated his nomination. Teller urged Silver 
Republicans to endorse Bryan and assured the Democrat that 
Patterson would "do you much good at St. Louis." Even Waite 
was jubilant over Bryan's nomination and wrote Donnelly, "Of 
course I support him." Stewart, never more than a Silver Populist, 
saw Populism in the Silver Democracy. "The majority who con-
trolled the [Democratic] convention," he wrote Butler, "were as 
emphatically Populistic in their sentiments and actions as you 
yourself. The platform is radical enough for you or me." Stewart 
would use his Silver Knight to promote the Populist nomination 
of both Bryan and Sewall.3S 
36 Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, July 14, 24, 1896; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
July 12, 1896; John Davis Scrapbook, vol. G, p. 50, KSHS; Marshall County 
Democrat (Marysville), July 24, 1896; Topeka Daily Capital, July ll, 1896: 
Topeka Advocate, July 22, 1896; Kansas Agitator, July 24, 1896: Ruppenthal 
Scrapbook, vol. 5, p. 29. 
37 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June ll, 1896: Kansas Semi- Weekly Capital, June 
23, 26, 1896; Sears to Bryan, June 23, 1896, Sears Papers. 
38 H. G. Clar to Bryan, July 10, 1896, and Teller to Bryan, July 15, 1896, Bryan 
Papers; Topeka Daily Capital, July ll, 1896; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 16, 
1896; Waite to Donnelly, July 12, 1896, Donnelly Papers; Stewart to Butler, July 
14, 1896, Stewart Papers. 
254 POPULISM and POLITICS 
Virtually alone among major Western Populists, Peffer did not 
immediately endorse Bryan or fusion. In early summer he had 
warned that fusion should not be considered inevitable if the 
Democrats adopted a silver platform, that the Populists could not 
consent to sacrifice their principles, that if the Democrats desired 
Populist assistance the time to seek it was before the Democratic 
convention. Peffer restated this position after the Republican 
convention in announcing his rejection of the Silver Populist scheme 
to nominate Teller. While he was convinced the Democrats would 
be for silver, he was equally confident that they would not commit 
themselves to other principles vital to Populism. "I had hoped," 
he repeated, "that there might be some amalgamation of Democrats, 
Populists, and silver men and others on a declaration of principles, 
and, if need be, a new name. But the time for that has gone by, 
and all that remains is for the Populist party to maintain its 
integrity by nominating its own candidates on its own platform."39 
Peffer's defense of Populist integrity and independence met with 
stinging abuse among Kansas Populists. Surprised at the uniformity 
and pervasiveness of the opposition to his stand, Peffer retreated 
slightly but adhered to his long-expressed general position. Teller 
might be a good choice, he admitted, if the various reform elements 
joined to form a new and permanent party and then to nominate 
a candidate. But, he warned, Populists should not foolishly expect 
either a Democratic nomination of anyone other than a Democrat 
or a postponement of the Democratic convention in order to permit 
all reformers to participate equally and honestly in the formation 
of a new major party. Without such action, he believed, the 
People's party could not honorably do other than name its own 
candidate on its own platform. If cooperation with other silver 
elements was still thought necessary, a partial fusion could later be 
arranged on the electoral tickets in each state. The Democratic 
nomination of a Populist for vice president, he suggested, might be 
the best means to effect such limited cooperation as desirable.40 
When the Democracy at Chicago performed according to Peffer's 
expectations rather than his hopes, he responded predictably. 
39 New York Times, June 11, 1896; Southern Mercury, July 9, 1896. 
40 Topeka Advocate, July 1, 1896; Kansas Agitator, July 3, 1896; Kansas City 
Star, July 14, 1896. 
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Praising Bryan as an able and honorable man, and commending 
the Democratic party for its generally progressive attitude, Peffer 
nevertheless told a reporter, "I think it would be improper for the 
Populist national convention to endorse Mr. Bryan. In fact, I 
think the Populists should adopt their own platform, name their 
own candidate for President, and maintain organization." Again, 
however, he expressed his belief that combinations on electoral 
tickets could insure a solid vote for financial reform while not 
compromising Populism or its ultimate triumph.41 
Again Peffer was assaulted by Kansans as one who was out of 
touch with the new Populism. The totality and the fury of the 
condemnation made him once more explain his position. Though 
some accused him of "hedging" in a desire to gain reelection, and 
though obviously he continued to retreat from his solitary opposi-
tion to the course of the People's party, Peffer remained distinct 
from the flaccid Populists who urged total capitulation, and his 
position retained a basic consistency.42 
Five days after Bryan's nomination, Peffer wrote an editorial 
entitled "Present Duty of Populists." "Events of the last four 
weeks," he declared, "have so changed the political situation that 
a grave responsibility has been suddently thrust upon the Populist 
party." Instead of equivocating, the Republicans had "boldly and 
plainly espoused the cause of the money power," which portended 
"class rule, oppression of the poor-debt, poverty, perpetual enslave-
ment of the masses." The Democrats, by contrast, had accepted the 
challenge and partially "espoused the people's side" by calling for 
an end to bond issues and national bank notes and for an income 
tax as well as free silver in their financial plank. The Populist 
responsibility was to defeat McKinley and what he represented, for 
the Populists had enough votes, Peffer maintained, when united 
with others demanding financial reform, "to win this battle for 
the people." Nevertheless, he asserted that the Populists should 
reaffirm the Omaha Platform and, though suggesting holding con-
ferences with other financial reformers to arrange necessary coop-
eration, he did not advocate Bryan's nomination by Populists.43 
41 Topeka Daily Capital, July 11, 1896. 
42 Kansas City Star, July 14, 1896. 
43 Topeka Advocate, July 15, 1896. See Norman Pollack, The Populist Re-
256 POPULISM and POLITICS 
Peffer also wrote to the Kansas Commoner at the same time, 
revealing his modified stance. "The conversion of the Democracy," 
he wrote, made it "the wise and patriotic course" for Populists to 
unite against the oppression of the gold standard. But he empha-
sized, "vVe can do this and still maintain our organization for 
future use." The Commoner and other papers read this as an 
indication that Peffer had withdrawn his opposition to Bryan's 
nomination and would support the Nebraskan. "With the accession 
of Senator Peffer to the Bryan forces," the Associated Press reported, 
"the Populists of Kansas are practically a unit for the Democratic 
nominee."44 
As the Populists descended upon St. Louis in mid-July, there 
seemed a strong possibility that the party might actually split over 
the question of nominating Bryan. Although historians have 
focused on the "extremist minority of mid-road Populists, who were 
ready to split the party rather than accept Bryan," Western Pop-
ulists, with their solitary commitment to silver, were even more 
arrogant and determined to split the party if necessary to have 
Bryan. Stewart, for instance, declared that as Western Populists 
supported Bryan exclusively, "any attempt to run an opposition 
candidate by the Populists will be a failure and will destroy the 
Populist Party." Insisting that Populists approve Bryan, Stewart 
added that "the attitude of the Southern delegates will have no 
effect at all." Simpson proved just as imperious. "So far as Kansas 
is concerned," he remarked, "it matters not what this convention 
does. \Ve will endorse Bryan and vote for silver." Waite, himself 
a radical who supported Bryan, commented, "The Southern del-
egates are not so radical as they were, but they are still sore enough 
to walk out of the convention if they are not given their own 
way. On the other hand, the silver men from the West are generally 
determined to have Bryan or walk out."45 
In the face of the two antagonistic demands to accept totally and 
sponse to Industrial America (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 107-10, for a dis· 
cussion of the Advocate's course. 
44 Kansas Semi· Weekly Capital, July 17, 1896; New York Times, July 16, 1896. 
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to repudiate entirely the decision of the Chicago convention, a 
number of compromise proposals were presented to preserve the 
unity and identity of the People's party. Though each had its 
special champions at St. Louis and historians have debated the 
identity of their initial advocates, each major compromise measure 
eventually adopted in some form in 1896 had antecedents in Peffer's 
articles, letters, and interviews during the early summer in con-
templation of possible reform alliances. It is, of course, impossible 
to determine his actual influence in formulating these compromises 
at the convention itself, for, as he was not a delegate, his public 
participation in the convention was confined to various honorary 
appearances. But he was quite visible in the activity surrounding 
the convention. As one reporter commented, "Senator Peffer, wise, 
whiskery, and wonderfully calm, in comparison with the intense, 
noisy, contentious throng of delegates, but just as cranky, extreme, 
and revolutionary in his way as any of them, sits about to give 
Senatorial advice."46 
That advice was soon forthcoming. Arriving on July 18, four 
days before the convention opened, he refused to announce for 
Bryan as had been predicted. His editorials and letters had not 
endorsed Bryan and, as he told one reporter, they had been mis-
construed. "There are only two points upon which I feel tenacious. 
The first is to maintain our party organization and the second is 
to combine the silver vote of the country." He urged the immediate 
reaffirmation of the Omaha Platform and the election of "a national 
executive committee to look after party affairs so as to preserve 
our party identity. There is no reason why we should abandon our 
doctrine or party." Second, he advocated the proportional repre-
sentation of electors on a combined ticket with the selection of a 
common candidate to be made by them only after the election, 
either Bryan or the Populist nominee or, should the Populists make 
no nomination at all, from a group of Populist and Silver Dem-
ocratic leaders. "That would allow all of us to vote according to 
party preferences, and it would relieve us of a great deal of friction 
that might otherwise occasion trouble."47 
46 New York Times, July 21, 1896. 
47 Kansas City Star, July 19, 1896; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 19, 1896; New 
York Times, July 21, 1896. 
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Peffer's proposal met with little favor at the divided convention. 
Mid-road leader Jacob Coxey did accept the basic plan and en-
couraged delegates to support it. The Kansas and Nebraska del-
egations, however, unanimously opposed Peffer's suggestions and 
argued for total endorsement of the Democratic ticket. Moreover, 
Bryan's representatives in St. Louis were reported as bitterly op-
posed to Peffer's plan as to that of the intransigents. Nevertheless, 
the proposal reemerged in the campaign in the policy of both Pop-
ulists and Democrats in arranging fusion electoral tickets based on 
their respective strength in the various states, but with definite and 
specific commitments to candidates. It may also have influenced 
the decision of the convention to postpone the presidential nom-
ination in order to achieve harmonious action.4S 
One surprising supporter of Peffer's plan was Taubeneck, who 
grasped it as the means to protect the independence of the People's 
party in the face of the demand for surrendering totally to the 
Democrats. Although other party officials such as J. H. Turner 
and Martin C. Rankin, secretary and treasurer of the Populist 
National Committee, had announced immediately for Bryan's en-
dorsement-Turner even intimating that there was no further need 
of the People's party at all and that Populists should join the 
Democracy-Taubeneck reacted to Bryan's nomination with dismay. 
Initially favorable to Bryan, the chairman then decided that the 
People's party should avoid submersion in the Democratic campaign 
and nominate Teller after all. Teller, however, emphatically re-
fused to be considered and urged all Populists to support Bryan. 
Taubeneck then declined to discuss publicly the question of Bryan's 
possible Populist nomination until the eve of the convention when 
he rejected it as representing "the surrender and destruction of 
the People's Party organization" and seized upon Peffer's plan as 
the party's salvation.49 
Taubeneck's vacillation suggests that unlike such Silver Populists 
as "\Veaver and Stewart, who saw personal power and free silver as 
the only ultimate objectives, he had sincerely believed that his 
48Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, July 21, 1896; New York Times, July 21, 1896; 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 20, 1896. 
49 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 15, 18, 19, 1896; Teller to Bryan, July 18, 1896, 
Bryan Papers; New York Times, July 21, 1896; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 
20, 1896; John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (Minneapolis, 1931), p. 359. 
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schemes would deliver the nation's silver voters to the People's 
party. If so, however, it reveals at the same time that his "practical 
politics" were even more absurdly obtuse than the mid-roaders had 
earlier thought. In any event, the Western Populists doubted Tau-
beneck's sincerity, perhaps because they had worked closely with 
him before. They asserted that with his Teller manifesto he had 
tried to force upon the party a man who agreed with Populists 
only on silver but that he now opposed a man who agreed with 
them on many issues in addition to silver. Kansans particularly 
denounced Taubeneck for, they argued, he had formulated their 
state platform so that Democrats and silverites would accept his 
Populism; now the Democrats had adopted a stronger platform 
and fusion should be no less desirable. At St. Louis, Taubeneck 
soon reversed himself again and demanded the Populist endorse-
ment of Bryan.5° His political and, presumably, mental acrobatics 
so wearied all Populists by the end of the convention that he was 
not reelected national chairman and thereafter dropped out of 
Populist sight. Only the natural results of his misguided policies 
remained to torment the People's party. 
The most immediate problem faced by the middle-of-the-road 
delegates was that of finding a candidate. Lloyd had hoped to focus 
the opposition on Debs, but Debs refused to be considered. Neither 
did Coxey desire to oppose Bryan. Some Southerners favored 
Charles Towne, a Minnesota Silver Republican, but Towne re-
sponded that all factions should support Bryan. On the eve of the 
convention, the Texas delegation, the largest and most determinedly 
anti-Bryan group, sent a committee to Peffer and promised to 
support him against Bryan. Peffer replied that Western Populists 
were so agreed upon Bryan that if he accepted the Populist nom-
ination he would be unable to carry even a single county in his 
own state of Kansas. Josephus Daniels, an ardent Bryan Democrat 
reporting the Populist convention, explained the plight of the 
mid-road Populists on the day before the convention opened: 
"They cannot get a silver Republican or big Populist to accept the 
nomination."51 
50 Kansas City Star, July 17, 19, 1896; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 20, 1896. 
51 Eugene V. Debs to Lloyd, July 25, 1896, Lloyd Papers; Abilene Monitor, 
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Accordingly, all but the most irreconcilable of the mid-road Pop-
ulists agreed to accept Bryan's nomination provided the "pluto-
cratic" Sewall were replaced with a Southern Populist_ Peffer had 
suggested this, too, well before the Democratic convention as a 
possible means to consolidate the anti-gold forces, but Butler was 
the plan's leading advocate at the convention. Although fusion 
Populists Weaver, Harris, Lewelling, and Patterson rejected the 
scheme, it seemed to be the only answer to the plight of the con-
vention, preserving the distinctiveness of the People's party and 
mollifying the unhappy Southerners while still substantially main-
taining a unity of the silver forces. Only when most mid-roaders 
dropped their demand for an independent ticket-and even the 
Georgia, Tennessee, and Alabama delegations reported swings to 
Bryan-did Peffer finally agree to Bryan, convinced that a large 
majority favored his nomination in order to combine the opposition 
to the money power. Since the large Kansas delegation was vocally 
and unanimously for Bryan, some observers had been surprised at 
Peffer's obvious reluctance to support the Nebraskan. After his 
announcement, Peffer worked with other prominent Populists in the 
Bryan headquarters, but unlike them he approved the proposal to 
replace Sewall with a loyal Southern Populist.52 
After hearing a long and conciliatory speech by Butler, as tempo-
rary chairman, the convention devoted most of the first day to 
committee meetings. On the second day, July 23, the delegates 
demonstrated their determination to consolidate political forces on 
Bryan and silver by electing Senator Allen as permanent chairman. 
Allen supported both candidates on the Democratic ticket and 
called for Populists not to "get into that stupid attitude where we 
are willing to stand so closely in the middle of the road that others 
will pass us in the race for success." Shortly thereafter the con-
vention accepted the report of the resolutions committee, chaired 
by Weaver, and thus adopted a platform which stressed the financial 
question and invited the cooperation of all accordant groups. It 
seemed clear that Bryan would be nominated; those who opposed 
full capitulation to the Democracy would have to insist upon the 
52 Topeka Advocate, July 1, 1896; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 20, 22, 23, 
1896: Kansas City Star, July 19, 23, 1896; Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, July 21, 
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excision of Sewall from the ticket. The minority report of the 
committee on rules and procedures called for a reversal of the 
usual order of nominations and the selection of a vice-presidential 
nominee first, a maneuver designed to ensure the substitution of 
a Southern Populist for Sewall. The convention narrowly adopted 
this procedure. 
Many Populists besides the mid-roaders believed the rumors that 
James K. Jones, Democratic national chairman, had promised to 
secure the withdrawal of Sewall for the Populist nominee if the 
Populists named Bryan to head their ticket. Thus hopeful, they 
nominated Tom Watson for the vice presidency, although Sewall 
received solid support from the \Vestern states, including all but 
one of Kansas's ninety-two votes. Peffer was pleased with Watson's 
nomination, but Harris angrily refused to accept Sewall's defeat 
and the possible disruption of his own plans for fusion in Kansas. 
He promised that Western Populists would vote for Sewall in 
November anyway.53 
Democrats Bryan and Jones also declined to countenance Sewall's 
defeat or his proposed replacement. In public telegrams, the two 
agreed that Bryan's name should be withdrawn if Sewall were not 
also nominated, and Bryan wired Allen privately his refusal to 
be a candidate if Sewall were rejected. Nevertheless, Weaver nom-
inated Bryan, dismissed the candidate's views with the assertion 
that Bryan had no right to dictate to the convention, and Allen 
refused to release his telegram from Bryan. After seconding speeches 
by Taubeneck, Simpson, and others, the Populist convention agreed 
overwhelmingly with Weaver and nominated the Democrat for 
their party's highest honor.54 
As the exhausted delegates left St. Louis, few Populists were 
pleased with the results of their convention. Most Western Populists 
intensely regretted the failure to nominate Sewall with Bryan and 
worried that the silver vote would be split after all. Southerners, in-
cluding Watson, remained disappointed. Peffer had only reluctantly 
accepted Bryan and felt no great enthusiasm for the coming cam-
53 Bryan, First Battle, p. 267; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 24, 25, 1896; New 
York Times, July 25, 1896; Kansas City Star, July 19, 25, 26, 1896: Kansas Semi-
Weekly Capital, July 31, 1896; Abilene Daily Reflector, July 27, 1896. 
54 Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 364, 366; Bryan, First Battle, pp. 276-79; St. 
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paign. Donnelly had seconded Bryan's nomination but bitterly 
believed that the Silver Populists and Democratic-Populists had 
betrayed the party; he intended to retire from politics after the 
election. Another Populist confessed a similar inclination after the 
convention: "I am sick and weary and tired of it all," wrote G. W. 
Everts. "I sometimes feel like never taking any further part in 
politics, not even to vote." He also belatedly recognized how the 
opportunistic course of party leaders had perverted the movement: 
"Somebody has blundered. Our convention should never have 
been postponed until after those of the old parties, with the object 
of catching the crumbs that might fall from their tables. Neither 
should it, harlot like, alluring with wanton smiles and beckonings," 
he continued, have asked "the lecherous and treacherous Democracy 
to come and occupy with us our bed. I admire the firmness of those 
middle of the road men. Their predictions are being fulfilled."55 
Others also blamed Populist politicians for the debacle of 1896. 
Lloyd was disappointed in one group of Populist leaders and dis-
gusted with a second. The first included those who reluctantly 
assented to Bryan and Democracy though they knew how inad-
equate free silver was to solve the nation's fundamental problems. 
Coxey made no resistance outside of the resolutions committee, he 
noted, and Waite accepted Bryan for the sake of harmony. "Senator 
Peffer, who has shown an ample courage in every emergency at 
Washington, sat silent, though he was bitterly opposed to the 
methods of the managers." Though disappointed, Lloyd could 
understand this group. He himself had been unable to summon 
the courage at St. Louis to deliver a prepared speech urging the 
delegates to reject Bryan. "The fear ruled that unless the reform 
forces united this time they would never again have the opportunity 
to unite," he explained. "If the radicals made a mistake, it was a 
patriotic mistake. "56 
Lloyd could not forgive the second group. Taubeneck, Weaver, 
and their associates, he claimed, had deliberately planned to subvert 
55 People's Party Paper, July 31, 1896; Martin Ridge, Ignatius Donnelly: The 
Portrait of a Politician (Chicago, 1962), p. 357; G. W. Everts to L. H. Weller, 
July 26, 1896, Weller Papers. 
56 Henry D. Lloyd, "The Populists at St. Louis," Review of Reviews 14 (Sep-
tember 1896): 303; C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel (New 
York, 1938), p. 301. 
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the party for their own interests. There could have been no other 
result than the surrender at St. Louis "with managers whose sole 
occupation was to 'trim' off the principles of the party, and to seek 
for champions in all parties but their own." Lloyd then attempted 
to explain the Populist tragedy. "The leaders have never been 
men well grounded in reform principles, nor really desirous of 
effecting fundamental social and industrial changes. Their stock 
of radicalism consisted mainly in the no doubt very sincere belief," 
he continued, "that if they were 'in' and the others were 'out' the 
country would be saved. They went so far and only so far with 
their platforms as the pressure from the people compelled, and 
they were forever only too happy to respond to the voice of any 
siren of Fusion and slip out of the straight and narrow way of 
principle into the sweet fields of dalliance for office." Believing 
that the split between radicals and opportunists in the People's 
party would continue to widen, Lloyd soon rejected the party and 
turned to socialism, denouncing free silver as "the cow-bird of the 
Reform movement. It waited until the nest had been built by 
the sacrifices of others, and then it laid its eggs in it, pushing out 
the others which lie smashed on the ground. . . . The People's 
Party has been betrayed, and all that, but after all it is its own 
fault. No party that does not lead its leaders will ever succeed."57 
In recent years historians have disputed Lloyd's charges as to the 
nature of the Populist leadership, the St. Louis convention, the 
importance of silver, and the desirability of fusion. One historian 
did little more than to argue that since the Populists fused on 
silver, fusion was ipso facto a "resounding affirmation of principle" 
and silver a radical issue. Another merely misread Lloyd's meaning 
and accepted the mouthings of Taubeneck in attempting to demon-
strate that socialism and not silver tried to capture the Populist 
movement. The first, however, presented an intellectual history, 
with little consideration of political developments. Striving to 
explain a preeminently "practical" policy without recourse to spe-
cific events, the author accepted rationales. The other focused only 
on 1896, even then ignoring most of the preconvention period, and 
overlooked the nature of early Populism and the political develop-
57 Lloyd to J. H. Ferriss, August 6, 1896, and Lloyd to A. B. Adair, October 
10, 1896, Lloyd Papers. 
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ments within the party before 1896. There may indeed have been 
no "conspiracy" at the convention, as he asserts, nor were Populists 
at the convention tricked into naming Bryan.58 
The "conspiracy" long preceded the St. Louis convention, and 
it had already triumphed in the January 1896 meeting of the 
Populist National Committee and in the state Populist conventions 
in the spring which sent Silver Populists to St. Louis. There was 
no reason to "trick" the delegates in the convention; they were well 
prepared to acknowledge silver and fusion as the only major goal 
and acceptable strategy of the party. The only significant objections 
arose over the question of with whom to fuse. Lloyd was indeed 
mistaken in believing that the genuine Populists at the convention 
could have "split the convention near the middle, if not . . . 
carried it." If Peffer or Coxey had accepted the leadership of the 
anti-Bryan Populists there would have been a more substantial 
protest than occurred behind the relatively obscure Seymour F. 
Norton, but one still far from defeating Bryan's nomination. 
Peffer was right about Kansas and the West. In his own state's 
delegation there were but two or three Populists who would have 
voted for his nomination. Lloyd was more realistic when he added 
that not only had Peffer, Coxey, and Waite not led the convention 
against silver and Bryan, but "their followers did not clamor to 
be led."59 
But Lloyd was right about the preconvention conduct of Weaver 
and Taubeneck and about the cow-bird nature of silver. Silver had 
been among the demands of Populism from its earliest days, but it 
was a peripheral and unessential issue, even considered by most 
early Populists as almost a fraudulent issue. The opportunistic 
politicians within the party had seized upon it, as Weaver admitted, 
as "the line of least resistance," and systematically strove to remake 
Populism into a silver movement, forcing out of the party many 
of those who wanted to retain the sweeping reform commitment of 
early Populism and bringing into the party many more who re-
garded silver as the only issue. Separated by only five years, there 
should have been substantial duplication in the leadership of the 
Cincinnati Conference of 1891 and the St. Louis convention of 
58 Pollack, Populist Response to Industrial America, p. 103; Durden, Climax 
of Populism, p. ix. 
59 Lloyd, "Populists at St. Louis," p. 303. 
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1896. In fact there was not, testifying to the transformation of the 
party. Of those prominent in both, Peffer and Donnelly had repre-
sented the great majority in 1891 and accepted the 1896 results 
with grave reservations. Weaver and Simpson had almost alone 
countered the sentiment at Cincinnati but virtually dictated the 
St. Louis convention. Others influential at Cincinnati were nowhere 
to be found five years later: John Otis, Frank McGrath, Robert 
Schilling, John Rice, W. F. Rightmire, to name a few. Those 
ascendant at St. Louis had gained distinction either as a result of 
fusion maneuvers or as silver politicians: Butler, Allen, Harris, 
Stewart, Skinner, Patterson. Equally striking was that each of these 
was an officeholder explicitly forbidden by the Omaha Ordinance 
from participating in the party's deliberations. The Populists had 
failed in their attempt to assure popular control even over their 
own politicians. At the local and state level, the replacement of 
original Populists by conservative or Silver Populists had been 
even more marked, complicated further by partisan factors, par-
ticularly in the Midwest and West. 
The People's party in 1896 was emphatically not the same as 
original Populism, but as Lloyd said, "It is its own fault." The 
Populists had agreed to compromise on issues and tickets and to 
deemphasize those radical measures they themselves had described 
as essential to the necessary reordering of America. Having done 
so, they lost the initiative to the Democrats, and yet could not 
truly claim to have converted the Democracy, for the Democrats 
of the South and West that nominated Bryan had advocated free 
silver before the birth of the People's party. Rather, the Populists 
capitulated to more clever Silver Democrats and then stumbled 
toward the inevitable destruction of their party. They agreed to 
subordinate party to principle at St. Louis, but they had already 
subordinated principle to politics. Populists had failed to heed 
Donnelly's earlier warning: "Let us subordinate everything to 
the success of the cause; but do not let us subordinate the cause 
to success. "60 
Moreover, subordination failed to bring that seductive and 
delusive success. The results of the St. Louis convention left the 
People's party in confusion not confidence. Would Populists notify 
60 Quoted in Ridge, Donnelly, p. 341. 
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Bryan of his nomination? Would he accept? How could he stand 
on two different platforms? Would Sewall or Watson be withdrawn? 
If neither withdrew how could the silver vote be united on Bryan? 
Without funds or an effective central organization, the Populists 
proved a distinctly junior partner to the Bryan Democracy in 1896. 
Watson and Butler, now the party's nominal leaders, argued bitterly 
throughout the campaign and each consistently sought to under-
mine the work of the other. As the new national chairman, Butler 
cooperated closely with the Democrats and everywhere tried to 
arrange fusion electoral tickets, some devoted to Watson, others to 
Sewall; Watson repeatedly denounced what he considered Butler's 
willingness to sacrifice the Populist half of their ticket to political 
expediency. Beyond this, they sharply disagreed over the propriety 
of fusion. And fusion continued to disrupt the party. The Populist 
candidate for governor of North Carolina illustrated the demoraliza-
tion of the party when he wrote Butler, "I myself am 'befogged' at 
present, hardly know where to go, what to say when I speak, or 
'where I am at.' " His perplexity resulted from Populist-Democratic 
fusion on the national ticket and a simultaneous Populist-Repub-
lican fusion on the state ticket. Was this what the original Populists 
had meant when they condemned both old parties as equal partners 
in oppressing the people? ·watson thought not, and told Butler so: 
"Senator, a reform party has no right to exist if it has no valid 
complaint to make. Populists cannot denounce the sins of the two 
old parties, and yet go into political copartnership with them. The 
moment we make a treaty the war must cease ... and when we 
cease our war upon the two old parties, we have no longer any 
excuse for living."61 
The political situation in Kansas particularly irritated Watson. 
The Kansas delegates at St. Louis had overwhelmingly supported 
Sewall, and many proposed to stand by him despite Watson's 
nomination. They discounted the objections of Southern Populists 
because, they pointed out, Populist votes were not needed for 
Bryan to triumph in the Southern states. Both Harris and Lewelling 
immediately repudiated Watson. Lewelling argued that Watson 
61 Jones, Election of 1896, pp. 321-26; Watson to Butler, September 27, 1896, 
Butler Papers; Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 368-79; Woodward, Watson, pp. 309-
30; C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge, La., 1951), 
pp. 288-89. 
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should withdraw in favor of Sewall and declared Kansas Populists 
would remove the Georgian from their ticket. To facilitate fusion 
on the state level, Harris proposed that the Democrats could name 
the electors and the Populists the state ticket, and each endorse the 
others' nominees. In his comparable eagerness for Democratic 
support, Simpson promised the Democratic Seventh Congressional 
District convention that the Populists would replace Watson with 
Sewall, first in Kansas and then nationally.62 
Only a few Kansas Populists defended Watson. Peffer praised 
him as "a Populist of the straightest sect," and he urged Kansans 
to "keep faith with the South" and stand by the Georgian. If 
Kansans repudiated the Populist national ticket at their state con-
vention in Abilene in favor of Bryan and Sewall as Harris ad-
vocated, he declared, it would disrupt and disgrace the party. The 
smaller mid-road papers like the Kansas Agitator and Girard World 
also demanded support of Watson, but such Populists were clearly 
in the minority. \'\Then Breidenthal, now a member of the Populist 
National Executive Committee, perfunctorily remarked that Kansas 
Populists would uphold their party's national ticket, he provoked 
an outburst of complaint from both Populists and Democrats.63 
Democrats proclaimed it the duty of Kansas Populists to endorse 
Sewall in order to consolidate silver sentiment. The Atchison 
Patriot warned Populists that if they nominated Watson electors, 
McKinley would receive the entire electoral vote of the state; 
therefore, those who demanded Watson electors were working in 
the interest of the gold-standard Republicans. Democrats, like 
Populists, had already made clear their intentions to have fusion. 
At the June Democratic state convention to select delegates to the 
party's national convention, the chairman again spoke of the 1892 
fusion arrangements but unlike 1894 praised them. Once more 
fusion would aid the Democrats and opportunistically they clam-
ored for it. Earlier some Democrats had proposed nominating 
Harris for governor in their August state convention. This, they 
believed, would assure a fusion ticket, if a nominally Populist one; 
62 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 23, 1896; Kansas Agitator, July 31, 1896; Ab-
ilene Daily Reflector, July 27, 1896; John Breidenthal to Butler, August 2, 1896, 
Butler Papers: Southern Mercury, August 20, 1896; Durden, Climax of Populism, 
pp. 52-53, 76-78, 107-8, 119. 
63 Topeka Advocate, July 29, August 5, 1896; Kansas Agitator, July 31, 1896; 
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and many considered Harris as much a Democrat as a Populist any-
way. In May and June, Democrats and Democratic-Populists, 
particularly Harris and Sears, had arranged a number of fusion 
nominations. Sears's major disappointment, in fact, was his in-
ability to deliver one joint congressional nomination to a straight 
Democrat rather than a Democratic-Populist. By July the pattern 
was clear, and Kansas Democratic leaders assured a Chicago Tri-
bune reporter at the national convention that there would be "a 
fusion between the Democratic and Populist parties, despite Senator 
Peffer's efforts to prevent it."64 
Unlike 1890 when the Populist state convention repudiated all 
suggestions of fusion, or 1892 and 1894 when Populist managers 
denied fusionist intentions while scheming to fulfill them, the 
Populists at their 1896 state convention in Abilene made no effort 
to hide their determination to have Democratic fusion. They im-
mediately named a committee to confer and arrange fusion with 
the Democrats, meeting simultaneously in Hutchinson. Concerned 
above all to assert the party's identity, Peffer argued futilely for 
the nomination of electors pledged to Watson, as the party's duly 
chosen nominee. Harris countered by describing Bryan, not Wat-
son, as "the real choice of the St. Louis Populist convention," and 
he urged the delegates to endorse Democratic Sewall electors in 
exchange for Democratic endorsement of the Populist state ticket. 
The fusion committee accepted this proposal and the delegates 
dutifully agreed. The only concessions made to Peffer and the 
few other Populists who maintained that the party must recognize 
its own vice-presidential nominee were to permit the Populist ticket 
to list the Democratic electors under a Bryan-Watson heading and 
to promise that the electors would vote for Watson if he received 
more votes than Sewall outside Kansas.65 
Having thus sacrificed Watson, the Populists next determined 
who would reap the reward of the Democratic recognition so 
secured. And as the Democrats praised the Populist agreement as 
a certain way to deliver Kansas to the Democratic national ticket, 
64 Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, April 28, June 5, 16, 23, July 31, 1896; Atchison 
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they found the Populist state ticket to their liking too. "As rapidly 
as the Democratic convention received the names of the nominees 
of the Populist convention," reported one paper, "they were 
indorsed [sic]." No strong anti-fusion sentiment or candidates 
developed at Abilene. Peffer refused to endorse any candidate, 
perhaps reflecting this fact as much as a desire to avoid discord. 
Harris and Lewelling fought each other to a standstill, and John 
Leedy received the gubernatorial nomination. But Leedy had been 
a Democrat and a successful fusionist candidate for state senator 
in 1892, and he had arranged fusion in his own county in 1896 
and favored fusion plans at Abilene. Former Democrats appeared 
frequently among the other nominees, and only the selection of 
Doster for the supreme court could have irritated the regular 
Democrats. Doster, however, was no longer averse to cooperating 
with Democrats, and most men distinguished between his rhetorical 
radicalism and his legal conservatism.66 
Several days later the Republicans renominated Governor Morrill 
and prepared for the campaign. They were without enthusiasm, 
however; Morrill's administration had been marred by scandals 
and ineptness until he had lost the support even of many party 
regulars. The national gold plank, moreover, disrupted Republican 
ranks in Kansas, where silver had long been a tenet of party faith. 
Republicans were disproportionately represented in the silver 
meetings of the state after McKinley's nomination and in the del-
egation to the St. Louis convention of the silver party. Though 
most Republicans swallowed the golden pill, some did not. "I am 
afraid the once grand old party of this nation is going out of 
business this year," confessed one Republican before the Republican 
convention. "I do not believe that the State Ticket will win no 
matter who will be nominated."67 
While the Republicans struggled into the campaign, the Populists 
also faced internal dissension. The protesters were few, however; 
by 1896 Populists largely numbered only those who favored the 
66 Abilene Monitor, August 6, 1896; Abilene Daily Reflector, August 6, 1896; 
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fusion maneuvers of their leaders or who had become inured to 
the callous artifices of the reformers. Some such as Peffer and 
Clemens resigned themselves to the situation and tried to make 
the best of it, though Peffer devoted most of his time to the national 
campaign. Others such as Otis and Bennington turned, as Lloyd 
did, to socialism. Still other disillusioned Populists rejoined the 
Republican party, especially in local politics. As before, Willits, 
Corning, and Rightmire spearheaded the extreme mid-roaders who 
sought to repudiate the new Populism and remake the party accord-
ing to its original intentions. Joined in 1896 by Abe Steinberger, 
vocal editor of the Girard World, these radicals had fought the 
dictation of Breidenthal and other party leaders throughout the 
year and had hoped to depose such specious Populists at Abilene 
but were themselves scarcely represented. Opposed even to Bryan's 
endorsement, they were determined to have at least one Populist 
on their national ticket and intensely contested the Abilene deci-
sion.as 
The radical mid-roaders had three objections to the Populism 
of 1896. First, they opposed the political chicanery and arrogant 
assumptions of the fusionist managers, which betrayed the promise 
and ideals of an effective political democracy that they had found 
in original Populism. Second, they rejected the fraudulent silver 
issue and demanded adherence to Omaha Populism and the abso-
lute independence of the party from the corrupt old politicians 
and parties. Finally, they despised the Democratic party, to which, 
moreover, they believed the fusionist Populists had delivered their 
party by their objectionable methods for narrow and selfish ends. 
The Girard World provided the fullest illustration of this tri-
lateral outlook. Denouncing the manipulations of fusionists for 
making politics a struggle for office and patronage rather than 
principles and reform, the paper wondered, "How long will schem-
ing politicians think they can play the Populists for mere tools to 
use for their old party schemers and spoils hunters?" The ardent 
mid-road belief in the wisdom and justice of the individual voter 
prevented the radicals from fully grasping how completely the Pop-
68 Topeka Advocate, September 2, 23, 1896; Kansas Biographical Scrapbook, 
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ulist rank and file had been educated to the acceptance of the 
fusionist rationale while it further caused them to expect optimis-
tically that the Populists would yet reject their leaders. The World 
also arraigned the silver panacea. "Are the men who have been 
fighting the battle of humanity in this country for twenty years 
willing to acknowledge all they wanted was a change in basic 
money?" After Bryan's nomination, it declared, "The thoughtful 
Populist would just as soon be crucified upon a cross of gold as 
upon a cross of silver." At the same time, the World repudiated 
not only fusion but the intended partner to the fusion. Like vir-
tually all the radical Populists, Steinberger had formerly been a 
Republican, and he constantly denied any connection between 
Populism and Democracy and scoffed at the notion of a new 
Democracy committed to sincere reform. "We confess that we 
are not ready to join the rotten and treacherous old Democratic 
party. . . . The Populist Party is not going to crawl into its grave 
to elect a Democratic president." The Abilene trade seemed to the 
World to involve all three offenses. "The delivery of the electoral 
ticket at Abilene last week to the same old Democracy which has 
been most bitter to Populistic teachings, was a cowardly act that 
cannot be condoned," the paper announced. "It was the trading 
of the national candidate for a mess of state pottage."69 
Marion Butler asked Populist leaders to change the Abilene 
arrangement to guarantee Watson at least some of Kansas's electoral 
votes. Breidenthal replied that the matter was closed and the 
National Committee should not interfere lest it disturb the plan 
made to give the state government to the Populists. Steinberger, 
Willits, and Rightmire, hoping that Butler might recognize a 
straight Populist ticket committed to Bryan and Watson, conferred 
with Watson in September and then summoned a mid-road con-
vention to nominate such a ticket. Willits and Rightmire pointedly 
revealed the changes in Populism by calling the mid-road con-
vention as "your standard bearers in the campaign of 1890," and 
by denouncing the "office hunters who have secured control of the 
People's Party organization." At the same time, Willits explained 
to Butler that the Kansas Populist leaders had sold out the party 
to the Democrats and warned that "their wholesale slaughter of 
69 Girard World, July 16, August 6, 13, 1896. 
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the Party and our fearless leader of the South will be resented in 
a way that all may understand it."70 
Most Populists angrily denounced the mid-roaders as working 
for Republican money and sought to drive them from the canvass. 
·when \Vatson campaigned briefly in Kansas-over the objections 
of the regular Populist organization-Breidenthal kept him from 
the major cities, tried to censor his speeches, and declared that the 
Populist vice-presidential candidate campaigned "under the aus-
pices and management of a Republican annex." Local party leaders 
tried to prevent Populists from attending mid-road meetings. And 
the regular Populists also attempted to prohibit the mid-road ticket 
from appearing on the ballot. For a "traitor," Steinberger had 
excellent credentials: president of the Kansas Reform Press As-
sociation, a member of the executive committee of the National 
Reform Press Association, secretary of the Populist Central Com-
mittee of the Third Congressional District, and a Populist central 
committeeman of Crawford County. \Villits had been the first 
Populist gubernatorial candidate, the president of the Kansas State 
Farmers' Alliance, twice the national lecturer of the National Farm-
ers' Alliance and Industrial Union, and that organization's national 
president in 1895-1896. Nevertheless, their determination to upset 
the fusion arrangements made them the verbal target for fusionists 
of both parties. Eventually, even those such as Peffer and Clemens, 
who had supported Watson and denounced the Abilene trade, 
came out against the radical anti-fusionists, fearful that their sep-
arate ticket would divide the reform forces and concerned about 
the scarcely disguised Republican approval of their actions.n 
The mid-roaders failed completely. Butler refused to assist them, 
accepting Breidenthal's practical defense of the political deal as 
guaranteeing the election of Populists to state and congressional 
offices. In Kansas, Populists cooperated with Democrats as never 
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before. In carrying fusion principles to their logical end, members 
of each party participated in conventions of the other, and some-
times the conventions met together in one body. ·where the con-
ventions met separately but simultaneously, as in past years, there 
were few arguments over candidate and partisan recognition, and 
the delegates expected fusion as a matter of course and accepted it 
without discussion. Political trades, deals, and promises were openly 
arranged without the subterfuge of earlier fusion campaigns, and 
in some instances cooperation was remarkably cordial. In the con-
gressional conventions of the Fourth District, Democrats expressed 
their trust in the judgment of Populists and did not even suggest 
any names for a fusion candidate. At other times, however, Dem-
ocrats were more demanding, often encouraged by Martin who 
hoped to secure a Democratic balance of power in the next legis-
lature in order to gain senatorial election in Peffer's place. Populist 
leaders, too, encouraged fusion arrangements for their own ends. 
In Leavenworth County, the Populists granted all county offices 
to Democrats in exchange for a fusion nomination to the state 
senate for Harris.72 
Kansas Populists also rejected the mid-road appeal to avoid the 
artificial issue of free silver, and silver-tongued orators everywhere 
preached in the old pulpits of 1890 that had witnessed the Populist 
pentecostal tongues demanding a new society. Silver was the issue, 
however artificial, and it provided the means to wrest the state 
government from the Republicans at the polls. The fusionists 
elected their entire state ticket, a majority of members in both 
houses of the legislature, and six congressmen. Willits led the 
mid-road ticket with a mere 1,240 votes. But even in a state with 
a long nonpartisan tradition of silver advocacy, the margin of 
victory was surprisingly small. Bryan got a scant 51 percent of the 
vote and the state ticket even less. The "Popocrats"-with sub-
stantial Silver Republican help-had hardly overwhelmed an un-
popular Republican administration. Significantly, nearly three-
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quarters of the fusion votes were cast under the Democratic rather 
than the Populist heading.73 
Nationally, Bryan and silver did even worse. With a record 
turnout, the country's voters rejected Bryan for the advance agent 
of prosperity. In addition to losing every state east of the Mississippi 
and north of the Potomac, Bryan even failed to carry five Western 
and four border states and lost the election decisively. The Dem-
ocrats had suffered from the popular and just connection of the 
Democratic administration with the great depression, from tra-
ditional bloody-shirt appeals and prejudices, and from economic 
and social pressures of various kinds. 
The Populists emerged from the Bryan campaign disorganized 
and confused. They had agreed to join the Democrats in a silver 
crusade as a practical move guaranteed to produce victory and re-
form, however minor; but their victory was lost in the nation's 
polling booths. The Bryan-\Vatson ticket received little more than 
200,000 popular votes and Watson won only twenty-seven electoral 
votes. Although Populists achieved a share of victory in Kansas, 
Nebraska, and some other ·western states, Republicans triumphed 
easily in North Dakota and Minnesota, and the Populists lost 
Colorado to a Democratic-Silver Republican fusion. Throughout 
the South, Populists fused with Republicans in state contests, achiev-
ing a great victory in North Carolina, but the effects of dual fusion 
maneuvers were demoralizing. Many Southern Populists refused 
to vote at all and some even voted for McKinley. And as fusion 
drove some Populists in Kansas back to the Republican party or 
into splinter Populist factions, fusion in the South encouraged 
some Populists to return to the Democrats. Under the influence 
of united efforts on the national ticket the People's party perma-
nently lost many of its adherents to a partially revitalized Democ-
racy. Major Populists placed a Bryan victory above party identity. 
Weaver, for instance, accepted a position on the Democratic na-
tional campaign committee, and even Donnelly campaigned in the 
Midwest for the Democratic National Committee after declining 
to canvass under the auspices of the Populist National Committee. 
On the other hand, Peffer campaigned extensively for the Populist 
National Committee and Waite broke with the fusionist Populist 
73 Tenth Annual Report of the Secretary of State of Kansas (Topeka, 1896). 
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party of Colorado, now under Patterson's control, to campaign on 
a middle-of-the-road ticket. 74 
Finally, compounding the original disaster it had inflicted upon 
Populism, the party organization had surrendered during the cam-
paign much of the party's independence that its existence was 
designed to preserve. The National Committee worked closely with 
the Democratic committee, sought and received Democratic funds, 
failed to coordinate Populist state campaigns, urged Populist candi-
dates to withdraw in favor of Democratic nominees, and accepted 
Sewall electors as an expedient policy. Watching these maneuvers, 
one Illinois Populist concluded that "the party organization [was] a 
disgrace to populism." Without waiting for the inevitable Novem-
ber defeat, G. L. McKean wrote Butler that he was renouncing all 
allegiance to such a party: "I shall remain a populist, but do not 
recognize the so-called People's Party as a political organization 
animated and directed by the spirit of true populism." It remained 
for Watson to pronounce the final words after the election. The 
party of the people, he declared, "does not exist any more."75 
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CHAPTER NINE 
The Reward of the Faithful 
AFTER THE election of 1896, the disintegration of the People's party 
accelerated. Having lost both its independence and its strength by 
being absorbed into the Bryan silver campaign, the party divided 
into quarreling factions that agreed only on the fact that Populism 
had changed greatly since its birth. Members of the mid-road group 
recognized this explicitly and demanded a return to early Populism 
and an avoidance of fusion and silver; the larger group implicitly 
recognized the transformation of Populism but believed the hope 
of the party lay in a continuation of the policies that had already 
destroyed its future. The latter position was absurd and myopic; 
the former attitude was no less self-deceptive for it was already 
obsolete. The American political system had broken its great 
challenger. 
No episode in 1897 better illustrated the transformation of 
Populism than did the Kansas senatorial election. Populists totally 
ignored the old Alliance rule requiring the office to seek the man. 
No sooner had William A. Harris lost the gubernatorial nomina-
tion than he began to seek Peffer's Senate seat, with election to the 
state senate being the first step. John Breidenthal had supported 
the gubernatorial ambitions of Harris partially to clear the path 
to the Senate for himself, and he soon confirmed his candidacy as 
he had in 1891 and 1893, apparently limiting his personal goals to 
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a posltwn awarded by politicians in the legislature rather than 
an office determined by popular election. In November and Decem-
ber 1896, Lewelling and several other Populists also began to seek 
the nomination openly. John Martin had announced his candidacy 
in 1895 and reaffirmed it throughout 1896. Harris and Breidentha1 
even set up official headquarters in Topeka by the first week in 
January 1897. Harris was the most open in declaring his intentions. 
He systematically gathered information about the legislators, and 
his friend William H. Sears wrote individual legislators as early as 
November to solicit their votes for him, promising that Harris never 
forgot a favor and scarcely veiling a threat that he never forgot a 
slight either. "I believe it would be a smart thing for you to tie 
your fortunes to him," Sears wrote one legislator, "not only for 
your present good but for future advancement."1 
Peffer alone attempted to follow the old Alliance rule, though 
eventually he also sought the party's nomination. In August he 
replied to inquiries as to his possible candidacy for reelection by 
declaring he had only one qualification that others lacked: senato-
rial experience. ·without announcing a desire for reelection, he 
would say only that he would regard it as a great honor. In early 
November, moreover, Peffer returned to Washington to work on 
senatorial matters, and he remained there until the session ended 
in March, abstaining from personal appeals or the vigorous lobby-
ing in which the other candidates engaged. In December, however, 
he sent a circular letter to all Populist legislators, mentioning his 
experience and knowledge gained in the previous years, summariz-
ing his work in the Senate, and reminding them that "I have kept 
faith with the people." This low-key bid for support was Peffer's 
concession to playing politics, but it could hardly have been effec-
tive: an impersonal, formal letter, promising nothing more than 
continued faithful service.2 
More important, perhaps, for his reelection hopes was his control 
of the Advocate, which defended him as the Kansas Farmer had in 
1 Topeka Daily Capital, November 25, 26, 1896; Fort Scott Daily Monitor, 
January 5, 1897: W. H. Sears to D. M. Rothweiler, November 21, 1896, Sears to 
W. B. Helm, November 20, 1896, and Sears to A. G. Forney, November 20, 1896, 
Sears Papers. 
2 Topeka Advocate, August 5, November 4, 1896; Topeka State Journal, 
December 11, 1896. 
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1891. But it was clearly defensive; Peffer simply no longer repre-
sented the People's party and had no definite base of support in the 
legislature. His opponents revived the old charges of his age and 
delicate health as well as new ones intimating that he had been 
less than generous to the state campaign in 1896. The Advocate 
accordingly printed long articles pointing out Peffer's present good 
health and noting that twenty-two senators were older. His alleged 
neglect of Kansas during the 1896 campaign, the Advocate ex-
plained, had been at the urgent request of the National Committee 
and with the permission of the State Committee. Even Breidenthal 
rebuked such criticism as unfair and joined others in pointing out 
that Peffer had long carried the party's financial burdens, especially 
in maintaining the Advocate at a heavy cost and campaigning in 
both state and nation at his own expense.3 The Advocate, however, 
could not effectively rebut the major objection to Peffer. What he 
represented, most Populists wanted to avoid: anti-fusion politics, 
adherence to early Populism, and Republican antecedents. And if 
Breidenthal and others defended him for campaigning outside of 
Kansas in 1896, Peffer's opposition to fusion, the Abilene arrange-
ment, and Leedy had only been too obvious. 
The newspaper was not just a Pefferian Advocate, however. In 
the interest of the party, its columns were opened to all senatorial 
aspirants and the paper printed endorsements and articles support-
ing other candidates. Nor did Peffer attempt to persuade his rivals 
to withdraw. Breidenthal, for example, wrote privately to Peffer to 
inform him of his intended candidacy, and the senator, according 
to Breidenthal's friends, "assents and interposes not the slightest 
objection." Breidenthal, however, contended that Peffer's position 
had become hopeless and urged him to retire from the contest.4 
Though Peffer refused to concede defeat, Breidenthal was correct 
in arguing that the Populist tide had turned against Peffer. News-
paper articles suggesting other candidates made this abundantly 
clear. The LeRoy Reporter perhaps best expressed the views of 
the new Populists: Peffer, the Reporter admitted, had done "very 
3 Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital (Topeka), December 29, 1896, January 8, 1897; 
Topeka Advocate, November 18, December 2, 9, 16, 1896; Kansas City journal, 
November 14, 1896. 
4 Topeka Advocate, December 2, 9, 23, 30, 1896, January 6, 1897; Topeka Daily 
Capital, November 25, 26, 1896. 
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well for a figure-head when the party was new and its members 
comparative strangers to one another. But things have changed," 
the paper continued. "Crazy and impractical notions have been 
dropped out of the profession of faith. Victory and a sense of 
responsibility have made the party more conservative and imbued 
its leaders" with different attitudes and goals. But Peffer remained 
committed to the original positions and therefore was unacceptable 
to most Populists in 1897. The Reporter concluded, then, it felt 
no surprise to see such men as Peffer gradually displaced by new 
and different men.a 
Of course Peffer retained some support, but more among the 
rank and file than among the legislators, as straw votes invariably 
revealed. Some legislators, instructed for Peffer by their constit-
uents, even announced their intention to vote for another candidate, 
mocking the original Populist emphasis upon popular participation 
and local control in politics. Most of Peffer's journalistic backing 
came from the moderate mid-road element, which emphasized his 
constancy to the principles of early Populism. The Ness City Echo, 
for instance, after announcing the results of a straw vote showing 
Peffer nearly three to one over his opposition and urging his re-
election, declared, "Senator Peffer has gallantly and continuously 
fought for the principles espoused way back in the eighties." The 
Kansas Agitator remained one of Peffer's foremost advocates. In 
a poll of its readers, this mid-road paper found only one objector 
to Peffer's reelection, yet he could suggest no other acceptable 
candidate and based his protest simply on the belief that six years 
was long enough to serve. More characteristic was the assertion of 
one venerable reformer that he not only favored Peffer's reelection 
but that "if our senators and representatives go back on Peffer, 
they needn't expect the support of the old Greenbackers hereafter."a 
The silver fusionists in the legislature, however, cared little for 
the old Greenbackers. They were more concerned about their 
Democratic antecedents and their Democratic allies. Democrats 
claimed that the legislature owed its election to their support and 
admitted that "the Democracy did not aid the Populists because it 
5 Quoted in Topeka Advocate, January 6, 1897. 
6 Ibid., November 25, December 2, 30, 1896, January 20, 1897; Kansas Agitator 
(Garnett), November 6, 20, 27, December 18, 1896. 
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loved that party more, but because it loved Republicanism less." 
Such self-interested action required a tangible reward, and future 
fusion, these partisans warned, was doomed unless a Democrat 
received the senatorial honors. Dangling fusion before the eager 
Populists, the Newton journal announced that "the loss of Peffer 
is comparatively insignificant to the great gain that would surely 
result to the Populists from the election of a Democrat as senator."7 
Faced with such demands, the Populist fusionists were all the 
more ready to drop Peffer, an anti-fusion ex-Republican, especially 
unacceptable to the Democrats, and to follow their usual practice: 
a covert surrender to Democratic demands while maintaining a 
semblance of integrity. In this instance, Democratic newspapers 
pointed the way by recommending the election of Harris. Harris 
was everything Peffer was not: a former Democrat, the state's fore-
most fusionist, an ardent Silver Populist, and a conservative who 
had always opposed the distinctive measures of early Populism. 
From the start, moreover, Sears had based his letter-writing cam-
paign for Harris on the necessity of insuring future Democratic 
fusion. Peffer's defense only injured further his chances by em-
phasizing his faithful service and by defending his allegedly "vision-
ary ideas" as strictly in accordance with party beliefs.s Populists in 
1897 wanted to forget their origins as they had already repudiated 
their beliefs. Peffer was the spirit and representative of original 
Populism; Harris embodied the new Populism. 
The politicians, reported one newspaper after another, had thus 
decided against Peffer. When the fusionist legislators caucused in 
Topeka on January 19, 1897, Peffer received but twenty-four of 102 
votes; Harris won the nomination and, a week later, the election.9 
The reaction to the election of Harris confirmed the expectations 
of the fusionist Populists and dramatically endorsed the transforma-
tion of Populism. Democrats were ecstatic. The Newton journal 
described Harris as a Democrat and crowed that the Populists had 
7 Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, January 12, 1897; Newton Semi-Weekly Journal, 
January 5, 12, 1897. 
8 Marshall County Democrat (Marysville), December 25, 1896; Sears to Helm, 
November 20, 1896, Sears to Jason Helmick, November 20, 1896, Sears to 
Rothweiler, November 21, 1896, Sears Papers; Topeka Advocate, January 6, 20, 
1897. 
9 Fort Scott Daily Monitor, January 9, 1897; Abilene Monitor, December 10, 
1896; Topeka Advocate, January 27, 1897. 
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answered the Democratic demand. Conservatives of all parties 
praised the decision. The Topeka Capital was pleased that, 
although nominally a Populist, Harris "has never been identified 
with the extreme element of that party and will not cause humilia-
tion to his state by the introduction of sensational financial bills 
or by foolish political harangues." Most especially gratifying was 
the direct contrast to his predecessor. "His appearance in Senator 
Peffer's seat in the Senate will create a favorable impression and 
will be generally regarded outside of Kansas as an evidence that 
the more moderate counsels are in control of the Populist party in 
this state." Former Governor Thomas Osborn agreed. "There is 
a wide difference in the Populist party ... from what that party 
was four years ago," he declared. "It has lost much of its former 
radicalism, and has virtually abandoned many of its impracticable 
schemes of governmental reform. I don't think its leaders will 
depart hereafter from a safe and conservative course." Only the 
few middle-of-the-road Populists complained. The Kansas Agitator 
deplored Peffer's defeat and added, "We do not admire Col. Harris 
and never did."lO It was a tragic irony that opposition to Peffer 
in 1891 had rested primarily in the fear that he might prove less 
than completely committed to reform and might cooperate with 
one of the old parties, and that opposition to him in 1897 resulted 
principally from his steadfast adherence to those reform principles 
and his resistance to fusion. 
Though the senatorial contest best represented the changes Pop-
ulism had undergone since its birth, the performance of both the 
governor and the legislature further demonstrated the degradation 
of Populism and correctly questioned the wisdom of fusion politics. 
From the beginning the Leedy administration lacked the reformist 
zeal that had characterized early Populism or even the eloquent 
posturings of the Lewelling administration. Republicans praised 
Leedy's innocuous inaugural address for being devoid of that "sickly 
balderdash" that had formed the thrust of earlier Populist speeches, 
and the erstwhile calamity-howlers interrupted Governor Morrill's 
valedictory remarks with heavy applause when he spoke of the 
great prosperity and progress of the state and condemned those 
10 Newton Semi-Weekly Journal, January 22, 1897: Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, 
January 22, 29, 1897; Kansas Agitator, January 22, 1897. 
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who would criticize it. In office, Leedy blundered badly in working 
with the legislature and quarreled with other leading Populists.11 
Leedy's patronage policies also disturbed the Populist ranks. He 
recalled that at their "early party conventions some one would in-
variably inquire, when a new candidate was brought forward, 'is 
he a Republican or a Democrat?'" Now, however, convinced that 
Populists no longer worried about former political affiliations, 
Leedy announced his intention to treat fusionists as members of a 
single party in distributing patronage. Leedy then ignored the 
recommendations of Peffer and other early Populists and awarded 
offices in a conscious attempt to consolidate Democrats and Populists 
permanently. Some Populists complained that Leedy slighted his 
own party while rewarding Democrats excessively. Radical anti-
fusionists laughed at these myopic protesters "for not having intel-
ligence enough to know the legitimate and inevitable consequences 
of political prostitution." The governor, they declared, "is simply 
trying to maintain and perpetuate that fusion which you . 
persisted in making in the face of . . . all our protests and ad-
monitions. "12 
Leedy's attitudes toward prohibition and the metropolitan police 
law also disrupted party harmony. Leedy announced that he had 
not become a Populist "to hunt joints nor to fight resubmission," 
and like Lewelling he relaxed prohibition enforcement because of 
a desire to retain Democratic support. Prohibitionists in all parties 
criticized the governor, charged that he had made a deal with the 
liquor interests, and demanded the enforcement of the law.1s 
The legislature proved equally disappointing. For the first time, 
Republicans controlled neither house, and great results were an-
ticipated. Instead, what the legislature of 1897 managed to achieve 
was merely to indicate that Populism had come full circle. In the 
original movement, the primary economic demands involved lower 
12Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, December 8, 1896, February 9, 1897; Peffer to 
Leedy, November 20, 1896, and accompanying letters to Leedy in John Davis 
Scrapbook, val. L, KSHS. 
13 Topeka Advocate and News, February 9, 1898; Topeka Daily Capital, May 
19, 1897, February 3, 1898. 
11 Topeka Daily Capital, January 12, March 10, 1897; Kansas Biographical 
Scrapbook "C," vol. 4, p. 255; John Dunsmore to Sears, July 28, 1898, Sears 
Papers. 
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interest rates and a maximum freight rate railroad law and were 
directed by Peffer in each instance. In 1897 the Populist legislature 
voted down bills designed to achieve these objectives and in each 
instance Harris directed the new Populism. Whereas the Repub-
lican legislature in 1889 had violated its reform pledges made in 
the campaign of 1888, thereby providing the real impetus to Pop-
ulism, eight years later the People's party controlled the legislature 
and similarly repudiated its solemn pledges to the people made in 
the previous campaign. Those who argued that devotion to prin-
ciples did not necessarily diminish when "practical politics" dictated 
the course of the party were proved disastrously wrong.14 
Legislation to reduce the maximum legal interest rates had always 
been a major Populist goal. A bill designed to meet that demand 
failed in the senate when several Populists voted against it. These 
negative Populists were virtually coterminous with the party's non-
farmer, middle-class element. Harris, still a state senator despite 
his elevation to the United States Senate, was the most vigorous 
opponent of reducing interest rates; he argued that higher interest 
rates would encourage Eastern capital to invest in Kansas and spur 
the state's economic development. These Populists were no calam-
ity-howlers; Populism had become respectable-and perfidious.15 
The Populist legislators also failed to enact a bill establishing a 
maximum freight rate for railroads, a perennial reform demand 
from at least the early 1880s, when Peffer strongly advocated it, and 
a Populist 1896 platform declaration as well. One legislator re-
minded his fellow Populists that such a law involved the "cardinal 
principle" of the state party. Nevertheless, the legislators side-
tracked the designated bill for a weak substitute designed merely 
to revise the old and inadequate railroad commission. The senate 
unanimously passed this impotent bill and the house approved it 
by a 121-1 vote. The Republican support for the bill suggested its 
harmless nature and helped cause forty-four Populists to protest 
the bill formally because "it is not the measure we have promised 
14 The phrasing comes from a Walter T. K. Nugent apologia for fusion in his 
The Tolerant Populists (Chicago, 1963), p. 187. 
15 Norton Liberator, February 26, 1897; Senate journal (Topeka, Kans., 1897), 
pp. 451-52, 525-27; 0. Gene Clanton, Kansas Populism: Ideas and Men (Lawrence, 
1969), p. 201. 
284 POPULISM and POLITICS 
the people." They also asserted that the bill had been promoted 
and approved by the railroad lobby. Though these Populists 
protested, they accepted the weak bill; Governor Leedy refused 
to do so and vetoed it. There was, however, no time left for the 
legislature to consider an appropriate measure, and the session 
ended without the promised railroad regulation. The architect of 
this disaster was none other than Harris, who had devised the 
objectionable bill and led the fight to defeat the inclusion of a 
maximum rate provision.16 
The remainder of the legislative session provided no encourage-
ment. Several Populists voted with Republicans to defeat a pro-
posed initiative and referendum amendment, another prime Pop-
ulist demand. A few minor reform laws were passed but the 
legislature rapidly dissolved into a contentious and vicious body 
with commonplace allegations of bribery and betrayal. The major 
quarrel occurred between Andrew J. Titus, a Populist of Repub-
lican antecedents already disgusted with fusionists in his district, 
and Lewelling, also a state senator. Titus charged the former 
governor with questionable lobbying and attempted bribery, and 
Lewelling retorted that Titus was involved in a conspiracy to 
destroy him politically. Jerry Simpson was also an active lobbyist, 
with at least as dubious intentions. His opposition to the maximum 
rate railroad bill and other distinctively Populist proposals pro-
voked one observer to wonder, "Which is the real Simpson, the 
sockless ranter in Congress, or the conservative lobbyist in Topeka?" 
Finally the legislature appointed a committee to investigate the 
various charges of corruption, and for several months the bickering 
reformers denounced one another. No hard evidence ever appeared 
to prove the allegations, but when the legislature finally adjourned, 
the Populists were discredited, divided, and downcast.17 
To many, the fruits of fusion were bitter. The old mid-road 
arguments against the election of H. L. Moore or John Martin 
seemed borne out again: if placed in power, those not wholly 
committed to reform could hurt the entire movement. The Norton 
Liberator, for example, condemned Harris and other fusionists 
16 Topeka Daily Capital, February 24, 25, 1897; Senate journal, p. 680; House 
journal (Topeka, Kans., 1897), pp. 680, 908, 911. 
17 Topeka Daily Capital, January 26, 30, April 6, 10, 11, 20, 1897. 
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who violated their platform pledges as the "Judases of Populism." 
The Liberator explained the lesson of the legislature: Populists 
should not replace the faithful who had definite and radical posi-
tions with newcomers who promised respectability and conservatism. 
"We were successful at the polls but defeated in the legislative 
halls. Thus our victory last fall became a more ignominious defeat, 
than if our candidates had failed of election." The Kansas Agitator 
agreed that the legislature weakened the party by voting against 
Populist measures promised to the people.ls 
After the legislature adjourned, the Topeka Capital justly com-
mented that nothing remained of Populism. In the state the party 
had repudiated the essential features of Kansas Populism in the 
railroad and interest rate laws; in the nation the Populists had 
rejected the subtreasury and fiat money for silver. Populists in 1897 
would jeer at Peffer's The Way Out, the paper continued. The 
new Populists simply refused to enact the Populist principles of 
the early 1890s. This pleased the Capital which saw the new 
behavior as more "sensible" and "responsible," but the paper also 
rightly pointed out that there was no need of a third party without 
distinct principles, that was guided by the same interests and 
objectives as the two major parties.19 
Peffer, in active editorial charge of the Advocate, severely de-
nounced the disloyal politicians as traitors to Populism. Sounding 
once again like an 1889 Republican disgusted with a Republican 
legislature, Peffer declared that platforms must be redeemed, not 
"made as a means of securing office," and he hoped that "in the 
future none but men who will be faithful to their constituents will 
be placed in power by Populist voters." He also struck out at 
Leedy's performance, especially on prohibition, appearing at mass 
rallies in Topeka to castigate the governor for refusing to perform 
his constitutional duty and for "abusing the temperance people" 
while cooperating with "the violators of the law." By June, Peffer's 
critical course continually "created consternation among the Pop-
ulist politicians," one paper reported. One Advocate editorial, for 
example, made Leedy, according to a friend, "so mad when he 
18 Norton Liberator, February 26, March 12, April 16, 1897; Kansas Agitator, 
April 2, 1897. 
19Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, March 2, 5, 16, 1897. 
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read it that he tore the Advocate up and threw it into the waste-
basket."2o 
Peffer's position also troubled the national party leaders. Even 
during the 1896 campaign he had insisted that the People's party 
and the Democracy were essentially different and that the fusion 
of 1896 was not a permanent union. Immediately after the election, 
Peffer declared that the reform forces must never again unite under 
Democratic leadership, and he repeated his old proposal for the 
creation of a new and permanent reform party under a new name 
free of the distracting prejudices associated with former partisan 
alignments. To organize such a party he favored calling a con-
ference of reformers. This announcement met the same opposition 
of silence as his earlier proposals had. Moreover, many prominent 
Populists advocated a continued, even perpetual, fusion of the 1896 
allies, and some were already prepared to follow Bryan into the 
Second Battle. Allen even offered to resign his Senate seat in favor 
of Bryan.21 
Promptly after the election, Southern mid-roaders demanded the 
reorganization of the National Committee to end "the fusion 
heresy" and prepare for independent party action in the future. 
"Abolish the bargain counter, repudiate the fusion leaders, re-
organize the party, oust the office-holders from our National Com-
mittee," wrote Tom Watson, "-and Populism yet has a future." 
When his own suggestions were ignored, Peffer added his voice to 
those of the other mid-roaders. "I see there is a disposition on the 
part of some of our fellows to follow Bryan and his people," Peffer 
noted. "I, for one, am not in favor of a coalition of forces." The 
Populist predicament, as Peffer incisively explained, was that the 
party was composed of former members of the two old parties and 
was divided philosophically along approximately the same lines. 
The former Republicans believed in a strong and active national 
government, the former Democrats in a limited and negative 
government. "The radical or Republican element among the Pop-
ulists," he declared, could not accept the theory behind the Dem-
20 Topeka Advocate, March 3, 10, June 2, July 14, 1897; Kansas Semi- Weekly 
Capital, May 11, 21, June 4, 1897. 
21 Topeka Advocate, July 29, October 21, November 11, 25, 1896; Kansas Semi-
Weekly Capital, November 24, 1896; Fred E. Haynes, ]ames Baird Weaver (Iowa 
City, 1919), pp. 383-85. 
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ocratic platform demands for state banks and redemption in coin, 
for example, "while the Democratic element does." Thus, one 
faction of the party eagerly sought the fusionist program that the 
other faction could never accept. And a reaffirmation of the original 
principles and purpose might cause the Democratic-Populists to 
withdraw from the party and thereby "leave us where we [were] 
in the beginning." Nevertheless, Peffer believed such a course was 
necessary if the Populists were ever to accomplish their initial 
objectives. "Principle before policy."22 
Accordingly, Peffer joined other mid-roaders in urging that a 
conference be held to take steps to reverse the party's mistaken 
direction. The meeting was held in Memphis on February 22, 
1897, to coincide with the annual gathering of the National Reform 
Press Association there. Paul Van Dervoort, president of the 
editorial association, believed that Weaver, Allen, Butler, and other 
Populist fusionists were planning to consign the party to the Democ-
racy. He declared that it was therefore essential to devise a with· 
drawal from fusion and a return to original Populism. The 
conference agreed, and asked the Populist National Committee to 
arrange a delegate convention to decide the party's course.23 
Butler saw no reason to accept this proposal of the mid-roaders. 
As chairman of the National Committee he approved his own 
policy and, if regretting his inability to coordinate the Populists in 
the country, saw fusion as an appropriate future strategy. Indeed, 
he believed he could best assist the party by isolating the extreme 
mid-road element in the party. He had not supported the Memphis 
meeting and he opposed a national convention to define the party's 
position because he feared that the radical elements would dominate 
such a meeting. In April, after consulting with Simpson, Harris, 
Allen, and other congressional Populists, Butler announced his 
refusal to convoke the requested conference and viciously de-
nounced the mid-roaders. Peffer had urged Butler to call the 
convention and soon took angry exception to the chairman's course. 
22 People's Party Paper (Atlanta), November 13, 1896; Tom Watson to Davis 
Waite, November 8, 1896, Waite Papers; Southern Mercury (Dallas), December 
10, 1896: Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, January 29, February 2, 1897; Boston 
Herald, January 11, 25, 1897. 
23 Boston Herald, January 11, 1897; Paul Van Dervoort to Lemuel H. Weller, 
January 16, 1897, Weller Papers; Southern Mercury, February 25, March 11, 1897. 
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Peffer accused him and the congressional fusion Populists of 
misusing their power and criticized them for constantly harassing 
the mid-roaders. He reminded them that vital differences existed 
between Populism and Democracy. He harshly censured Butler and 
Simpson for their arguments that the mid-roaders were Republican 
tools, all the while they themselves accepted Republican assistance 
in North Carolina and worked with the Democrats. Simpson even 
listed himself in the Congressional Directory as a Democrat-Pop-
ulist, provoking Peffer to designate him an "assistant Democrat."24 
When Butler refused to call an official conference, a special 
committee of the NRP A did so, asking Populists to meet in Nash-
ville on July 4, 1897. Peffer regretted that Butler's inaction made 
the conference unofficial and therefore incapable of resolving 
matters. It was necessary to maintain an independent, anti-fusion 
third party, he believed. Much of the Kansas Populist press im-
mediately attacked Peffer for trying to create dissension in the 
fusion ranks and argued that the Democratic party was thoroughly 
reformed, thereby eliminating the need for an independent People's 
party. This duplicated the Democratic position, testifying to the 
virtual consolidation of the two parties. The Democratic Man-
hattan Mercury, for example, announced that the revitalization of 
the Democracy had removed the excuse for the existence of the 
People's party and that Populists should join the Democratic party. 
Even many Populist papers that nominally opposed Democratic 
absorption decried the mid-roaders as a disruptive factor financed 
and encouraged by the Republicans, demanded a boycott of the 
Nashville Conference, and apparently believed that Butler's policy 
of drift would somehow preserve the party's integrity.25 
Despite the harsh criticism, Peffer continued to oppose the fusion 
Populists. He rebuked the National Committee for doing nothing 
to assure Populist autonomy, Weaver for working with the Dem-
ocrats in Iowa, Allen for accepting money from Bryan ostensibly 
for Populist campaign purposes. He applauded the results of the 
24 Marion Butler to Ignatius Donnelly, December 10, 1896, Donnelly Papers; 
!louthern Mercury, March 25, 1897; Topeka Advocate, March 24, 31, April 14, 
1897. 
25 Ottawa Weekly Times, April 1, 22, 29, June 3, 1897; Topeka Advocate, 
April 7, 28, 1897; Southern Mercury, April 22, 1897; Girard World, May 13, 1897; 
Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, June 11, 1897; Norton Liberator, May 21, July 9, 
1897. 
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Nashville Conference, which condemned fusion and formed the 
National Organization Committee to keep the regular Populist 
Committee honest and to provide an organization within the party 
from which anti-fusion action could be launched. The object of 
the mid-road Populists, Peffer explained, "is not to destroy the 
party by declaring war against its regularly appointed officers, but 
to save the party by getting control, at the proper time and in the 
proper way, of the party machinery." Though Allen, Weaver, and 
other nominal Populists who accepted Democratic principles could 
become Democrats with little trauma, Peffer wrote, the mid-roaders 
were Populists who felt that serious differences existed between 
Populism and Democracy, who were not convinced that the Democ-
racy was regenerated, and who believed that uniting with another 
party was equivalent to abandoning their own. Peffer declared 
that, if fusion was forced upon him again by the policies of Butler 
and his cohorts, he would probably feel "that it would be more 
manly, more honorable and more fitting every way to go as a 
volunteer Democrat or Republican than as a conscripted Populist. 
If our party is worth saving, let us fight for it under our own 
colors. "26 
So believing, Peffer accepted an invitation to campaign in Iowa 
against the Democratic-Populists. Weaver had led Iowa's Populists 
into the Democratic party after the legislature amended the state 
ballot law to prevent a candidate from being listed under more 
than one party. Desirous of fusion, Weaver did not hesitate to 
take the logical step and accepted the Democratic platform and 
name. He vacuously justified his action by claiming that it had 
gained 200,000 Iowa votes for the cause. Peffer retorted that it 
seemed a strange way to gain supporters: "That is the way Jonah 
captured the whale." When Stewart's Silver Knight made a claim 
similar to Weaver's, Peffer wondered publicly why, if the Democrats 
had really become Populists as the fusionists charged, "don't they 
take our name and adopt our platform?" Instead, Weaver's course 
showed clearly that the Populists had become Democrats, taking 
their name and platform. The few remaining Iowa Populists who 
rejected fusion rallied around A. W. C. Weeks and Lemuel H. 
Weller and determined to run a straight ticket. They called a 
26 Topeka Advocate, April 28, June 30, July 14, 1897. 
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convention for August 19, 1897, and invited Peffer to address 
them.27 
Anticipating criticism, Peffer carefully prepared his speech and 
read it rather than speaking extemporaneously. The People's party, 
he announced, had been organized when existing parties refused 
to face the harsh problems arising from industrialization that con-
fronted the nation; they had become subservient to the nation's 
despoilers. Populism asserted "the equality of human rights" and 
demanded a fundamental restructuring of American life to place 
"paramount power and authority" in the hands of the people. The 
Democrats, Peffer charged, had never changed their opposition to 
this central thrust of Populism. They accepted in 1896 some periph-
eral demands of Populism-but not even these completely: they 
disavowed irredeemable paper money and were relatively uncon-
cerned about the ratio to gold in silver coinage, thereby implicitly 
approving the gold standard. Peffer then outlined those matters 
which true Populists regarded as fundamental and balanced each 
with the Democratic position, concluding that Populists and Dem-
ocrats remained distinctly opposed to each other. This being true, 
Peffer rejected the two propositions of the fusion Populists: first, 
that Populists limit themselves to silver, and second, that Populists 
ally themselves to the Democracy. The union of 1896, he declared, 
had been a temporary arrangement for one campaign, but the 
fusionists now wanted to make permanent the expediency of that 
year. Peffer assured his listeners, however, that as faithful Populists 
they need not accept the dictation or manipulation of politicians: 
we are "free to determine our own affairs in our own way as a 
party and as individual men."2s 
Abe Steinberger addressed the Iowa convention after Peffer and 
announced that the nation's discouraged Populists would be re-
inspired "when the news from Des Moines is wired over this 
country that you listen to these words from Senator Peffer of Kan-
sas-and no man can assail his integrity; no man can question his 
27 Ibid., July 14, August 25, 1897; Silver Knight-National Watchman (Washing-
ton, D.C.), July 1, 8, 1897; A. W. C. Weeks to Weller, July 5, 12, August 10, 1897, 
and J. Bellangee to Weller, July 25, 1897, Weller Papers; Herman C. Nixon, 
"The Populist Movement in Iowa," Iowa journal of History and Politics 24 
(January 1926): lOl. 
28 Topeka Advocate, August 25, 1897; Girard World, August 26, September 2, 
1897. 
Reward of the Faithful 291 
honesty or the sincerity of his purpose, when he said to you: 'You 
are doing the right thing.' "29 
Steinberger was greatly mistaken. National Populist leaders re-
buked Peffer, and Kansas Populists exploded in bitter denunciation 
of their former senator. The Ottawa Times headlined its account 
of the speech, "Peffer Gone Wrong," and declared that as Dem-
ocrats were Populists Peffer was promoting the election of Repub-
licans. The Topeka Independent headed its critical account with 
"Unwise Leadership" and similarly asserted the congruity of the 
two parties. Others were less kind. The Pleasanton Herald de-
scribed the former senator as "a consummate donkey," "an ingrate," 
and "despicable.'' Even Annie Diggs, an active fusionist by 1897, 
criticized Peffer from Iowa where she was campaigning for the 
Democratic ticket.Bo 
Peffer sought to defend himself in the Advocate. He printed his 
speech to indicate that he had said nothing contrary to Populism 
and noted that his critics never reported what he said but only 
condemned the speech. Underlying his defense, however, was a 
bewilderment and incredulity. Nominal Populists were harshly 
arraigning him for defending the integrity of Populism and his 
party. Could not they understand what was happening? Peffer 
replied to his detractors that he was still a Populist-but were 
they?-and that he simply advocated remaining a Populist-but 
did they? He asked the critical Eureka Union if it could say "why 
Mr. Peffer should not be and remain a Populist if he so desires? ... 
He is satisfied with the Populist party. Why should he be driven 
from it? Who has the authority to transfer his allegiance? Think 
a moment, Mr. Union, where are you drifting." He was less subtle 
in replying to Latimer's vicious charges in the Pleasanton Herald: 
"If the Herald wants to go into the Democratic party, why doesn't 
it go and stop its growling at Populists who prefer to remain in 
their own party?"31 
Spurned by Kansas Populists, Peffer joined Davis Waite and 
Jacob Coxey in campaigning for the Iowa mid-roaders in September 
29 Girard World, October 28, I897. 
30 Silver Knight-National Watchman, August 26, I897; Ottawa Weekly Times, 
August 26, I897; Pleasanton Herald, September 3, I897; Topeka Advocate, 
September I, 8, I897. 
31 Topeka Advocate, August 25, September I, 8, 15, 29, 1897. 
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and October. To his wife, Waite explained the hopes of these loyal 
Populists in their Iowa canvass. "We do not expect to carry the 
state," he wrote. "Weaver's cursed fusion has been too well ar-
ranged for that, but the Democrats, I think, cannot carry the elec-
tion." Waite hoped that if fusion failed in Iowa, "the scheme will 
be seen to be impracticable, and our People's Party organization 
can be saved. . . . If we can only save the Populist organization 
and get rid of the traitors like Weaver, Butler, Allen, Taubeneck, 
Sockless Simpson, Cyclone Davis, and various other scoundrels too 
numerous to mention, who have more or less control of the party 
machinery," he continued, "-there is hope in the future, not in 
my time, but certainly in [Waite's young son] Frank's, and possibly 
people a good deal older." Though the Democrats failed in Iowa, 
the mid-road Populists could not claim the credit. The Populists 
polled fewer than 6,000 of the well over 400,000 votes-a showing 
that did not entitle the party to appear on any future ballot. 
Populism was dead in another state. "This is the result of General 
Weaver's suicidal policy of going into the Democrat party and 
voting the Democrat ticket," Peffer lamented.32 
In Kansas, too, Peffer fought a losing battle against the fusion 
Populists. He insisted that the party return to original and in-
dependent Populism, adopt thorough and genuine Populist plat-
forms, and nominate straight Populist tickets. James H. Ferriss, 
chairman of the executive committee of the NRP A, believed that 
Peffer stood alone in Kansas in supporting true Populism, but 
Steinberger, Willits, Clemens, and a few others still agreed with 
the former senator on the necessity of independent political action 
by Populists. Steinberger complained, "When the People's Party 
maintained its ground and stood for the people and its own creed 
it grew up and defied all opposition, but since tangling up with the 
Democracy for the offices and spoils, it has commenced to wane 
and dwindle away." Clemens taunted the fusionists by questioning 
the need to maintain the People's party between elections if they 
planned to fuse every time with the Democrats, as was their ap-
parent intention. Willits provided another forceful moral con-
demnation of fusion Populism in an effort to defeat the policy in 
32 Waite to Celia Waite, October 24, 1897, Waite Papers; Girard World, 
October 14, 1897; Topeka Advocate, November 10, 1897. 
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the 1897 elections. Fusion, he wrote, "is simply a compromise with 
wrong. It is an agreement with death and a covenant with hell. 
If our immortal declaration of principles is just and right, in the 
name of God let us stand by them and go down if need be, fighting 
for God, home, and humanity instead of disgracefully surrendering 
to the common enemy." Willits also presented the radical mid-
road view of the People's party in 1897: "We have simply been 
sold and delivered to the Democracy by a gang of unprincipled 
office-seekers and self-constituted political bosses, who think more 
of self-interest than they do of the future of our country and the 
condition of our children and children's children for all time."33 
There were a few local Populist struggles against fusion with 
the Democrats, but the party generally approved the policy without 
debate. Former Republicans continued to provide the base of 
anti-fusion sentiment, and the virtual absence of the first by 1897 
made inevitable the absence of the second. Republican-Populists 
led by Andrew J. Titus fought the Simpson fusion machine in 
Harper and Barber counties. Simpson supported the regular Dem-
ocratic nominees to defeat his Populist opponents and to prove the 
political necessity of Democratic fusion and his leadership. In 
Shawnee County, farmer and former-Republican John Mcintosh 
objected to fusionist attempts to nominate Democrats ("Here, you 
______ , what are you doing? This is a Populist con-
vention. We don't want no __ Democrats nominated here."), 
but he was physically restrained until after the Populist fusionists 
had carried the day. Another Republican-Populist denounced 
Harris as the betrayer of the party because of his legislative per-
formance. "But what else can we expect from a man who has all 
his life consorted with Democrats?" Harris "pretended to be a 
friend of the Populist cause. He mingled in our ranks, and finally 
he led the majority of the Populist Senators astray," declared 
Moses A. Householder. Harris "did all in his power to turn back 
the radical measures of his party."34 
But Harris had become the Populist United States Senator, and 
33 Topeka State Journal, August 17, 1897; Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, Sep-
tember 24, 1897; Girard World, October 21, November 11, 1897; Topeka Ad-
vocate, August 4, 1897; John F. Willits to B. F. Oldfield, July 20, 1897, Kansas 
Biographical Scrapbook, vol. 175, p. 27. 
34 Kansas Semi- Weekly Capital, July 20, October 7, 12, 29, December 7, 1897. 
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his policy dominated the party. Fusion was effected throughout 
Kansas in the 1897 elections, and both parties planned it again for 
the 1898 state election and the 1900 presidential election. Populist 
papers asserted the congruity of Populism and Democracy and ad-
vocated the permanent unification of the two parties. Even Peffer 
resignedly admitted to a Nebraskan interviewer, "I guess it will be 
fusion down there with us [Kansans] for a good many years to 
come," and he spoke of "the Demopops, as they are sometimes 
called."35 Obviously, the meaning of fusion was changing. Once 
signifying a temporary alliance of individual parties for a single 
political campaign, fusion by 1897 was becoming a permanenl 
policy, expected and accepted without discussion. Populists were 
truly losing their individual identities. The Democrats who had 
always hoped to capture the People's party for the benefit of the 
Democracy had succeeded. Common by 1897 were such statements 
as that of Populist state senator W. H. Ryan, a former Democrat, 
in which he advocated the complete abandonment of the People's 
party and the incorporation of Populists into the Democratic party. 
Mid-roaders complained that Ryan had merely masqueraded as a 
Populist and had constantly worked to subvert the People's party 
and force it into the Democracy.36 Whatever the intentions, how-
ever, the results were convincing. 
In this drift toward Democratic absorption of the People's party, 
Peffer's isolation became increasingly marked. Maine Populist 
leader L. C. Bateman believed that Peffer was the only Western 
Populist who understood the implications of fusion. "Peffer," de-
clared Bateman, "towers above the pie-hunting mediocrities by 
whom he is surrounded, and who can appreciate neither his genius 
nor his patriotism." The object of continual criticism from the 
fusionists that dominated both parties, Peffer began to turn inward. 
After the 1897 election, he sold the Advocate and determined to 
retire from political life and devote himself to writing articles and 
to editing the "Farm Department" section of the Advocate and 
News, successor to his own paper. The Norton Liberator noticed 
35 Emphasis added. Girard World, November 11, 1897; Newton Semi-Weekly 
Journal, June 22, November 16, 30, 1897; Pleasanton Herald, November 19, 
December 17, 1897; Ottawa Weekly Times, October 21, 1897; Kansas Semi-Weekly 
Capital, June 18, July 6, 1897. 
36 Girard World, July 22, 1897. 
Reward of the Faithful 295 
his retirement with the comment, "Mr. Peffer, while a reformer, has 
considerable dislike for politics as now conducted, and felt some-
what restive in his position. It is a fact that the Populist party 
in its machinery and manipulations is patterning too much after 
the old parties to suit ... [those] who have helped to build it 
up." J. W. Morphy, Peffer's friend and loyal assistant on the 
Advocate, also remarked that Peffer "is not a politician in the 
sense that the word is now used. He could not adapt himself to 
modern political methods, which is to his credit."37 
In January 1898 Peffer published "The Passing of the People's 
Party" in the North American Review. "That the People's party 
is passing must be evident to all observers," he wrote. "Why it is 
going and where, are obviously questions of present public concern." 
Peffer assigned the dissolution of the party to the dissension over 
fusion. The split within the party, Peffer asserted, was decisive 
and fatal. Fusionists were already working with the Democrats in 
Kansas, Iowa, and Nebraska, for example, and were not even 
waiting to determine the position of the Democracy in 1900. The 
anti-fusionists refused to support a party with principles antag-
onistic to their own. The fusionists had rejected the repeated 
requests of the mid-roaders for a conference to adjust differences 
and decide upon the proper course for the party, and they had 
ignored Peffer's own suggestion, as an "individual anti-fusionist," 
to move toward the creation of a new party. The very readiness 
of the fusionists to accept Democratic direction, Peffer charged, 
prevented the formation of a new and unified party by causing 
Democrats to believe they could attract all reformers into their 
own party. 
Obviously, fusion Populists would cooperate with Democracy in 
1898 and 1900 while the anti-fusionists would not, Peffer continued. 
Therefore, the party was "passing." He was less sure of where the 
party was going but he hoped that eventually his desired political 
realignment would occur. In the meantime, while fusionists joined 
the Democrats, the anti-fusionists would in their own way continue 
the work for which the People's party was born. That work, Peffer 
conceded, would be delayed but it would come to fruition in time 
37 Topeka Advocate, November 17, 1897; Topeka Advocate and News, Novem-
ber 24, 1897; Norton Liberator, November 19, 1897. 
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and the loyal Populists "shall have at last the reward of the faith-
ful."38 
This article plainly revealed Peffer's disenchantment with the 
evolution of the People's party. Nationally, the party organization 
was under fusionist control, and the mid-road opposition seemed 
both ineffectual and hopeless. In Kansas, fusionists completely dom-
inated the party. Even the Advocate and News was no longer open 
to mid-road statements and urged Populists to nominate Democrats, 
while Simpson applied for a position on the Democratic National 
Congressional Committee, and Harris suggested a nationwide fusion 
of Democrats and Populists. Peffer avoided political activity, but 
kept busy. In January, for example, he addressed the state Farmers' 
Alliance annual meeting, was elected an officer of the Kansas State 
Historical Society, spoke to the annual convention of the Kansas 
State Temperance Union, and was elected to that organization's 
executive committee. He also wrote regularly for the Advocate and 
News on various general topics.39 Clearly, Peffer was withdrawing 
from his political attitude of the 1890s and reverting to his agricul-
tural and temperance interests of the 1880s and to a nominally non-
partisan attitude. 
In the spring, Percy Daniels tried to draw Peffer back into 
political activity. In a public letter to Peffer, Daniels assured the 
former senator of his support in the face of the harsh criticism 
directed against him by the party leaders. Daniels also believed 
that the People's party had lost its opportunity to combine all 
reform elements under its own banner and that, as the Democracy 
was untrustworthy, a new party would have to be organized. 
Because the official Populist leadership, deceiving itself as to the 
true condition of the party, opposed the necessary realignment, 
Daniels urged that Peffer take the public lead in forming the new 
party by arranging meetings and calling a delegate convention of 
reformers.40 
38 William A. Peffer, "The Passing of the People's Party," North American 
Review 166 (January 1898): 12-23. 
39 Topeka Advocate and News, December 29, 1897, January 5, 12, 26, February 
9, 1898; Newton Semi· Weekly journal, January 7, March 22, 1898; F. C. Johnson 
to Jacob C. Ruppenthal, June 23, 1899, Jacob C. Ruppenthal Papers, KSHS; 
Kansas Agitator, January 21, 1898. 
40 Percy Daniels to W. A. Peffer, supplement to Girard Independent News, 
April 14, 1898. 
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To Peffer, Daniels's plea must have sounded only too familiar, 
and only too futile. He ignored it. His public activity instead 
increasingly concentrated on prohibition, and he spoke regularly 
against Leedy's poor performance on the question. Prohibition had 
been imperfectly enforced throughout the decade, but under Leedy 
there was scarcely a pretense at enforcement. Democrats were 
delighted with Leedy's evident hostility toward prohibition, and 
some even expected that the People's party would declare for re-
submission in its 1898 platform, but it was clear that the Pro-
hibitionists would challenge the governor. Peffer's coolness toward 
Leedy fusionists plus his reputation as an ardent prohibitionist had 
encouraged speculation about his gubernatorial candidacy by May 
1897. Peffer refused to countenance such talk and asserted his 
intention to avoid political office.41 
By June 1898, however, opposition to Leedy was so intense among 
Prohibitionists that they determined to nominate Peffer, believing 
that he would attract both Populist and Republican support. 
After Samuel Dickey, the national chairman of the Prohibition 
party, visited him in Topeka, Peffer agreed to accept the nomina-
tion provided the platform was confined to prohibition, and he 
accepted the nomination not as a Prohibitionist, but as a private 
citizen. Prohibitionists actually believed that Peffer could poll 
100,000 votes and win, and many Populist officials, including Leedy 
and Breidenthal, feared his appeal. Indeed, anti-Leedy groups 
within the party threatened to support Peffer for the Populist 
gubernatorial nomination. Leedy accordingly sought to silence his 
opposition by suspending the metropolitan police system, which 
had provoked much of the prohibitionist resentment. Mrs. Diggs 
declared that this action left "no temperance Populist a shadow 
of excuse to give his vote to Senator Peffer." But Peffer's threat 
was short-lived for other reasons. He refused to discuss any question 
other than prohibition, made only nonpartisan speeches, and did 
not campaign actively. The Prohibitionist party had little official 
organization and depended on local ministers for strength and 
encouragement. And Peffer admitted that he did not expect to 
41 Topeka Advocate and News, April 20, May 4, 1898; Topeka Fulcrum, April 
8, 1898; Kansas Semi- Weekly Capital, December 31, 1897; Norton Liberator, May 
28, 1897; Topeka Advocate, June 9, July 28, 1897. 
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be elected but that he only wanted to compel Leedy and Repub-
lican nominee William E. Stanley to promise enforcement of the 
Prohibitory law. If either would do so, Peffer said, he would end 
his campaign. By September Prohibitionists predicted that Peffer 
would receive but 10,000 votes and eventually he received fewer 
than that, though running far ahead of his ticket and nearly 
doubling the Prohibition vote of 1896.42 
The Populists and Democrats joined in a complete campaign in 
1898, even combining their party committees, few in either party 
objecting to the other any longer. But the fusionists had no chance. 
Discredited by their failures in the legislature, lacking the Silver 
Republican support of 1896, undermined by returning national 
prosperity, and opposed by a patriotic current to support a Re-
publican president, they fell easily to the Republicans. The GOP 
elected its entire state ticket, a majority of the legislature, and all 
but one congressman.43 Many Populists had predicted just such an 
outcome, and, perhaps in their frustration, they again lashed out 
at Peffer, a vivid symbol of their failure. 
Peffer denied the charges that he had injured the cause of reform 
by his course. In his letter of acceptance, he had pointed out that 
the nomination came from "a party other than that to which I 
belong" and that his acceptance would not "affect my party rela-
tions, or change my party designation." His was a nonpartisan 
campaign. The Prohibitionists agreed. "He was not nominated as 
a party Prohib and does not claim to be one," the Topeka Fulcrum 
wrote of Peffer, "nor does the party claim him as a member. He 
claims to be a Populist, but it is a well known fact that he is ... 
in reality a Populist without a party for the simple reason that 
the so-called Populist party are not populists, but fusionists first, 
last, and all the time." Peffer emphatically declared his own belief 
that the party had indeed left him, and not the reverse. His com-
mitment to the original principles of the movement, he maintained, 
was undiminished, but "the present Populist party will inevitably 
42 Topeka Fulcrum, June 10, July I, August 12, 1898: Emporia Daily Gazette, 
June 8, 1898; Anthony Weekly Bulletin, June 10, 1898; Kansas Semi-Weekly 
Capital, July 2, 1898; Topeka Advocate and News, June 15, 22, August 31, Sep-
tember 21, 1898; Newton Semi-Weekly Journal, August 23, September 23, 1898; 
Kansas Biographical Scrapbook, "P," vol. 2, p. 6L 
43 Nugent, Tolerant Populists, pp. 224-25; Clanton, Kansas Populism, p. 215. 
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be absorbed in the Democratic party .... I am not a Democrat 
and I cannot follow the Populist party into the Democratic ranks."44 
Following the election, the fusionists speculated on their political 
future. J. Mack Love, Democratic state party chairman, announced 
that Populists no longer had any choice but to become Democrats 
fully and finally. A few scattered mid-roaders such as Clemens 
protested that "true Populists" would never accept the Democratic 
party, but most Populists seemed ready to acquiesce. There 
simply were not many original Populists left in the fusion coalition. 
"The trouble is," explained William Stryker, the thoughtful Pop-
ulist state superintendent of public instruction, "that the People's 
Party has drifted away from the purposes for which it was created. 
The issues on which it was founded," he continued, "have been 
abandoned by self-styled leaders, and the party entered into league 
with the worst instead of the best element of the state. Much as 
I deplore [the recent] defeat," he concluded, "the party has brought 
it upon itsel£."45 
Peffer also responded to Love's statement. Those Populists who 
had not objected to Democratic fusion, he believed, would join 
the Democracy as the People's party faded out of existence. But 
there were others who would not agree to such a course, Peffer 
warned. "As to the original Populist who remembers the Farmers' 
Alliance grip and pass word, he does not wish to be reorganized 
that way just now; he has no desire to be merged in a party that 
is not in sympathy with any of the ideas which he regards as 
vital." Peffer believed that "the original Populist clings to his first 
love," that, "in short, he believes in the people doing for themselves, 
through the agency of their government, everything that will tend 
to equalize benefits among the people, and that will in that way 
better than in any other serve the public interest." As the Dem-
ocratic party opposed such an outlook, he expected that the original 
Populist would shun the Democracy. Indeed, "as between the 
Democratic and Republican parties, with respect to their founda-
tion beliefs concerning the powers and duties of our government, 
44 Topeka Fulcrum, June 24, July 1, 1898; Topeka Advocate and News, June 
15, 1898. 
45 Topeka Advocate and News, November 16, 1898; Independence Star and 
Kansan, November 18, December 9, 1898; Kansas Agitator, December 2, 1898. 
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the Republican idea is much broader than that of the Democratic, 
and may, therefore, be expected to advance faster in improving the 
agencies of public operations."46 
The drift of Peffer's remarks was obvious. In the following 
spring, he declared that the vast increases in gold production, the 
increased use of commercial paper, and the return of prosperity 
had removed the financial question from politics and that he 
opposed the Democratic intention to make expansionism a partisan 
issue. "The Populist party has been eliminated nationally by the 
Democrats," he announced, "so those of us who don't want to 
flock by ourselves will have to vote our convictions as best we can." 
The principles of the Democratic party, Peffer believed, contra-
vened those of the People's party, which centered about the need 
and desirability of a strong and active central government to 
promote the rights of the public. Fusion forced the Populists to 
choose between the Republicans and the Democrats, he maintained, 
and the Republicans favored the use of national power and had 
provided the antecedents of many Populist ideas. "The old simon-
pure Alliance man who left the Republican party," Peffer con-
cluded, "never was headed for the Democracy, and he is not now." 
The press naturally reported that Peffer had "flopped" to the 
GOP. This Peffer strenuously denied, asserting that he had made 
but two points: first, that the People's party was dead and, second, 
that he was not a Democrat. "Now that the process of absorbing 
the Populist party is complete," he wrote, "and the fight is between 
Republican and Democrat, I respectfully ask leave to be against 
the Democrat and stop there."47 
Peffer's distinction between being a Republican and being against 
Democrats in a political arena inhabited by only Democrats and 
Republicans was tenuous to say the least. Not surprisingly, the 
Populist press condemned him, continuing the harsh criticism 
heaped upon him for several years that, almost as much as any-
thing else, drove him from the People's party. Peffer, however, tried 
to cling to this distinction. He repeated that he had neither left the 
46 Topeka Advocate and News, November 23, 1898. 
47 Topeka State .Journal, May 18, 1899; Kansas Biographical Scrapbook, vol. 
128, pp. 62-63: Chicago Tribune, July 9, 1899; Peffer to editor, Topeka Daily 
Capital, May 21, 1899. 
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People's party nor joined the GOP but merely that he believed 
that the political contests of the future would occur between the 
two old parties and "as between the Democratic and the Republican 
parties I have always been against the Democrats. . . . I expect 
to do all that I can honorably do to keep the Democratic party 
out of power in the nation." And in 1900, Peffer campaigned for 
McKinley and Roosevelt under the auspices of the Republican 
National Committee.4s Regardless of his defensive reasoning, it 
was clear that the end had come. Populism had failed, and Peffer 
had returned home. 
48 Kansas Agitator, May 26, 1899; Topeka Daily Capital, June 23, 1899; Kansas 
Biographical Scrapbook, vol. 137, pp. 97-98. 
CHAPTER TEN 
Populism and Politics 
WHATEVER their views on the merits of Populism, scholars have 
frequently agreed that it was ultimately successful if originally re-
jected. To list the Populist demands, declared one historian, "is to 
cite the chief political innovations made in the United States dur-
ing recent times."1 Many Populists in the first decade of the new 
century leaped eagerly and hopefully to the same conclusion. 
William Peffer expressed great pleasure that the principles which 
he had championed as a Populist and which were, he said, "laughed 
to death at that time are now considered respectable," and that in 
1907 "the country now hotly demands legislation it abused me 
for advocating." He maintained that "today I do religiously believe 
in all the fundamental principles of the People's Party and have 
at no time cast them from me," and he continued to advocate 
reform in the social, political, and economic structure of the nation. 
But he accepted the hegemony of the GOP and eventually became 
an admitted Republican (''I'm an insurgent, though," he insisted). 
He had great praise for Theodore Roosevelt, believing that the 
president was "applying the principles of Populism."2 
But Peffer must have known that this was a fiction. Roosevelt 
had regarded Peffer as an "anarchistic crank" in the 1890s and at 
one time urged that the Kansan be summarily executed. As pres-
ident, Roosevelt's words remained more radical than his actions, 
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and the transformation of American society promised in original 
Populism never occurred, despite the minor, palliative reforms of 
the twentieth century. The vaporings of Roosevelt became the 
triumph of Populist principles only through the cataracts of an 
old man's eyes and the mists of history. 
Populism died because it failed to transcend the American political 
system. It was killed by those very factors of politics that its found-
ers had intended to kill: prejudice, elite manipulation, corruption. 
Populists decried the divisive sectionalism still rampant in the 1890s 
and attempted to overcome it by promoting a union of sections 
based on generally shared interests; Populists arraigned partisan 
prejudices as destructive of the general good and urged the forma-
tion of a new grand union to surmount the obstacles provided by 
traditional and emotional party loyalties. Instead, the South re-
jected the Western yearnings in 1892 for the intertwined sectional 
and partisan appeals and stood as the Solid South for the Dem-
ocratic party. Faced with this sectional and partisan rebuff of their 
good intentions, aggravated by the consequent election of a con-
servative Democratic administration, many Western Populists sur-
rendered again to the intolerance and prejudices that had previously 
guided their political lives, reacting bitterly to the South and to 
Democrats. Thus, early, Populism underwent a significant change, 
with many former Republicans returning to the GOP, never to 
leave again, even in 1896. The People's party itself, too, became a 
sectional party, perhaps more so than either of its opponents, and 
yet it was unable to use effectively the possible advantages of 
1 John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (Minneapolis, 1931), p. 407. 
2 Kansas City Star, September 6, 1903; Topeka State journal, .June 27, 1907; 
Topeka Daily Capital, August 31, 1902; Kansas Biographical Scrapbooks, vol. 
140, pp. 26-27, and "P," vol. 9, p. 107. 
For Peffer's continued reform interests, see his following articles; "The Trust 
Problem and its Solution," Forum 27 (July 1899): 523-33; "The Trust in 
Politics," North American Review 170 (February 1900): 244-52; "Prohibition in 
Kansas," Forum 31 (April 1901): 209-12; "Fifty Years Ahead of Time: A Look 
Forward into the Political, Social, Industrial, and Labor Questions," Kansas 
Biographical Scrapbook, "P," vol. 14, p. 28; "Government Banking," North 
American Review 191 (January 1910): 12-17. The last mentioned involves nearly 
pure economic Populism minus silver: government banking, paper money, 
government loans directly to the people at low rates of interest, deemphasis of 
the tariff, abolition of note-issuing national banks. 
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sectionalism, which continued to be directed against it. In the 
West and in the South, the dominant party induced great instability 
in the Populist coalition by appealing to traditional loyalties and 
threatening the pending triumph of the despised minority party 
through the People's party. Ignatius Donnelly argued that popular 
prejudice against Democrats disrupted the People's party and 
destroyed the possibility of its success. "The Republican speakers 
claim[ed] that the People's Party men have all turned Democrats," 
he wrote, "and then they raked over the Democracy during the 
vVar, and drove our Republican friends back to their 'first love.' "3 
In the South, Republicans, especially black Republicans, served as 
the bete noire to keep party lines firm against Populism. Racial 
bigotry joined sectional provincialism and partisan prejudice in 
the triumphant assault on a Populism which, despite its rhetorical 
hyperbole, preached a realistic politics. 
The struggle between partisans of different political traditions 
continued within the People's party. A Minnesota lawyer warned 
William Jennings Bryan against "the tyranny of political partisan-
ship," which "is fundamental, all pervasive and permissive of all 
other political evils. As long as men regard the political instru-
mentality through which a principle is to be obtained as of more 
moment than the principle itself, just so long will we have corrupt 
politics." That statement cogently explained the predicament of 
the third party, but Bryan already understood the problem and 
he knew that too often Populists themselves, despite their intentions, 
remained slaves to the same tyranny. In his own 1894 attempt to 
elect a fusionist legislature to send him to the Senate, he learned 
that "the Republican members of the Populist party voted almost 
to a man for the Republican candidate for their legislature." And, 
the Nebraska Democratic state chairman told him, "so it would 
be on every occasion when the issue is between a Democrat and a 
Republican."4 Indeed, at least part of the fight over fusion involved 
simple distrust of Democrats, and Peffer's course during the 1890s 
typified that of the Populist who tried valiantly to overcome the 
partisan prejudice of his personal heritage and ultimately failed. 
3 Ignatius Donnelly to W. A. Bentley, December 29, 1896, Donnelly Papers. 
4 L. C. Harris to Bryan, October 21, 1895, and C. J. Smyth to Bryan, May 2, 
1895, Bryan Papers. 
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The Topeka Capital had commented shortly after his senatorial 
election in 1891 that it was a "moral and physical impossibility 
for a man of Senator Peffer's antecedents and acquaintance with 
the differences between the Republican and Democratic parties to 
turn himself politically inside out at this late day." The issue 
was unsettled for nearly a decade, but perhaps never in doubt. 
Peffer was not the only major Populist who campaigned for Mc-
Kinley in 1900; Mary Lease supported the GOP because "as I take 
it the issue has resolved itself into the old issue of copperheadism 
versus Republicanism, and as the daughter of an old Union soldier 
I feel that my place is with the Republican party." Thomas F. 
Byron, the anti-fusion editor whom Weaver forced from the Des 
Moines Farmers' Tribune, did not even wait till 1900. In 1896 he 
organized McKinley clubs in Iowa and supported the GOP rather 
than accept a national fusion with the Democrats.5 The Populists 
had hoped to transform politics but had fallen under its dead 
weight; as the products of years of elite manipulation of passions 
and prejudices, they ultimately failed to escape from their past. 
But they had tried, something most Americans never considered 
doing. 
Not just the trappings of the American political system, but the 
very nature of American politics also destroyed Populism. There 
were formal aspects to this: the bipolarizing effects of single-mem-
ber legislative districts and other statutory features of the structure 
of American politics militated against third-party action. But the 
informal, though no less certain and decisive, features of politics 
proved eventually more destructive. The impulse of American 
politics was not toward a realistic appraisal of societal needs and 
a sincere attempt to solve the nation's basic problems. Rather, 
political parties were concerned with winning elections and more 
interested in votes than principles. Thus, the tariff, the bloody 
shirt, the Lost Cause, and white supremacy dominated political 
discussion before Populism: issues essentially irrelevant to the 
massive problems the nation confronted in industrialization, urban-
5 Topeka Daily Capital, April 3, 1891; Leavenworth Times, September 22, 
1900; Kansas Biographical Scrapbook, "L," vol. 1, p. 130; Herman C. Nixon, 
"The Populist Movement in Iowa," Iowa Journal of History and Politics 24 
(January 1926); 87. 
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ization, expansion, and immigration; but issues which would, 
because of their emotional content, mobilize electorates in state, 
section, and nation to maintain the dominance of self-seeking 
groups and parties. More than that, such sham issues often inten-
sified national problems which continued to fester, unsolved, and 
diverted attention from real problems. Dependent upon traditional 
loyalties or ethnic-cultural cleavages for electoral support, old 
parties could not or would not formulate relevant policies for 
pressing economic, social, racial, and political difficulties. The two-
party system did not meet the need to articulate constituent 
demands directly into the political framework. 
What was significant about original Populism, after all, was that 
it developed outside the political system-and precisely because the 
system had proved incapable of responding to real needs. Yet in 
the transformation of Populism from a mass movement into the 
People's party, much of its democratic and directly responsive 
nature was lost. Populism became incorporated within the same 
system and the People's party became subject to the same influences 
that guided the other parties. The history of the People's party 
became one of a continuing struggle against the subversive ten-
dencies of politics, undermining the original goals of Populism and 
substituting those of the old parties. The People's party, if orig-
inally for different reasons, became concerned with winning office 
and gradually accepted institutional objectives. Under the direction 
of professional politicians such as Taubeneck, Breidenthal, and 
Butler, Populist politics too became more of a struggle for office 
and power than for reform. The party became increasingly oligar-
chic and more easily dominated by its officials, and it became more 
and more difficult for the rank and file to influence policy. In 
Kansas, for example, as early as 1892 the party leadership rigged 
conventions, lied to its rank-and-file members, and overturned duly 
nominated candidates in the search for office. 
In 1897 Davis Waite looked back at the Populist failure already 
evident and blamed the party organization. There had been no 
means to hold the party to principle, he lamented. It had adopted 
the same caucus system and the same party committees, used the 
"rotten delegates" and the "bossism" of the old parties. An "inside 
ring" had usurped the rights and circumvented the action of the 
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rank and file, Waite asserted. "A few leading officials of the People's 
Party by as bald trickery in the way of bossism, bogus proxies, and 
paper delegates as ever distinguished 'Tammany Hall,' assumed 
supreme control of the party and exercised that control without 
consulting the popular will and without appeal." Henry Lloyd 
also complained about the increasing oligarchic control of his 
party. "When I see the selfishness, and stupidity, (synonymous 
terms) which appear in organizations, seeking to usurp the com-
mon sacrifice for personal advantage," he confessed to a friend, 
"I find it hard to keep my footing as a believer." Peffer similarly 
declared that local, independent action by autonomous popular 
groups would never interfere with the goals of Populism but that 
"the danger to Populism lies in the tendency of the party to go 
backward instead of forward." 6 
Annie Diggs recalled in 1901 that the true strength of Populism 
"never did lie in its party organization" and that in fact one of 
the roots of the movement was "a protest against the dangers and 
tyranny of permanent party organization." More important as a 
cause of Populism than economic distress, she argued, "was the 
discovery that the national machinery of both the Republican and 
the Democratic parties was set to the service of privileged classes 
and of commercial combinations." The people became furious 
when they understood "the humbuggery of the protective tariff . 
. . . the hypocrisy of the national party policies, the sham battle 
between Democracy and Republicanism over free-trade and pro-
tection." That vast mass movement of "the memorable revolt of 
1890," she declared, was above narrowly "partisan politics." But 
"later, when success and official reward entered the minds of the 
people who came as recruits, the dominant spirit of the People's 
Party became less fraternal and unselfish."7 
Percy Daniels saw the tragedy of the People's party. "It came. 
It saw," he wrote. "It has been conquered." Populism had repu-
diated "the methods of the old party machines" and denied "the 
celebrated theory of Mr. Ingalls that intrigue and corruption are 
essential to political success." But the party leaders set aside the 
6 Davis Waite manuscript speech, 1897, Waite Papers: Lloyd to G. A. Gates, 
May 23, 1895, Lloyd Papers; Kansas Biographical Scrapbook, vol. 128, p. 60. 
7 Kansas City Star, June 2, 1901. 
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original purpose of the movement, disobeyed the wishes of the rank 
and file, and adopted as legitimate tactics and appropriate goals 
what had been condemned. By 1898, Daniels denied that any party 
was controlled or directed in the interest of justice and declared 
that henceforth he would work outside the party system. "Parties 
as they exist today are bellowing imposters and organized frauds," 
he wrote, "sowing little but deception and garnering little but 
spoils and corruption. . . . They are either reliable machines of 
plutocracy and the corporations," he concluded, "or they are the 
handy tools of hypocrites and harlequins, and are as much respon-
sible, through the deceptions they have practiced and the corruption 
they have defended, for the servitude of the masses to plutocratic 
usurpers, as are the lawless exactions of organized capital for their 
plundering."8 
Those in control of the party machinery justified their manipula-
tions in the name of "practical politics." Such machinations, how-
ever antithetical to the original professions of the movement, were 
necessary, argued Taubeneck, Weaver, Breidenthal, Butler, and 
Latimer, if the party were to secure election. Those who disagreed 
with such a policy were "impractical visionaries" and hopelessly 
utopian. It was not practical politics that the country needed, 
however; it had that in the Democratic and Republican parties. 
America needed realistic politics, a policy of ignoring facile prej-
udices, investigating the realities of problems, and formulating 
relevant programs without resorting to traditional and outmoded 
dogma. There were those who demanded just such a necessary 
radical reappraisal of American society, but they were precisely 
those damned as impractical visionaries. Gradually the Populist 
politicians succumbed to the same temptations affecting the old 
party leaders; too often converts to an elitist ideology, they proved 
as cynical as any of their opponents and certainly no more open 
and honest. But ultimately with less experience in dissembling, 
they lost to past masters. As much as the irrelevant tariff had served 
the old parties, the practical Populists used the issue of free silver 
as a political panacea. Essentially a minor reform, clearly of 
limited effectiveness, free silver nevertheless promised an electorate 
8 Daniels to Peffer, supplement to Girard Independent News, April 14, 1898; 
Percy Daniels in supplement to ibid., October 28, 1898. 
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to the People's party because as a panacea it was attractive to 
those who shrank from the requirements of realistic politics. Pop-
ulist party leaders seized upon the issue to the exclusion of a 
consideration of vital problems and realistic reform proposals that 
the People's party had been created to advance. Silver and fusion, 
the tangible death instruments of Populism, did not dominate the 
People's party until its leaders subordinated the early demands of 
the movement in a practical grasp for power. Henry Lloyd wrote 
bitingly in 1896 of this Populist abdication of responsibility: 
The men in the management of the P.P. who are specially and bitterly 
traitorously opposed to the real issues now before the public are the ones 
who have fanned this free silver back fire. All the railroad, telegraph, 
telephone, trust, bank, and other monopolists could ask nothing better 
than that the dangerous-to them-sentiment among the people be beguiled 
into believing that the principal cause of their woes was that the privilege 
of the silver owners to compel the people to accept their product as legal 
tender had been taken away. . . . [Demonetization, however, occurred 
long after the basis for the nation's social and industrial problems had 
been laid. But now] the poor people are throwing up their hats in the 
air for those who promise "to lead them out of the wilderness" by the 
currency route. It is awful. The people are to be kept wandering forty 
years in the currency labyrinth as they have for the last forty years . . . 
over the tariff bill. 9 
But the practical Populists suppressed the realistic Populists, and 
with the use of a prime old party technique. They condemned as 
"socialism" every suggestion that free silver coinage was not the 
primary and essential reform. Thus discredited in the eyes of 
those voters educated to the acceptance of panaceas, superficial 
solutions to nonexistent problems, and the avoidance of question-
ing the accepted myths which formed the bulwark of those in 
power, the radical Populists were pushed aside. Those such as 
John Willits who refused to acquiesce in the slightest to the de-
mands of the party leadership were pursued with ever greater 
villification. A pariah in 1897, Willits explained his treatment as 
a mid-roader in 1896: "Because I refused to bolt our national con-
vention, abandon the only Populist on the national ticket, and 
yell for the Democratic nominee and the Plutocratic Sewall, I was 
9 Lloyd to Bayard Holmes, July 13, 1896, Lloyd Papers. 
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denounced as a 'Hannacrat' by the whole gang of Democratic 
hirelings and cowardly, truckling, would-be Populists. You know 
too well the results," he continued. "Kansas went Democratic, the 
People's Party lost its identity, and the hands of time are turned 
back."10 
Just as important as silver to the practical Populists was fusion, 
the policy of making concessions to other groups in hopes of finding 
a shortcut to political power. Fusion was a practical political 
maneuver in a political system that rewarded only one winner, 
but too often it required the betrayal of the promises of Populism 
(Peffer marveled at "how filthy the corruption of 'practical politics' 
among Reformers" became), and it gradually changed the composi-
tion, ideals, and objectives of the People's party.U Too, fusion was 
addictive and once taken it made the new party dependent and 
circumscribed its options. 
Fusion and its requisite attendants of compromise, coercion, and 
constraint became the touchstone of Populism. Those who opposed 
fusion were interested in thorough, racial changes, focused on 
political reform which would provide a method to right any future 
abuses through establishing a responsive, realistic, and genuinely 
democratic political system. Fusionists were never as interested in 
political, or general, reform as in limited measures of economic 
reform. Lacking the great overall reformatory zeal, they were 
willing to refuse implementation of Populism where it was im-
mediately possible-within the People's party-in futile hopes of 
achieving their own perverted program of personal power and a 
truncated economic Populism.12 
In 1902 a Populist newspaper accused Peffer of being a traitor to 
Populism. Peffer replied that he had always stood for Populist 
principles, had demanded them in the Senate while Allen and 
others had denied them, had advocated them in party affairs, 
social positions, and all areas of life. He had resisted both compro-
mise on Populist principles and fusion with other parties. "Had 
10 John Willits to B. H. Oldfield in Kansas Semi· Weekly Capital (Topeka), 
July 27, 1897. 
11 Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1899. 
12 See William M. Stewart's comment upon Peffer in his Silver Knight·National 
Watchman (Washington, D.C.), August 26, 1897. 
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the party remained as it began," he added, "I would still be one 
of its faithful workers and earnest champions." But, he wrote to 
the editor, "you and others like you" wanted to compromise issues, 
restrict their application, emphasize free silver, adopt the unscrupu-
lous methods of the unacceptable old parties, and fuse with the 
Democrats. Such a course Peffer had constantly opposed, he de-
clared, "and advocated independent action on our own principles 
and policies. Who is the traitor-you or 1?"13 
13 Kansas Biographical Scrapbook, vol. 137, pp. 93-95, 97-98. 
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MANUSCRIPTS 
Participants in a mass movement are rarely the type of people who 
possess or preserve personal papers, and lack of adequate manuscript 
sources has long hampered historians seeking to understand Pop-
ulism. In the case of William A. Peffer, there is the additional 
disappointment that although he accumulated massive files of 
letters, scrapbooks, and diaries covering four decades and wished 
these papers to be given to the Kansas State Historical Society, 
his family divided the collection, nearly all of which was subse-
quently lost. The Kansas State Historical Society was able to 
acquire later several of the scrapbooks from Peffer's son, Douglas, 
but they largely contain only political cartoons. The Society also 
has a brief autobiographical sketch and several letters by Peffer, 
but most of his relatively few surviving letters must be found 
scattered in other collections. 
The Kansas State Historical Society does have a number of other 
helpful manuscript holdings, especially the Lorenzo D. Lewelling 
Papers, which reveal the governor's problems in politics and patron-
age and provide a great deal of information on Kansas social con-
ditions as well. The John Leedy Papers, from his term as governor, 
are fewer and disappointing. The Taylor Riddle Papers are also 
thin but should be consulted, for Riddle was Frank Doster's brother-
in-law and the Populist state chairman in the late 1890s. The 
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Charles Robinson Papers and those of his son-in-law William H_ 
Sears are valuable for the fusionist efforts of Democrats and Dem-
ocratic-Populists_ The collections of the following Republican 
leaders merit some attention: John J. Ingalls, M. M. Beck, Edmund 
N. Morrill, and Eugene F. Ware. The P. H. Coney Papers reflect 
the Silver Republican element. The Lyman U. Humphrey Papers 
are especially good for the Republican reaction to the rise of the 
Farmers' Alliance and the People's party entry into politics. Finally, 
the Society has two other collections, the Populist Party Manuscripts 
and the Republican Party Manuscripts, which should be surveyed. 
The Kansas State Historical Society also has a number of relevant 
scrapbook collections, the most valuable of which are the John 
Davis Scrapbooks of the Populist editor and congressman; the Jacob 
C. Ruppenthal Scrapbooks of a local Populist official; the William 
H. Sears Scrapbooks; and the Farmers' Alliance Clippings, People's 
Party Clippings, and Kansas Biographical Scrapbooks, all assembled 
by the Society's staff from newspaper accounts. 
The Spencer Research Library of the University of Kansas has 
several collections of interest. The George C. Angle Papers con-
tain correspondence to a loyal local Republican party worker, with 
intriguing if incomplete references to the Farmers' Alliance; the 
J. B. Watkins Papers are a voluminous collection of the correspon-
dence and records of a major land mortgage company, most im-
mediately useful for viewing the moneylenders' political interests; 
the 0. E. Learnard Papers throw light on the relations between 
Kansas politicians and railroads in the 1880s; the Lyman U. Hum-
phrey Papers are much less full and more personal than those in 
the Kansas State Historical Society. 
For Populism on the national level there are a few, widely scat-
tered collections of considerable significance. The Ignatius Donnel-
ly Papers at the Minnesota Historical Society are perhaps the most 
important, with correspondence both from major Populist figures 
and from local Populists, especially helpful for the early years of 
the movement. Virtually unknown and unused by historians are 
the Davis H. Waite Papers at the Colorado State Archives and 
Public Records. These include valuable information on the struggle 
against the Silver Populists' subversion of Omaha Populism as well 
as on the problems of Rocky Mountain Populism. The Henry D. 
Lloyd Papers at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin comple-
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ment Waite's, for they contain much material on the radical Pop-
ulists' efforts against the silver politicians. The Papers of Robert 
Schilling, first national secretary of the People's party, and of 
Lemuel H. Weller, both also at the State Historical Society of Wis-
consin, similarly represent anti-fusion Populist views but are of 
little relative importance. 
The fusionist Populists left little manuscript evidence of their 
activities. The James B. Weaver Papers at the Iowa Department 
of History and Archives are of small value, and it is necessary to 
examine Weaver's letters in other collections. The William M. 
Stewart Papers at the Nevada State Historical Society illuminate 
the labors of a major silverite who temporarily affiliated with the 
Populists. They are of special interest in revealing the early nature 
of silverite opposition to Omaha Populism and some of the maneu-
verings before the 1896 national convention. The Marion Butler 
Papers in the Southern Historical Collection of the University of 
North Carolina are particularly good for the campaign of 1896 and 
the problems the Populists then encountered in every part of the 
country but also have considerable information on the earlier ac-
tivities of the Silver Populists. 
Two other holdings in the Southern Historical Collection are of 
some value, the Leonidas L. Polk Papers and the Thomas E. Watson 
Papers. Most of Polk's Papers pertain to his varied activities before 
the 1890s, and Watson's Papers for the period are disappointing, 
limited mostly to business records and undated newspaper clippings. 
Of the papers of non-Populists the most important are those of 
William Jennings Bryan in the Library of Congress. They contain 
considerable material on the fusion operations of Bryan Democrats 
and Nebraska and Iowa Populists before 1896 and valuable infor-
mation on the actions of silverites of both parties leading to the 
1896 Populist national convention. The Grover Cleveland Papers 
in the Library of Congress provide surprising glimpses into Dem-
ocratic state politics, but the Benjamin Harrison Papers, also at the 
Library of Congress, offer little assistance. 
NEWSPAPERS 
The relative scarcity of manuscript material is partially compen-
sated for by the wealth of newspapers available from a time of 
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personal journalism. Most important, of course, were Peffer's own 
newspapers, the Kansas Farmer and the Advocate, both of Topeka. 
In Kansas, the most helpful papers of the mid-road persuasion 
were the Kansas Agitator (Garnett) of W. 0. and Anna Champe, the 
Kincaid Kronicle for the campaign of 1892, and Cyrus Corning's 
The People and New Era (both of Topeka) with Abe Steinberger's 
Girard World for the extreme element thereafter. The fusion 
Populists were best represented in the Kansas Commoner (Wichita) 
and in the Pleasanton Herald of J. E. Latimer. 
The Topeka Capital was the leading Republican newspaper and 
also provided the most extensive reporting of all state political de-
velopments. The Atchison Champion represented the more liberal 
Republicans, and the Fort Scott Monitor and Emporia Republican 
were other major GOP organs. The strange Democratic course is 
best followed in the Wichita Beacon and the Kansas Democrat 
(Topeka). More consistent was the conservative course of the Paola 
Western Spirit in opposing fusion with the Populists. 
Over a hundred other Kansas newspapers were systematically 
read to cover all political positions within each of the three major 
parties, plus the Union Labor party and the Prohibitionists, and 
to cover every section of the state. They ranged from the Valley 
Falls Farmers' Vindicator and the Norton Liberator to the Erie 
Republican-Record and the Marshall County Democrat (Marys-
ville). Citations of such journals can be found in the appropriate 
footnotes. Files of all these newspapers are in the splendid collec-
tion of the Kansas State Historical Society. 
For national developments, the most important Populist news-
papers were the Topeka Advocate, under both Stephen McLallin 
and Peffer; the American Non-Conformist (Indianapolis); and the 
Southern Mercury (Dallas). Balancing these mid-road papers were 
those of the Silver Populists, especially William Stewart's Silver 
Knight and N. A. Dunning's National Watchman, both published 
in Washington, D.C. Among others of major significance, the 
People's Party Paper (Atlanta) provided Tom Watson's point of 
view, and the National Economist (Washington) was valuable for 
the Farmers' Alliance in the early 1890s. Leading non-Populist 
newspapers consulted included the Chicago Tribune, the Washing-
ton Post, the Dallas Morning-News, the Kansas City Star, the St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, the Louisville Courier-journal, the Cincinnati 
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Commercial-Gazette, and the New York Times and World. Again, 
dozens of other journals, from every region and of every persuasion, 
were examined, and where appropriate they are cited in the foot-
notes. 
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS 
Essential to the development of the statistical information pertain-
ing to the demographic characteristics of Kansas partisans in the 
1890s was the United States Bureau of the Census, Eleventh Census 
of the United States, 1890 (Washington, 1891-1895). Also used were 
population and agricultural statistics derived from the Biennial 
Reports of the [Kansas] State Board of Agriculture (Topeka, Kans., 
1887-1900) and election statistics recorded in the Biennial Reports 
of the Secretary of State of the State of Kansas (Topeka, Kans., 
1885-1900). The Congressional Record and the House Journal and 
Senate Journal of the Kansas legislature contain considerable ma-
terial apart from the legislative process itself and help indicate 
the changing objectives of Populists in office. Finally, specialized 
documents fully cited in the footnotes, such as the Second Annual 
Report of the [Kansas] Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics 
(Topeka, Kans., 1887) or Peffer's own Senate report, Agricultural 
Depression; Causes and Remedies (Washington, 1895), provide 
helpful information on their specific concerns. 
OTHER CONTEMPORARY SOURCES 
Peffer was a prolific author, and I consulted all his published works. 
The most useful and important were The Farmer's Side: His 
Troubles and Their Remedy (New York, 1891), the primary ex-
pression of the early Populist positions on society, economics, and 
politics; The Way Out (Topeka, Kans., 1890), a proposed solution 
of agrarian economic problems similar to the more famous sub-
treasury scheme; "The Farmers' Defensive Movement," Forum 8 
(December 1889): 464-73, which describes the various farm orders, 
their grievances, and their objectives preceding the 1889 St. Louis 
meeting that attempted to unite them; "Government Control of 
Money," in The Farmers' Alliance History and Agricultural Digest, 
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ed. Nelson A. Dunning (Washington, D.C., 1891), pp. 262-71; and 
"The Mission of the Populist Party," North American Review 157 
(December 1893): 665-78, which contains some general proposals 
to guide Populists. Peffer's attitudes toward the demise of Populism 
appear in his "The Passing of the People's Party," North American 
Review 166 (January 1898): 12-23; "Populism, Its Rise and Fall," 
published in the Chicago Tribune, 1899; and "The People's Party," 
in Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History (New York, 
1902), 8: 130-37. His continued reform interests are obvious in 
"The Cure for a Vicious Monetary System," Forum 22 (February 
1897): 722-30; "The Trust Problem and its Solution," Forum 27 
(July 1899): 523-33; "The Trust in Politics," North American 
Review 170 (February 1900): 244-52; and "Government Banking," 
North American Review 191 (January 1910): 12-17, among other 
articles. 
Other Populist publications of significant value include Gaspar 
C. Clemens, An Appeal to True Populists (Topeka, Kans., 1896), 
an anti-politics manifesto, opposing an early national convention 
in 1896 and insisting upon original, not Silver, Populism; a series 
of works by Percy Daniels which demonstrate his personal approach 
to reform, particularly A Crisis for the Husbandman (Girard, 
Kans., 1889), A Lesson of Today and a Question of Tomorrow 
(Girard, Kans., 1892), and Cutting the Gordian Knot (Pittsburg, 
Kans., 1896); John F. Willits and Abe Steinberger, Populism (n.p., 
n.d.), which in its simplicity of title as well as in its arguments 
conveys the feeling of change within the People's party as it defies 
the 1896 fusion plan; S. S. King, Bondholders and Breadwinners 
(Kansas City, Kans., 1892). The early positions of the Farmers' 
Alliance and People's party are well presented in W. Scott Morgan, 
History of the Wheel and the Alliance, and the Impending Revolu-
tion (Fort Scott, Kans., 1891), the official Southern Alliance history, 
and in Nelson A. Dunning, ed., The Farmers' Alliance History and 
Agricultural Digest (Washington, D.C., 1891). Populist campaign 
material is illustrated by Thomas E. Watson, Not a Revolt, It is 
a Revolution: The People's Party Campaign Book (Washington, 
D.C., 1892), and outlined by John Breidenthal, Agitate; Educate; 
Organize (Topeka, Kans., 1896). 
A number of Populists described their leading associates, most 
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notably Annie L. Diggs m two articles, "The Farmers' Alliance 
and Some of its Leaders," Arena 5 (April 1892): 590-604, and "The 
Women in the Alliance Movement," Arena 6 (July 1892): 160-79, 
and in a later eulogistic book, The Story of jerry Simpson (Wichita, 
Kans., 1908). Hamlin Garland provided a classic description of 
Peffer, among others, in "The Alliance Wedge in Congress," Arena 
5 (March 1892): 447-57. W. F. Rightmire supplied an insider's 
viewpoint in two reminiscent articles, "The Alliance Movement in 
Kansas-Origin of the People's Party," Transactions of the Kansas 
State Historical Society (Topeka, Kans., 1906), 9: l-8; and "Orga-
nization of the National People's Party," Collections of the Kansas 
State Historical Society (Topeka, Kans., 1928), 17: 730-33. Henry 
D. Lloyd surveyed the Populist leaders and their actions at the 1896 
national convention in "The Populists at St. Louis," Review of 
Reviews 14 (September 1896): 298-303. 
William Jennings Bryan set forth his account of the 1896 election 
in The First Battle: A Story of the Campaign of 1896 (Chicago, 
1896), which is especially useful for its reprinted documents. Joseph 
K. Hudson, Letters to Governor Lewelling (Topeka, Kans., 1893), 
presents a Republican version of the infamous 1893 Kansas legis-
lature. A Populist rejoinder is Edwin S. Waterbury, The Legis-
lative Conspiracy in Kansas. Court vs. Constitution. Who Are the 
Anarchists? (Topeka, Kans., 1893). 
SELECTED SECONDARY SOURCES 
Populism has generated a great deal of scholarly work and a vigor-
ous interpretive debate. Much of this is not directly relevant to 
this study, and for a proper introduction interested readers should 
consult Theodore Saloutos, "The Professors and the Populists," 
Agricultural History 40 (October 1966): 235-54, and C. Vann 
Woodward, "The Populist Heritage and the Intellectual," in The 
Burden of Southern History (New York, 1960), pp. 141-66. 
For Populism itself, the most comprehensive history still remains 
John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (Minneapolis, Minn., 1931). 
Kansas Populism has received special attention from a number of 
authors. Elizabeth N. Barr, "The Populist Uprising," in A Stan-
dard History of Kansas and Kansans, ed. William E. Connelley 
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(Chicago, 1918), 2: 1113-95, is an early sympathetic account still 
extremely valuable; W. P. Harrington, a former Populist, produced 
a fine and informed master's thesis published as "The Populist 
Party in Kansas," Collections of the Kansas State Historical Society 
(Topeka, Kans., 1925), 16: 403-50; Raymond C. Miller overem-
phasizes the economic roots of agrarian politics in "The Populist 
Party in Kansas" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1928). Of 
more recent studies, Walter T. K. Nugent, The Tolerant Populists: 
Kansas Populism and Nativism (Chicago, 1963), correctly maintains 
the Populist innocence of the indictment of nativism but sometimes 
is less accurate in discussing the political aspects of Populism. James 
C. Malin, A Concern About Humanity: Notes on Reform, 1872-
1912, at the National and Kansas Levels of Thought (Lawrence, 
Kans., 1964), and Confounded Rot About Napoleon: Reflections 
upon Science, Technology, Nationalism, World Depression of the 
Eighteen-Nineties and Afterwards (Lawrence, Kans., 1961), imag-
inatively if arcanely pursue a variety of objectives dealing with 
reform traditions and methodology. A good synthesis, with par-
ticular emphasis upon major leaders, is 0. Gene Clanton, Kansas 
Populism: Ideas and Men (Lawrence, Kans., 1969). 
Specific aspects of the Kansas Populist experience have received 
coverage too. In an important article, "Some Parameters of Pop-
ulism," Agricultural History 40 (October 1966): 255-70, Walter T. 
K. Nugent demonstrates the correspondence between Populist 
rhetoric and economic reality and proposes notable differences 
between members of the various political parties. In a more 
traditional way, Nugent also examines "How the Populists Lost in 
1894" (Kansas Historical Quarterly 31 [Autumn 1965]: 245-55) 
but with results and interpretations much less satisfactory. William 
Parrish discusses the Legislative War in "The Great Kansas Legis-
lative Imbroglio of 1893," ] ournal of the West 7 (October 1968): 
471-90. William H. Chafe, "The Negro and Populism: A Kansas 
Case Study," journal of Southern History 34 (August 1968): 402-19, 
argues that blacks were more concerned with practical than ideo-
logical factors in politics. Peter H. Argersinger, "Pentecostal Pol-
itics in Kansas: Religion, the Farmers' Alliance, and the Gospel of 
Populism," Kansas Quarterly 1 (Fall 1969): 24-35, suggests con-
nections between economic conditions, religious activity, and polit-
320 Essay on Sources 
ical developments. Using Peffer's Kansas Farmer as one important 
example, Allan G. Bogue maintains that the "agrarian interpreta-
tion of the moneylender" needs significant revision in Money at 
Interest: The Farm Mortgage on the Middle Border (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1955), a detailed study relevant to Nebraska as well as Kansas. 
Nebraska Populism itself has been fruitfully studied by Stanley 
B. Parsons. In a pioneering article, "vVho Were the Nebraska 
Populists?" Nebraska History 44 (June 1963): 83-99, Parsons first 
used some of the techniques employed in this work to identify 
Populists by their socioeconomic characteristics. This he has de-
veloped and expanded, from a behavioral perspective, in his recent 
The Populist Context: Rural versus Urban Power on a Great 
Plains Frontier (Westport, Conn., 1973), which is especially valuable 
for its discussion of the structure of power in Nebraska. David S. 
Trask, "Formation and Failure: The Populist Party in Seward 
County, 1890-1892," Nebraska History 51 (Fall 1970): 281-301, 
is a study of a Nebraska county that rejected Populism for economic, 
ethnic, and political reasons. 
Populism in other states in the Midwest and Plains has been 
treated more briefly by historians. Herman C. Nixon provides an 
admirable account of "The Populist Movement in Iowa" in the 
Iowa Journal of History and Politics 24 (January 1926): 3-107, 
while Fred E. Haynes examines Iowa Populism in the general con-
text of Third Party Movements since the Civil War (Iowa City, 
1916). Roy V. Scott, The Agrarian Movement in Illinois, 1880-1896 
(Urbana, Ill., 1962), demonstrates that Populism held little appeal 
for diversified, commercial farmers and suggests the weaknesses of 
agrarian political leadership as well. This should be supplemented 
by Chester McArthur Destler's useful and painstaking work, 
American Radicalism, 1865-1901 (New London, Conn., 1946), 
which focuses on the labor side of Populist radicalism, particularly 
in Illinois. The Indiana experience earns direct treatment in 
Ernest Stewart, "The Populist Party in Indiana," Indiana Magazine 
of History 14 (December 1918): 332-67, and 15 (March 1919): 53-74, 
an early study that again indicates the vulnerability of Populism 
to political developments and provides a good account of 1896 
fusion maneuvers. South Dakota receives limited consideration in 
Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr., "Some Political Aspects of Populism 
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in South Dakota," North Dakota History 34 (Winter 1967): 77-92; 
and Terry Paul ·wilson concludes that free silver and fusion caused 
"The Demise of Populism in Oklahoma Territory" (Chronicles of 
Oklahoma 43 [Autumn 1965]: 265-74). An imaginative and sug-
gestive intellectual history of Populism focusing on the entire Mid-
west is Norman Pollack, The Populist Response to Industrial 
America (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), an impassioned defense of 
Populist radicalism and relevancy that is usually too quickly dis· 
missed. Unfortunately, Pollack's determination to defend all who 
claimed to be Populists leads him into tortuous illogic when he 
defends fusion. A greater attention to political developments over 
time might have shown the wisdom of Cyrus Corning's statement 
that "fighting fusion is not fighting the People's Party any more 
than fighting prostitution is opposing virtue." 
Despite its importance, Populism in the Rocky Mountain states 
is only recently the subject of historical examination, much of it 
emphasizing silverite politics. Thomas A. Clinch, Urban Populism 
and Free Silver in Montana (Helena, Mont., 1970), stresses the labor 
orientation of the movement in the West. Mary Ellen Glass, Silver 
and Politics in Nevada: 1892-1902 (Reno, Nev., 1969), demon· 
strates that silverites were anything but reformers. G. Michael 
McCarthy, "The People's Party in Colorado: A Profile of Populist 
Leadership," Agricultural History 47 (April 1973): 146-55, refutes 
the view that Populists were "disillusioned old men who had 
experienced years of political failure and who had embraced 
numerous political philosophies before incorporating them into 
'Populism.' " The most famous of the Colorado Populists is the 
subject of a valuable dissertation by John R. Morris, "Davis Hanson 
Waite: The Ideology of a Western Populist" (Ph.D. diss., Univer· 
sity of Colorado, 1965), the first work to use the important Waite 
Papers. All studies of Far Western Populism should be superseded 
by a forthcoming book by James E. Wright. 
The student of Southern Populism should begin with two general 
works, C. Vann Woodward's magnificent Origins of the New South, 
1877-1913 (Baton Rouge, La., 1951), and Theodore Saloutos, 
Farmer Movements in the South, 1865-1933 (Berkeley, Calif., 1960). 
On the state level, Alabama has received the most thorough treat-
ment. John B. Clark, Populism in Alabama (Auburn, Ala., 1927), 
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1s a competent study since surpassed by William Warren Rogers, 
The One-Callused Rebellion: Agrarianism in Alabama, 1865-1896 
(Baton Rouge, La., 1970), and by Sheldon Hackney's very good 
Populism to Progressivism in Alabama (Princeton, N.J., 1969). 
Using social science concepts and quantitative techniques, Hackney 
more explicitly comes to conclusions similar to my own about the 
conflict between values and power in social movements, but his 
main concern is to demonstrate the discontinuity between Populism 
and Progressivism. Ironically, despite his approach, he fails to use 
the time dimension fully in his analysis or to take into complete 
account the factional nature of the Populist movement. 
Three older but still valuable studies of Southern state Populism 
are Alex Arnett, The Populist Movement in Georgia (New York, 
1922); Roscoe C. Martin, The People's Party in Texas (Austin, 
Texas, 1933); and William DuBose Sheldon, Populism in the Old 
Dominion: Virginia Farm Politics) 1885-1900 (Princeton, N.J., 
1935). A more general narrative of Mississippi politics is Albert 
D. Kirwan, Revolt of the Rednecks: Mississippi Politics) 1876-1925 
(Lexington, Ky., 1951). William Ivy Hair discusses this same tra-
ditional political struggle between conservative Democrats and 
discontented farmers but adds considerable social history as well 
in his Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana Politics) 1877-
1900 (Baton Rouge, La., 1969). 
The historical record of much of Southern Populism has been 
shaped by C. Vann Woodward's superb biography, Tom Watson) 
Agrarian Rebel (New York, 1938), perhaps the single most com-
pelling work on Populism. However, its influence has also helped 
lead to an unfortunate reversal of the earlier overemphasis upon 
Western Populism that neglected the South and to an inaccurate 
conclusion that "Southern Populism," as Richard Hofstadter 
became convinced in his critical The Age of Reform: From Bryan 
to F.D.R. (New York, 1955), "was at least as strong as the Western 
brand and contained the more radical wing of the agrarian revolt 
of the nineties." A more "typical" Southern Populist leader than 
Watson is described by Stuart Noblin in his biography of the 
president of the Farmers' Alliance, Leonidas LaFayette Polk) 
Agrarian Crusader (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1949). Southern political 
leaders who refused to break from the Democratic party are help-
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fully discussed in Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman (Baton 
Rouge, La., 1944), an examination of the leader of the South 
Carolina Alliance, and in Robert Cotner's biography of the Dem-
ocratic governor of Texas james Stephen Hogg (Austin, Texas, 
1959). 
Martin Ridge, Ignatius Donnelly: The Portrait of a Politician 
(Chicago, 1962), is the best biography of a Western Populist, a 
careful, detailed study of a fascinating character. Fred E. Haynes, 
james Baird Weaver (Iowa City, 1919), is excessively kind to its 
subject. Ray Ginger, The Bending Cross: A Biography of Eugene 
Victor Debs (New Brunswick, N.J., 1949), and Chester McArthur 
Destler, Henry Demarest Lloyd and the Empire of Reform (Phila-
delphia, 1963), deal only briefly with the Populist activities of their 
admired subjects. Michael]. Brodhead, Persevering Populist: The 
Life of Frank Doster (Reno, Nev., 1969), is a fine biography of the 
Kansas Populist, though it deliberately avoids relating Doster to 
historiographical concerns. Brodhead further illuminates connec-
tions between the legal mind and the political man in an essay 
on another Kansas Populist Supreme Court Justice, "Populism and 
the Law: Some Notes on Stephen H. Allen," Kansas Quarterly I 
(Fall 1969): 76-84. Karel Bicha shows that there was even less 
connection between rhetoric and behavior for another Populist 
leader in "Jerry Simpson: Populist without Principle," journal of 
American History 54 (September 1967): 291-306. One Populist 
whose behavior has always been suspect is the subject of a brief 
article by 0. Gene Clanton, "Intolerant Populist? The Disaffection 
of Mary Elizabeth Lease," Kansas Historical Quarterly 34 (Summer 
1968): 189-200. 
Two biographies of leading Kansas Republicans throw little 
additional light on the topic of Populism: Burton ]. Williams, Sen-
ator john james Ingalls: Kansas' Iridescent Republican (Lawrence, 
Kans., 1972), and Mark A. Plummer, Frontier Governor: Samuel]. 
Crawford of Kansas (Lawrence, Kans., 1971). A more important 
figure receives more detailed and valuable consideration in Paola E. 
Coletta, William jennings Bryan: Political Evangelist, 1860-1908 
(Lincoln, Neb., 1964), Paul W. Glad, The Trumpet Soundeth: 
William jennings Bryan and His Democracy, 1896-1912 (Lincoln, 
Neb., 1960), and J. Rogers Hollingsworth, The Whirligig of Politics: 
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The Democracy of Cleveland and Bryan (Chicago, 1963), the last 
two particularly useful for understanding the convolutions of the 
Democratic party in the 1890s. Elmer Ellis has written the standard 
biography of the leading Silver Republican, Henry Moore Teller: 
Defender of the West (Caldwell, Idaho, 1941 ). Stanley P. Hirshson 
traces one important element in Republican politics of the period 
in Farewell to the Bloody Shirt: Northern Republicans and the 
Southern Negro, 1877-1893 (Bloomington, Ind., 1962), but de-
clining concern for Southern blacks did not necessarily mean an 
end to bloody shirt politics, and Hirshson overlooks the continuing 
strength of sectional prejudices in the electorate. 
Paul "\V. Glad surveys personalities and issues of both parties 
and the role of attitudes and emotions as well in his excellent and 
underrated study of the election of 1896, McKinley, Bryan, and 
the People (Philadelphia, 1964). The fullest discussion of that 
critical election is Stanley L. Jones, The Presidential Election of 
1896 (Madison, Wis., 1964). The Populist role in the campaign is 
described by Robert Durden in The Climax of Populism: The 
Election of 1896 (Lexington, Ky., 1965), a useful book marred by 
the author's too complete reliance on the Marion Butler Papers 
and his failure to investigate Populist actions before 1896 that 
helped determine the direction and development of the campaign 
he details. In their books cited above, Clanton, Hackney, Hicks, 
and "\Voodward examine aspects of the post-1896 Populist experi-
ence, but none is fully satisfying, which perhaps the Populists 
would have found appropriate. 
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Fourth District, 40, 129, 131-33, 142-43, 
178, 278 
Frasius, Friedrich W., 175 
free silver: early Populist attitude 
toward, 91-92, 194; Peffer's attitude 
toward, 91-92, 99, 148, 152, 182, 194, 
195-96, 203, 2ll, 224, 226-27, 244, 
245; and Democratic-Populists, 134, 
170, 190, 220; political attitudes 
toward, 167-68, 217-19, 221-22, 
228-29; as issue to promote fusion, 
167-68, 170, 199, 201, 202, 214, 215, 
233, 234, 237, 239-45, 247-49, 252-53, 
255; and Kansas Democrats, 169-70, 
176, 229-30; in 1894 campaign, 
181-82, 199; subverts the People's 
party, 190-91, 194-267, 270-71, 273-74; 
and Silver Democrats, 196, 198-99, 
211, 215, 219, 220-21, 228, 229-30, 
243-45, 247-50; and Silver Republi-
cans, 228-29, 269; mentioned, passim 
Funston, Edward H., 136, 137 
fusion: in 1880s, 35; in 1890 Kansas 
campaign, 36-41: Peffer's opposition 
to, 36-40, 123, 125-26, 148-49, 222, 
226-27, 243-45, 289-92; and Dem-
ocrats, 36-38, 40-41, ll6, 120-23, 
124-25, 135-36, 138, 159-60, 174-78, 
267-68; disrupts People's party, 36, 
126-34, 140-44, 150, 156-58, 167-72, 
266, 269-72; as self-destructive for 
Populism, 76-77, 79, 126-29, 139, 
168-70, 179, 270-71, 309-10; and 
historians, 79, 134, 175, 263; in the 
South, ll3, ll4, 200-201, 250, 266, 
274; in 1891 Kansas campaign, ll6-l7, 
121; in 1892 Kansas campaign, 
120-46; Populist attitudes toward, 
125-29; encourages Democratization 
of People's party, 142, 160; promoted 
by Lewelling administration, 160-62, 
164, 166-67, 172-73, 176-77; in 1894 
Kansas campaign, 164-84; advocated 
by Silver Populists, 199-260; 
endorsed by Populist delegations, 
240-42; in 1896 Kansas campaign, 
241-42, 267-74; in 1897 Kansas 
campaign, 292-94; changing meaning 
of, 294; in 1898 Kansas campaign, 
298; mentioned, passim 
fusion Populists: in 1890 campaign, 37; 
attitudes of, 127-28, 167-68, 170, 
172-73: in 1892 campaign, 129, 142; 
support Martin's election, 156, 157; 
program of, 161-62, 166-67, 170; in 
1894 campaign, 172-73, 176-79, 183; 
support Harris's election, 280; 
control party, 295-96; mentioned, 
passim. See also Silver Populists 
Garnett, Kansas, 137, 139 
George, Henry, 82 
Georgia, 87, 101, 102, 103, 201, 260; 
1892 election in, 114, 119, 145 
Gibson, George H., 206 
Girard World, 267, 270-71 
Glick, George, 47, 150, 181; fusion 
plans of, 120-22, 124, 125, 130, 131, 
135; opposes fusion, 174-75 
Gordon, John B., 109 
Grand Army of the Republic, 51 
Grange, 9, 24, 29 
Gray County, 63 
Greenbackers, 2; as faction within the 
People's party, 39, 50, 79, 279 
Gronlund, Laurence, 83 
Hall, Uriel S., 93-94, 100 
Halvorson, Kittel, 107 
Handlin, Oscar, 59 
Harper County, 293 
Harris, Isham, 228 
Harris, William A., 39, 148, 167, 269; 
and 1891 senatorial election, 49, 52; 
as fusionist leader, 77, 131, 170, 177, 
199, 204, 247, 265, 287, 296; political 
attitudes of, 94, 134, 169, 195, 283; 
and the Democracy, 124, 131, 134, 
135, 136, 176, 267-68, 280, 293; 
nominated for Congress, 134, 173; 
effect of nomination of, 144-45; 
elected to Congress, 149; promotes 
silver fusion, 241-42, 252-53, 260; 
opposes ·watson's nomination, 261, 
266-68; nominated as state senator, 
273: elected U.S. Senator, 276-77, 
280-81; contrasted with Peffer, 
280-81; as a state senator, 283-84, 
293 
Harrison, Benjamin, 45 
Henderson, Ben, 172-73, 180 
Hicks, John D., 58, 224n 
historians: attitudes of, toward 
Populism, 58-60, 65, 71, 79, 134, 
175, 263-64 
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Homestead strike, 148, 193 
Householder, Moses A., 293 
Howard, Milford W., 217, 218, 235 
Howe, J. T., 88 
Hudson, Joseph K., 46-47 
Hudson, Thomas Jefferson, 136, 143, 
149, 178, 179, 204 
Humphrey, Lyman U., 28, 29, 45, 49, 
53, 72, 143; nominated for governor, 
13; reaction to Alliance, 33-34; and 
prohibition issue, 44; in Ohio 
campaign, 99-100 
Illinois Populists, 203-4, 246, 275 
Illinois Silver Democratic Convention, 
221 
immigrants, 161, 173, 175 
Indiana People's party, 100 
Indianapolis, 91, 100, 101-3 
Indianapolis Resolution, 107 
Ingalls, John J.: elected Senator, 2; 
and bloody shirt, 3, 51-53, 89; and 
Democrats, 3, 27, 32, 41; and farmers, 
12, 27, 29, 33; and the Alliance, 
27, 29, 31, 32-33; and Peffer, 27, 
31-32, 35, 45, 47, 55-56, 89, 94, 104; 
iridescent dream, speech of, 30-31, 
32, 164, 307: reelection of, a political 
issue, 32-33, 37, 39, 46, 48, 49, 92, 
99; quoted, 42, 58-59; defeated for 
reelection, 47, 50-56, 94, 104, 121 
interest rates: and agrarians, 5, 6, 25; 
demand for reduction of, 12, 16, 17; 
laws dealing with, 18, 283, 285; and 
voting behavior, 61, 63, 64-65 
Iowa, 199, 214, 295, 305; 1891 election 
in, 96, 100; 1897 campaign in, 
288, 289-92 
Iowa People's party: organized, 100 
Iowa Populists: in 1891 election, 100; 
and silver fusion, 199, 214-15, 241, 
244; in 1897 election, 289-92 
Iowa State Farmers' Alliance, 99 
Irby, John L. M., 108, 109 
iridescent dream, 32, 164· quoted, 30-31 
Ives, John, 39, 40, 46, 124, 130, 134 
Jones, James K., 261 
Jones, John P., 198, 204, 209, 216 
Kansas: early politics of, 1-5; economic 
conditions of, 3-4, 11, 12: agrarian 
agitation in, 5-35; legislatures of, 
6, 7, 16-18, 153-57, 282-85; People's 
party organized, 29, 35; fusion 
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politics in, 35-41, 116-17, 120-46, 
160-84, 241-42, 267-74, 292-94, 298; 
campaign of 1890 in, 36-46; 1891 
senatorial election in, 47-57; voting 
behavior in, analyzed, 61-79, 184-91; 
1891 election in, 116-17, 121, 122; 
1892 campaign in, 117-19, 122-50; 
political developments in, under 
Lewelling, 153-83; silver agitation in, 
229-32; 1896 campaign in, 241-42, 
252-53, 266-73; 1897 senatorial 
election in, 276-81; consolidation of 
fusionists in, 282, 291, 294, 298-99; 
mentioned, passim 
Kansas Agitator (Garnett), 137, 138, 
140, 239, 246, 267, 279, 281, 285 
Kansas Alliance Lecture Bureau, 87 
Kansas City, Kansas, 66, 69, 76, 124, 131 
Kansas Commoner (Wichita), 29, 208, 
256 
Kansas Democratic party: minority 
status of, 3; ineptness of, 14, 44; 
fusion maneuvers of, 36-38, 40-41, 
52, 116, 120-25, 129-40, 142, 167, 
267-68, 272-73, 294, 298-99; in 1890 
campaign, 36-38, 40-41, 46; weakened 
by the People's party, 46, 74-75, 121, 
160, 174, 181, 184-88; opposes 
Peffer's election, 49, 55; and voting 
behavior, 62, 66-67, 70-79, 184-90; 
in 1892 campaign, 124-25, 129-40, 
142, 146, 149; controlled by stalwarts, 
159-60, 169; rejects fusion, 174-78; 
in 1894 campaign, 174-78, 181; and 
free silver, 229-30; in 1896 campaign, 
267-68, 272-73; mentioned, passim 
Kansas Democratic State Central 
Committee, 125, 159 
Kansas Farmer (Topeka): influence of, 
4, 10, 13-14, 15, 37, 50; promotes 
agrarian reform interests, 6, 8, 15, 
17-18, 19-20, 25, 27, 28, 30; and 
Farmers' Alliance, 12, 22-23; opposes 
Ingalls, 31; role in 1891 senatorial 
election, 48, 277 
Kansas legislature: and railroads, 6-7, 
18, 283-84; of 1889, 16-20; senatorial 
elections in, 46-57, 152-53, 155-57, 
277-80; of 1893, 150, 153-57, 163; of 
1897, 281-85, 298 
Kansas People's party: organized, 29, 
35; 1890 convention of, 38-39; 
candidates of, 39, 131, 132, 134-35, 
136, 140, 142, 173, 177, 178, 269; and 
fusion, 40-41, 120-44, 164-73, 175-81, 
242, 267-69, 273, 292-94; and 1890 
campaign, 41-46; factionalism in, 47, 
48-51, 52, 54-55, 56, 78-79, 152-53, 
156, 163, 165-66, 167-70, 269-72, 
276; and senatorial elections, 
47-57, 152-53, 155-57, 276-81; and 
voting behavior, 62-79, 183-91; 
composition of, by previous partisan 
affiliation, 72-79, 187-88; national 
party promoted by, 80-103; disrupted 
by Southern political developments, 
83-84, 86, 94, 114-16, 117-20, 144-45; 
and silver, 92, 166-67, 170, 181-82, 
230-32, 273; in 1891 election, 116-17; 
in 1892 campaign, 124-50; officials of, 
promote fusion, 124-25, 128, 130, 
136, 140, 158, 176-77, 242, 267-69, 
272, 296, 306; transformation of, 
141-42, 184-91, 280-81, 282-84, 285; 
as distinct from Populism, 141-42, 
144, 179-80, 285; and the legislative 
war, 153-55; antifusion movement 
within, 157-58, 164-66, 171-72; 
democratization of, 160, 169, 184-91; 
and woman suffrage, 162-64, 172-73, 
175-76; in 1894 campaign, 171-82; in 
1896 campaign, 241-42, 252-53, 
254-56, 266-73; in 1898 campaign, 
298; mentioned, passim 
Kansas People's party State Central 
Committee, 82, 87, 124, 128, 132, 
134, 278 
Kansas Populist League, 232 
Kansas Reform Press Association 
(KRP A), 82, 84, 232, 272 
Kansas Republican party: and reform 
activity, 1-5, 6-7, 10, 12-13, 16-20, 
33-34, 146, 283; and bloody shirt, 3, 
14-15, 44-45, 51-52, 62, 147; and 
prohibition, 3, 14, 36, 43-44, 62; and 
economic development, 4, 12, 14, 
147; and 1888 election, 14-15; and 
the Alliance, 24, 27, 30, 32-34, 44-45, 
51, 81-82; fusion directed against, 
36-37' 40, 120-21, 122, 124, 132, 181, 
182, 273, 298; and 1890 campaign, 
42-46; and 1891 senatorial election, 
51-55; and voting behvaior, 62, 66-67, 
70-79, 184-90; and Southern Crusade, 
115-16; in 1891 election, 116-17, 
121; attempts to attract Republican-
Populists, 117-19, 146; and 1892 
campaign, 117-19, 146-48, 149-50; 
and the legislative war, 153-55; and 
1894 election, 181-83; and silver, 181, 
229; in 1896 campaign, 269, 273; in 
1898 campaign, 298; mentioned, 
passim 
Kansas State Board of Railroad 
Commissioners, 18, 29, 34 
Kellogg, Edward, 26 
Kern, Omar, 107 
Kentucky, 96-98 
Kies, B. E., 29, 87 
Kimball, C. H., 12-13, 14 
Kincaid Kronicle, 129, 137, 138, 140, 
141, 144 
King, S. S., 137, 138-40 
Knights of Labor, 29, 35, 56, 82, 84 
Kolb, Reuben, 250 
Kyle, James H., 80, 83, 106, 196, 204, 
228, 252 
Latimer, J. E., 170, 291, 308; promotes 
fusion, 122, 124, 138 
Lawrence jeffersonian, 49 
Lease, Mary Elizabeth, 43, 62, 148, 173, 
182: and Southern Crusade, 87, 95; 
1892 Southern treatment of, 113, 
118, 145; opposes fusion, 123, 156, 
164, 169; attacks Simpson for his 
Democratic inclination, 153; opposes 
Martin's election, 156-57; and 
Lewelling administration, 164, 165, 
180; attitudes of, toward Democrats, 
168-69, 305; attacks Breidenthal, 
180, 183 
Leavenworth County, 66, 134, 175, 
187n, 273 
Leedy, John: nominated for governor, 
269; opposed by Peffer, 278, 285, 
297-98; as governor, 281-82, 284, 285, 
297-98; fusion policy of, 282 
Leedy administration, 281-82 
Legate, Henry, 206 
legislative war, 154-55, 175, 182 
Leland, Cy, 3, 7, 53, 182 
LeRoy Reporter, 278-79 
Lewelling, Lorenzo D., 175, 269, 277; 
nominated for governor, 134-35; 
endorsed by Democrats, 135, 146; 
elected governor, 149; supports 
election of Democratic Senator, 153, 
156; and the legislative war, 154-55; 
promotes fusion, 160-62, 164, 166-67, 
172, 176-77, 241-42, 252, 260; 
patronage problems of, 161-62; and 
Mary Lease, 164, 180; opposed by 
mid-roaders, 165, 171, 179, 180, 284: 
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renominated, 173; supported by 
Silver Democrats, 181-82; on his 
defeat, 183; repudiates Watson, 
266-67 
Lewelling administration, 161, 281; 
importance of, for the People's 
party, 150; and fusion, 160-62, 
164-67, 171-73, 176-77; record of, 
attacked by Republicans, 182 
Lincoln (Nebraska) Wealth Makers, 
206, 209 
Little, John T., 135, 137-38, 180 
Livingston, John, 53 
Livingston, Leonidas F., 87, 102, 107-10 
Lloyd, Henry Demarest, 203, 215, 217, 
235, 259; denounced by Silver 
Populists, 204, 213; defends Omaha 
Populism, 206-7; criticizes Populist 
politicians, 251-52, 262-65; complains 
of oligarchic control in the People's 
party, 307 
Lost Cause, 89, 305 
Loucks, Henry L., 234 
Louisiana, 101, 201; 1892 election in, 
113-14, 119 
Louisiana People's party, 114 
Love, J. Mack, 299 
Lyndon People's Herald, 230-31 
McCarty, Mrs., 94 
McDowell, John H., 22, 111, 250 
McGrath, Frank, 84, 86, 98, 124, 265; 
and sectional loyalties, 84, 115; 
disavows the People's party, 143 
Mcintosh, John, 293 
McKean, G. L., 275 
McKeighan, William, 107, 199, 200, 204 
McKinley, William, 99, 246, 255, 267, 
269, 274, 301, 305 
McKinley Tariff, 35, 46 
McLallin, Stephen, 25, 108, 141, 172, 
194, 200; as editor of the Advocate, 
23, 29, 82, 131, 225; favors third-
party action, 23-24, 29, 31, 81; and 
fusion, 36, 39, 77, 123, 126, 158, 166, 
170; attitude of, toward the South, 
84, 118; attacked by Silver Populists, 
208; opposes plans of national party 
officials, 212, 214, 217, 219, 222; 
defends the Omaha Platform, 219 
Macune, Charles W., 26, 81, 83, 108, 
151 
Mantle, Lee, 228 
Martin, John, 129, 134, 169, 181, 243, 
284; promotes fusion, 36, 121-22, 132, 
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Martin, John, continued 
135, 164; elected Senator, 156-57, 162, 
183; opposed by stalwart Democrats, 
159-60; promotes silver issue, 230, 
243; seeks 1897 Senate election, 230, 
273, 277 
Matchett, Benjamin, 143 
Matthews, Charles X., 208 
Maxson, P. B., 29, 34 
Memphis, Tennessee: Farmers' 
Alliance meeting in, 151; silver 
convention in, 220-21; NRP A 
meeting in, 287 
.i\Ieriden Advocate, 23 
middle-of-the-road Populists, 123, 159, 
176, 177, 183, 201, 223, 224, 250, 
252, 275; attitudes of, toward fusion, 
86n, 126-29, 157-58, 167-71; charac-
terized as pro-Republican, 128, 137, 
138, 267, 272, 288; in 1892 conven-
tions, 130-34, 137; oppose party 
officials, 132, 136, 138-44, 179, 180, 
238-39, 245-46, 248, 251, 262, 270-71, 
309; and 1893 senatorial election, 
153, 156-57; and 1893 local elections, 
158-59; return of, to the Republican 
party, 137, 158, 180-81; oppose the 
Lewelling administration, 164-66, 
171-74, 179; and Republican ante-
cedents, 168-69; oppose fusion 
Populists, 178-80, 276, 284; support 
the Omaha Platform, 180, 206, 
212-13, 217, 219, 220, 223, 225-27, 
232, 238, 239; oppose Silver Populists, 
200, 205-7, 209, 211-13, 214, 221-22, 
232, 239, 240, 241, 248; denounce 
the silver party, 216-17; advocate an 
early national convention, 233-35, 
238; make presidential endorsements, 
242-43; fear the nomination of a 
Silver Democrat, 243-45; at the 
national convention, 256, 258, 
259-61; in 1896 Kansas campaign, 
270-73; support Peffer for reelection, 
279, 281; fight the National Com-
mittee, 286-89, 295; in Iowa, 289-92 
Midwest, 96, 223; Populists of, 247, 
251-52, 265 
Mills tariff bill, 91 
"Mission of the Populist Party, The" 
(Peffer), 152 
1'v[ issouri TV orld, 245 
Moonlight, Thomas, 72, 120·22, 155 
Moore, Horace L., 149, 150, 178, 284; 
nominated for Congress, 137; seeks 
Populist endorsement, 137-40 
Morgan, W. Scott, 208-9, 212, 232 
Morphy, J. W., 295 
Morrill, Edmund N., 181, 182, 183, 
269, 281 
mortgage indebtedness: as a political 
issue, 12, 62-65, 70, 72 
mortgage redemption laws, 15-16, 17, 
18, 146 
mortgages, 61, 62, 65, 71 
Nashville Conference, 288-89 
national banks, 5, 25, 26, 152, 193, 203 
National Citizens' Alliance. See 
Citizens' Alliance 
National Economist, The (Washington, 
D.C.), 81, 108 
National Farmers' Alliance, 9, 12, 22, 
23, 24, 100 
National Farmers' Alliance and 
Industrial Union. See Farmers' 
Alliance 
National Organization Committee, 289 
National Reform Press Association 
(NRP A), 102, 225, 272, 288, 292; 
1895 annual meeting of, 212: opposes 
party officials' plans, 212-14; 1896 
annual meeting of, 239; 1897 annual 
meeting of, 287 
National Union Conference. See 
Cincinnati Conference 
National Watchman (Washington, 
D.C.), 197, 200, 204, 222, 239; attacks 
Populist radicalism, 207, 208, 209, 
211-12, 213-14 
nativism, 71-72 
Nebraska Populists, 199-200, 252, 258, 
304 
Neely, S. F., 131 
"Negro domination," 90, 101, lll, 
112-13, 304 
Neosho County, 186 
Ness City Echo, 279 
New York World, 30, 217-19 
Nicholson, M. B., 173 
Non-Conformist. See American 
Non-Conformist 
North: and political sectionalism, 
83-84, 95, 115 
l•.'orth American Review, 152, 295 
North Carolina, 101, ll2; fusion in, 
201, 250, 266, 274, 288 
North Carolina Populists, 266, 274 
Northern Alliance. See National 
Farmers' Alliance 
Northwest, 80, 87; and political 
sectionalism, 83-85, 96, 113-15, 117 
Norton, Seymour F., 264 
Norton Liberator, 163, 284-85, 294-95 
Nugent, Walter T. K., 58, 168n, 224n 
Ocala Conference, 48, 51, 81, 110 
Ocala platform, 94, 101, 102 
Ohio, 96, 99-100 
Ohio People's party, 99 
Ohio Populist, 243 
Ollinger, D. G., 145 
Omaha Convention, 110, 111-12, 138 
Omaha Ordinance for the Purification 
of Politics, 112, 172, 265 
Omaha Platform, 164, 165, 166, 210, 
251; adopted, 111-12; as essence of 
Populism, 180, 208, 240; campaign 
against, by Silver Populists, 196, 
204, 206, 207, 210-16, 223, 235, 241; 
defended by mid-roaders, 206, 212-13, 
217, 219, 220, 232, 238, 239; Peffer's 
defense of, 222-23, 225-27, 243, 255, 
257 
Osborn, Russell, 173 
Osborn, Thomas, 281 
Otis, John G., 109, 111, 143, 148, 149, 
236; as Populist leader, 40, 43, 83, 
99, 100, 105, 141, 142, 163, 204, 265; 
and the Southern Crusade, 87, 96; 
denounces Southern Democrats, 107, 
151; issue of renomination of, 
129-33: opposes fusion, 131-33, 171, 
172, 232; denounces politicians, 
132-33, 173: opposes Lewelling 
administration, 165; turns to social-
ism, 270 
Overmeyer, David: promotes fusion, 
121-22, 129, 132, 134; opposes 
Populism, 170, 175, 230; nominated 
for governor, 176 
Palmer, John M., 83, 100, 124 
Park, Milton, 207, 219, 238, 239 
"Passing of the People's Party, The" 
(Peffer), 295-96 
Patrons of Husbandry, 35. See also 
Grange 
Patterson, Thomas, 236, 237, 238, 247, 
253, 260, 265 
Peffer, Douglas M., 161 
Peffer, Elwood S., 102 
Peffer, William Alfred: early life of, 
1-2; and agrarian tradition, 1, 5; 
reform interests of, 2, 5, 8-9, 15-16, 
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25, 302; Republicanism of, 2, 5, 
9-10, 13-14, 48, 301, 304-5; opposes 
politicians, 2, 6, 7, 8, 18, 19, 27, 90, 
125-26, 238, 285; as editor of the 
Kansas Farmer, 4, 6, 8, 15, 23, 28, 
48; and agrarian complaints, 5-6, 7, 
17-18, 22, 24-26; and railroad 
regulation, 6-7; attitudes of, toward 
political parties, 6, 7-8, 10, 13, 18, 
27-28, 29-30, 34-35, 226; promotes 
farmers' organization, 8-11, 12, 22-23; 
opposes third-party action, 9-11, 14, 
21, 23: and prohibition, 10, 42, 163, 
285, 297-98; and Union Labor party, 
13-14; and 1889 legislature, 15-20; 
and Farmers' Alliance, 22-23, 27, 35, 
49, 81, 83, 84, 91-94; and The Way 
Out, 25-26; and Ingalls, 27, 31-32; 
attacked by Republicans, 28, 31, 32; 
views of, on Populism, 34-35, 152, 
169-70, 226-27, 290, 299; opposes 
fusion, 36-40, 123, 125-26, 148-49, 
153, 170, 222, 226-27' 243-45, 289-92; 
and 1890 campaign, 37-39, 42-43, 45, 
46; and senatorial election, 4 7-50, 
52, 54-57; health of, 49, 50, 102, Ill, 
148, 278; opposed by Democrats, 49, 
55, 106, 124, 280; estimates factional 
strength within the People's party, 
73; helps form national party, 
80-86; and the Advocate, 82, 131, 
162, 166, 225-26, 294; elected 
president of the KRPA, 82; and 
Cincinnati Conference, 84-86; and 
the Southern Crusade, 87, 89-92, 
94-98; and sectionalism, 89-90, 97; 
and white supremacy, 89, 95; and 
free silver, 91-92, 99, 148, 152, 182, 
194, 195-96, 203, 211, 218, 224, 
226-27: and Northern elections, 
99-l 00; national reception of, 104-6; 
physical description of, 105-6; Senate 
activity of, 106, 108-9, 193, 197, 
205, 310; and the organization of 
Congress, 107, 227-28; and 1891 
election, 116-17; and 1892 campaign, 
118, 119, 148-49; and Simpson, 124, 
151-52, 288; regrets Martin's election, 
156; and woman suffrage, 163-64, 
182; attitudes of, toward Democratic 
party, 169-70, 245, 289, 290, 299-301; 
and 1894 campaign, 182, 183: and 
repeal of Sherman Act, 195-96; 
opposes plans of Silver Populists, 
197-98, 203, 205, 211, 243-44, 245, 
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248; attitudes of, toward a reform 
coalition, 203, 218, 222-23, 226, 254; 
supports Omaha Platform, 219, 
222-23, 225-27, 255, 257; press 
reporting of, 224-25; and the 
Populist caucus, 227, 235; endorsed 
for presidential nomination, 242-43; 
as committed to original Populism, 
242, 278-80, 287, 298, 302, 310-11; as 
unrepresentative of the new 
Populism, 243, 245, 277-81, 310-11; 
opposes Teller's nomination, 248, 
254; and Bryan's nomination, 254-56, 
257-58, 259-60; criticized by Pop-
ulists, 254-55, 288, 291, 294, 296, 298, 
300; at 1896 national convention, 
257-62, 264, 265; defends Watson, 
267, 268; in 1896 campaign, 270, 272, 
274, 278; and 1897 Senate election, 
276-81; contrasted with Harris, 
280-81; attacks Leedy on prohibition, 
285, 297-98; proposes new party, 
286, 295; objects to party leadership, 
286-89; explains difference between 
Republican- and Democratic-
Populists, 286-87, 299; in 1897 Iowa 
campaign, 289-92; "retires" from 
politics, 294-97; 1898 Prohibitionist 
candidate for governor, 297-98; 
reassociates with the Republican 
party, 300-301, 302; on the danger 
of party to Populism, 307 
Peffercrats, 104 
Pefferism, 104-5, 147-48 
Pefferites, 104-5 
Pence, Lafe, 204, 253 
People's Call, 209 
People's party: organized at Cincinnati 
Conference, 85-86: campaign for 
support of, 86-103, 106-10; effect of 
sectionalism on, 95, 97, ll4-16, 
303-4; identified with Peffer, 104-5; 
Omaha convention of, 111-12: future 
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